Sa peers 


See a ah 
pasehtntentesrens ; 


Soe ha 


Spas Soe Bee he oe 
pisreihte : : 
Bnd abt 
saedpraes 
: oH 
Prati em ie 


aes 3 


erreien 


tht 


riere 


teint) 


RNY OF Pa Le 


SEP 20 1919 
Ay oe 
<2 o6tea. $€ seu 


BT LEP .P75. F919 00.7 
Pohle, Joseph, 1852-1922. 


Grace, actual and habitual, 
a dogmatic treatise | 


« 


nes 
mr 


i 


‘ 
J 
fs 
{ 
EF 


=o as 
va hares 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2022 with funding from 
Princeton Theological Seminary Library 


https://archive.org/details/graceactualhabit0Opohl 


DOGMATIC THEOLOGY 
VII 


THE POHLE-PREUSS SERIES OF DOG- 
MATIC TEXT-BOOKS 


God: His Knowability, Essence and At- 
tributes. vi & 479 pp., $2.00 net. 

The Divine Trinity. iv & 207 pp., $1.50 
net. 

God the Author of Nature and the Su- 
pernatural. v & 365 pp., $1.75 net. 

Christology. ili & 310 pp., $1.50 net. 

Soteriology. iv & 169 pp., $1 net. 

Mariology. iv & 185 pp., $1 net. 

Grace: Actual and Habitual. iv & 443 pp., 
$2.00 net. 

The Sacraments. Vol. I. (The Sacra- 
ments in General. Baptism. Confirma- 
tion.) vi & 328 pp., $1.50 net. 

The Sacraments. Vol. II. (The Holy 
Eucharist.) vi & 408 pp., $1.75 net. 
The Sacraments. Vol. III. (Penance.) 

vi & 270 pp., $1.50 net. 

The Sacraments. Vol. IV. \ (Extreme 
Unction,. Holy Orders, Matrimony.) 
iv & 249 pp., $1.50 net. 

Eschatology, or The Catholic Doctrine of 
the Last Things. iv & 164 pp., $1.00 net. 


The Whole Set, $18 net. 


< ARN OF PRI OF Palle 


SEP 29 1919 


G RA C: 1D Cor yg Ls ecy\h 


sil 
ACTUAL AND HABITUAL 7 


A DOGMATIC TREATISE 


ie LE A ag 
THE RT. REV. MSGR. JOSEPH POHLE, Pu.D.,D.D. 


FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AT ST. 
JOSEPH’S SEMINARY, LEEDS (ENGLAND), LATER PROFESSOR 
OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY AT THE CATHOLIC 
UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA 


ADAPTED AND EDITED 
BY | 


ARTHUR PREUSS 


THIRD, REVISED EDITION © 


B. HERDER BOOK CO. 


17 SourH Broapway, St. Louis, Mo. 
AND 
68, GREAT RussELL ST., Lonpon, W. C. 


1919 


NIHIL OBSTAT 
Sti. Ludovici, die 18 Jan. 1919 


F. G. Holweck, 
Censor Librorum 


IMPRIMATUR 
Sti. Ludovici, die 21 Jan. 1919 


H Joannes J. Glennon 
Archiepiscopus 
Sti. Ludovici 


Copyright, 1914 
by 
Joseph Gummersbach 


All rights reserved 
Printed in U.S, A. 


BECKTOLD 
PRINTING & BOOK MFG. CO. 
ST. LOUIS, U.S. A. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 
cilie SHB LOX Gol OG MAUR RO RoI a TAP SE ae OR oc eaiReaRDH UEMURA RED AL La OR 
PArtei ACTUAL’ GRACE. {\~) fc dM LAL eat cr at aan AL ge” 


reas Lhe: Nature. of sActual Graces) 5) Vio \ ue iin se 
eet. Dehmition: of “ActualMGrace so) ari ries eke 


Si 2. LMVisio OL: ACtBan Graben yi geen athe. ahh be eee 
Cri iene re roperties Oh vctual “Gracey, sia3.o%e wk AG 
§ 1, The Necessity of Actual Grace . . 50 
ArT. 1. The Capacity of Mere Nature: Without 
Grace . 50 
Art. 2. The Ncceegi of Rerad Grace e. all 
Salltary Aces Wow. te 82 


ArT. 3. The Necessity of Actual Grate for “the 
States of Unbelief, Mortal Sin, and Justification 096 
$2) The: Gratuity.of Actual): Grace ire cea sean. Bat 
§ 3. The Universality of Actual Grace . . Ne Le 
Art. 1. The Universality of God’s Will to Bate Bay st: 

Art, 2. God’s Will to Give Sufficient Grace to All 
Adult Fiuman) Bemas\in Particular ih) oom 
ART, 200 Lhe, Predestination | ot) ithe) Blecti wi uous Top 
ArT. 4. The Reprobation of the Damned . . . 212 


Cu. III. Grace in Its Relation to Free-Will . . . . 222 
§ 1. The Heresy of the Protestant Reformers and 
the; Jansenistsy (34. gee 
§ 2. Theological Systems Bavised) ia ip oniee) We 
Dogmas of Grace and Free-Will . . .. .). 231 
Arr. 1); Thomism and Augustinianism'’\; .)./5 °°. 232 
ART 2. evolinisns and Congriism |e) cose tiie an 285 


BeAr Te GOAN CTIPVING MIRACE Ch RR ULTRAM Ulu a Re ECG arate 


Cu. I. The Genesis of Sanctifying Grace, or the Process 
of Justification . . PANG | Ea ary 
§ 1. The Necessity of EN Vor Feetifeaton POR ey 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 

§ 2. The Necessity of Other Che Acts Besides 
Banths 20: : DUN UE 2) 
Cu. II. The State of FGunaton Noe Crete eH Py Sea tag 8 
§ 1, The Nature of Justification . . . 301 


Art. 1. The Negative Element of fsieenice Wage 
Art. 2. The Positive Element of Justification . 310 
§ 2. Justifying or Sanctifying Grace . . ss) allah teens 
Art. 1. The Nature of Sanctifying Grant EEE Wat My 3-1 
Art. 2. The Effects of Sanctifying Grace . . . 347 
Art. 3. The Supernatural Concomitants of Sancti- 


fying: Grace)... Ea en UNE ait ope 
§ 3. The Properties of eS ineheyile Grace rene / 398 
Cu. III. The Fruits of Justification, or the Merit BE 
Good Works. f(r Qe RO en aaa 
Sr. The: Existence of Merit i a ie aalare Viete i eanened | 
§ >. The Requisites of "Merit. 0) 5.02) nee 4aO 


§ = The Objects of Merit 2 0.0 6 ee 8 ei) Aes 
ENE a Site le dog 10 acts aya al aR aN 


INTRODUCTION 


Humanity was reconciled to God by the Re- 
demption. This does not, however, mean that 
every individual human being was forthwith jus- 
tified, for individual justification is wrought by 
the application to the soul of grace derived from 
the inexhaustible merits of Jesus Christ. 

There are two kinds of grace: (1) actual and 
(2) habitual. Actual grace is a supernatural 
gift by which rational creatures are enabled to 
perform salutary acts. Habitual, or, as it is com- 
monly called, sanctifying, grace is a habit, or 
more or less enduring state, which renders men 
pleasing to God. 

This distinction is of comparatively recent date, 
but it furnishes an excellent principle of division 
for a dogmatic treatise on grace.* 


1 The Fathers and the Schoolmen 
“do net emphasize the difference, 
and frequently speak of habitual 
and actual grace as of one whole. 
Controversial reasons account for 
this discrepancy, which readers of 


the older theologians should con- 
stantly bear in mind.” (Wilhelm- 
Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theol- 
ogy, Vol. II, p. 229, 2nd ed., Lon- 
don i901.) 


Ma 
Beier aty 
era: 


Be 


PART | 
ACTUAL GRACE 


Actual grace is a transient supernatural help 
given by God from the treasury of the merits of 
Jesus Christ for the purpose of enabling man to 
work out his eternal salvation. 

We shall consider: (1) The Nature of Actual 
Grace; (2) Its Properties, and (3) Its Relation 
to Free-Will. 


GENERAL READINGS :— St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, 
qu. 109-114, and the commentators, especially Billuart, De Gratia 
(ed. Lequette, t. III) ; the Salmanticenses, De Gratia Dei (Cursus 
Theologiae, Vol. IX sqq., Paris 1870); Thomas de Lemos, 
Panoplia Divinae Gratiae, Liége 1676; Dominicus Soto, De Natura 
et Gratia, 1. III, Venice 1560; *Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, 
3 vols. (I, Bordeaux 1634; II, Lyons 1645; III, Cologne 1648). 

*C, y. Schazler, Natur und Ubernatur: Das Dogma von der 
Gnade, Mainz 1865; Inem, Neue Untersuchungen tiber das Dogma 
von der Gnade, Mainz 1867; *J. E. Kuhn, Die christliche Lehre 
von der géttlichen Gnade, Tiibingen 1868; Jos. Kleutgen, S. J., 
Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. Il, 2nd ed., pp.. 152 sqq.. Munster 
1872; R. Cercia, De Gratia Christi, 3 vols., Paris 1879; *C. Maz- 
zella S. J., De Gratia Christi, 4th ed., Rome 18905; *J. H. Oswald, 
Die Lehre von der Heiligung, d.i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnaden- 
wahl, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885; *D. Palmieri, S. J., De Gratia Di- 
vina Actuali, Gulpen 1885 ; *Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theo- 
logie, Vol. VIII, Mainz 1897; *S. Schiffini, S. J.. De Gratia Divina, 
Freiburg 1901; G. Lahousse, S. J., De Gratia Divina, Louvain 

3 


4 ACTUAL GRACE 


1902; Chr. Pesch, S. J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd 
ed., Freiburg 1908; G. van Noort, De Gratia Christi, Amsterdam 
1908; E. J. Wirth, Divine Grace, New York 1903; S. J. Hunter, 
S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. Ill, pp. 1 sqq.; Wil- 
helm-Scannell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
pp. 227 saqq., London 1901; A. Devine, The Sacraments Ex- 
plained, 3rd ed. pp. 1-43, London 1905.— L. Labauche, S. S., God 
and Man, Lectures on Dogmatic Theology II, pp. 123 sqq., New 
York 1916-—J. E. Nieremberg, S. J., The Marvels of Divine 
Grace, tr. by Lady Lovat, London 1917. 

On the teaching of the Fathers cfr. Isaac Habert, Theologiae 
Grecorum Patrum Vindicatae circa Universam Materiam Gratiae 
Libri III, Paris 1646; E. Scholz, Die Lehre des hl. Basilius von 
der Gnade, Freiburg 1881; Hiimmer, Des hl. Gregor von Nazianzg 
Lehre von der Gnade, Kempten 1800; E. Weigl, Die Heilslehre 
des hl. Cyrill von Alexandrien, Mainz 10905. 


* The asterisk before an author’s name indicates that his treatment of 
the subject is especially clear and thorough. As St. Thomas is invariably 
the best guide, the omission of the asterisk before his name never means 


that we consider his work inferior to that of other writers. There are © 


vast stretches of theology which he scarcely touched. 


CHAPTER I 


THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 


SECTION 


DEFINITION OF ACTUAL GRACE 


1. GENERAL Notion oF GRACE.—The best way 
to arrive at a correct definition of actual grace is 
by the synthetic method. We therefore begin 
with the general notion of grace. 

Like “nature,” ! grace (gratia, xéps) is a word 
of wide reach, used in a great variety of senses. 
Habert2 enumerates no less than fourteen; 
which, however, may be reduced to four. 

a) Subjectively, grace signifies good will or 
benevolence shown by a superior to an inferior, as 
when a criminal is pardoned by the king’s grace. 

b) Objectively, it designates a favor inspired 
by good will or benevolence. In this sense the 
term may be applied to any free and gratuitous 
gift (donum gratis datum), as when a king be- 
stows graces on his lieges. 


1Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- Vindicatae circa Universam Mate- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- riam Gratiae Libri III, I, 4, Paris! 
ural, pp. 181 sqq., St. Louis 1912. 1646. 

2Theologiae Graecorum Patrum 


5 


6 ACTUAL GRACE 


c) Grace may also mean personal charm or at- 
tractiveness. In this sense the term frequently 
occurs in Latin and Greek literature (the Three 
Graces). Charm elicits love and prompts a per- 
son to the bestowal of favors. 

d) The recipient of gifts or favors usually 
feels gratitude towards the giver, which he ex- 
presses in the form of thanks. Hence the word 
gratiae (plural) frequently stands for thanksgiv- 
ing (“gratias agere,’ “Deo gratias,’ “to say 
grace after meals”).? 

The first and fundamental of these meanings 
is “a free gift or favor.” The benevolence of 
the giver and the attractiveness of the recipient 
are merely the reasons for which the gift is im- 
parted, whereas the expression of thanks is an 
effect following its bestowall. 

Dogmatic theology is concerned exclusively 
with grace in the fundamental sense of the term. 


e) Grace is called a gift (donum, 8uped), because it is 
owing to free benevolence, not required by justice. It is 
called gratuitous (gratis datum), because it is bestowed 
without any corresponding merit on the part of the crea- 

3“‘ The same name is loosely ap- 1: “ Secundum communem loquen- 


plied to the act of ‘blessing* the di modum tripliciter gratia accipt 
food before taking it, which is consuevit: uno modo pro dilectione 


properly the function of a priest,  alicuius... 3; secundo sumitur pro 
but which is suitably performed by  aliquo dono gratis dato... 3; ter- 
every Christian.” (Hunter, Out- tio modo sumitur pro recompensa- 


lines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. tione beneficii gratis dati, secundum 
III, p. 6.) Cfr. S. Thomas, Sum- quod dicimur agere gratias benefi- 
ma Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. 110, art. ciorum.” 


ee ee 


THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 7 


ture. A gift may be due to the recipient as a matter of 
distributive or commutative justice, and in that case it 
would not be absolutely gratuitous (gratis). Grace, on 
the contrary, is bestowed out of pure benevolence, from no 
other motive than sheer love. This is manifestly St. 
Paul’s idea when he writes: “ And if by grace, it is not 
now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace.” * It is 
likewise the meaning of St. Augustine when he says, in his 
Homilies on the Gospel of St. John, that grace is “ some- 
thing gratuitously given . . . as a present, not in return 
for something else.” ® 


2, NATURAL AND SUPERNATURAL GRACE.— 
Grace is not necessarily supernatural. Sacred 
Scripture and the Fathers sometimes apply the 
word to purely natural gifts. We petition God 
for our daily bread, for good health, fair weather 
and other temporal favors, and we thank Him 
for preserving us from pestilence, famine, and 
war, although these are blessings which do not 
transcend the order of nature.® 


a). Our petitions for purely natural favors are inspired 
by the conviction that creation itself, and everything con- 
nected therewith, is a gratuitous gift of God. This con- 
viction is well founded. God was under no necessity of 
creating anything: creation was an act of His free-will. 
Again, many of the favors to which human nature, as 
such, has a claim, are free gifts when conferred upon the 
individual. Good health, fortitude, talent, etc., are natural 


4 Rom. XI, 6: “St autem gratia, Quid est gratia? Gratis data. 
iam non ex operibus; alioquin gratia Quid est gratis data? Donata, non 
4am non est gratia.” reddita.” 


5 Tract. in Ioannem, III, -n. 9: 6 Debitum naturae. 


8 ACTUAL GRACE 


graces, for which we are allowed, nay obliged, to petition 
God. The Pelagians employed this truth to conceal a per- 
nicious error when they unctuously descanted on the 
magnitude and necessity of grace as manifested in crea- 
tion. It was by such trickery that their leader succeeded in 
persuading the bishops assembled at the Council of Dios- 
polis or Lydda (A. D. 415) that his teaching was quite or- 
thodox. St. Augustine and four other African bishops 
later reported to Pope Innocent I, that if these prelates 
had perceived that Pelagius meant to deny that grace by 
which we are Christians and sons of God, they would not 
have listened to him so patiently, and that, consequently, 
no blame attached to these judges because they simply 
took the term “grace” in its ecclesiastical sense.’ 


b) Generally speaking, however, the term 
“grace” is reserved for what are commonly 
called the supernatural gifts of God, the merely 
preternatural as well as the strictly supernatural.® 
In this sense “grace” is as sharply opposed to 
purely natural favors as nature is opposed to the 
supernatural. 


The importance of the distinction between supernatural 
and purely natural grace will appear from an analysis of 
the concept itself. Considered as gifts of God, the strictly 
supernatural graces (eé. g., justification, divine sonship, the 


7Epistula ad Innocent., n. 2: non culpandi sunt indices, qui ec- 
“Nam si intellexissent ili episcopi, clesiasticé consuetudine nomen gra- 
eam illum dicere gratiam, quam tiae [i. e. christianae] audierunt.”’ 
etiam cum impiis habemus, cum qui- 8 On the difference between these 
bus homines sumus, negare vere two categories see Pohle-Preuss, 
eam quad Christiani et filii Det God the Author of Nature and the 
sumus, quis eum patienter... ante Supernatural, pp. 180 sqq. 
oculos suos ferret? Quapropter 


4 


THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 9 


beatific vision) ontologically exceed the bounds of nature. 
Considered as purely gratuitous favors, they are negatively 
and positively undeserved. The grace involved in crea- 
tion, for instance, is not conferred on some existing bene- 
ficiary, but actually produces its recipient. The creation 
itself, therefore, being entirely gratis data, all that suc-_ 
ceeds it, supernatural grace included, must be negatively 
undeserved, in as far as it was not necessary for the recipi- 
ent to exist at all. But the supernatural graces are in- 
debitae also positively, 7. e. positing the creation, because 
they transcend every creatural claim and power. Both 
elements are contained in the above-quoted letter of the 
African bishops to Pope Innocent I: “ Though it may be 
said in a certain legitimate sense, that we were created by 
the grace of God, ... that is a different grace by which 
we are called predestined, by which we are justified, and 
by which we receive eternal beatitude.”® Of this last- 
mentioned grace (7. e. grace in the strictly supernatural 
sense), St. Augustine says: “ This, the grace which Cath- 
olic bishops are wont to read in the books of God and 
preach to their people, and the grace which the Apostle 
commends, is not that by which we are created as men, but 
that by which as sinful men we are justified.” *° In other 
words, natural is opposed to supernatural grace in the 
same way that nature is opposed to the supernatural. 
“| To believe] is the work of grace, not of nature. It is, I 
say, the work of grace, which the second Adam brought us, 
not of nature, which Adam wholly lost in himself.” 14 


9 Epist, ad Innocent., l. c.: “ Etst “‘Haec est enim gratia, quam in 
quadam non improbandé ratione di- libris Dei legere et populis praedicare 
citur gratia Det quad creati sumus  catholict antistites consueverunt, et 
[gratia naturalis],... alia est gratia quam commendat Apostolus 
tamen, qua praedestinati vocamur, non est ea qua creatt sumus, ut 
tustificamur,  glorificamur [gratia homines essemus, sed qua iustificati 
supernaturalis].’’ sumus, quum mali homines essemus.” 

10 Epist, ad Sixt., 194, n. 8: 11 St. Augustine, Ep., 217: “ Hoc 


10 ACT UAL GRACE 


Adding the new note obtained by this analysis we arrive at 
the following definition: Grace is a gratuitous super- 
natural gift.” 


3. THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE GRACE OF 
Curist.—Though all supernatural graces are 
from God, a distinction is made between the 
“srace of God” and the “grace of Christ.” The 
difference between them is purely accidental, 
based on the fact that the “grace of Christ’’ flows 
exclusively from the merits of the atonement. 


a) The following points may serve as criteria to dis- 
tinguish the two notions: 

a) The gratia Dei springs from divine benevolence and 
presupposes a recipient who is unworthy merely in a nega- 
tive sense (=not worthy, non dignus), whereas the gratia 
Christi flows from mercy and benevolence and is con- 
ferred on a recipient who is positively unworthy (indig- 
NUS). 

B) The gratia Dei elevates the soul to the supernatural 
order (gratia elevans), while the gratia Christi heals the 
wounds inflicted by sin, especially concupiscence (gratia 
elevans simul et sanans). 

y) The gratia Dei is a gratuitous gift conferred by the 
Blessed Trinity without regard to the theandric merits of 
Jesus Christ, whereas the gratia C hristi is based entirely 
on those merits. 

b) The Scotists hold that the distinction between gratia 
Dei and gratia Christi is purely logical. They regard 
[scil. credere] opus est gratiae, non non naturae quam totam perdidit in 
naturae. Opus est, inquam, gratiae  seipso Adam.” 


quam nobis attulit secundus Adam, 12 Gratia est donum gratis datum 
supernaturale. 


THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE II 


the Godman as the predestined centre of the uni- 
verse and the source of all graces.1* The Thomists, on the 
other hand, regard the grace of the angels, and that 
wherewith our first parents were endowed in Paradise, 
purely as gratia Det; they hold that the merits of Christ 
did not become operative until after the Fall, and that, 
consequently, there is a real distinction between the grace 
of the angels and that of our first parents on the one 
hand, and the grace of Christ on the other. 

As it cannot reasonably be supposed that the angels 
are endowed with specifically the same graces by which 
mankind was redeemed from sin, the Scotists are forced 
to admit a distinction between the grace of Christ as God- 
man (gratia Christi Dei-hominis) and the grace of Christ 
as Redeemer (gratia Christi Redemptoris), so that even 
according to them, the dogmatic treatise on Grace is con- 
cerned solely with the grace of Christ gua Redeemer. 

Hence, grace must be more particularly defined as a gra- 
tuitous supernatural gift derived from the merits of Jesus 
Christ +" 


4. EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL GRACE.—FExter- 
nal grace (gratia externa) comprises all those 
strictly supernatural institutions which stimulate 
pious thoughts and salutary resolutions in the 
human soul. Such are, for example, Holy Scrip- 
ture, the Church, the Sacraments, the example of 
Jesus Christ, etc. Internal grace (gratia in- 
terna) inheres or operates invisibly in the soul, 
and places it in relation with God as its supernat- 


13 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology. 14 Gratia est donum gratis datum, 
A Dogmatic Treatise on the Redemp- supernaturale, ex meritis Christi. 
tion, pp. 24 sqq., St. Louis 1914. 


12 ACTUAL GRACE 


ural end. Internal graces are, e. g., the theolog- 
ical virtues, the power of forgiving sins, etc. The 
Pelagians admitted external, but obstinately de- 
nied internal grace.*” 


St. Paul 1° emphasizes the distinction between external 
and internal grace by designating the former as “law” 
(lex, véuos) and the latter as “faith” (fides, mlotis ). 
With one exception, (viz., the Hypostatic Union, which 
is the climax of all graces), external is inferior to, 
because a mere preparation for, internal grace, which 
aims at sanctification. We are concerned in this treatise 
solely with internal grace. Hence, proceeding a step 
further, we may define grace as a gratuitous, supernatural, 
internal gift of God, derived from the merits of Jesus 
Christ.*? 


s, “Gratia Gratis Data” and “GRATIA 
Gratum Faciens.”—The supernatural grace of 
Christ, existing invisibly in the soul either as a 
transient impulse (actus) or as a permanent state 
(habitus), tends either to the salvation of the 
person in whom it inheres or through him to 
the sanctification of others. In the former case 
it is called ingratiating (gratia gratum faciens ) 
in the latter, gratuitously given (gratia gratis 
data). The term gratia gratis data is based on 
the words of our Lord recorded in the Gospel of 
St. Matthew: ‘Heal the sick, raise the dead, 


15 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra Duas 17 Gratia est donum gratis datum, 
Epistolas Pelagianorum, IV, 15. supernaturale, internum, ex meritis 
16 Gir. “Rom; Iil,22: ‘sqq.4 ) Gal: Christi. 
LT e16. 


THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE 13 


cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely have you 
received, freely give.” * 


a) The gratia gratum faciens is intended for all men 
without exception; the gratia gratis data only for a few 
specially chosen persons. To the class of gratuitously be- 
stowed graces belong the charismata of the prophets and 
the ordinary powers of the priesthood. 

Each of these two species of internal grace may exist 
independently of the other because personal holiness is 
not a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of the char- 
-ismata or the power of forgiving sins, etc. 

b) Considered with regard to its intrinsic worth, the 
gratia gratum faciens is decidedly superior to the gratia 
gratis data. St. Paul, after enumerating all the charis- 
mata, admonishes the Corinthians: ‘‘ Be zealous for the 
better gifts, and I show unto you yet a more excellent 
way,” *° and then sings the praises of charity:24 “If I 
speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have 
not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling 
cymbal. And if I should have prophecy and should know 


18 St. Matthew X, 8: “ Infirmos 
curate, mortuos suscitate, leprosos 
mundate, daemones eiicite: gratis 
accepistis, gratis date (dwpedy 
O6Te).”"— The name “ gratuitously 
given,” as Fr. Hunter observes (Out- 
lines, III, 10), is ‘‘ tautological and 
not particularly expressive,’ and 
“helps in no way to indicate what 
is the nature of the graces which 
it is intended to exclude. These are 
such as, for want of a better word, 
we call ingratiating: the Latin name 
used by theologians (gratwm faciens) 
denotes that they make a man 
pleasing to God, grateful to Him, if 
we understand grateful of that 
which gives pleasure, and not in 


its commoner sense, which is nearly 
the same as thankful.’’ 

19 For a list of the charismata see 
t Cor. XII, 4 sqq. Cfr. Englmann, 
Von den Charismen im allgemeinen 
und von dem Sprachencharisma im 
besonderen, Ratisbon 1848; Cornely, 
Comment. in S. Pauli Priorem 
Epistolam ad Corinthios, pp. 410 
sqq., Paris 1890; Chr. Pesch, Prae- 
lect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 
243 sqq., Freiburg 1908, 

201 Cor. XII, 31: “ Aemulamini 
autem charismata meliora, et adhuc 
excellentiorem viam vobis demon- 
stro.” 

21 Caritas, dydaqn. 


14 ACTUAL GRACE 


all the mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have 
all faith, so that I could remove mountains, I am nothing, 
etc.” 22. Charity is a gratia gratum faciens. Hence, since 
the gratia gratis data is treated elsewhere (Apologetics, 
Mystic and Sacramental Theology), we must add another 
note to our definition: Grace is a gratuitous, supernat- 
ural, internal gift, derived from the merits of Jesus 
Christ, by which man is rendered pleasing in the sight of 
God.”* | | 


6. AcTtuUAL AND HapiTuaL GRACcE.—The gratia 
gratum faciens is given either for the perform- 
ance of a supernatural act or for the production 
of a permanent supernatural state (habitus). In 
the latter case it is called habitual, or, as it sanc- 
tifies the creature in the eyes of God, sanctifying 
grace. 


Actual grace comprises two essential elements: (1) 
divine help as the principle of every salutary supernatural 
act, and (2) the salutary act itself. Hence its designation 
by the Fathers as @cod évepyeia, 7 Tov Adyov xelp, Jeta xivgors, 
or, in Latin, Dei auviliwm, subsidium, adiutorium, motio 
divina,— all of which appellations have been adopted by 
the Schoolmen. Actual grace invariably tends either to 
produce habitual or sanctifying grace, or to preserve and 


221 Cor. XIII, 1 sqq. Cir. St. paratoria finis ultimi, sicut per 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., 1a prophetiam et miracula et huius- 
zae, qu. 111, art. 5: “ Unaquaeque modi homines inducuntur ad hoc 
virtus tanto excellentior est, quanto quod ‘ultimo fint coniungantur. Et 
ad altius bonum ordinatur. Semper ideo gratia gnatum faciens est multo 
autem finis potior est his, quae sunt excellentior quam gratia gratis . 
ad finem [i. e. media]. Gratia au- data.” 
tem gratum faciens ordinat hominem 23 Gratia est donum gratis datum, 
immediate ad coniunctionem ultimi supernaturale, internum, gratum 
finis; gratiae autem gratis datae or- faciens, ex meritis Christi 
dinant hominem ad quaedam prae- 


THE; NATURE), OP (ACTUAL: GRACE 15 


increase it where it already exists.. It follows that, being 
merely a means to an end, actual grace is inferior to 
sanctifying grace, which is that end itself. 


Actual grace may therefore be defined as an 
unmerited, supernatural, internal divine help, 
based on the merits of Jesus Christ, which ren- 
ders man pleasing in the sight of God, enabling 
him to perform salutary acts; or, somewhat 
more succinctly, as a supernatural help bestowed 
for the performance of salutary acts, in con- 
sideration of the merits of Jesus Christ. 


Actual grace is (1) a help (auxilium), because it 
consists in a transient influence exercised by God on 
the soul. (2) A supernatural help, to distinguish it from 
God’s ordinary providence and all such merely natural 
graces as man would probably have received in the state 
of pure nature.2** (3) It is attributed to the merits of 
Jesus Christ, in order to indicate that the graces granted 
to fallen man are all derived from the atonement both 
as their efficient and their meritorious cause. (4) Ac- 
tual grace is said to be given for the performance of 
salutary acts to show that its immediate purpose or end is 
an act, not a state, and that the acts for which it is given 
must be in the order of salvation. 


7, THE TWoFOLD CAUSALITY OF ACTUAL 
Grace.—If grace is a supernatural help, mere 
nature cannot, of its own strength, perform salu- 
tary acts. Consequently, actual grace exercises a 


24 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, pp. 229 sq. 


16 ACTUAL ‘GRACE 


causal influence without which man would be help- 
less in the matter of salvation. 

The causality of actual grace is both moral and 
physical. ; 

a) As a moral cause grace removes the ob- 
stacles which render the work of salvation 
difficult. Besides this negative it also has a posi- 
tive effect: it inspires delight in virtue and hatred 
of sin. 


This mode of operation manifestiy presupposes a cer- 
tain weakness of the human will, 7. e. concupiscence, 
which is an effect of original sin. Actual grace exercises 
a healing influence on the will?® and is therefore called 
gratia sanans sive medicinalis. “ Unless something is 
put before the soul to please and attract it,” says St. Au- 
gustine, “the will can in no wise be moved; but it is not 
in man’s power to bring this about.” ?® Concretely, this 
moral causality of grace manifests itself as a divinely in- 
spired joy in virtue and a hatred of sin, both of which 
incline the will to the free performance of salutary acts. 
These sentiments may in some cases be so _ strong 
as to deprive the will temporarily of its free- 
dom to resist. The sudden conversion of St. Paul is a 
case in point. Holy Scripture expressly assures us that 
God is the absolute master of the human will and, if He 
so chooses, can bend it under His yoke without using . 
physical force. ,.Cfr..Prov.. XXI;'t:) “he heart of the 
king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will, 

25 Ibid., pp. 298 sq. mum, moveri nullo modo potest; hoe 

26 Ep. ad Simplician., I, 9, 22: autem, ut occurrat, non est in ho- 


“Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occure minis potestate.” 
rerit quod delectet et invitet ani 


THE NATUREVORIACTUAL GRACE 17 


he shall turn it.” “ Who will be so foolish as to say,” 
queries St. Augustine, “that God cannot change the evil 
wills of men, whichever, whenever, and wheresoever He 
chooses, and direct them to what is good?” ?” It is but 
rarely, of course, that God grants to any man a summary 
victory over his sinful nature; but this fact does not pre- 
vent the Church from praying: “ Vouchsafe, O Lord, to 
compel our wills to thee, even though they be rebel- 
liousi528 


b) Even more important than the moral 
causality of grace is its physical causality. Man 
depends entirely on God for the physical strength 
necessary to perform salutary works. Grace ele- 
vates the faculties of the soul to the supernatural 
sphere, thereby enabling it to perform super- 
natural acts. 


Physical is as distinct from moral causality in the order 
of grace as in the order of nature. The holding out of 
a beautiful toy will not enable a child to walk without 
support from its elders. Moral causality is insufficient to 
enable a man to perform salutary acts. Grace (as we 
shall show later) is absolutely, 7. e. metaphysically, neces- 
sary for all salutary acts, whether easy or difficult, and 
hence the incapacity of nature cannot be ascribed solely 
to weakness and to the moral difficulty resulting from sin, 
but must be attributed mainly to physical impotence. A 
bird without wings is not merely impeded but utterly un- 


27 Enchiridion, c. 98: “ Quis tam etiam rebelles compelle propitius 
impie desipiat, ut dicat, Deum malas voluntates.’? For a full treatment 


hominum voluntates, quas voluerit, of God’s moral causality the stu- 
quando voluerit, ubi voluerit, in dent is referred to Ripalda, De Ente 
bonum non posse convertere?”” Supernaturali, disp. 109, sect, 2 sq. 


28“ Domine,...ad te nostras 


18 ACTUAL: GRACE 


able to fly ; similarly, man without grace is not only handi- 
capped but absolutely incapacitated for the work of sal- 
vation. Considered under this aspect, actual grace is 
called gratia elevans, because it elevates man to the super- 
natural state.?° 


This double causality of grace is well brought 
out in Perrone’s classic definition: “Gratia 
actualis est gratuitum illud auxtlium,® quod 
Deus ** per Christi merita *? homint lapso * largi- 
tur, tum ut ems mfrmitatt consulat* .. . tum 
ut eum erigat ad statum supernaturalem atque 
idoneum faciat ad actus supernaturales elicien- 
dos,*? ut tustificationem possit adipisci*® in eaque 
1am consecuta perseverare, donec perveniat ad 
vitam aeternam.” *" In English: “ Actual grace is 
that unmerited interior assistance which God, by 
virtue of the merits of Christ, confers upon fallen 
man, in order, on the one hand, -to remedy his 
infirmity resulting from sin and, on the other, to 
raise him to the supernatural order and thereby 
to render him capable of performing supernatural 
acts, so that he may attain justification, persevere 
in it to the end, and thus enter into everlasting 
life.” This definition is strictly scientific, for it 
enumerates all the elements that enter into the 
essence of actual grace. 


29 Cfr, D. Palmieri, De Gratia 83 Causa materialis. 
Divina Actuali, thes. 15. 34 Causalitas moralis. 
80 Causa formalis. 35 Causalitas physica. 
31 Causa efficiens. 36 Causa finalis inadaequata. 


32 Causa meritoria. 87 Causa finalis adaequata. 


SECTION, 2 
DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 


Actual grace may be divided according to: (1) the dif- 
ference existing between the faculties of the human soul, 
and (2) in reference to the freedom of the will. 

Considered in its relation to the different faculties of 
the soul, actual grace is either of the intellect, or of the 
will, or of the sensitive faculties. With regard to the free 
consent of the will, it is either (1) prevenient, also called 
cooperating, or (2) efficacious or merely sufficient. 


I. THe ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE INTEL- 
LECT.—Actual grace, in so far as it inspires salu- 
tary thoughts, is called illuminating (gratia illu- 
minationts s. tllustrationis ). 


This illumination of the intellect by grace may be either 
mediate or immediate. It is mediate if grace suggests 
salutary thoughts to the intellect by purely natural means, 
or external graces, such as a stirring sermon, the perusal 
of a good book, etc.; it is immediate when the Holy Ghost 
elevates the powers of the soul, and through the instru- 
mentality of the so-called potentia obedientialis, pro- 
duces in it entitatively supernatural acts. 

The existence of the grace of immediate illumination 
follows from its absolute necessity as a means of salva- 

1On the potentia obedientialis see Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 
Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of 188 sqq. 

19 


20 ACTUAL. GRACE 


tion, defined by the Second Council of Orange, A.D. 
529." 

a) The grace of mediate illumination may be 
inferred aprioristically from the existence of a di- 
vine revelation equipped with such supernatural 
institutions as the Bible, the sacraments, rites, 
ceremonies, etc. In conformity with the psycho- 
logical laws governing the association of ideas, in- 
telligent meditation on the agencies comprised un- 
der the term “external grace” ® elicits in the mind 
salutary thoughts, which are not Deceseat aly su- 
pernatural in their inception. 


It is not unlikely that Sacred Scripture refers to such 
graces as these when it recommends “the law of God” 

r “ the example of Christ” as fit subjects for meditation. 
Cfr. Ps. XVIII, 8 sai: ) °° Thetlaw of, the Lord -isjaine 
spotted, converting souls, . . . the commandment of the 
Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes.’ * 1 Pet. II, 21: 
“ Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that 
you should follow his steps.”> St. Augustine probably 
had in mind the grace of mediate illumination when he 
wrote: “God acts upon us by the incentives of visible 
objects to will and to believe, either externally by evan- 
gelical exhortations, ... or internally, as no man has 
control over what enters into his thoughts.”® The grace 


2Can. 7, quoted by Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 180. 

3 Supra, p. 11. 

4“ Lex Domini immaculata, con- 
vertens animas, ... praeceptum Do- 


vobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequa- 
mini vestigia eius.” 

6 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 34: 
“Visorum suasionibus agit Deus, ut 
velimus et ut credamus, sive extrin- 


mint lucidum, illuminans oculos.’’ 
5“ Christus passus est pro nobis, 


secus per evangelicas exhortationes 
sive intrinsecus, ubt nemo habet in 
potestate, quid ei veniat in mentem.” 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 21 


of mediate illumination has for its object to prepare the 
way quietly and unostentatiously for a grace of greater 
import, namely, the immediate illumination of the mind 
by the Holy Ghost. 


b) The grace of immediate far surpasses that 
of mediate illumination because the supernatural 
life of the soul originates in faith, which in turn 
is based on a strictly supernatural enlightenment 
of the mind. 

a) St. Paul expressly teaches: ‘And such con- 
fidence we have, through Christ, towards God; 
not that we are sufficient to think anything of 
ourselves, as of ourselves: but our sufficiency 
is-ef God.” 7 


The salient portion of this text reads as follows in 
the original Greek: Ody 87 ixavol éopev AoyicacGat Tt ad’ 
eavTov os && éavtav, ddd’ 4 ixavdrns fav ex Tov cod. Speak- 
ing in the plural (pluralis maiestaticus), the Apostle con- 
fesses himself unable to conceive a single salutary thought 
(AoyioweGar), and ascribes the power (ixarérns) to do so to 
God. Considered merely ‘as vital acts, such thoughts 
proceed from the natural faculties of the mind (é¢’ 
cavtév), but the power that produces them is divine (é 
@cov), not human (é éavrsv). Hence each salutary 
thought exceeds the power of man, and is an immediate 
supernatural grace. 

A still more cogent argument can be derived from 1 
Cor. III, 6 sq.: “I have planted, Apollo watered, but 

72 Cor. III, 4 sq.: “ Fiduciam  simus cogitare aliquid a nobis qua- 


autem talem habemus per Christum si ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra 
ad Deum; non quod suficientes ex Deo est.” 


22 ACTUAL GRACE 


God gave the increase. Therefore, neither he that plant- 
eth is anything, nor he that watereth; but God that giveth 
the increase.” ® In this beautiful allegory the Apostle 
compares the genesis of supernatural faith in the soul to 
that of a plant under the care of a gardener, who while he 
plants and waters, yet looks to God for “ the increase.” 
The Apostle and his disciple Apollo are the spiritual gard- 
eners through whose preaching the Corinthians received 
the grace of mediate illumination. But, as St. Paul says, 
this preaching would have been useless (non est aliquid) 
had not God given “the increase.” In other words, the 
grace of immediate illumination was necessary to make the 
Apostolic preaching effective. “For,” in the words of 
St. Augustine, “ God Himself contributes to the produc- 
tion of fruit in good trees, when He both externally 
waters and tends them by the agency of His servants, and 
internally by Himself also gives the increase.” ® 


B) The argument from Tradition is based 
chiefly on St. Augustine, “the Doctor of Grace,” 
whose authority in this branch of dogmatic the- 
ology is unique.?? His writings abound in many 
such synonymous terms for the grace of immedi- 
ate illumination, as cogitatio pia, vocatio alta et 
secreta, locutio in fOgu AH ORS aperitio veritatis, 
ete.) etc. 


tum, qui et forinsecus rigat atque 
excolit per quemlibet ministrum et 
per se dat intrinsecus incrementum.” 
Cfr. also Eph. I, 17 sq., Acts XXVI, 


8x1 Cor. III, 6: “Ego plantavi, 
Apollo rigavit; sed Deus incre- 
mentum dedit (ad\d\a 6 beds nvéa- 
vey). Itaque neque qui plantat est 


aliquid neque qui rigat, sed qui in- 
crementum dat, Deus (6 advtdvav 
Oeds).”” 

9 De Gratia Christi, c. 19: “ Ipse 
in bonis arboribus cooperatur fruc- 


LO Sagi) 2) (Comal Vai 6. 2) Johnie, 
20 and 27. 

10 Cfr. Mazzella, De Gratia, disp. 
1, art. 1, §4, 3rd ed., Rome 1882. 


ee ee 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 23 


He says among other things: “Instruction and ad- — 
monition are external aids, but he who controls the hearts 
has his cathedra in heaven.” ** Augustine esteems human 
preaching as nothing and ascribes all its good effects to 
grace. “It is the internal Master who teaches; Christ 
teaches and His inspiration.”?? In harmony with his 
master, St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, the ablest defender of 
the Augustinian (7. e. Catholic) doctrine of grace, says: 
“In vain will our sacred discourses strike the external 
ear, unless God by a spiritual gift opens the hearing of | 
the interior man.” 1% 


2. THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL. 
—This grace, usually called gratia inspira- 
tionts,'* may also be either mediate or immediate, 
according as pious affections and wholesome 
resolutions are produced in the soul by a preceding 
illumination of the intellect or directly by the 
Holy Ghost. Owing to the psychological inter- 
action of intellect and will, every grace.of the 
mind, whether mediate or immediate, is eo 1pso 
also a mediate grace of the will, which implies a 
new act of the soul, but not a new grace. What 
we are concerned with here is the immediate 


11 Tract. in Ioa., III, 13: “ Ma- 
gisteria forinsecus adiutoria quaedam 


interioris aperiat.’ Other Patristic 
texts will be found in the classic 


sunt et admonitiones; cathedram in 
coelo habet, qui corda tenet.” 

122. c.: “Interior magister est, 
qui docet; Christus docet, inspiratio 
ipsius docet.’’ 

13 Ep. 17 de Incarn. et Grat., n. 
67: “Frustra [divinus sermo] ex- 
terioribus auribus sonat, nisi Deus 
spiritals munere auditum hominis 


work of Ripalda, De Ente Super- 
naturali, disp. 1o1, sect. 3-4. 

14 It is to be noted, however, that 
the term gratia inspirationis, both in 
the writings of St. Augustine and in 
the decrees of Trent (Sess. VI, can. 
3), sometimes also denotes the im- 
mediate illuminating grace of the 
mind, 


24 ACTUAL GRACE 


strengthening grace of the will, which is far more 
important and more necessary. 

We are not able to demonstrate this teaching 
frem Sacred Scripture. ‘The texts John VI, ‘44 
and Phil. II, 13, which are usually adduced in 
this connection, are inconclusive. 

Hence we must rely solely on Tradition. The 
argument from Tradition is based mainly on St. 
Augustine. In defending divine grace against 
Pelagius, this holy Doctor asserts the indispensa- 
bility and superior value of the strengthening 
grace of the will. 


“ By that grace it is effected, not only that we discover 
what ought to be done, but also that we do what we have 
discovered ; not only that we believe what ought to be 
loved, but also that we love what we have believed.” 1 
And again: .“ Let him discern between knowledge and 
charity, as they ought to be distinguished, because knowl- 
edge puffeth up, but charity edifieth. . . . And inasmuch 
as both are gifts of God, although one is less and the other 
greater, he must not extol our righteousness above the 
praise which is due to Him who justifies us in such a way 
as to assign to the lesser of these two gifts the help of 
divine grace, and to claim the greater one for the control 
of the human will.” +6 St. Augustine emphasized the 


15De Gratia Christi, c. 12:  inflat, quando caritas GEGIUCATO saris 


“Qua gratié agitur, non solum ut 
facienda noverimus, verum etiam ut 
cognita faciamus, nec ut solum dili- 
genda credamus, verum etiam ut 
credita diligamus.” 

16 Op. cit., c. 26: “ Cognitionem 
et dilectionem, sicut sunt dis- 
cernenda, discernat, quia  scientia 


Et quum sit utrumque donum Dei, 
sed unum minus, alterum maius, non 
sic iustitiam nostram super laudem 
iustificatoris extollat, ut horum du- 
orum quod minus est divino tribuat 
adiutorio, quod autem maius est 
humano usurpet arbitrio.” 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 25 


existence and necessity of this higher grace of the will 
in his controversy with the Pelagians. He was firmly 
convinced that a man may know the way of salvation, and 
yet refuse to follow it.17 He insisted that mere knowledge 
is not virtue, as Socrates had falsely taught. 
Ecclesiastical Tradition was always in perfect accord 
with this teaching, which eventually came to be defined by 
the plenary Council of Carthage (A.D. 418) as follows: 
“If any one assert that this same grace of God, granted 
through our Lord Jesus Christ, helps to avoid sin only for 
the reason that it opens and reveals to us an understand- 
ing of the [divine] commands, so that we may know 
what we should desire and what we should avoid; but 
that it is not granted to us by the same (grace) to desire 
and be able to do that which we know we ought to do, let 
him be anathema;—since both are gifts of God: to 
know what we must do and to have the wish to do it.” 18 
Like the illuminating grace of the intellect the strength- 
ening grace of the will effects vital acts and manifests 
itself chiefly in what are known as the emotions of the 
will. St. Prosper, after Fulgentius the most prominent 
disciple of St. Augustine, enumerates these as follows: 
“ Fear (for ‘the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wis- 
dom’) ; joy (‘I rejoiced at the things that were said to 
me: We shall go into the house of the Lord’); desire 


17 He applies a variety of prac- 
tically synonymous terms to the 
strengthening grace of the will, for 
instance: delectatio coelestis, spiritus 
caritatis, inspiratio dilectionis, bona 
voluntas, voluptas, sanctum deside- 
rium, inspiratio suavitatis, cupiditas 
bont; ete. 

18Canon 4: “ Quisquis dixerit, 
eandem gratiam Dei per Iesum 
Christum D. N. propter hoc tantum 
adiuvare ad non peccandum, quia 


per ipsam nobis aperitur et revelatur 
intelligentia mandatérum, ut sciamus 
quid appetere et quid vitare debea- 
mus, non- autem per illam nobis 
praestari ut quod faciendum cog- 
noverimus, etiam facere diligamus 
atque valeamus, a. S.; ... quum sit 
utrumque donum Dei, et scire quid 
facere debeamus et diligere ut fa- 
ciamus.’”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 
104.) 


26 ACTUAL GRACE 


(‘My soul longeth and fainteth for the courts of the 
Lord’) ; delight (‘ How sweet are thy words to my palate, 
more than honey to my mouth’);”—-and he adds: 
“Who can see or tell by what affections God visits and 
guides the human soul?” , 


3. ACTUAL GRACES OF THE SENSITIVE SPHERE. 
—Though it cannot be determined with certainty 
of faith, it is highly probable that actual grace in- 
fluences the sensitive faculties of the soul as well 
as the intellect and the will. 


God, who is the first and sole cause of all things, is 
no doubt able to excite in the human imagination phan- 
tasms corresponding to the supernatural thoughts pro- 
duced in the intellect, and to impede or paralyze the re- 
bellious stirrings of concupiscence which resist the grace 
of the will,— either by infusing contrary dispositions or 
by allowing spiritual joy to run over into the appetitus 
sensitivus. The existence of such graces (which need 
not necessarily be supernatural except quoad modum et 
finem) may be inferred with great probability from 
the fact that man is a compound of body and soul. 
Aristotle holds that the human mind cannot think with- 
out the aid of the imagination.?° If this is true, every 
supernatural thought must be preceded by a correspond- 


19 Contra Collator., c. VII, 2: 
“Trahit timor; principium enim 
sapientiae timor Domini (Prov. I, 7). 
Trahit laetitia, quoniam  laetatus 


enim faucibus meis eloquia tua, 
super mel et favum ori meo (Ps. 
CXVIII, 103). Et quis perspicere 
aut enarrare possit, per quos affectus 


sum in his, quae dicta sunt mihi: 
in domum Domini ibimus (Ps. 
CXXI, 1). Trahit desiderium, quo- 
niam concupiscit et deficit anima mea 
in atria Domini (Ps. LXXXIII, 3). 
Trahunt delectationes: quam dulcia 


visitatio Dei animum ducat huma- 
num?” Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia 
Divina, thes. 11; Palmieri, De 
Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 8. 
20De Anima, i, 8: *Avev 
pavradcuatros ovK eare voeip. 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 27 


ing phantasm to excite and sustain it. As for the sen- 
sitive appetite, it may either assume the form of con- 
cupiscence and hinder the work of salvation, or aid it 
by favorable emotions excited supernaturally. St. Augus- 
tine says that the delectatio victrix has for its object “to 
impart sweetness to that which gave no pleasure.” 21 St. 
Paul, who thrice besought the Lord to relieve him of the 
- sting of his flesh, was told: “ My grace is sufficient for 
rhea 74 


4. THE ILLUMINATING GRACE OF THE MIND 
AND THE STRENGTHENING GRACE OF THE WILL 
CONSIDERED AS VITAL AcTS OF THE SouL.—If 
we examine these graces more closely to deter- 
mine their physical nature, we find that they are 
simply vital acts of the intellect and the will, and 
receive the character of divine “graces” from 
the fact that they are supernaturally excited in 
the soul by God. 


a) The Biblical, Patristic, and conciliar terms cogitatio, 
suasio, Scientia, cognitio, as well as delectatio, voluptas, 
desiderium, caritas, bona voluntas, cupiditas, all manifestly 
point to vital acts of the soul. But even where grace 1s 
described as vocatio, illuminatio, illustratio, excitatio, 
pulsatio, inspiratio, or tractio, the reference can only be — 
if not formaliter, at least virtwaliter —to immanent vital 
acts of the intellect or will. This is the concurrent teach- 
ing of SS. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The former 
says: “God calls [us] by [our] innermost thoughts,” 

21De Peccatorum . Meritis et gratia mea.’ For further infor- 
Remissione, II, 19, 33: “... ut mation on. this point the student 


suave faciat, quod non delectabat.”’ is referred to Ripalda, De Ente 
222 Cor. XII, 9: “ Sufficit tibi _ Supernaturali, disp. 44, sect. 9. 


28 ACTUAL GRACE 


and: ‘“ See how the Father draws [and] by teaching de- 
lights [us].” 28 The latter quotes the Aristotelian axiom : 
“ Actus moventis in moto est motus.” *4 

If the graces of the intellect and of the will are super- 
naturally inspired acts of the soul, by what process does 
the mind of man respond to the impulse of illumination 
and inspiration? 

The language employed by the Fathers and councils 
leaves no doubt that supernatural knowledge manifests 
itself mainly in judgments. But simple apprehension and 
ratiocination must also play a part, (1) because these two 
operations are of the essence of human thought, and the 
grace of illumination always works ‘through natural 
agencies; and (2) because some intellectual apprehensions 
are merely condensed judgments and syllogisms. 

The graces of the will naturally work through the 
spiritual emotions or passions, of which there are eleven: 
love and hatred, joy and sadness, desire and abhorrence, 
hope and despair, fear and daring, and lastly anger. 
With the exception of despair (for which there is no 
place in the business of salvation), all these passions have 
a practical relation to good and evil and are consequently 
called “graces” both in Scripture and Tradition. Love 
(amor) is the fundamental affection of the will, to which 
all others are reducible, and hence the principal function 
of grace, in so far as it affects the will, must consist in pro- 
ducing acts of love.2® The Council of Carthage (A. D. 
418) declares that “ both to know what we must do, and 
to love to do it, is a gift of God.” ?® It would be a mis- 


28\In ~  Psalmos,) ~ 102," n,)., 16% 25S.) Dheol.) ma-2ae, qu. 25;att.. 2. 


“Vocat [Deus] per intimam cog- 


nitionem.’’— Tract. in TIoa., 26, n. 
7: “Videte quomodo trahit Pater, 
docendo delectat.” 

24 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, 
ares 2. 


26“. 2. quum sit utrumque donum 
Dei, et scire quid facere debeamus, 
et diligere ut faciamus.” (V. supra, 
P. 25.) 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 29 


take, however, to identify this “love” with theological 
charity, which is “a perfect love of God above all things 
for His own sake.” 2" Justification begins with super- 
natural faith, is followed by fear, hope, and contrition, 
and culminates in charity.?8 

St. Augustine sometimes employs the word caritas in 
connections where it cannot possibly mean theological 
love.*® This peculiar usage is based on the idea that love 
of goodness in a certain way attracts man towards God 
and prepares him for the theological virtue of charity. 
In studying the writings of St. Augustine, therefore, we 
must carefully distinguish between caritas in the strict, 
and caritas in a secondary and derived sense.®° The 
champions of the falsely so-called Augustinian theory of 
grace ** disregard this important distinction and erron- 
eously claim that St. Augustine identifies “ grace”’ with 
caritas in the sense of theological love; just as if faith, 
hope, contrition, and the fear of God were not also graces 
in the true meaning of the term, and could not exist with- 
out theological charity. 

b) Not a few theologians, especially of the Thomist 
school, enlarge the list of actual graces by including 
therein, besides the supernatural vital acts of the soul, 
certain extrinsic, non-vital qualities (qualitates fuentes, 
non vitales) that precede these acts and form their basis. 
It is impossible, they argue, to elicit vital or immanent 


27“ Amor Dei propter se super 
omnia.” 

28V. infra, Part II, Ch. 1. 

t8Cir, 2. 2°) De Trinitate, VIII, 
10: “Quid est dilectio vel caritas, 
quam tantopere Scriptura divina 
laudat et praedicat, nisi amor boni? ” 
— Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., II, 
9, 21: “ Quid est boni cupiditas nisi 
caritas?’”’— De Gratia Christi, ¢. 21: 


“ Quasi vero aliud sit bona voluntas 
quam caritas.” 

30 It should also be noted that 
in Augustine’s writings inspiratio 
caritatis, as an immediate grace of 
the will, is not necessarily identical 
with the infusion of theological love, 

31 FE. g. Berti, De Theol. Discipl., 
AL 7 


30 ACTUAL GRACE 


supernatural acts unless the faculties of the soul have 
previously been raised to the supernatural order by means 
of the potentia obedientialis. The gratia elevans, which 
produces in the soul of the sinner the same effects that the 
so-called infused habits produce in the soul of the just, 
is a supernatural power really distinct from its vital 
effects. In other words, they say, the vital supernatural 
acts of the soul are preceded and produced by a non- 
vital grace, which must be conceived as a “ fluent quality.” 
These “ fluent’ (the opponents of the theory ironically 
call them “ dead’) qualities are alleged to be real graces.*” 
Alvarez and others endeavor to give their theory a dog- 
matic standing by quoting in its support all those passages 
of Sacred Scripture, the Fathers and councils in which 
prevenient grace is described as pulsatio, excitatio, vocatio, 
tractio, tactus, and so forth. The act of knocking or call- 
ing, they say, is not identical with the act of opening, in 
fact the former is a grace in a higher sense than the 
latter, because it is performed by God alone, while the 
response comes from the soul codperating with God. 

The theory thus briefly described is both theologically 
and philosophically untenable. 

a) Holy Scripture and Tradition nowhere mention any 
such non-vital entities or qualities—a circumstance 
which would be inexplicable if it were true, what Cardinal 
Gotti asserts,*4 that the term “ grace”’ applies primarily 
and in the strict sense to these qualities, while the vital 
acts are merely effects. Whenever Sacred Scripture, the 
Fathers, and the Church speak literally, without the use 


32 Cfr. Alvarez, De Auz., disp. “ Ecce sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis 


67,,in. 6. audierit vocem meam et aperuerit 
33 Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 74.— mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum.” 
Cfr. John VI, 44: “Nemo potest 34 Comment. in Summam Theol. 


venire ad me, nisi Pater, qui misit SS. Thomae Aquinatis, p. 2, tr. 6, qu. 
me, traxerit eum.’ Apoc. III, 20: 2), att. Se, 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 31 


of metaphors, they invariably apply the term “ grace” to 
these vital acts themselves and ascribe their supernatural 
character to an immediate act of God.* In perfect 
conformity with this teaching St. Augustine explains such 
metaphorical terms as vocare and tangere in the sense of 
credere and fides.** God employs no “ fluent qualities ”’ 
or “non-vital entities ” in the dispensation of His grace, 
but effects the supernatural elevation of the soul immedi- 
ately and by Himself.*7 
8) The theory under consideration is inadmissible also 
from the philosophical point of view. A quality does not 
“flow” or tend to revert to nothingness. On the con- 
trary, its very nature demands that it remain constant until 
destroyed by its opposite or by some positive cause. It 
is impossible to conceive a quality that would of itself 
revert to nothingness without the intervention of a de- 
structive cause. Billuart merely beats the air when he 
says: “ Potest dici qualitas incompleta habens se per 
modum passions transeuntis.” °8 What would Aristotle 
have said if he had been told of a thing that was half 
roiwv and half wécxew, and consequently neither the one nor 
the other? Actual grace is transitory ; it passes away with 
the act which it inspires, and consequently may be said 
to “ flow.” But this very fact proves that it is not a dead 
quality, but a modus vitalis supernaturalis. In the dis- 
pensation of His grace, God employs no fluent qualities 
or non-vital entities, but He Himself is the immediate 
cause of the supernatural elevation of the human soul and 


35V. supra, Nos. 1 and 2. 

36 Ad Simplic., I, 2, n. 21: “ Ouis 
potest credere, nist aliqué vocati- 
one, h. e. aliqué rerum testificatione 
tangatur? Quis habet in potestate 
tali viso attingi mentem suam, quo 
eius voluntas moveatur ad fidem?” 

87 Cfr. Suarez, De Div. Grat., 


III, 4: “In Conciltis et Patribus 
nullum vestigium talis gratiae in- 
venimus, quin potius ipsam inspira- 
tionem ponunt ut gratiam primam 
et praeterea indicant immediate in- 
fundi ab ipso Spiritu Sancto et non 
mediante aliquaé qualitate.’ 
88 De Gratia, diss. 4, art. 2. 


32 ACTUAL GRACE 


its faculties. St. Thomas is perfectly consistent, there- 


fore, when he defines actual grace as a vital act of the 
soul.®° 


5. PREVENIENT AND COOPERATING GRACE.— 
The vital acts of the soul are either spontaneous 
impulses or free acts of the will. Grace may 
precede free-will or cooperate with it. If it 
precedes the free determination of the will it is 
called prevenient; if it accompanies (or coincides 
with) that determination and merely codperates 
with the will, it is called cooperating grace. 

Prevenient grace, regarded as a divine call to penance, 
is often styled gratia vocans sive excitans, and if it is re- 
ceived with a willing heart, gratia adiuvans. Both spe- 
cies are distinctly mentioned in Holy Scripture. Cefr. 
Eph. V, 14: “Wherefore he saith: Rise thou that 
sleepest, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall en- 
lighten thee.” 2 Tim. I, 9: “ Who hath delivered us 
and called us by his holy calling, not according to our 
works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which 
was given us in Christ Jesus before the times of the 


39 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 110, modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita 


art. 2: “‘In eo, qui dicitur gratiam 
Dei habere, significatur esse quidam 
effectus gratuitae Dei voluntaiis. 
Dictum est autem supra (qu. 109, 
art. 1), quod dupliciter ex gratuita 
Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur: uno 
modo. inquantum anima hominis 


movetur a Deo ad aliquid cogno- 
scendum vel volendum vel agendum; 


et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus 
in homine non est qualitas, sed 
motus quidam animae; actus enim 
moventis in moto est motus, ut dici- 
tur Phys. 1, 3; text. 228). Alio 


Dei voluntate, secundum quod ali- 
quod habituale donum a Deo animae 
infunditur , .. et sic donum gratiae 
qualhitas quaedam est.’—Cfr. Pal- 
mieri, De Gratia Div. Actuali, thes. 
16; Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. 
V, 3rd ed., pp. 23 sqq.; Schiffini, 
De Gratia Divina, pp. 220 sqq. 
The Thomistic doctrine on this point 
is viewed with favor by several 
Molinist theologians, e. g., Platel 
(De Gratia, n. 547) and Gutberlet 
(Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 
pp. 25 sq., Mainz 1897). 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE B3 


world.” Rom. VIII, 26: “ Likewise the Spirit also help- 
eth our infirmity.” Rom. VIII, 30: “And whom he 
predestinated, them he also called. And whom he called, 
them he also justified. And whom he justified, them he 
also glorified.” Apoc. III, 20: “ Behold I stand at the 
gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice, and 
open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup 
with him, and he with me.” 

St. Augustine says: ‘“ Forasmuch as our turning away 
from God is our own act and deed, and this is [our] 
depraved will; but that we turn to God, this we cannot do 
except He rouse and help us, and this is [our] good will, 
— what have we that we have not received?’’ *° 

An equivalent division is that into gratia operans and 
cooperans, respectively — names which are also founded 
onuscriptures)) Cir.) Phil. (1,12: For) it, is: Godiwho 
worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according 
to his good will.” Mark XVI, 20: “But they going 
forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and 
confirming the word with signs that followed.” 

St. Augustine describes the respective functions of 
these graces as follows: “He [God] begins His influ- 
ence by working in us that we may have the will, and He 
completes it by working with us when we have the 
will,?/41 

A third division of the same grace is that into prae- 
veniens and subsequens. It is likewise distinctly Scrip- 


40 De Peccat. Merit. et Rem., II, 
18: “ Quoniam quod a Deo nos 


cipiens, qui volentibus cooperatur 
perficiens.’-—On certain __ differ- 


avertimus nostrum est, et haec est 
voluntas mala; quod vero ad Deum 
nos convertimus nisi ipso excitante 
et adiuvante non possumus, et haec 
est voluntas bona.’’ 

41 De Grat. et Lib: Arbitr., c. 17, 
33: “Ipse ut velimus, operatur in- 


ences of opinion on this point be- 
tween Suarez (De Div. Motione, 
III, 5) and St. Thomas (Summa 
Theol.;\1a2ae; qu.) 111;/art.. 2)irsee 
Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 252 
sqq. 


34 ACTUAL GRACE 


tural,** and its two members coincide materially with 
gratia vocans and adiuvans, as can be seen by comparing 
the usage of St. Augustine with that of the Tridentine 
Council. “ God’s mercy,” says the holy Doctor, “ pre- 
vents |2. e. precedes] the unwilling to make him willing; it 
follows the willing lest he will in vain.” #® And the Coun- 
cil of Trent declares that “in adults the beginning of jus- 
tification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of 
God, through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His voca- 
tion, whereby, without any merits existing on their part, 
they: are called.” * 

If we conceive a continuous series of supernatural 
graces, each may be called either prevenient or subse- 
quent, according as it is regarded either as a cause 
or as an effect. St. Thomas explains this as follows: 
“As grace is divided into working and codperating 
grace, according to its diverse effects, so it may 
also be divided into prevenient and subsequent grace, 
according to the meaning attached to the term grace 
[1. e., either habitual or actual]. The effects which grace 
works in us are five: (1) It heals the soul; (2) moves 
it to will that which is good; (3) enables man effica- 
ciously to perform the good deeds which he wills; (4) 
helps him to persevere in his good resolves; and (5) 
assists him in attaining to the state of glory. In so far 
as it produces the first of these effects, grace is called 
prevenient in respect of the second; and in so far as it 
produces the second, it is called subsequent in respect of 
the first. And as each effect is posterior to one and prior 

42 Cfr. Ps, LVIII,: 113 XXII; 6, stificationis exordium in adultis a 

43 Enchiridion, c. 32: “Nolen- Dei per Iesum Christum  praeve- 
tem praevenit, ut velit; volentem _ niente gratia sumendum esse, h. e. 
subsequitur, ne frustra velit.’’ ab eius vocatione, qua nullis eorum 


44 Conc, Trident., Sess. VI, cap.  existentibus meritis vocantur.” 
5: “ Declarat praeterea, ipsius ju-  (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 35 


to another, so grace may be called prevenient or subse- 
quent according as we regard it in its relations to dif- 
ferent, ettects:”))* 

Among so many prevenient graces there must be one 
which is preceded by none other (simpliciter praeven- 
tens), and this is preéminently the gratia vocans s. 
excitans. 

There is a fourth and last division, mentioned by the 
Council of Trent, which is also based on the relation of 
grace to free-will. “ Jesus Christ Himself,” says the holy 
Synod, “continually infuses His virtue into the justified, 
and this virtue always precedes, accompanies, and fol- 
lows their good works.” #* The opposition here lies be- 
tween gratia antecedens, which is a spontaneous move- 
_ment of the soul, and gratia concomitans, which cooper- 
ates with free-will after it has given its consent. This 
terminology may be applied to the good works of sinners 
and saints alike. For the sinner no less than the just man 
receives two different kinds of graces — (1) such as pre- 
cede the free determination of the will and (2) such as 
accompany his free acts. 

Thus it can be readily seen that the fundamental divi- 


45 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 111, 
art. 3: “‘ Sicut gratia dividitur in 
operantem et cooperantem secundum 
diversos effectus, ita etiam in prae- 
venientem et subsequentem, qualiter- 
cumque gratia accipiatur (1. e. sive 
habitualis sive actualis). Sunt au- 
tem quinque effectus gratiae in 
nobis, quorum primus est ut anima 
sanetur; secundus ut bonum velit; 
tertius est ut bonum quod vult 
eficactter operetur; quarius est ut 
in bono perseveret; quintus est ut 
ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo 
gratia, secundum quod causat in 
nobis primum effectum, vocatur 


praeveniens vespectu secundi effec- 
tus; et prout causat in nobis secun- 
dum, vocatur subsequens respectu 
primi effectus. Et sicut unus 
effectus est posterior uno effectu et 
prior alio, ita gratia potest dici 
praeveniens et subsequens secundum 
eundem effectum respeciu diverso- 
rum.” 

46 Conc. Trideni., Sess. VI, cap. 
16: “Iesus Christus in ipsos iusti- 
ficatos iugiter virtutem influit, quae 
virtus bona eorum opera semper 
antecedit et comitatur et subse- 
quitur.”? 


36 ACTUAL GRACE 


sion of actual grace, considered in its relation to free-will, 
is that into prevenient and cooperating grace. All other 
divisions are based on a difference of function rather than 
of nature.*’ 


a) The existence of prevenient grace (gratia 
praeveniens s. excitans s. vocans) may be in- 
ferred from the fact that the process of justifica- 
tion begins with the illumination of the intellect, 
which is by nature unfree, 7. e. devoid of the 
power of choosing between good and evil. That 
there are also graces which consist in spontane- 
ous, indeliberate motions of the will,*® is clearly 
taught by the Council of Trent,*® and evidenced 
by certain Biblical metaphors. Thus God is de- 
scribed as knocking at the gate (Apoc. III, 20), as 
drawing men to Him (John VI, 44), and men are 
said to harden their hearts against His voice (Ps. 
MEIV  S)s etc.’ Cir iser, XV ilaee si Bamaney. 
did not hear, nor incline their ear: but hardened 
their neck, that they might not hear me, and might 
not receive instruction.” 

The Catholic tradition is voiced by St. Augus- 
tine, who says: “The will itself can in no wise 
be moved, unless it meets with something which 


470On the distinction to be  sqq.; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 


drawn between the various mem- 241 sqq. 

bers of these pairs, whether it be 48V. supra, Nos. 1 and 4. 
real or merely logical, theologians 49 Sess. VI, cap. 5 and can. 4, 
differ. Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat., quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s 


thes. 18; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Enchiridion, n. 797 and 814. 
Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 17 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 37 


- 


delights or attracts the mind; but it is not in the 
power of man to bring this about.” °° St. Pros- 
per enumerates a long list of spontaneous emo- 


tions which he calls supernatural graces of the 
will.?* | 


Prevenient grace is aptly characterized by the Patristic 
formula: “ Gratia est in nobis, sed sine nobis,” that is, 
grace, as a vital act, is in the soul, but as a salutary act it 
proceeds, not from the free will, but from God. In other 
words, though the salutary acts of grace derive their 
vitality from the human will, they are mere actus hominis 
(O€rnors), not actus humani (Bovdrnos).°2 “ God,” ex- 
plains St. Augustine, “does many good things in man, 
which man does not do; but man does none which God 
does. not cause man to do.”*? And again: “ [God] 
operates without us, in order that we may become willing ; 
but when we once will so as to act, He codperates with us. 
We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good 
works of piety without Him either working that we may 
will, or cooperating when we will.” ** St. Bernard em- 
ploys similar language.®® 


50 Ad Simblic., I, qu. 2, n. 22: 
“Voluntas ipsa, nisi aliquid occur- 
rerit, quod delectet atque invitet 
animum, moveri nullo modo potest; 
hoc autem ut occurrat, non est in 
hominis potestate.’’ 

51 Conir. Collator., c. VII, 2: 
“Et quis perspicere aut enarrare 
possit, per quos affectus visitatio 
Dei animum ducat humanum, ut quae 
fugiebat sequatur, quae oderat dili- 
gat, quae fastidiebat esuriat, ac su- 
bité commutatione mirabili quae 
clausa et fuerant sint aperta, quae 
onerosa levia, quae amara_ sint 
dulcia, quae obscura sint Iucida?’’ 

52 Cfr. M, Cronin, The Science of 


Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 30 sqq., Dublin 
1909. 

538 Contra Duas Epistolas Pela- 
gian., II, 9, 21: “ Multa Deus facit 
in homine bona, quae non facit 
homo; nulla vero facit homo, quae 
non facit Deus, ut faciat homo.’ 

54 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., c. 
17, n. 33: “Ut ergo velimus, sine 
nobis operatur; quum autem volumus 
et sic volumus ut faciamus, nobis- 
cum cooperatur; tamen sine illo vel 
operante ut velimus, vel cooperante 
quum volumus, ad bona pietatis 
opera nihil valemus.” 

55 De Gratia et Lib. Arbitr., ¢. 
14: ‘Si ergo Deus tria haec, h. e. 


38 ACTUAL GRACE 


b) Cooperating grace (gratia cooperans s. 
adiuvans s. subsequens) differs from prevenient 


grace in this, that it supposes a deliberate act of 


consent on the part of the will (fovAqos, not 
Gednors), St. Gregory the Great tersely explains 
the distinction as follows: “The divine goodness 
first effects something in us without our codpera- 
tion [gratia praeveniens|, and then, as the will 
freely consents, codperates with us in performing 
the good which we desire [ gratia cooperans].” °° 
That such free and consequently meritorious acts 
are attributable to grace is emphasized by the 
Tridentine Council: “So great is the bounty [of 
God] towards all men that He will have the things 
which are His own gifts to be their merits.” 57 
Such free salutary acts are not only graces in the 
general sense, but real actual graces, in as far as 
they produce other salutary acts, and their exist- 
ence is as certain as the fact that many men freely 


bonum cogitare, velle, perficere, opus, etsi non ex nobis, non iam 


operatur in nobis (2 Cor. III, 5; 
Phil. II, 13), primum profecto sine 
nobis, secundum nobiscum, tertium 
per nos facit. Siquidem immittendo 
bonam cogitationem, nos praevenit; 
immutando etiam malam voluntatem 
sibt per consensum iungit; ministran- 
do et consensui facultatem foris per 
aperium opus nostrum internus opi- 
fex innotescit. Sane ipsi nos prae- 
venire nequaquam possumus. Qui 
autem bonum neminem  invenit, 
neminem salvat, quem non praevenit. 
A Deo ergo sine dubio nostrae fit 
salutis exordium, nec per nos utique 
nec nobiscum. Verum consensus et 


tamen sine nobis.’—On the mis- 
interpretation of this text by the 
Jansenists, see Palmieri, De Gratia 
Divina Actuali, pp. 84 sq. 

. 56 Moral., XVI, 10: “ Superna 
pietas prius agit in nobis aliquid 
sine nobis [gratia praeveniens], ut 
subsequente libero arbitrio bonum, 
quod appetimus, agat nobiscum 
[gratia cooperans].”’ 

57 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, c. 16: 
Tanta est [Dei] erga homines 
bonitas, ut eorum velit esse merita 
quae sunt itpsius dona,.’? (Denzin- 
ger-Bannwart, n. 810.) 


ee 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 30 


follow the call of grace, work out their salvation, 
and attain to the beatific vision. It is only in this 
way, in fact, that Heaven is peopled with Saints, 


a) St. Augustine embodies all these considerations in 
the following passage: “It is certain that we keep the 
commandments when we will; but because the will is 
prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him that we may 
will so much as is sufficient to make us act in willing. It 
is certain that we will whenever we like, but it is He 
who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said 
(Prov. VIII, 35): ‘The will is prepared by the Lord,’ 
and of whom it is said (Ps, XXXVI, 32): ‘The steps 
of a [good] man are ordered by the Lord, and his way 
doth He will,’ and of whom it is said (Phil. II, 13): ‘It 
is God who worketh in you, even to will.’ It is certain 
that we act whenever we set to work; but it is He who 
causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers 
_to our will, who has said (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): ‘I will 
cause you to walk in my commandments, and to keep my 
judgments, and do them.’ When He says: ‘I will cause 
you ... to do them,’ what else does He say in fact than 
(Ezech. XI, 19): ‘I will take away the stony heart out 
of their flesh,’ from which used to rise your inability to 
act, and (Ezech. XXXVI, 26): ‘I will give you a heart 
of flesh,’ in order that you may act.” 5° 


58 De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., c. 16, 
32: ““ Certum enim est nos mandata 
servare, si volumus; sed quia prae- 
paratur voluntas a Domino, ab illo 


de quo dictum est (Ps. XXXVI, 
32): ‘A Domino gressus hominis 
dirigentur et viam eius volet’; de 
quo. dictum est (Phil. II, 13): 


petendum est, ut tantum velimus ‘ Deus est qui operatur in nobis et 
quantum sufficit, ut volendo fa-  velle.’ Certum est nos facere quum 
ciamus. Certum est nos velle, facimus; sed ille facit ut faciamus, 


quum volumus; sed ille facit ut velt- 
mus bonum, de quo dictum est quod 
paulo ante posui (Prov. VIII, 35): 
‘ Praeparatur voluntas a Domino’; 


praebendo vires efficacissimas volun- 
tatt, qui dixit (Ezech. XXXVI, 27): 
“Faciam ut in tustificationibus meis 


ambuletis et iudicia mea observetis 


40 ACTUAL GRACE 


8) The manner in which grace and free-will codperate 
is a profound philosophical and theological problem. A 
salutary act derives its supernatural character from 
God, its vitality from the human will. How do these 
two factors conjointly produce one and the same 
act? The unity of the act would be destroyed if 
God ard the free-will of man in each case performed, 
either two separate acts, or each half of the same 
act. To preserve the unity of a supernatural act two 
conditions are required: (1) the divine power of grace 
must be transformed into the vital strength of the will 
and (2) the created will, which by its own power can 
perform at most a naturally good act, must be equipped 
with the supernatural power of grace. These conditions 
are met (a) by the supernatural elevation of the will 
(elevatio externa), and (b) by the supernatural concur- 
rence of God (concursus supernaturalis ad actum secun- 
dum). The supernatural elevation of the will is accomp- 
lished in this wise: God, by employing the illuminating 
and strengthening grace, works on the potentia obedien- 
tialis, and thus raises the will above its purely natural 
powers and constitutes it a supernatural faculty in actu 
primo for the free performance of a salutary act. The 
divine concursus supervenes to enable the will to perform 
the actus secundus or salutary act proper. This special 
divine concurrence, in contradistinction to the natural con- 
cursus whereby God supports the created universe,®® is 
a strictly supernatural and gratuitous gift. Consequently, 
God and the human will jointly perform one and the 
et faciatis.’ Quum dicit: ‘ Faciam ut the subject of this paragraph see 
faciatis, quid aliud dicit nisi (Ezech. Palmieri, of. cit., thes, 10, and Chr. 
XI, 19): ‘Auferam a vobis cor Pesch, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq. 
lapideum,’ unde non faciebatis, 59 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 


(Ezech. XXXVI, 26), et ‘dabo vobis thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
cor carneum,’ unde facitis.’—On ural, pp. 67 sqq.- 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE AI 


same salutary act — God as the principal, the will as the 
instrumental cause.®° 


6. Erricacious GRACE AND MrErety SuFFI- 
CIENT GrRAcE—By efficacious grace (gratia 
eficax) we understand that divine assistance 
which with infallible certainty includes the free 
salutary act. Whether the certainty of its opera- 
tion results from the physical nature of this par- 
ticular grace, or from God’s infallible foreknowl- 
edge (scientia media), is a question in dispute be- 
tween Thomists and Molinists.** 

Merely sufficient grace (gratia mere sufficiens ) 
is that divine assistance whereby God communi- 
cates to the human will full power to perform a 
salutary act (posse) but not the action itself 
(agere). 

The division of grace into efficacious and 
merely sufficient is not identical with that into 
prevenient and cooperating. Codperating grace 
does not ex wt notionis include with infallible 
certainty the salutary act. It may indeed be ~ 
efficacious, but in matter of fact frequently fails 
to attain its object because the will offers resist- 
ance. eA, 

a) The existence of efficacious graces is as cer- 
tain as that there is a Heaven filled with Saints. 


60 Cfr. Palmieri, De Div. Grat. Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., 
Actual; thes. 17, and Chr. Pesch, pp. 28 sqq. 
61 V. infra, Ch. III, Sect. 2. 


42 ACTUAL GRACE 


God would be neither omnipotent nor infinitely wise if 
all His graces were frustrated by the free-will of man. 
St. Augustine repeatedly expresses his belief in the ex- 
istence of efficacious graces. Thus he writes in his 
treatise on Grace and Free-Will: “It is certain that we 
act whenever we set to work; but it is He [God] who 
causes us to act, by giving thoroughly efficacious powers 
to the will.’ ®? And in another treatise: ‘‘ [Adam] had 
received the ability (posse) if he would [gratia sufficiens], 
but he had not the will to exercise that: ability [gratia 
eficax|; for if he had possessed that will, he would have 
perseverec, "2 


b) Before demonstrating the existence of suf- 
ficient grace it is necessary, in view of certain 
heretical errors, carefully to define the term. 

a) Actual grace may be regarded either in its 
intrinsic energy or power (wvirtus, potestas 
agendi) or in its extrinsic efficacy (efficientia, 
efficacitas). All graces are efficacious consid- 
ered in their intrinsic energy, because all confer 
the physical and moral power necessary to per- 
form the salutary act for the sake of which they 
are bestowed. From this point of view, therefore, 
and im actu primo, there is no real but a purely 
logical distinction between efficacious and merely 
sufficient grace. If we look to the final result, 


62De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., c. “ Acceperat posse, si vellet [gratia 
16, 32: “Certum est nos facere, sufficiens]; sed non habuit velle 
quum facimus; sed ille facit ut [gratia efficax] quod posset, nam si 
faciamus, praebendo vires efficacis- habuisset, perseverasset.” Cir. Pal- 
simas voluntati.” mieri, De Div. Grat. Actuali, thes. 
63 De Corrept. et Grat., c 11: wT 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 43 


however, we find that this differs according as 
the will either freely codperates with erace or 
refuses its codperation. If the will cooperates, 
grace becomes truly efficacious; if the will resists, 
grace remains “merely sufficient.’ In other 
words, merely sufficient grace confers full power 
to act, but is rendered ineffective by the resistance 
of the will. 


The inefficacy of merely sufficient grace, therefore, is 
owing to the resistance of the will and not to any lack of 
intrinsic power. This is a truth to which all Catholic 
systems of grace must conform, 

Merely sufficient grace may be subdivided into gratia 
proxime sufficiens and gratia remote suficiens. 

Proximately sufficient grace (also called gratia opera- 
tionis) confers upon the will full power to act forth- 
with, while remotely sufficient grace (also termed gratia 
orationis) confers only the grace of prayer, which in its 
turn brings down full power to perform other salutary 
acts. 

The gratia orationis plays a most important role in the 
divine economy of grace. God has not obliged Himself 
to give man immediately all the graces he needs. It is 
His will, in many instances, as when we are besieged by 
temptations, that we petition Him for further assistance. 
“God does not enjoin impossibilities,” says St. Augus- 
tine, “but in His injunctions He counsels you both to do 
what you can for yourself, and to ask His aid in what 
you cannot do.” & ; 

64De Nat. et Grat., 43: “Nam possis, et petere quod non possis, 


Deus impossibilia non iubet, sed et adiuvat ut possis.” 
tubendo monet, et facere quod 


44 ACTUAL GRACE 


Hence, though grace may sometimes remain ineffective 
(gratia ineficax = gratia vere et mere sufficiens), it is 
never insufficient (insufficiens), that is to say, never too 
weak to accomplish its purpose. 


Calvinism and Jansenism, while retaining the 
name, have eliminated sufficient grace from their 
doctrinal systems. 


Jansenius (-+ 1638) admits a kind of “ sufficient grace,” 
which he calls gratia parva, but it is really insufficient be- 
cause no action can result from it unless it is supple- 
mented by another and more powerful grace. ‘This 
heretic denounced sufficient grace in the Catholic sense 
as a monstrous conception and a means of peopling hell 
with reprobates.°* Some of his followers even went so 
far as to assert that “in our present state sufficient grace 
is pernicious rather than useful to us, and we have reason 
to pray: 


8) Itis an article of faith that there is a merely 
sufficient grace and that it is truly sufficient 
even when frustrated by the resistance of the 
will. The last-mentioned point is emphasized by 
the Second Council. of ‘Orange (A.D. 529): 
“This also we believe, according to the Catholic 


65 De Gratia Christi, IV, 10: — serviens.”’ 
. tia inefficax, ex qua operatio 3) 


(De Grat. Christi, III, 


6é 
° 


From sufficient grace, O Lord, deliver us!” °" 


ne possit quidem sequi, nisi etius 
inefficacia per aliam suppleatur.’”’ 
66 “ Illud a recentioribus prolatum 
gratiae sufficientis genus, quo adiu- 
vante nullum unquam opus factum 
est aut fiet unquam, videtur mon- 
strum quoddam singulare  gratiae, 
solummodo peccatis faciendis ma- 
iorique damnationi accersendae 


67 “ Gratia sufficiens statui nostro 
non tam utilis quam perniciosa est, 
sic ut proinde merito possimus 
petere: ‘A gratia sufficienti libera 
nos, Domine.” This assertion was 
condemned by Pope Alexander VIII 
in 1690. It is convincingly refuted 
by Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 
354 sqq. 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 45 


faith, that all baptized persons, through the grace 
received in Baptism, and with the help and co- 
operation of Christ, are able and in duty bound, if 
they will faithfully do their share, to comply 
with all the conditions necessary for salvation.” °8 
The existence of sufficient grace was formally de- 
fined by the Council of Trent as follows: “If any 
one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited 
by God, . . . no wise codperates towards dispos- 
ing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace 
of justification ; that it cannot refuse its consent if 
it would, . . . let him be anathema.” °% 

This dogma can be convincingly demonstrated 
both from Sacred Scripture and Tradition. 

(1) God Himself complains through the mouth 
of the prophet Isaias: “What is there that I 
ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not 
done to it? Was it that I looked that it should 
bring forth grapes, and it hath brought forth wild 
grapes?’ This complaint clearly applies to the 
Jews. Yahweh did for the Jewish nation what- 
ever it behooved Him to do lavishly (gratia 
vere sufficiens), but His kindness was unrequited 


68“ Hoc etiam secundum fidem 
catholicam credimus, quod accepta 
per baptismum gratia omnes bap- 
tizati Christo auxiliante et cooperan- 
te, quae ad salutem pertinent, possint 
et debeant, si fideliter laborare 
voluerint, adimplere.’ (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 200.) ; 

69'Sess. (VI, can, 42 Sj quis 


dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium 
a@ Deo motum et excitatum nihil 
cooperari Deo, ... neque posse dis- 
sentire, si velit, anathema sit.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.) 
T0Is,- VV, 4: “Quid est, quod 
debui ultra facere vineae meae et 
non feci ei? An quod exspectavi, 
ut faceret uvas et fecit labruscas? ” 


46 ACTUAL GRACE 


(gratia mere sufficiens). In the Book of Prov- 
erbs He addresses the sinner in these terms: 
“TI called, and you refused: I stretched out my 
hand, and there was none that regarded.” ™ 
What does this signify if not the complete suf- 
ficiency of grace? The proffered grace remained 
inefficacious simply because the sinner rejected it 
of his own free will. Upbraiding the wicked cities 
of Corozain and Bethsaida, our Lord exclaims: 
“If in Tyre and Sidon had been wrought the 
miracles that have been wrought in you, they had 
long ago done penance in sackcloth and ashes.” 7 
The omniscient God-man here asserts the exist- 
ence of graces which remained inefficacious in 
Corozain and Bethsaida, though had they been 
given to the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, they 
would have proved effective. The conclusion evi- 
dently is: these graces remained ineffective, not 
because they were unequal to the purpose for 
which they were conferred, but simply and solely 
because they were rejected by those whom God in- 
tended to benefit.”® 

(2) Though they did not employ the name, the 
Fathers were thoroughly familiar with the notion 
of sufficient grace. 


71 Prov. I, 24: “ Vocavi et renu- @3 Cire Matth, XXIII) 3730 vActs 
istis, extendi manum meam et non Vile sts ereaConte..c13 3) 2GCor avi, 
fuit qui adspiceret.” i; Cre ThessyVeero: 


72 Matth. XI, 21. 


DIVISION OF ACTUAL GRACE 47 


Thus St. Irenaeus comments on our Lord’s lamentation 
over the fate of the Holy City: “When He says: 
(Matth. XXIII, 37): ‘How often would I have gath-_ 
ered together thy children, . . . and thou wouldest not,’ 
He manifests the ancient liberty of man, because God 
hath made him free from the beginning. .. . For God 
does not employ force, but always has a good inten- 
tion. And for this reason He gives good counsel to all. 
. .. And those who do it [gratia efficaxr] will receive 
glory and honor, because they have done good, though 
they were free not to do it; but those who do not do 
good will experience the just judgment of God, because 
they have not done good [gratia inefficax], though they 
were able to do it [gratia vere et mere sufficiens].” 7 St. 
Augustine is in perfect agreement with ecclesiastical tra- 
dition, and the Jansenists had no right whatever to claim 
him for their teaching. “The grace of God,” he ex- 
pressly says in one place, “assists the will of men. If 
in any case men are not assisted by it, the reason lies with 
themselves, not God.” 7® And again: “No one is guilty 
because he has not received ; but he who does not do what 
he ought to do, is truly guilty. It is his duty to act if he 
has received a free will and amply sufficient power to 
Bettie, 


a4\Contra’ Haer., IV;) 37,- 43 
“Tilud autem quod dicit (Matth. 
AXIII, 37): Quoties volui colligere 


lud non operantur, iudicium iustum 
excipient Dei, quoniam non sunt 
operati bonum [gratia inefficax], 


filios tuos, et noluisti, veterem liber- 
tatem hominis manifestat, quia li- 
berum eum fecit Deus ab initio, ... 
Vis enim a Deo non fit, sed bona 
sententia adest illi semper. Et prop- 
ter hoc consilium quidem bonum 
dat omnibus. ... Et qui operantur 
quidem illud [gratia efficax], gloriam 
et honorem percipient, quoniam ope- 
ratt sunt bonum, quum  possint 
now operari ilud; hi autem, qui il- 


quum possint operari illud [gratia 
vere et mere. sufficiens].” 

75“ Gratia- Det... quae  ho- 
minum adiuvat voluntates: qua ut 
non adiuventur, in ipsis itidem causa 
est, non in Deo.’ De Peccat. Mer. 
et Rem., II, 17. 

76 De Lib. Arbitr., III, 16: “ Ex 
eo quod non accepit, nullus reus 
est; ex eo autem quod non facit 
quod debet, iuste reus est. Debet 


48 ACTUAL GRACE 


READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, ta 2ae, qu. I10, 
art. 1; qu. III, art. 1-5—J. Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 
1861.—M. Glossner, Lehre des hl. Thomas vom Wesen der 
Gnade, Mainz 1871.— Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 
1-16, Gulpen 1885.—Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heiligung, 3rd ed., 
§ 1-3, Paderborn 1885.—S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, disp. 1, 
sect. 2; disp. 3, sect. 1-5, Freiburg 1901 Heinrich-Gutberlet, 
Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 3 sqq., Mainz 1897.— B. J. 
Otten, S. J.. A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. Il, St. 


Louis 1918, pp. 234 sqaq. 


autem [facere], si accepit et volun- 
tatem liberam et sufficientissimam 
facultatem.”?” On the Jansenist dis- 
tortions of St. Augustine’s teaching 
see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina 


Actuali, thes. 48. The doctrine of 
the Greek Fathers is thoroughly re- 
hearsed by Isaac Habert, Theol.’ 
Patr. Graec., II, 6 sq. 


CRAP TE Re EL 


THE ‘PROPERTIES’ OF ACTUAL GRACE 


Actual grace has three essential properties: 
(1) necessity, (2) gratuity, and (3) universality. 
The most important of these is necessity. 


49 


SECTION x 


THE NECESSITY. OF ACTUAL GRACE 


In treating of the necessity of actual grace we 
must avoid two extremes. ‘The first is that mere 
nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing 
good. This error was held by the early Protes- 
tants and the followers of Baius and Jansenius. 
The second is that nature is able to perform su- 
pernatural acts by its own power. This was 
taught by the Pelagians and Semipelagians. 

Between these two extremes Catholic theology 
keeps the golden mean. It defends the capacity 
of human nature against Protestants and Jansen- 
ists, and upholds its incapacity and impotence 
against Pelagians and Semipelagians. Thus our 
present Section naturally falls into three Articles. 


ARTICLE 2 


THE CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE WITHOUT GRACE 


The capacity of nature in its own domain may 
be considered with regard either to the intellect 
or to the will. 

50 


CAPACITY OF, MERE NATURE 51 


Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of 
his intellect to arrive at a knowledge of God from a 
consideration of the physical universe. 


This proposition embodies an article of faith 
defined by the Vatican Council: “If any one 
shall say that the one true God, our Creator and 
Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural 
light of human reason through created things, 
let him be anathema.” ? 

For a formal demonstration of this truth we 
must refer the reader to our treatise on God: His 
Knowabthity, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 17 sqq. 
The argument there given may be supplemented 
by the following considerations: 


1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of 
the human intellect when it says: “The Catholic 
Church, with one consent, has ever held and does hold, 
that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both 
in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowl- 
edge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by 
divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to 
which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our 
belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely 
revealed, cannot be known.”? This teaching, which the 


1 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revel., 
can. 1: “St quis dixerit, Deum 
unum et verum, Creatorem et 
Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae fac- 
ta sunt, naturali rationis humanae 
lumine certo cognosci non posse, 
anathema sit.’’ ; 

2Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4: 
“Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae 


catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, 
duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, 
non solum principio, sed obiecto 
etiam distinctum: principio quidem, 
quia in altero naturali ratione et 
altero fide divin& cognoscimus; ob- 
iecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad 
quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, 
credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria 


SE ORPOR 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 


In treating of the necessity of actual grace we 
must avoid two extremes. The first is that mere 
nature is absolutely incapable of doing any thing 
good. This error was held by the early Protes- 
tants and the followers of Baius and Jansenius. 
The second is that nature is able to perform su- 
pernatural acts by its own power. This was 
taught by the Pelagians and Semipelagians. 

Between these two extremes Catholic theology 
keeps the golden mean. It defends the capacity 
of human nature against Protestants and Jansen- 
ists, and upholds its incapacity and impotence 
against Pelagians and Semipelagians. Thus our 
present Section naturally falls into three Articles. 


ARTICLE I 


THE CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE WITHOUT GRACE 


The capacity of nature in its own domain may 
be considered with regard either to the intellect 
or to the will. 

50 


GAPACITY -OF MERE. NATURE 51 


Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of 
his intellect to arrive at a knowledge of God from a 
consideration of the physical universe. 


This proposition embodies an article of faith 
defined by the Vatican Council: “If any one 
shall say that the one true God, our Creator and 
Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural 
light of human reason through created things, 
let him be anathema.” ! 

For a formal demonstration of this truth we 
must refer the reader to our treatise on God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 17 sqq. 
The argument there given may be supplemented 
by the following considerations: 


1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of 
the human intellect when it says: ‘The Catholic 
Church, with one consent, has ever held and does hold, 
that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both 
in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowl- 
edge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by 
divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to 
which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our 
belief mysteries hidden in God, which, unless divinely 
revealed, cannot be known.”? This teaching, which the 


1 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Revel., 
can. 1: “Si quis dixerit, Deum 
unum et verum, Creatorem et 
Dominum nostrum, per ea, quae fac- 
ta sunt, naturali rationis humanae 
lumine certo cognosci non posse, 
anathema sit.’ : 

2Conc. Vat., Sess. III, cap. 4: 
“Hoc quoque perpetuus Ecclesiae 


catholicae consensus tenuit et tenet, 
duplicem esse ordinem cognitionis, 
non solum principio, sed obiecto 
etiam distinctum: principio quidem, 
quia in altero naturali ratione et 
altero fide divin@ cognoscimus; ob- 
wecto autem, quia praeter ea, ad 
quae naturalis ratio pertingere potest, 
credenda nobis proponuntur mysteria 


52 ACTUAL GRACE 


Church had repeatedly emphasized on previous occasions 
against the scepticism of Nicholas de Ultricuria,? the 
rationalistic philosophy of Pomponazzi, the “log-stick- 
and-stone ” theory * of Martin Luther, the exaggerations 
of the Jansenists, and the vagaries of the Traditionalists,® 
is based on Revelation as well as on sound reason. Holy 
Scripture clearly teaches that we can gain a certain 
knowledge of God from a consideration of the created 
universe. Reason tells us that a creature endowed with 
intelligence must be capable of acquiring natural knowl- 
edge, and that supernatural faith is based on certain 
praeambula, which are nothing else than philosoph- 
ical and historical truths.? ‘The existence of God and 
other like truths,” says St. Thomas, “are not articles of 
faith, but preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes 
natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and 
perfection something that can be perfected.” ® Luther de- 
nounced reason as the most dangerous thing on earth, be- 
cause “all its. discussions and conclusions are as certainly 
false and erroneous as there is a God in Heaven.” ® The 


in Deo abscondita, quae, nisi revelata 4“ Klotz-, Stock- und Steintheo- 


divinitus, innotescere non possunt.? rie.’ 


(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1795.) 

3 Nicholas d’Autricourt, a master 
in the University of Paris, in 1348, 
was compelled by the Sorbonne and 
the Apostolic See to retract a num- 
ber of propositions taken from his 
writings which were infected with 
scepticism. These propositions, most 
of which had _ been 
as heretical, and some as merely 
false, may be found in Natalis 
Alexander, Hist. Eccles., ed. Bing., 
XV, 195, and also, with some ex- 


planatory remarks, in Denifle-Chate- — 


lain, Chartularium Univ. Paris., II, 
1, Paris 1891. 


censured | 


5 On Traditionalism, see Pohle- 
Preuss, God: His Kuowability, Es- 
sence, and Attributes, pp. 44 saq., 
2nd ed., St. Louis 1914. 

6 Wisd. XIII, 1 sqq.; Rom. I, 
20 sq.; Rom. II, 14 sq. Cfr. Pohle- 
Preuss, op. cit., pp. 17 sqq. 

7 Ibid., pp. 38 sqq. 

8 Summa Theol., ta, qu. 2, art. 
2,ad 1: “ Deum esse et alia huius- 
modi... non sunt articuli fidei, sed 
praeambula ad articulos; sic enim 
fides praesupponit cognitionem na- 
turalem, sicut gratia naturam et per- 
fectio perfectibile.’’ 

9 Luther’s Werke, 
XII, 400, Halle 1742: 


ed. Walch, 
* Alles, was 


VCAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 53 


Church teaches, in accordance with sound philosophy and 
experience, that the original powers of human nature, es- 
pecially free-will, though greatly weakened, have not been’ 
destroyed by original sin.1? The Scholastics, it is true, 
reckoned ignorance among the four “ wounds of nature ” 
inflicted by original sin.* But this teaching must be re- 
garded in the light in which the Church condemned Ques- 
nel’s proposition that “ All natural knowledge of God, even 
that found in pagan philosophers, can come from nowhere 
else than God, and without grace produces nothing but 
presumption, vanity, and opposition against God Himself, 
instead of adoration, gratitude, and love.” #2. The Tradi- 
tionalist contention that the intrinsic weakness of the hu- 
man intellect can be cured only by a primitive revelation 
handed down through the instrumentality of speech and 
instruction, or by a special interior illumination, involves 
the false assumption that there can be a cognitive fac- 
ulty incapable of knowledge,— which would ultimately 
lead to a denial of the essential distinction between nature 
and the supernatural, because it represents exterior reve- 
lation or interior grace as something positively due to 
fallen nature? Following the lead of .St. Thomas," 
Catholic apologists, while maintaining the necessity of a 


sie Ortert und schleusst, so gewisslich 
falsch und irrig ist, als Gott lebt.’? 

10Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 1 
and canon 5. 

11 On the wulnera naturae cfr. 
Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of 
Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 
298 sqq., St. Louis 1912. Already 
St: Augustine observed: “ Ad 
miseriam iustae damnationis per- 
tinet ignorantia et difficultas, quam 
patitur homo ab exordio nativitatis 
suae, nec ab isto malo nisi Dei gra- 
iG liberatur.” (Retract., I, 9.) 

12 Propos. 41: “ Omnis cognitio 


Dei etiam naturalis, etiam in phi- 
losophis ethnicis, non potest venire 
nist a Deo; et sine gratia non pro- 
ducit nist praesumptionem, vanitatem 
et oppositionem ad ipsum Deum loco 
affectuum adorationis, gratitudinis 
et amoris.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
nN. 1391.) 

13 On the debitum naturae cfr. 
Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of 
Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 
184 sq. 

14 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 2, 
art. 4. 


54 ACTUAL GRACE 


supernatural revelation even with regard to the truths of 
natural religion and ethics, base their argument not on the 
alleged physical incapacity of reason to ascertain these 
truths, but on the moral impossibility (7. e. insuperable 
difficulty) of finding them unaided. “ It is to be ascribed 
to this divine Revelation,” says the Vatican Council, “ that 
such truths among things divine as are not of themselves 
beyond human reason, can, even in the present state of 
mankind, be known by every one with facility and firm 
assurance, and without admixture of error.’’*® In con- 
formity with the teaching of Revelation and Tradition, 
the Church has always sharply distinguished between 
mioris and yvréous,— faith and knowledge, revelation and 
philosophy,— assigning to reason the double réle of an 
indispensable forerunner and a docile handmaid of faith. 
Far from antagonizing reason, as charged by her enemies, 
the Church has on the contrary always valiantly cham- 
pioned its rights against Scepticism, Positivism, Criticism, 
Traditionalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, and Modernism.2® 

2. As regards those purely natural truths that consti- 
tute the domain of science and art, Catholic divines are 
practically unanimous * in holding that, though man pos- 
sesses the physical ability of knowing every single one 
of these truths, even the most highly gifted cannot master 
them all. Cardinal Mezzofanti had acquired a knowl- 
edge of many languages,'® and undoubtedly was capable 


15 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, De O, Willmann, Geschichte des Idea- 
Revel., cap, 2: “Ut ea, quae in  lismus, Vol. III, 2nd ed., pp. 811 
rebus divinis humanae rationi per  sqq., Braunschweig 1908;  Bellar- 
se impervia non sunt, in praesenti mine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 
quoque generis humani conditione V, 1 sqq. 


ab omnibus expedite, firma certitu- 
dine et nullo admixto errore co- 
gnosci possint.” 

16 Cfr. Chastel, S. J., De la Valeur 
de la Raison Humaine, Paris 1854; 


17 The only dissenting voice is 
that of Cardinal Cajetan. 

18 Mezzofanti spoke perfectly 
thirty-eight languages, thirty others 
less perfectly, and was more or less 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 55 


of learning many more; yet without a special grace he 
could not have learned all the languages spoken on earth, 
though their number is by no means infinite. The science 
of mathematics, which embraces but a limited field of 
knowledge, comprises an indefinite number of propositions 
and problems which even the greatest genius can not 
master. Add to these impediments the shortness of hu- 
man life, the limitations of the intellect, the multitude and 
intricacy of scientific methods, the inaccessibility of many 
objects which are in themselves knowable, (e. g. the 
interior of the earth, the stellar universe) — and you have 
a host of limitations which make it physically impossible 
for the mind of man to encompass the realm of natural 
truths.?® 


Thesis II: Fallen man, whether pagan or sinner, is 
able to perform some naturally good works without the 
aid of grace. 


This thesis may be technically qualified as pro- 
positio certa. 

Proof. A man performing moral acts may be 
either in a state of unbelief, or of mortal sin, or of 
sanctifying grace. The question here at issue is 
chiefly whether all the works of pagans, that is all 
acts done without grace of any kind, are morally 
bad, or whether any purely natural works may be 
good despite the absence of grace. Baius and Jan- 


familiar with fifty dialects. Cfr. U. Pohle-Preuss, Christology, pp. 258 

Benigni in the Catholic Encyclope-  sqq., St. Louis 1913. Cfr. also St. 

dia, Vol. X,:p. 271. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 
19 On the question whether grace 109, art. 1, and Palmieri, De Gratia 

can enable a man™o acquire an un- Divina Actuali, thes, 19. 

limited, universal knowledge, ~see 


56 ACTUAL GRACE 


senius affirmed this; nay more, they asserted that 
no man can perform good works unless he is in 
the state of grace and inspired by a perfect love of 
God (caritas). If this were true, all the works of 
pagans and of such Christians as have lost the 


faith, would be so many sins. But it is not 


true. The genuine teaching of the Church may © 
be gathered from her official condemnation of 
the twenty-fifth, the twenty-sixth, and the thirty- 
seventh propositions of Baius. These proposi- 
tions run as follows: “Without the aid of God’s 
grace free-will hath power only to sin;’2> “To 
admit that there is such a thing as a natural 
good, 1. e. one which originates solely in the pow- 
ers of nature, is to share the error of Pelaouiie as 
“All the actions of unbelievers are sins and the 
virtues of philosophers vices.” 2 To these we 
may add the proposition condemned by Pope 
Alexander VIII, that “The unbeliever necessarily 
sins in whatever he does.” 28 

I. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, St. Au- 
gustine included, admit the possibility of per- 
forming naturally good, though unmeritorious, 


20 Prop. Baii Damn., 27: “ Li- 22 Prop. Baii Damn., 25: “ Omnia 
berum arbitrium sine gratiae Det opera infidelium sunt peccata et 
adiutorio nonnisi ad peccandum philosophorum virtutes sunt vitia.”? 
valet,’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 1025.) 
1027.) 23 Prop. Damn. ab Alex. VIII: 

21 Prop. Baii Damn., 37: “Cum  “ Necesse est infidelem in omni 
Pelagio sentit, qui boni aliquid opere  peccare.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
naturalis, 7. @. quod ex naturae solis wart, n. 1298.) , 
viribus  ortum ducit, agnoscit.? 

(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1037.) 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 57 


works (opera steriliter bona) in the state of un- 
belief; and their teaching is in perfect conformity 
with right reason. | 


a) Our Divine Lord Himself says:*4 “If you love 
them that love you, what reward ** shall you have? Do 
not even the publicans this? And if you salute ** your 
brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heath- 
ens *’ this?’ The meaning plainly is: To salute one’s 
neighbor is an act of charity, a naturally good deed, com- 
mon even among the heathens, and one which, not being 
done from a supernatural motive, deserves no supernatural 
reward. But this does not by any means imply that to 
salute one’s neighbor is sinful. 

St. Paul ?* says: “ For when the gentiles,2° who have 
not the law,®° do by nature * those things that are of the 
law ; these having not the law are a law to themselves: 
who shew the work of the law written in their hearts.” 
By “ gentiles ” the Apostle evidently means genuine heath- 
ens, not converts from paganism to Christianity,®? and 
hence the meaning of the passage is that the heathens 
who know the natural law embodied in the Decalogue 
only as a postulate of reason, are by nature ** able to “ do 
those things that are of the law,” ** 7. e. observe at least 
‘some of its precepts. That St. Paul did not think the 
gentiles capable of observing the whole law without the 
aid of grace appears from his denunciation of their folly, 
a little further up in the same Epistle: “ Because that, 


24 Matth. V, 46 sq. 32 It is not our business to prove 
25 Mercedem, poor. this here; see the exegetical com- 
26 Salutaveritis, domdonode. mentaries on this text, e. g., Cor- 
27 Ethnict, of éOvixol. nely, Comment. in Epist. ad 
28 Rom. II, 14. sqq. Romanos, pp. 140 sqq. 

29 Gentes, €Ovn. 83 Naturaliter, pices 

30 That is, the Mosaic law. 84“ Quae legis sunt, faciunt.” 


31 Naturahier, dice 


58 ACTUAL GRACE 


when they knew God, they have not glorified him as 
God, or given thanks; but became vain in their 
thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, etc.,” 5 
and also from the hypothetic form of Rom. II, 14 in the 
original Greek text: 
éow — St quando gentes, . . . quae legis sunt, faciunt.” 34 

In Rom. XIV, 23: “ For all that is not faith is sin,” 3” 
a text often quoted against our thesis, “ faith’ does not 
mean the theological habit of faith, but ‘“ conscience,” * 
as the context clearly shows.®® 


\ + NY Gaya ed 
Orav yap €Ovy . . . TH TOU VOmMOV ToI- 


b) The teaching of the Fathers is in substan- 
tial harmony with Sacred Scripture. 

a) Thus St. Jerome, speaking of the reward 
which Yahweh gave to Nabuchodonosor for his 
services against Tyre,*® says: ‘The fact that 
Nabuchodonosor was rewarded for a good work 
shows that even the gentiles in the judgment of 
God are not passed over without a reward when 
they have performed a good deed.” 4! In his 
commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians 
the same holy Doctor observes: ‘Many who are 
without the faith and have not the Gospel of 
Christ, yet perform prudent and holy actions, 


35 Rom. I, 21 sqq. 

36 For other germane texts see 
Ezech. XXIX, 18 sqq.; Rom. I, 21, 

me may d€ 6 ovK éx TicTews, dpmap- 
TLA €OTLD. 

38 riotis = ouveldyors. 

39 Cfr. also 1 Cor. VIII, 10 sqq. 
For a fuller explanation see Schee- 
ben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 954 
sqq. 

40 Ezech. XXIX, 20: “And for 


the service that he hath done me 
against it [the city of Tyre], I have 
given him the land of Egypt, be- 
cause he hath labored for me, saith 
the Lord God.” 

41 In Ezech., XXIX, 20: ‘Ex eo 
quod Nabuchodonosor accepit mer- 
cedem boni operis, intelligimus 
etiam ethnicos, si quid boni fecerint, 
non absque mercede Dei iudicio prae- 
teriri.”’ 


a) 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 59 


e. g. by obeying their parents, succoring the 
needy, not oppressing their neighbors, not taking 
away the possessions of others.” 4? 3 

B) The teaching of St. Augustine offers some 
difficulties. There can be no doubt that. this 
Father freely admitted that pagans and infidels 
can perform naturally good works without faith 
and grace. Thus he says there is no man so 
wicked that some good cannot be found in him.*® 
He extols the moderation of Polemo‘** and the 
purity of Alypius, who were both pagans.?° 
He admires the civic virtues of the ancient 
Romans,** etc. Holding such views, how could 
Augustine write: “Neither doth free-will avail 
for anything except sin, if the way of truth is 
hidden.” #7 And what did his disciple Prosper 
mean when he said: ‘The whole life of unbeliey- 
ers is a sin, and nothing is good without the high- 
est good. For wherever there is no recognition 
of the supreme and immutable truth, there can 


42 In Gal., I, 15: “ Multi absque 
fide et evangelio Christi vel sapienter 
faciunt aliquid vel sancte, ut paren- 
tibus obsequantur, ut inopit manum 
porrigant, non opprimant VICINOS, 
non aliena diripant.’’ 

43De Spiritu et Litera, c 28: 
“Sicut enim non impediunt a vita 
aeterna iustum quaedam  peccata 
venialia, sine quibus haec vita non 
ducitur, sic ad salutem aeternam 
nihil prosunt impio aliqua bona 
opera, sine quibus difficillime vita 
cuiuslibet pessimi hominis invenitur.?? 


44 Ep., 144, 2. 

45 Confess., VI, 10. 

46 Ep., 138, c. 3: “Deus enim 
sie ostendit in opulentissimo et prae- 
claro imperio Romanorum, quantum 
valerent civiles etiam sine vera re- 
ligione virtutes, ut intelligeretur hac 
addita fiert homines cives alterius 
civitatis, cuius rex veritas, cuius lex 
caritas, cuius modus aeternitas,” 

47 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 3, n. 5: ° 
* Neque liberum arbitrium quidquam 
nist ad peccandum valet, si Jateat 
veritatis via.’ 


60 ACTUAL GRACE 


be no genuine virtue, even if the moral standard 
be of the highest.’ *° | 

To understand these and similar passages 
rightly and to explain at the same time how it was 
possible for Baius and Jansenius to bolster their 
heretical systems with quotations from the writ- 
ings of St. Augustine and his disciples, it 1s neces- 
sary to observe that the quondam rhetorician and 
Platonic idealist of Hippo delights in applying to 
the genus the designation which belongs to 
its highest species, and vice versa.*® Thus, in 
speaking of liberty, he often means the perfect 
liberty enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise; °° 
in using the term “children of God” he designates 
those who persevere in righteousness;°* and in 
employing the phrase “a good work’ he means 
one supernaturally meritorious. Or, vice versa, 
he designates the slightest good impulse of the 
will as “caritas,’ as it were by anticipation, and 
brands every unmeritorious work (opus informe 
s. sterile) as false virtue (falsa virtus), nay sin 
(peccatum). To interpret St. Augustine cor- 
rectly, therefore, allowance must be made for his 
peculiar idealism and a careful distinction drawn 


48 Sent. ex August. n. 106: Cyprian (Ep., 93, ¢. 10, n. 39): 
“Omnis vita infidelium peccatum ‘‘ Habet quandam propriam faciem, 
est et nihil est bonum sine summo qua possit agnosci,” applies in an 


bono. Ubi enim deest agnitio sum- even truer sense to his own writ- 
mae et incommutabilis veritatis, falsa ings. 
virtus est etiam in optimis moribus.” 50 Cfr. Enchirid., c. 30. 

49 What Augustine himself ob- 51 Cfr. De Correptione et Gratia, 


serves of the literary style of St. c. 9, n. 20 sqq. 


| 
q 
: 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 61 


between the real and the metaphorical sense of 
the terms which he employs. Baius neglected 
this precaution and furthermore paid no attention 
to the controversial attitude of the holy Doctor. 
Augustine’s peculiar task was not to maintain the 
possibility of naturally good works without faith 
and grace, but to defend against Pelagius and 
Julian the impossibility of performing super- 
naturally good and meritorious works without 
the aid of grace. It is this essential difference in 
their respective points of view that explains how 
St. Augustine and Baius were able to employ 
identical or similar terms to express radically dif- 
ferent ideas.°? | 

c) It can easily be demonstrated on theological 
grounds that fallen man is able, of his own initia- 
tive, 7. e. without the aid of grace, to perform 
morally good works, and that Baius erred in as- 


serting that this is impossible without theological 
faith. 


a) With regard to the first-mentioned point it will be 
well, for the sake of clearness, to adopt Palmieri’s dis- 
tinction between physical and moral capacity.°* Man 
sins whenever he transgresses the law or yields to tempta- 


52 For a fuller and more adequate mieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, 
treatment of this question see J. thes, 21. 
Ernst, Werke und Tugenden der Un- 53 Palmieri, 7, c., thes, 20.. Con- 
gliubigen nach Augustinus, Frei- cerning the effects of original sin 
burg 1871; Ripalda, De Ente Su- on free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, God 
pernaturali, t, III, Cologne 1648; S. the Author of Nature and the Super- 
Dechamps, De Haeresi Ianseniana, natural, pp, 291 sq. 
Paris 1645; and, more briefly, Pal- 


62 ACTUAL (GRACE 


tion. This would be impossible if he were physically 
unable to keep the whole law and resist temptation. 
Hence he must be physically able to do that which 
he is obliged to do under pain of sin, though in this or 
that individual instance the difficulties may be insuper- 
able without the aid of grace. To put it somewhat dif- 
ferently: Baius and Jansenius hold that fallen man can 
perform no morally good works because of physical or 
moral impotence on the part of the will. This assump- 
tion is false. Man is physically able to perform good 
works because they are enjoined by the moral law of 
nature under pain of sin; he is morally able because, in 
spite of numerous evil tendencies, not a few gentiles and 
unbelievers have led upright lives and thereby proved 
that man can perform good works without the aid of 
grace.°# This is also the teaching of St. Thomas.” 

B) It is an expressly defined dogma that the process 
of justification starts with theological faith (fides), pre- 
ceded by the so-called grace of vocation, which prepares 
and effects conversion. To say, as Baius did, that 
all good works performed in a state of unbelief are so 
many sins, is tantamount to asserting that the preliminary 
acts leading up to faith, and which the unbeliever per- 
forms by the aid of prevenient grace, are sinful; in other 
words, that God requires the unbeliever to prepare him- 
self for justification by committing sin. This is as absurd 
as it is heretical.*° 

The whole argument of this section applies a fortiort to 


54 On this distinction see supra, 
pp. 15 sqq. 

55 Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 10, 
art. 4: “ Bona opera, ad quae suf- 
ficit bonum naturae, aliqualiter 
operari possunt [infideles]. Unde 
non oportet quod in omni suo opere 
peccent; sed quandocunque aliquod 


opus operantur ex infidelitate, tunc 
peccant.” 

56 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
can, 7: “Si quis dixerit, opera 
omnia quae ante iustificationem 
fiunt, quacunque ratione facta sint, 
vere esse peccata vel odium Det 
mereri, aut quanto vehementius quis 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 63 


the theory that no act can be morally good unless 
prompted by both theological charity and theological 
faith.®* 


2. We must now define the limitations of fallen 
nature unaided by grace. -Though the graces dis- 
pensed by Providence even for naturally good 
deeds are in the present economy de facto nearly 
all supernatural, nothing prevents us from con- 
ceiving a different economy, consisting of purely 
natural helps, such as would have been necessary 
in the state of pure nature.*® 


As regards the limitations of man’s moral power in 
the natural order, we may say, in a general way, that the 
will is able to keep the easier precepts of the moral law 
of nature without the assistance of grace (either su- 
pernatural or natural). However, as it is impossible in 
many instances to determine just where the easier pre- 
cepts end and the more difficult ones begin, a broad field is 
left open for theological speculation. 


a) Theologians are practically unanimous in 
holding that man cannot observe the natural law 
in its entirety for any considerable length of time 
without the aid of grace. 


Suarez is so sure of this that he does not hesitate to 
denounce the contrary teaching,— which is (perhaps un- 
justly) ascribed to Durandus, Scotus, and Gabriel Biel — 


nititur se disponere ad gratiam, tanto 58 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
eum gravius peccare, anathema sit.’’ thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 817.) ural, pp. 226 sqq. 


57 V. infra, No. 3. 


64 ACTUAL GRACE 


as “rash and verging on error.” °° In matter of fact the 


Church has formally defined that, because of concupis- 
cence, no one, not even the justified man, much less the 
sinner, is able, without divine assistance (grace), to keep 
for any considerable length of time the whole Decalogue, 
which embodies the essentials of the moral law. ‘“ Nev- 
ertheless,” says the Council of Trent, “ let those who think 
themselves to stand take heed lest they fall, and with 
fear and trembling work out their salvation, SLOT 
they ought to fear for the combat which yet remains aah 
the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they 
cannot be victorious unless they be with God’s grace 
obedient to the Apostle, who says: ‘We are debtors, 
a LR eh RO 

St. Paul, who lived, so to speak, in an atmosphere of 
grace, yet found reason to exclaim: “I am delighted 
with the law of God, according to the inward man, but I 
see another law in my members, fighting against the law of 
my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that 
is in my members,’® and: “ Unhappy man that I 
am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? 
The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.” © Surely 
it would be vain to expect the proud ideal of the Stoics 
or Pelagius’ presumptuous claim of impeccability ever 
to be realized on earth except by a special privilege of 
grace, such as that bestowed Bion the Blessed Virgin 
Mary.** 


59 “ Propositio temeraria et errori 
proxima.”’ 

60 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 13: 
“Verumtamen qui se existimant 
stare, videant ne cadant, et cum 
timore ac tremore salutem suam 
operentur. ... Formidare enim de- 
bent... de pugna, quae superest 
cum carne, cum mundo, cum diabolo, 


in qua victores esse non possunt, 
nisi cum Det gratid Apostolo obtem- 
perent dicenti: Debitores etc.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 806.) 

61 Rom. VII, 22 sqa. 

62 Rom. VII, 24 sq. 

63 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, 
pp. 80 sqq., St. Louis 1914, 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 65 


The Fathers follow St. Paul in describing the power 
of concupiscence, even after justification.** 


b) A pertinent question, closely allied to the 
proposition just treated, is this: Can the human 
will, without the aid of grace, overcome all the 
grievous temptations to mortal sin by which it is 
besieged ? 


It is the common teaching of theologians that, without 
the aid of grace, man in the fallen state succumbs with 
moral (not physical) necessity to grievous temptations 
against the moral law, 7. e. to mortal sin. This conclu- 
sion flows from the impossibility, which we have demon- 
strated above, of observing the whole law of nature for 
life or for any considerable length of time without the 
help of grace. If man were able to resist all violent 
temptations, he would be able to keep the whole law. 

The theological teaching which we are here expound- 
ing may be formulated in two different ways: (1) No 
man can overcome all grievous temptations against the 
moral law without the aid of grace; (2) there is no man 
living who is not now and then assailed by temptations 
to which he would inevitably succumb did not God lend 
him His assistance. 

In its first and rather indefinite form the proposition 
is attacked by Ripalda,®® Molina,®°* and many later Schol- 
astics. These writers argue as follows: It is impossible 
to deduce from Revelation or experience a definite 
rule by which man could determine the conditions on 
which the grievousness of a temptation depends. To 


64 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 65 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 
Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 109, art. 5; Hein- 114, sect, 18. 
rich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theolo- 66 Concord., art. 13, disp. 19. 


gie, Vol. VIII, § 416, Mainz 1897. 


66 ACTUAL GRACE 


say that a temptation is grievous when it cannot be re- 
sisted without the aid of grace, would be begging the 
question. Besides, the: possibility always remains that 
there be men who, though in theory unable to with- 
stand all grievous temptations without the aid of grace, 
de facto never meet with such temptations, but only with 
the lighter kind which can be overcome without supernat- 
ural help. 

The second and more specific formulation of our propo- 
sition is supported by Sacred Scripture, which explicitly 
declares that all men are subject to temptations which 
they could not resist if God did not uphold them.* 

If the just are obliged to watch and pray constantly, 
lest they fall,°* this must be true in an even higher degree 
of sinners and unbelievers. St. Augustine writes against 
the Pelagians: “Faithful men say in their prayer: 
‘Lead us not into temptation.’ But if they have the 
capacity [of avoiding evil], why do they pray [for it]? 
Or, what is the evil which they pray to be delivered from, 
but, above all else, the body of this death? . . . the carnal 
lusts, whence a man is liberated only by the grace of the 
Saviour. . . . He may be permitted to pray that he may 
be healed. Why does he presume so strongly on the 
capability of his nature? It is wounded, hurt, harassed, 
destroyed ; what it stands in need of is a true confession 
[of its weakness], not a false defense [of its capacity].” © 


67 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- — adest possibilitas, ut quid orant? 


mat., Vol. V, pp. 87 sqq. Aut a quo malo se liberari orant 

68 Cfr. the following passage from nisi maxrime de corpore mortis 
the Tridentine Council: “... cum  hwuius?...de  vitiis carnahibus, 
timore ac tremore salutem suam unde non liberatur homo sine gratia 
operentur in laboribus, in vigiliis, in Salvatoris. . . . Orare sinatur, ut 
eleemosynis, in orationibus et obla-  sanetur. Quid tantum de naturae 
tionibus, in ieiuniis et castitate.” possibilitate praesumitur? Vulnerata, 

69 De Natura et Gratia, c. 48, n. Sauciata, vexata, perdita est; vera 
62: “‘ Fideles enim orantes dicunt: confessione, non falsa defensione 


Ne nos inferas in tentationem. Si opus habet.” The necessity of grace, 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 67 


c) Another question, on which Catholic divines 
disagree, is this: Can fallen man, unaided by 
grace, elicit an act of perfect natural charity 
(amor Dei naturalis perfectus ) ? 


Scotus answers this question affirmatively,” and his 
opinion is shared by Cajetan,” Bafiez,”? Dominicus Soto,” 
and Molina.“* Other equally eminent theologians, no- 
tably Suarez ** and Bellarmime,”* take the negative side. 

In order to obtain a clear understanding of the question 
at issue we shall have to attend to several distinctions. 

_ First and above all we must not lose sight of the im- 
portant distinction between the natural and the super- 
natural love of God. Supernatural charity, in all its 
stages, necessarily supposes supernatural aid. The ques- 
tion therefore can refer only to the amor Dei natur- 


alis." 


That this natural charity is no mere figment ap- 


pears from the ecclesiastical condemnation of two propo- 


sitions of- Baius,7? 


and of prayer to obtain grace, is ad- 
mirably and exhaustively treated by 
Suarez, De Necessitate Gratiae, I, 23, 
sqq. Cfr. also Bellarmine, De Gratia 
et Libero Arbitrio, V, 7 saq. 

70 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
Sent: Ill, dist. 9273) qu.) ) unica: 
** Ratio recta docet, solum summum 
bonum infinitum esse summe diligen- 
dum et per consequens voluntas hoc 
potest ex puris naturalibus; nihil 
enim potest intellectus recte dictare, 
in quod dictatum non possit voluntas 
rationalis naturaliter tendere.”’ 

71 Comment. in Summam Theol. 
S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 171, 
arts- 2: 

72 Comment. in Summam Theol. 
S. Thomae Aqu., 2a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 
2. 

73 De Natura et Gratia, I, 21. — 


74 Concord., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 
Id. 
75 De Gratia, I, 33. 

76 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 
VI, 7: “ Existimamus non posse 
Deum sine ope ipsius diligi neque ut 
auctorem naturae neque ut largi- 
torem gratiae et gloriae, neque per- 
fecte neque imperfecte ullo modo, 
7+ + Quicquid aliqui minus consi- 
derate in hac parte scripserint.’” On 
the attitude of St. Thomas (Summa 
Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3) cfr. 
Billuart, De Gratia, diss, 3, art. 4. 

77 It is not true, as Bellarmine 
argues, that the amor Dei naturalis 
at its highest would result in justi- 
fication. 

78 Prop. Baii Damn., 34: “ Dis- 
tinctio illa duplicis amoris, naturalis 
videlicet, quo Deus amatur ut auctor 


68 ACTUAL GRACE 


Another, even more important distinction is that be- 
tween perfect and imperfect charity. Imperfect charity is 
the love of God as our highest good (amor Dei ut 
summum bonum nobis); perfect charity is the love of 
God for His own sake above all things (amor Dei 
propter se et super omnia). The holy Fathers and a 
number of councils * declare that it is impossible to love 
God perfectly without the aid of grace. The context 
and such stereotyped explanatory phrases as “ sicut 
oportet”’ or “ sicut expedit ad salutem,” ®° show that these 
Patristic and conciliary utterances apply to the super- 
natural love of God. Hence the question narrows itself 
down.to this: Can fallen man without the aid of grace 
love God for His own sake and above all things by a 
purely natural love? In answering this question Pesch,*? 
Tepe,*? and other theologians distinguish between affec- 
tive and effective love. They hold that whereas the 
amor atfectivus in all its stages is possible without the aid 
of grace, not so the amor effectivus, since that would in- 
volve the observance of the whole natural law. This com- 
promise theory can be demonstrated as highly probable 
from Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul says ** that the 
gentiles knew God and should have glorified Him. This 
evidently supposes that it was possible for them to glo- 
rify God, and consequently to love Him affectively, as 
easily and with the same means by which they knew Him. 


naturae, et gratuiti, quo Deus amatur 
ut beatificator, vana est et commen- 
titia,”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
1034).— 36: “Amor naturalis, qui 
ex viribus naturae exoritur, ex sola 
philosophia per elationem praesump- 
tionis humanae cum iniuria crucis 
Christi defenditur a nonnullis doc- 
toribus.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
1036.) 


79 Cfr. Conc. Arausic. II, a. 529, 
can. 25: “ Prorsus donum Dei est 
diligere Deum.” 

80 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 
Be 
81 Praelect. Dogm., Vol. V, pp. 73 
sqq. 
82 Instit. Theolog., Vol. III, pp. 19 
sqq. 

838 Rom. I, 21. 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 69 


Else how could the Apostle say of those gentiles who, 
“ when they knew God, glorified him not as God,” that they 
“ changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and 
served the creature rather than the Creator’? This 
interpretation of Rom. I, 21 sqq. is explicitly confirmed by 
St. Ambrose when he says: “ For they were able to ap- 
prehend this by the law of nature, inasmuch as the fabric 
of the cosmos testifies that God, its author, is alone to be 
loved, as Moses hath set it down in his writings ; but they 
were made impious by not glorifying God, and unright- 
eousness became evident in them when, knowing, they 
changed the truth into a lie and refused to confess the 
one tsod, 65 


3. It follows, by way of corollary, that Vas- 
quez’s opinion,” that there can be no good work 
without supernatural aid in the shape of a co gita- 
tio congrua, is untenable, as is also the assertion 
of Ripalda *’ that in the present economy purely 
natural good actions are so invariably connected 
with the prevenient grace of Christ that they 
practically never exist as such. 


a) Vasquez, whose position in the matter is opposed 
by most other theologians, contends * that no man 
can perform a good work or resist any temptation against. 
the natural law (Decalogue) without the help of super- 


84 Rom. I, 25. 

85In Epist. ad Roman., I, 18: 
“ Potuerunt enim id per legem na- 
turae apprehendere, fabricé mundi 
testificante auctorem Deum solum 
diligendum, quod Moyses  literis 
tradidit; sed impu facti sunt non 
colendo Creatorem et iniustitia in 


eis apparet, dum videntes dissinuila- 
bant a veritate, non fatentes unum 
Deum.” 

86 Comment. in Summam Theol. 
S. Thomae Aqu., ta 2ae, disp. 189 
sq. 

87 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 20. 

88 Op. cit. (see note 86). 


72 ACTUAL GRACE 


pothesis the necessity of grace is not theological but purely 
historic.°® 

Despite the wealth of arguments by which Ripalda at- 
tempted to prove his theory,®* it has not been generally 
accepted. While some, e. g. Platel ®? and Pesch,°® regard 
it with a degree of sympathy, others, notably De Lugo % 
and Tepe,’ are strongly opposed to it. Palmieri thinks 
it may be accepted in a restricted sense, 7. e. when limited 
to the faithful.1 

Ripalda’s hypothesis of the universality of grace is truly 
sublime and would have to be accepted if God’s salvific 
will could be demonstrated by revelation or some historic 
law to suffer no exceptions. But Ripalda has not been 
able to prove this from Revelation.1” Then, too, his 
theory entails two extremely objectionable conclusions: 
(1) a denial, not indeed of the possibility ( Quesnel), but 
of the existence of purely natural good works, and (2) the 
possibility of justification without theological faith. 
Neither of these difficulties probably occurred to Vasquez 


95 This must be kept in mind in 
judging Ripalda’s famous thesis: 


belief of Christians in the salutary 
effects of all good works, including 


“Ad quodlibet bonum opus morale 
sive ad quemlibet virtutis moralis 
actum necessarium esse per se 
naturae rationali elevatae auxilium 
theologicum gratiae.’”’ (Ibid., sect. 
3.) 

96 He urges the supernatural char- 
acter, in principle, of the present 
economy of salvation; the practical 
identity of the naturally good with 
the supernaturally salutary acts of 
the will, which he claims is taught in 
Sacred Scripture (cfr, Acts XIV, 
14 sqq.; Rom. I, 19 sqq.), and also 
by St. Augustine and his disciples 
Prosper and Orosius; the merciful 
dispensation of grace towards heath- 
ens, unbelievers, and_ sinners (uv. 
infra, Sect. 3, Art. 2); the universal 


those of the purely natural order, 
etc. For a discussion of these argu- 
ments consult Palmieri, De Gratia 
Divina Actuali, pp. 254 sqq. 

97 Synopsis de’ Gratia, n. 530. 

98 Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, p. 
72. 
99 De Virtute Fidei Divinae, disp. 
125); S@ct. | -2. 

100 Instit. Theolog., Vol. LID tpps 
22 sq., 248 sqq. 

101 De Gratia Div. Actuali, p. 268: 
“Si tamen ad solos fideles coarcte- 
tur, quum nulla argumenta obstent 
et pro hac hypothesi maxime valeant 
rationes Ripaldae, eam censemus 
veram esse.’ 

102 VV. supra, No. 1. 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 73 


or Ripalda,*°* because at the time when they wrote Pius 
VI had not yet condemned the teaching of the psetido- 
Council of Pistoia,1°* nor had Innocent XI censured the 
proposition that “ Faith in a broad sense, as derived from 
the testimony of creatures or some other similar motive, 
is sufficient for justification.” °° If the love of God, 
even perfect love, (such as we have shown to be possible 
in the natural order), were of itself necessarily super- 
natural, as Ripalda contends, it would be possible for a 
pagan to receive the grace of justification without theo- 
logical faith, which he does not possess, as is evident from 
the Vatican teaching that it is “ requisite for divine faith 
that revealed truth be believed because of the authority of 
God who reveals it.’’ 1° 


Thesis III: Not all actions performed by man in 
the state of mortal sin are sinful on account of his not 
being in the state of grace. 


This is de fide. 

Proof. Though this thesis is, strictly speak- 
ing, included in Thesis II, it must be demonstrated 
separately on its own merits, because it embodies 


103 Cfr. Mazzella, De 
Christi, disp. 2, art. 9. 

104 V, supra, p. 71. 

105 “ Fides late dicta ex testimonio 
creaturarum similive motivo ad iusti- 
ficationem sufficit.”” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 1173.) 

106 Conc. Vat., Sess. III, De Fide, 
can, 2: “Si quis dixerit,.:. ad 


Gratia of Ripalda’s opinion can be studied 
in Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actu- 
ali, pp. 265 sqq. Cfr. also Scheeben, 
Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 996 sqq. A 
difficulty arises from the twenty- 
second canon of the Second Council 
of Orange (A.D. 529): ‘Nemo 
habet de suo nisi mendacium et 
peccatum.”” But this canon was 


fidem divinam non requiri, ut reve- 
lata veritas propter auctoritatem Dei 
revelantis credatur, anathema sit.’ 
On this whole dispute cfr. Schiffini, 
De Gratia Divina, pp. 156 sqq. The 
arguments adduced by the defenders 


probably never approved by the Holy 
See. It is ably discussed by Gut- 
berlet in his continuation of Hein- 
rich’s Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
VITT, $478. 


74 ACTUAL GRACE 


a formally defined dogma which has been denied 
by the Protestant Reformers and by the followers 
of Baius and Jansenius. Martin Luther taught, 
—and his teaching was adopted in a modified 
form by the Calvinists,—that human nature is 
entirely depraved by original sin, and conse- 
quently man necessarily sins in whatever he 
does," even in the process of justification. 
Against this heresy the Tridentine Council de- 
fined: “If any one shall say that all the works 
done before justification ... are indeed sins, 
fone let him ibevanathema0° 

The Protestant notion of grace was reduced 
to a theological system by Baius ?°® and Jansen- 
ius,’*® whose numerous errors may all be traced to 
their denial of the supernatural order. 

The Jansenist teaching was pushed to an extreme by 
Paschasius Quesnel, 101 of whose propositions were 
formally condemned by Pope Clement XI in his famous 
Constitution “ Unigenitus.” + The Jansenistic teachings 
of the Council of Pistoia were censured by Pius VI, A. D. 


1794, in his Bull “ Auctorem fidei.’ The quintessence 
of this heretical system is embodied in the proposition 


107“ Ex viribus suis [natura] 
coram Deo nihil nisi peccare potest.” 
(Solida Declar., I, § 22.) Cfr. J. A. 
Mohler, Symbolik, §6-7 (English tr. 
by J. B. Robertson, Symbolism, sth 
ed,, London 1906, pp. 54 sqq.) 

108 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 7: 
“ Si quis dixerit, opera omnia, quae 
ante iustificationem fiunt, ... vere 
esse peccata,... anathema sit.’ 

109 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the 


Author of Nature and the Super- 
natural, pp. 183 saqq., et passim. 

110 A. D. 1585-1638. Cfr. Pohle- 
Preuss, op. cit., pp. 223 sqq. 

111 On this important document 
(issued A. D. 1713) see A. Schill, 
Die Konstitution Unigenitus, Frei- 
burg 1876; Thuillier, La Seconde 
Phase du Jansénisme, Paris 1901; 
M. Ott, art. “ Unigenitus ” in Vol. 
XV of the Catholic Encyclopedia. — 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 75 


that whatever a man does in the state of mortal sin is 
necessarily sinful for the reason that he is not in the state 
of grace (status caritatis). Baius 1? and Quesnel 143 gave. 
this teaching an Augustinian turn by saying that there is 
no intermediate state between the love of God and con- 
cupiscence, and that all the works of a sinner must con- 
sequently and of necessity be sinful. This heretical teach- 
ing is sharply condemned in the Bull “ Auctorem fiders + 
Quesnel pushed it to its last revolting conclusion when he 
said: “ The prayer of the wicked is a new sin, and that 
God permits it is but an additional j udgment upon 
them? 116 


The teaching of Baius and Quesnel is repug- 
nant to Revelation and to the doctrine of 
the Fathers. 

a) The Bible again and again exhorts sinners 
to repent, to pray for forgiveness, to give alms, 
ete Gir Hochws(iK boigt “My son, thou hast 
sinned? Do so no more: but for thy former sins 
also pray that they may be forgiven thee.” 
Ezech. XVIII, 30: “Be converted, and do pen- 
ance for all your iniquities: and iniquity shall not 


112 Prop. Damn., 38. quae ante wustificationem funt, 


113 Prop. Damn., 44. 

114“ Doctrina synodi de dublici 
amore enuntians, hominem sine 
gratia esse sub virtute peccati ipsum- 
que im eo statu per generalem cupidi- 
tatis dominantis iniuxum omnes suas 
actiones inficere et corrumpere — 
quatenus insinuat, in homine, dum 
est sub servitute sive in statu pec- 
cati, ... sic dominari cupiditatem 
ut per generalem hutus inhuxum 
omnes illius actiones in se inficiantur 
et corrumpantur, aut opera omnia 


quacunque ratione fiant, sint peccaia, 
quasi in omnibus suis actibus pec- 
cator serviat dominanti cupiditati: 
falsa, perniciosa, inducens in errorem 
a Tridentino damnatum ut haereti- 
cum, iterum in Baio damnatum art. 
40.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
1523). h 

115 Prop. Damn., 59: “ Oratio 
impiorum est novum peccatum, et 
quod Deus illis concedit, est novum 
in eos iudicium.”  (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 1409.) 


76 ACTUAL GRACE 


be your ruin.” Dan. IV, 24: ‘Redeem thou thy 
sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of 
mercy to the poor: perhaps he will forgive thy 
offences.” Zach. I, 3: ‘Thus saith the Lord of 
hosts: Turn ye to me, saith the Lord of hosts: 
and I will turn to you.” If all the works thus en- 
joined were but so many sins, we should be 
forced to conclude, on the authority of Sacred 
Scripture, that God commands the sinner to com- 
mit new iniquities and that the process of justi- 
fication with its so-called dispositions consists 
in a series of sinful acts. Such an assump- 
tion would be manifestly absurd and blasphe- 
mous. 


Quesnel endeavored to support his heretical conceit by 
Matth. VII, 17 sq.: “ Even so every good tree bringeth 
forth good fruit, and the evil tree bringeth forth evil 
fruit ; a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can 
an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” But as our Lord in 
this passage speaks of prophets, the fruits he has in 
mind must obviously be doctrines not works.1%* And 
what if they were works? Are not doctrines and morals 
ultimately related, and may we not infer from the lives 
they lead (according to their doctrines) whether prophets 
are true or false? By their fruits (7. e. works) you 
shall know them (i. e. the soundness or unsoundness of 
the teaching upon which their works are based). 

116 This passage, and the meaning in Enchiridion S. August., cs 15. 
it evidently bears in the context of | Other Scriptural texts distorted by 
St. Matthew’s Gospel, is thoroughly the Jansenists are quoted and ex- 


discussed by Suarez, De Gratia, I, plained in their true sense by Schee- 
4. Cfr. also J. B. Faure, Notae ben, Dogmatik, Vol. III, Pp. 923 sqq. 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 07, 


b) In appealing to the testimony of the Fathers 
the Jansenists were notoriously guilty of misin- 
terpretation. 


a) Origen plainly teaches that prayer before justifica- 
tion isa good work. “ Though you are sinners,” he says, 
“ pray to God; God hears the sinners.” 227 The seemingly 
contradictory text John IX, 31: “Now we know that 
God doth not hear sinners,” 28 is thus explained by 
St. Augustine: “ He speaks as one not yet anointed ; for 
God also hears the sinners. If He did not hear sinners, 
the publican would have cast his eyes to the ground in 
vain and vainly struck his breast saying: O God, be 
merciful to me, a sinner,” 119 Moreover, since there is 
question here of extraordinary works and signs only (vig. 
miracles), the text is wholly irrelevant in regard to works 
of personal righteousness. St. Prosper teaches: “ Hu- 
man nature, created by God, even after its prevarica- 
tion, retains its substance, form, life, senses, and reason, 
and the other goods of body and soul, which are not lack- 
ing even to those who are bad and vicious, But there 
is no possibility of seizing the true good by such things as 
may adorn this mortal life, but cannot give [merit] 
eternal life.” 12 


117 Hom. in Is.; 5, n. 2. 

118 “ Scimus autem quia peccatores 
Deus non audit.” 

119 Tract. in Toa, 44, m. 13: 
“ Adhuc inunctus loquitur; nam et 
peccatores exaudit Deus. Si enim 
peccatores Deus non exaudiret, fru- 
stra tle publicanus oculos in terram 
demittens et pectus suum percutiens 
diceret: Domine, propitius esto mihi 
peccatort [Luc.. XVIII, 13].” 

120 Contr. Collat., n. 36: “ Na- 
turae humanae, cuius creator est 


Deus, etiam post praevaricationem 
manet substantia, manet forma, 
manet vita et sensus et ratio cetera- 
que corporis et animi bona, quae 
etiam malis vitiosisque non desunt. 
Sed non illis veri boni perceptio est, 
quae mortalem vitam honestare pos- 
sunt, aeternam conferre. non pos- 
sunt.”’ For additional Patristic texts 
in confirmation of our thesis see 
Ripalda, De Ente Supernatural, t. 
ITI, disp. 20, sect, 4. 


78 ACTUAL GRACE 


8B) Baius and Quesnel succeeded in veiling their 
heresy by a phraseology of Augustinian color but with 
implications foreign to the mind of the Doctor of Grace. 
Augustine emphasized the opposition between “ charity ” 
and “concupiscence”’ so strongly that the intermediary 
domain of naturally good works was almost lost to view. 
Thus he says in his Encluridion: “ Carnal lust reigns 
where there is not the love of God.” #4. And in his trea- 
tise on the Grace of Christ: ‘ Here there is no love, no 
good work is reckoned as done, nor is there in fact any 
good work, rightly so called; because whatever is not of 
faith is sin, and faith worketh by love.” #? And again in 
his treatise on Grace and Free-Will: “The command- 
ments of love or charity are so great and such, that what- 
ever action a man may think he does well, is by no means 
well done if done without charity.” 178 We have pur- 
posely chosen passages in which the “Doctor of 
Grace” obviously treats of charity as theological love, not 
in the broad sense of dilectio** At first blush these 
passages seem to agree with the teaching of Baius, who 
says: “Every love on the part of a rational creature is 
either sinful cupidity, by which the world is loved, and 
which is forbidden by St. John, or that praiseworthy 
charity which is infused into the heart by the Holy Spirit, 
and by which we love God;’—1*> and with the forty- 


121 Enchiridion, c. .117, n. 31: . quid se putaverit homo facere bene, 


* Regnat carnalis cupiditas, ubi non 
est Dei caritas.” 

122 De  Gratia Christi, c. 26: 
© Ubi non est dilectio, nullum bonum 
opus imputatur, non recte bonum 
opus vocatur, quia omne quod non 
est ex fide peccatum est et fides per 
dilectionem operatur.’’ 

123 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 
c. 18: “ Praecepta dilectionis, t, e. 
caritatis, tanta et talia sunt, ut quid- 


si fiat sine caritate, nullo modo fiat 
bene.” 

124 Cfr. supra, p. 29. 

125 Proposit. Batti Damn., 38: 
“Omnis amor creaturae rationalis 
aut vitiosa est cupiditas qué mundus 
diligitur, quae a Ioanne prohibetur, 
aut laudabilis caritas qué per Spiri- 
tum Sanctum in corde diffusa Deus 
amatur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
1038.) 


2 el ae eT 


—- 


= 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 79 


fifth proposition of Quesnel: “ As the love of God no 
longer reigns in the hearts of sinners, it is necessary that 
carnal lust should reign in them and vitiate all their ac- 
tions.’ °° Yet the sense of these propositions is any- 
thing but Augustinian. Augustine upholds free-will in 
spite of grace and concupiscence, whereas the Jansenists 
assert that the carnalis cupiditas and the caritas dominans 
produce their effects by the very power of nature, 7. e. 
necessarily and of themselves.127 

Besides this capital difference there are many minor dis- 
crepancies between the teaching of St. Augustine and that 
of Baius and Quesnel. Augustine, it is true, in his strug- 
gle with Pelagianism,'*® strongly emphasized the opposi- 
tion existing between grace and sin, between love of God 
and love of the world; but he never dreamed of asserting 
that every act performed in the state of mortal sin is sinful 
for the reason that it is not performed in the state of 
grace. Scholasticism has long since applied the neces- 
sary corrective to his exaggerations. It is perfectly 
orthodox to say that there is an irreconcilable op- 
position between the state of mortal sin and the state of 
grace. “No one can serve two masters.” 12° This is 
not, however, by any means equivalent to saying, as the 
Jansenists do, that the sinners not being in the state of 
grace, of necessity sins in whatever he does. Augus- 
tine expressly admits that, no matter how deeply God 
may allow a man to fall, and no matter how strongly 
concupiscence may dominate his will, he is yet able to 
pray for grace, which is in itself a distinctly salutary 

126 Prop. Quesnelli Damn., 45:3 127 Infra, Ch. III, Sect. I. 
“Amore Dei in corde peccatorum 128 Especially against Julian of 
non amplius regnante necesse est, Eclanum. Cfr. Contra Iulianum, 
ut in eo carnalis regnet cupiditas ~ IV5i'3. 


omnesque actiones eius corrumpat.” 129 Matth. VI, 24. 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1395.) *- 


80 ACTUAL GRACE 


act. “If a sin is such,” he says in his Retractationes, 
“that it is itself a punishment for sin, what can the 
will under the domination of cupidity do, except, if it 
be pious, to pray for help?” 18° Compare this sentence 
with the fortieth proposition of Baius: ‘“ The sinner in 
all his actions serves the lust which rules him,” "1 and 
you will perceive the third essential difference that sep- 
arates the teaching of St. Augustine from that of the Jan- 
senists. The former, even when he speaks, not of the 
two opposing habits, but of their respective acts, does not, 
like Jansenism, represent the universality of sin without 
theological charity as a physical and fundamental necess- 
ity, but merely as a historical phenomenon which admits of 
exceptions. Thus he writes in his treatise On the Spirit 
and the Letter: “If they who by nature do the things 
contained in the law, must not be regarded as yet in the 
number of those whom Christ’s grace justifies, but rather 
as among those whose actions (although they are those 
of ungodly men who do not truly and rightly worship the 
true God) we not only cannot blame, but actually praise, 
and with good reason, and rightly too, since they have 
been done, so far as we read or know or hear, according 
to the rule of righteousness; though were we to discuss 
the question with what motive they are done, they would 
hardly be found to be such as to deserve the praise and 
defense which are due to righteous conduct.” 1°? 


180 Retract., I, 15: “Quando 48: “Si hi qui naturaliter, quae 
peccatum tale est, ut idem sit poena legis sunt, faciunt, nondum sunt 
peccati, quantum est quod valet habendi in numero eorum quos 
voluntas sub dominante cupiditate, Christi iustificat gratia [Rom. II, 
nisi forte, si pia est, ut oret auxi- 24], sed in eorum potius, quorum 


lium? ” 

131 Prop. Baii Damn., 40: “In 
omnibus suis actibus peccator servit 
dominanti cupiditati.” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 1040.) 

132 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 27, n. 


(etiam impiorum nec Deum verum 
veraciter iusteque colentium) quae- 
dam tamen facta vel legimus vel 
novimus vel audimus, quae secun- 
dum iustitiae regulam non solum 
vituperare non possumus, verum 


CAPACITY OF MERE NATURE 81 


In conclusion we will quote a famous passage from St. 
Augustine which reads like a protest against the distor- 
tions of Baius and Jansenius. “ Love,” he says, “is 
either divine or human; human love is either licit or illicit. 
. .. I speak first of licit human love, which is free from 
censure; then, of illicit human love, which is damnable; 
and in the third place, of divine love, which leads us to 
Pleaven)!'. ...You, therefore, have that love which is 
licit; it is human, but, as I have said, licit, so much so 
that, if it were lacking, [the want of] it would be cen- 
sured. You are permitted with human love to love your 
spouse, your children, your friends and fellow-citizens. 
But, as you see, the ungodly, too, have this love, e. g. 
pagans, Jews, heretics. Who among them does not love 
his wife, his children, his brethren, his neighbors, his 
relations and friends? This, therefore, is human love. 
If any one would be so unfeeling as to lose even human 
love, not loving his own children, . . . we should no 
longer regard him as a human being.” 488 Tepe perti- 
nently observes 1% that St. Augustine in this passage as- 
serts not only the possibility but the actual existence of 
naturally good though unmeritorious works (opera steri- 
etiam merito recteque laudamus;  vobis humana caritate diligere con- 
quamquam si discutiantur, quo fine iuges, diligere filios, diligere amicos 
fant, vix inveniuntur quae iustitiae vestros, diligere cives vestros. Sed 
debitam laudem defensionemve mere- videtis istam caritatem esse posse et 
antur.”’ ; impiorum, 7. e. paganorum, Iudae- 

133 Serm. de Temp., 349, c. Fis il orum,  haereticorum. Quis enim 
sq.: “Caritas alia est divina, alia eorum non _amat uxorem, filios, 
humana; alia est humana licita, alia __ fratres, vicinos, affines, amicos? 
ilicita, . . Prius ergo loquor de  Haec ergo humana est. St ergo tali 


humana licita, quae non reprehendi-  quisque crudelitate effertur, ut perdat 
tur; deinde de humana ilicita, quae etiam humanum dilectionis affectum, 


damnatur ; tertio de divina, quae nos et non amat filios suos,... nec 
berducit ad regnum.... Licitam inter homines numerandus est.” 
ergo caritatem habete;. humana est, CMignes| Pape XXXIX, 1520.) 

sed ut dixi licita, sed ita licita ut, 134 Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. 


si defuerit, reprehendatur. Liceat III, p. 23. 


82 ACTUAL GRACE 


liter bona), and that the theory of Ripalda *** is unten- 
able for this reason, if for no other, that the quoted 
passage is cited in Pius VI’s Bull “ Auctorem fidei.’ 1°6 


ARTICLE 2 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE FOR ALL SALUTARY ACTS 


Salutary acts (actus salutares) are those 
directed to the attainment of sanctifying grace 
and the supernatural end of man. 


According to this double purpose, salutary acts may be 
divided into two classes: (1) those that prepare for jus- 
tification (actus simpliciter salutares), and (2) those 
which, following justification, gain merits for Heaven 
(actus meritorit). 

In consequence of the supernatural character of the 
acts which they comprise, both these categories are dia- 
metrically opposed to that class of acts which are good 
only in a natural way,’ and hence must be carefully distin- 
guished from the latter. The Fathers did not, of course, 
employ the technical terms of modern theology; they 
had their own peculiar phrases for designating what we 
call salutary acts, e. g. agere sicut oportet vel expedit, 
agere ad salutem, agere ad iustificationem, agere ad vitam 
aeternam, etc.? 


I. PELAGIANISM.—Pelagianism started as a 
reaction against Manichaeism, but fell into the 


135 As explained above, pp. 71 , Augustinus, Vol. II, pp. 260 sqq., 


sqq. Freiburg 1909. 
136 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1824. Cir supra, “Art. 1. 
On the teaching of St. Augustine, 2On these and similar formulas 


see J. Mausbach, Die Ethik des hl. see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina 
Actuali, thes. 22. 


SE NECESSVUY OR ACTUAL, GRACE 83 


opposite extreme of exaggerating the capacity 
of human nature at the expense of eraces Nt 
denied original sin* and grace. 

As the necessity of grace for all salutary acts is 
a fundamental dogma of the Christian religion, 
the Church proceeded with unusual severity 
against Pelagian naturalism and condemned its 
vagaries through the mouth of many councils. 

a) Pelagius was a British lay monk, who came 
to Rome about the year 400 to propagate his er- 
roneous views.* He found a willing pupil in Ce- 
lestius, who after distinguishing himself as a 
lawyer, had been ordained to the priesthood at 
Ephesus, about 411. 


The Pelagian heresy gained another powerful champion 
in the person of Bishop Julian of Eclanum in Apulia. 
Its strongest opponent was St. Augustine. Under his 
powerful blows the Pelagians repeatedly changed their 
tactics, without however giving up their cardinal error 
in regard to grace. Their teaching on this point may be 
summarized as follows: The human will is able by 
its natural powers to keep all the commandments of God, 
to resist temptation, and to gain eternal life; in fact it 
can attain to a state of holiness and impeccability ® in 
which the petition “ Forgive us our trespasses ” no longer 
has any meaning except perhaps as an expression of hu- 
mility.© In so far, however, as free-will is itself a gift of 

3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- gianism ” in Vol. XI of the Catholic 
thor of Nature and the Supernatural, Encyclopedia. 
pp. 218 sqq. 5 Impeccantia, dvayaprnaia- 


4For details of his life see 6 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Haeres. 
J. Pohle, art. ‘‘Pelagius and Pela- ad Quodvultdeum, n. 88, 


\ 


84 ACTUAL GRACE 


the Creator, man can perform no good works without 
grace. Ata later period of his career Pelagius admitted 
the existence of merely external supernatural graces, 
such as revelation and the example of Christ and the 
saints,— which led St. Augustine to remark: “ This is 
the hidden and despicable poison of your heresy that 
you represent the grace of Christ as His example, not 
His gift, alleging that man is justified by imitating Him, 
not by the ministration of the Holy Spirit.”7 But even 
this external grace, according to Pelagius, does not con- 
fer the strength necessary to perform good works; it 
merely makes it easier to keep the commandments. 
Pelagius did not deny that justification and adoptive son- 
ship, considered in their ideal relation to the “ kingdom 
of Heaven,” as distinguished from “ eternal life,” ® are 
not identical in adults with the grace of creation, but he 
denied their gratuity by asserting that the free will is 
able to merit all these graces by its own power. 
Whatever. may have been the variations of Pelagian- 
ism, it is patent from the writings of St. Augustine that 
its defenders one and all rejected the necessity and exist- 
ence of the immediate grace of the will.1° Their attitude 
towards the illuminating grace of the intellect is in dis- 
pute. Some theologians ™ think the Pelagians admitted, 
others ** that they denied its existence. No matter what 


7“ Hoc est occultum et horren- 
dum virus haeresis vestrae, ut velitis 
gratiam Christi in exemplo eius esse, 
non in dono eius, dicentes quia per 
eius imitationem fiunt iusti, non per 
subministrationem Spiritus Sancti.” 
(S. Aug., Opus Imperf. contr. Iu- 
han, 13, 146.) 

8On the regnum coelorum in 
contradistinction to vita aeterna, in 
the teaching of Pelagius, see St. 


Augustine, De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., 
I, 18 sqq. 

9V. infra, Sect. 2. 

10 V. supra, p. 8. 

11E, g. Petavius, De Pelag. et 
Semipelag., c. 8 sq.; Wirceburg., 
De Gratia, n. 182; Palmieri, De 
Gratia Div. Actuali, pp. 140 sqq. 

12 Among them Suarez, Prolegom. 
de Gratia, c. 3, and J. Scheeben, 
Dogmatik, Vol. III, pp. 739 sq. 


PeT—y 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 8s 


they may have held on this point, there can be no doubt 
that the followers of Pelagius conceived the object of 
grace to be nothing more than to facilitate the work of 
salvation. 


b) Within the short span of twenty years (A. 
D. 411 to 431) no less than twenty-four councils 
occupied themselves with this new heresy. 


At first the wily heretic succeeded in deceiving the 
prelates assembled at Lydda (Diospolis), A. D. 415; but 
the bishops of Northern Africa, among them St. Augus- 
tine, roundly condemned his teaching at two councils held 
with the sanction of Pope Innocent I at Carthage and Mi- 
leve in 416. Shortly afterwards, deceived by the terms of 
the creeds and explanations which they circulated, Pope 
Zosimus (417-418) declared both Pelagius and Celestius 
to be innocent. Despite this intervention, however, two 
hundred African bishops, at a plenary council held at 
Carthage, A. D. 418, reiterated the canons of Mileve 
and submitted them for approval to the Holy See. These 
proceedings induced Zosimus to adopt stronger measures. 
In his Epistula Tractoria (418) he formally condemned 
Pelagianism and persuaded the Emperor to send Julian of 
Eclanum and seventeen other recalcitrant bishops into 
exile. The canons of Carthage and Mileve were subse- 
quently received by the universal Church as binding defi- 
nitions of the faith. The most important of them in re- 
gard to grace is this: “If anyone shall say that the 
grace of justification is given to us for the purpose of 
enabling us to do more easily by the aid of grace what 
we are commanded to do by free-will, as if we were able, 
also, though less easily, to observe the commandments of 


86 ACTUAL GRACE 


God without the help of grace, let him be anathema.” 
The Ecumenical Council of Ephesus (A.D. 431), with 
the approval of Pope Celestine I, renewed the condemna- 
tion of Celestius, but it was not until nearly a century later 
that Pelagianism received its death-blow. In 529 the Sec- 
ond Council of Orange defined: “If any one assert that 
he is able, by the power of nature, and without the illu- 
mination and inspiration of the Holy Ghost, who grants 
to all men the disposition believingly to accept the truth, 
rightly (ut expedit) to think or choose anything good 
pertaining to eternal salvation, or to assent to salutary, 
1. e. evangelical preaching, such a one is deceived by a 
heretical spirit.” "* This decision was reiterated by the 
Council of Trent: “If any one saith that the grace of 
God through Jesus Christ is given only for this, that man 
may be able more easily to live justly and to merit eternal 
life, as if by free-will without grace he were able to do 
both, though hardly indeed and with difficulty, let him be 
anathema.” + 


2. PELAGIANISM REFUTED.—Sacred Scripture 
and the Fathers plainly teach that man is unable 
to perform any salutary act by his own power. 


et inspiratione Spiritus Sancti, qui 
dat omnibus suavitatem in consen- 


18 “ Ouicunque dixerit, ideo nobis - 
gratiam tustificationis dari, ut quod 


facere per liberum iubemur arbitri- 
um facilius possimus implere per 
gratiam, tamquam etsi gratia non 
daretur, non quidem facile, sed 
tamen possimus etiam sine illa im- 
plere divina mandata, anathema sit.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 105.) 
14“ Si quis per naturae vigorem 


bonum aliquod, quod ad _ salutem 


pertinet vitae aeternae, cogitare ut 
expedit aut eligere sive salutari, i. e. 
evangelicae praedicationi consentire 
posse confirmat absque illuminatione 


tiendo et credendo veritati, haeretico 
falhtur spiritu.”” (Can. 7, quoted 
by Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 180.) 

15 Sess. VI, can. 2: “Si quis 
dixerit, ad hoc solum divinam gra- 
tiam per Iesum Christum dari, ut 
facilius homo iuste vivere ac vitam 
aeternam promereri possit, quasi per 
liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrum- 
que, sed aegre tamen et difficulter 
possit, anathema sit.” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 812.) 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 87 


a) Among the many Biblical texts that can 
be quoted in support of this statement, our 
Lord’s beautiful parable of the vine and its 
branches is especially striking. Cfr. John XV, 
4sq.: “As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, 
unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, un- 
less you abide in me. I am the vine; you the 
branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the 
same beareth much fruit: for without me you can 
do nothing.” *° 


a) The context shows that Jesus is not speaking here 
of purely natural works of the kind for which the 
concursus generalis of God suffices, but that He has in 
mind salutary acts in the strictly supernatural sense; 
and the truth He wishes to inculcate is that fallen nature 
cannot perform such acts except through Him and with 
His assistance. This supernatural influence is not, how- 
ever, to be understood exclusively of sanctifying or 
habitual grace, because our Divine Saviour refers to the 
fruits of justification and to salutary works. ‘“ Of these 
he does not say: ‘ Without me you can do but little,’ but: 
‘Without me you can do nothing.’ Be it therefore little 
or much, it cannot be done without Him, without whom 
nothing can be done.” 17 If this was true of the Apostles, 
who were in the state of sanctifying grace,!® it must be 


16 “' Sicut palmes non potest ferre 17 St. Augustine, Tract. in Ioa., 
fructum a semetipso, nist manserit 81, n. 3: “ Non ait, quia sine me 
in vite: sic nec Vos, nisi in me man- parum potestis facere, sed nihil 
seritis. Ego sum vitis, vos palmites:  potestis facere. Sive ergo parum 


qui manet in me, et ego in eo, hic sive mulium, sine illo fieri non pot- 
fert fructum multum:-quia sine me est, sine quo nihil fieri potest.” 
nihil potestis facere (dre xwpis 18 Cfr. John XV, 3. 

éuod ob divacbe Toteiy ovdéy).”- 


88 ACTUAL GRACE 


true a fortiori of sinners. Consequently, supernatural 
grace is absolutely necessary for the performance of any 
and all acts profitable for salvation. 


B) Nowhere is this fundamental truth so 
clearly and insistently brought out as in the 
epistles of St. Paul, who is preeminently ‘‘the 
Doctor of Grace” among the Apostles, 


There are, according to him, three categories of super- 
natural acts: salutary thoughts, holy resolves, and good 
works, 

St. Paul teaches that all right thinking is from God. 
2 Cor. III, 5: “Not that we are sufficient to think any- 
thing of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is 
from God.” 19 | 

Fe also declares that all good resolves come from above. 
Rom. IX, 15 sq.: “For he saith to Moses: I will have 
mercy on whom I will have mercy; and I will shew 
mercy to whom I will shew mercy. So then it is not of 
him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that 
sheweth mercy.” ?° 

He furthermore asserts that all good works come from 
God. Phil. II, 13: “ For it is God who worketh in you, 
both to will and to accomplish, according to his good 
will.” ** 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No man can say: Lord 
Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost.” 22 Pronouncing the 


19“ Non quod sufficientes simus, 
cogitare aliquid a nobis quasi ex 
nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Déo 
est.” On this text cfr. Cornely, 
Comment. in h. 1., Paris 1892. 

20“ Moysi enim dicit: Miserebor 
cuius misereor et misericordiam prae- 
stabo cuius miserebor. Igitur non 
volentis neque currentis (ob Tov 
OéXovros ode Tov TpéxovTOS), sed 


miserentis est Dei.” (Rom. IX, rs 
sq.) 

21“ Deus est enim, qui operatur 
in vobis et velle et perficere (kad 
TO OéNew Kat 7d évepyeiv) pro 
bona voluntate.” (Phil. II, 13.) 

22“ Nemo potest dicere: Dominus 
Tesus, nisi in Spiritu Sancto.” (1 
Cor, XID a:) 


THE NECESSITY @F ACTUAL GRACE? (89 


holy name of Jesus is obviously regarded as a salu- 
tary act, because mere physical utterance does not require 
the assistance of the Holy Ghost.?* But the act as a salu- 
tary act is physically impossible without divine assistance, 
because it is essentially supernatural and consequently 
exceeds the powers of nature.24 


b) The argument from Tradition is based 
almost entirely on the authority of St. Augustine, 
in whom, as Liebermann observes, God wrought a 
miracle of grace that he might become its pow- 
erful defender. There is no need of quoting spe- 
cific texts because this whole treatise is inter- 
larded with Augustinian dicta concerning the ne- 
cessity of grace. 


a) An important point is to prove that the early Fath- 
ers held the Augustinian, 7. e. Catholic view. It stands 
to reason that if these Fathers had taught a different 
doctrine, the Church would not have so vehemently re- 
jected Pelagianism as an heretical innovation. Augustine 
himself insists on the novelty of the Pelagian teaching. 
“Such is the Pelagian heresy,” he says, “ which is not an 
ancient one, but has only lately come into existence.” 2° 
And this view is confirmed by Pope Celestine I, who de- 
clares in his letter to the Bishops of Gaul CA Diagn): 
“ This being the state of the question, novelty should cease 
to attack antiquity.” 

In fact the teaching of the Apostolic Fathers, although 

23 Cfr. Matth. VII, 21; VIII, 29. c. 4: “Talis est haeresis pelagiana, 

24 Others explain. the passage 1 non antiqua, sed ante non multum 
Cor. XII, 3 differently, Cfr. also tempus exorta.’’ 

Ron. VITI (26; Phil, if, 63-Epha I, 26 “ Desinat, si res ita sunt, in- 


5 sqq. : cessere novitas vetustatem.” 
25 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, 


90 ACTUAL GRACE 


less explicit, agrees entirely with that of Augustine. 
Thus St. Irenaeus says: “As the dry earth, if it re- 
ceives no moisture, does not bring forth fruit, so we, 
being dry wood, could never bear fruit for life without 
supernatural rain freely given. ... The blessing of sal- 
vation comes to us from God, not from ourselves.” ?7 

The necessity of grace is indirectly inculcated by the 
Church when she petitions God to grant salutary graces 
to all men — a most ancient and venerable practice, which 
Pope St. Celestine explains as follows: ‘The law of 
prayer should determine the law of belief. For when the 
priests of holy nations administer the office entrusted to 
them, asking God for mercy, they plead the cause of the 
human race, and together with the whole Church ask and 
pray that the unbelievers may receive the faith, that the 
idolaters may be freed from the errors of their impiety, 
that the veil be lifted from the heart of the Jews, and 
they be enabled to perceive the light of truth, that the 
heretics may return to their senses by a true percep- 
tion of the Catholic faith, that the schismatics may receive 
the spirit of reborn charity, that the sinners be granted 
the remedy of penance, and that the door of heavenly 
mercy be opened to the catechumens who are led to the 
sacraments of regeneration.” *° In matters of salvation 


27 Adv. Haer., III, 17, 2: “* Sicut 
arida terra, si non percipiat hu- 


morem, non fructificat, sic et nos — 


lignum aridum existentes nunquam 
fructificaremus vitam sine superna 
voluntaria pluvia. ... Non a nobis, 
sed a Deo est bonum salutis nostrae.” 

28‘° Legem credendi lex statuat 
supbplicandit. Quum enim sanctarum 
plebium praesules madaté sibi lega- 
tione fungantur apud divinam cle- 
mentiam, humani generis agunt 
causam et tota secum Ecclesia con- 


gemiscente postulant et precantur, 
ut infidelibus donetur fides, ut ido- 
lolatrae ab impietatis suae liberentur 
erroribus, ut Iudaeis ablato cordis 
velamine lux veritatis appareat, ut 
haeretici catholicae fidei perceptione 
resipiscant, ut schismatici spiritum 
redivivae caritatis accipiant, ut lapsis 
poenitentiae remedia conferantur, ut 
denique catechumenis ad regenera- 
tionis sacramenta perductis coeles- 
tis misericordiae aula reseretur.” 
(Migne, Ph.) £.5 XLV, 1759.) 


=e — 
oS 


Se ee 


sada ete ai 


Mt 


Hb NECBSSITY’ GR ACTUAL GRACE) ison 


prayer and grace are correlative terms; the practice of the 
one implies the necessity and gratuity of the other.* 


B) That the Fathers not only conceived grace 
to be necessary for the cure of weakness induced 
by sin (gratia sanans) in a merely moral sense, 
but thought it to be metaphysically necessary for 
the communication of physical strength (gratia 
elevans ), is evidenced by such oft-recurring sim1- 
les as these: Grace is as necessary for salvation 
as the eye is to see, or as wings are to fly, or as 
rain is for the growth of plants. 


It will suffice to quote a passage from the writings of 
St. Chrysostom. ‘ The eyes,” he says, “ are beautiful and 
useful for seeing, but if they would attempt to see without 
light, all their beauty and visual power would avail them 
nothing. Thus, too, the soul is but an obstacle in its own 
way if it endeavors to see without the Holy Ghost.” *° 

This view is strengthened by the further teaching of 
the Fathers that supernatural grace was as indispensable 
to the angels in their state of probation (in which they 
were free from concupiscence) and to our first parents 
in Paradise (gifted as they were with the donum inte- 
gritatis), as it is to fallen man; the only difference being , 
that in the case of the latter, grace has the additional ob- 
ject of curing the infirmities and overcoming the diff- 
culties arising from concupiscence. In regard to the 
angels St. Augustine says: “ And who made this will but 
He who created them with a good will, that is to say with 
a chaste love by which they should cleave to Him, in one 


29 For additional Patristic texts see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina 
Actuali, thes. 26. 80 Hom. im 1. Cor, 7. 


92 ACTUAL GRACE 


and the same act creating their nature and endowing it 
with grace? ... We must therefore acknowledge, with 
the praise due to the Creator, that not only of holy men, 
but also of the holy angels, it can be said that ‘ the love of 
God is shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost, 
who is given unto them.’ ” *1 

Equally convincing is the argument that Adam in Para- 
dise was unable to perform any salutary acts without 
divine grace. “ Just as it is in man’s power to die when- 
ever he will,” says St. Augustine, “. . . but the mere will 
cannot preserve life in the absence of food and the other 
means of life; so man in Paradise was able of his mere 
will, simply by abandoning righteousness, to destroy him- 
self; but to have led a life of righteousness would have 
been too much for his will, unless it had been sus- 
tained by the power of Him who made him.” *2 

This is also the teaching of the Second Council of Or- 
ange (A.D. 529): “ Even if human nature remained in 
the state of integrity, in which it was constituted, it would 
in no wise save itself without the help of its Creator. 
If it was unable, without the grace of God, to keep what 
it had received, how should it be able without the grace 
of God to regain what it has lost?” 33 
-.. ad vitam vero tenendam 


voluntas non satis est, si adiutoria 
sive alimentorum sive quorumcunque 


31De Civitate Dei, XII, 9: velit, 
“Istam [bonam voluntatem] quis 
fecerat nisi ille, qui eos cum bona 


voluntate, i, e. cum amore casto quo 
tlh adhaererent creavit, simul eis et 
condens naturam et largiens gra- 
tiam? ... Confitendum est igitur 
cum debita laude Creatoris, non ad 
solos  sanctos homines  pertinere, 
verum etiam de sanctis angelis 
posse dici, quod caritas Dei diffusa 
Sit in eis per Spiritum Sanctum, qui 
datus est eis.”’ 

32 Enchiridion, ec. 106: “ Sicut 
mort est in hominis potestate, quum 


tutaminum desint, sic homo in pa- 
radiso ad se occidendum relinquendo 
iustitiam idoneus erat per volunta- 
tem; ut autem ab eo teneretur vita 
iustitiae, parum erat velle nisi ille, 
qui eum fecerat, adiuvaret.” 
33Can. 19: “ Natura humana, 
etiamsi in illa ivtegritate in qua est 
condita permaneret, nullo modo seip- 
sam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, 
servaret. Unde quum sine gratia 
Dei salutem non possit custodire 


THE: NECESSITY: OF ACTUAL GRACE 193 


c) The theological argument for the meta- 
physical necessity of grace is based on the essen- 
tially supernatural character of all salutary acts. 


a) St. Thomas formulates it as follows: “ Eternal 
life is an end transcending the proportion of human 
nature, . . . and therefore man, by nature, can perform 
no meritorious works proportioned to eternal life, but 
requires for this purpose a higher power,—the power 
of grace. Consequently, man cannot merit eternal life 
without grace. He is, however, able to perform acts 
productive of some good connatural to man, such as till- 
ing the soil, drinking, eating, acts of friendship, etc.” *4 
For the reason here indicated it is as impossible for man 
to perform salutary acts without grace as it would be to 
work miracles without that divine assistance which trans- 
cends the powers of nature.*® 

B) Catholic theologians are unanimous in admitting 
that all salutary acts are and must needs be supernatural ; 
but they differ in their conception of this supernatural 
quality (supernaturalitas). The problem underlying this 
difference of opinion may be stated thus: A thing may 


quae accepit, quomodo sine Dei manae...et ideo homo per sua 
gratia poterit reparare quod per- naturalia non potest producere opera 
didit?’’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. meritoria proportionata vitae 


192.)— St. Augustine holds that our 
first parents would have been able 
to preserve the state of grace by 
the divine adiutorium sine quo non, 
and that consequently the adiutorium 
quo would have been superfluous 
to them. On this subtle question 
cfr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, 
Vol. V, pp. 55 sqq., and Schiffini, 
De‘ Gratia Divina, pp. 472 sqq. 

34 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, 
art. 5: “Vita aeterna est finis ex- 
cedens proportionem naturae  hu- 


aeternae; sed ad hoc exigitur altior 
virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et 
ideo sine gratia homo non potest 
merert vitam aeternam. Potest 
tamen facere opera perducentia ad 
bonum aliquod homini connaturale, 
sicut laborare in agro, bibere, man- 
ducare et habere amicum et alia 
huiusmodi.” ; 

35 For the necessary Augustinian 
citations in proof of this assertion 
see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Ac- 
tual, pp. 174 sqq. 


04 AC UUALTGR AGE 


be supernatural either entitatively, quoad substantiam, or 
merely as to the manner of its existence, quoad modum. 
The supernaturale quoad substantiam is divided into the 
strictly supernatural and the merely preternatural.** The 
question is: To what category of the supernatural be- 
long the salutary acts which man performs by the aid of 
grace? Undoubtedly there are actual graces which are 
entitatively natural, e. g. the purely mediate grace of il- 
lumination,*’ the natural graces conferred in the pure state 
of nature, the actual graces of the sensitive sphere,** and 
the so-called cogitatio congrua of Vasquez.*® ‘The 
problem therefore narrows itself down to the t- 
mediate graces of intellect and will. Before the Tri- 
dentine Council theologians contented themselves with 
acknowledging the divinely revealed fact that these graces 
are supernatural ; it was only after the Council that they 
began to speculate on the precise character of this super- 
naturalitas. 

Some, following the teaching of the Scotist school, 
ascribed the supernatural character of salutary acts to 
their free acceptation on the part of God, holding them to 
be purely natural in their essence and raised to the super- 
natural sphere merely per denominationem extrinse- 
cam.*° This view is untenable. For if nature, as such, 
possessed the intrinsic power to perform salutary acts, 
irrespective of their acceptation by God, the Fathers 
and councils would err in teaching that this power is 
derived from the immediate graces of illumination and 
strengthening.* 


36 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- self with regard to this point cfr. 
thor of Nature and the Supernatural, P. Minges, O.F.M., Die Gnaden- 


pp. 186 sqq. lehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren 
87 V. supra, pp. 20. angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semi- 
38 V. supra, pp. 26 sq. pelagianismus gepriift, Minster 1906. 
39 V. supra, pp. 69 sqq. 41 This is true of man even in the 


40 On the teaching of Scotus him- exalted state in which he existed in 


PHE NECHSSIVY) OP VAC TUAL GRACE 95 


Others hold that the salutary acts which grace enables 
man to perform, are supernatural only quoad modum; 
because while it is the Holy Ghost Himself who incites 
the natural faculties to salutary thoughts and good re- 
solves, He does not eo ipso raise these thoughts and re- 
solves to the supernatural plane. This theory, besides be- 
ing open to the same objection which we have urged 
against the first, involves another difficulty. If all salu- 
tary acts were supernatural only quoad modum, sanctify- 
ing grace, which is as certainly supernatural in its essence 
as the beatific vision of God,!2 would cease to have an 
adequate purpose; for the intrinsic reason for its exist- 
ence is precisely that it raises the nature of the justified 
into a permanent supernatural state of being. 

A third school of theologians tries to solve the difficulty 
by adding to the natural operation of the intellect and the 
will some accidental supernatural modus. There are sev- 
eral such modi, which, though inhering in nature and 
really distinct therefrom, depend solely on the Holy 
Ghost, and consequently transcend the natural powers of 
man, e. g. the duration or intensity of a salutary act. 
This theory at first blush appears more plausible than the 
other two, but it cannot be squared with the teaching of 
Tradition. In the first place, the duration or intensity 
of a salutary act cannot affect its essence or nature. 
Then again, every such accidental supernatural modus is 
produced either by grace alone, or by grace working con- 
jointly with free-will. In the former hypothesis it would 
be useless, because it would not render the free salutary 
act, as such, supernatural; in the latter case it could do no 


Paradise. It is true also of the 42 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
angels. It is true even of the hu- thor of Nature and the Supernatural, 
man nature of our Lord Jesus Christ pp. 190 sqq. 

Himself. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Christ- 

ology, pp. 221 sqq. 


96 ACTUAL GRACE 


more than aid the will to do what is morally impossible, 
whereas every salutary act is in matter of fact a physical 
impossibility, that is, impossible to unaided nature.* 

There remains a fourth explanation, which ascribes to 
every salutary act an ontological, substantial, intrinsic 
supernaturalitas, whereby it is elevated to a higher and 
essentially different plane of being and operation. This 
theory is convincingly set forth by Suarez in his treatise 
on the Necessity of Grace.** 

It may be asked: If the salutary acts which we 
perform are supernatural in substance, why are we not 
conscious of the fact? The answer is not far to seek. 
Philosophical analysis shows that the intrinsic nature of 
our psychic operations is no more a subject of immedi- 
ate consciousness than the substance of the soul itself. 
Consequently, sanctifying grace cannot reveal its pres- 
ence through our inner consciousness. Having no in- 
tuitive knowledge of our own Ego, we are compelled 
to specify the different acts of the soul by means of their 
respective objects and their various tendencies (cogni- 
tion, volition). To our consciousness the supernatural 
love of God does not present itself as essentially different 
from the natural.* 


ARTICLE 3 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE FOR THE STATES OF 
UNBELIEF, MORTAL SIN, AND JUSTIFICATION 


Every adult man, viewed in his relation to actual 
grace, is in one of three distinct states: 


43 Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Ac- 45 On the whole subject of this 
tuah, p. 184. Article cfr. S. Schiffini, De Gratia 
44 Suarez, De Necessitate Gratiae, Divina, pp. 227 sqq.; Rademacher, 
List 4. Natur und Gnade, M. Gladbach 1908. 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 97 


(1) The state of unbelief (status infidelitatis), which 
may be either negative, as in the case of heathens, or 
positive, as in the case of apostates and formal heretics; 

(2) The state of mortal sin (status peccati mortalis), 
when the sinner has already received, or not yet lost, 
the grace of faith, which is the beginning of justifica- 
tion ; 

(3) The state of justification itself (status iustitiae 
sive gratiae sanctificantis), in which much remains yet 
to be done to attain eternal happiness. 

The question we have now to consider is: Does man 
need actual grace in every one of these three states, and 
if so, to what extent? 


I. SEMIPELAGIANISM.—Semipelagianism is an 
attempt to effect a compromise between Pelagian- 
ism and Augustinism by attributing to mere na- 
ture a somewhat greater importance in matters of 
salvation than St. Augustine was willing to ad- 
mit. 


a) After Augustine had for more than twenty years 
vigorously combatted and finally defeated Pelagianism, 
some pious monks of Marseilles,. under the leadership 
of John Cassian, Abbot of St. Victor,’ tried to find 
middle ground between his teaching and that of the 
Pelagians. Cassian’s treatise Collationes Patrum,? and 
the reports sent to St. Augustine by his disciples Pros- 
per and Hilary, enable us to form a pretty fair idea of 
the Semipelagian system. Its principal tenets were the 
following: 

1 Died 432. On his life and works 2 Reproduced in Migne, P.. L., 


see Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, XLIX, 477-1328. 
Pp- 515 sqq. 


98 ACTUAL GRACE 


a) There is a distinction between the “ beginning of 
faith” (initium fide, affectus credulitatis) and “ increase | 
in faith” (augmentum fide). The former depends en- 
tirely on the will, while the latter, like faith itself, re-. 
quires the grace of Christ. ) 

8B) Nature can merit grace by its own efforts, though 
this natural merit (meritum naturae) is founded on 
equity only (meritum de congruo), and does not confer 
a right in strict justice, as Pelagius contended. 

y) Free-will, after justification, can of its own power 
secure the gift of final perseverance (donum perseve- 
rantiae) ; which consequently is not a special grace, but 
a purely natural achievement. 

8) The bestowal or denial of baptismal grace in the case 
of infants, who can have no previous merita de congruo, 
depends on their hypothetical future merits or demerits as 
foreseen by God from all eternity.® 


b) Informed of these errors by his disciples, St. 
Augustine energetically set to work, and in spite 
of his advanced age wrote two books against the 
Semipelagians, entitled respectively, De Praedes- 
tinatione Sanctorum and De Dono Perseve- 
rantiae. The new teaching was not yet, however, 
regarded as formally heretical, and Augustine 
treated his opponents with great consideration, 
in fact he humbly acknowledged that he himself 


3 This contention is false, but it  servarentur vitam, scientia divina 
has never been proscribed as hereti- praeviderit.”’ On this absurd asser- 
cal. Prosper says in his Ep. 226, 5: tion see Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
“Tales aiunt perdi talesque [in- Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 
fantes] salvari, quales futuros illos pp. 380 sa. 

im annis maioribus, st ad activam 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL. GRACE «99 


had professed similar errors before his consecra- 
from (01), 204) .4 

After Augustine’s death, Prosper and Hilary 
went to Rome and interested Pope Celestine in 
their cause. In a dogmatic letter addressed to 
the Bishops of Gaul, the Pontiff formally ap- 
proved the teaching of St. Augustine on grace and 
original sin, but left open such other “more pro- 
found and difficult incidental questions” as pre- 
destination and the manner in which grace ope- 
rates inthe soul.’ But as this papal letter (called 
“Indiculus’) was an instruction rather than an 
ex-cathedra definition, the controversy continued 
until, nearly a century later (A.D. 529), the 
Second Council of Orange, convoked by St. 
Caesarius of Arles, formally condemned the Semi- 
pelagian heresy. This council, or at least its first 
eight canons,° received the solemn approbation of 
Pope Boniface II (A. D. 530) and thus became 
vested with ecumenical authority.’ 

2. [HE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—The 
Catholic Church teaches the absolute necessity of 
actual grace for all stages on the way to salva- 


4De Praedest. Sanctorum, c. 3, 
n. 7: “. .. putans fidem, qua in 
Deum credimus, non esse donum 


6Ernst (Werke und Tugenden 
der Ungliubigen nach Augustinus, 
Freiburg 1871) contends that the 


Det, sed a nobis esse in nobis et 
per tllam nos impetrare Dei dona, 
quibus temperanter et iuste et pie 
vivamus in hoc saeculo.’’ 
5Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, 


En- 
chiridion, n. 128 sqq. x 


approbation of Boniface II comprised 
all the canons of this synod. 

7 Cfr. F, Worter, Zur Dogmenge- 
schichte des  Semipelagianismus, 
Miinster 1900, 


100 ACTUAL GRACE 

tion. We shall demonstrate this in five separate 

theses. . 
Thesis I: Prevenient grace is absolutely necessary, 


not only for faith, but for the very beginning of faith. 


This is de fide. 

Proof. The Second Council of Orange defined 
against the Semipelagians: “If any one say that 
increase in faith, as well as the beginning of faith, 
and the very impulse by which we are led to be- 
lieve in Him who justifies the sinner, and by which 
we obtain the regeneration of holy Baptism, is in 
us not as a gift of grace, that is to say, through 
the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, but by nature, 

. . is an adversary of the dogmatic teaching of 
theiApostles, 22.5)" 

a) This is thoroughly Scriptural doctrine, as 
St. Augustine? and Prosper proved. 5t. 
Paul’s first epistle to the Corinthians had opened 
the eyes of Augustine, as he himself admits. 1 
Gor, IV,:72 .For ‘who: distingnisheth * theer™ 
Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? 
And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, 
as if thou hadst not received it?’ The Apostle 


8 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 5 (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 178): “Si quis 
sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium 
fidei ipsumque credulitatis affectum, 
quo in eum credimus qui tustificat 
impium et ad regenerationem sacri 
baptismatis pervenimus, non per 
gratiae donum, i. e. per inspirationem 
Spiritus S.,... sed naturaliter nobis 


inesse dicit, apostolicis dogmatibus 
adversarius approbatur.”’ Cr. Conc. 
Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 3. (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 1791). 

9In his treatise De Praedestina- 
tione Sanctorum. 

10In his work Adversus Colla- 
torem. 

11 Discernit, Siaxpiver. 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE io! 


means tosay: In matters pertaining to salvation 
no man has any advantage over his fellow men, 
because all receive of the grace of God without 
any merits of their own. This statement would 
be false if any man were able to perform even the 
smallest salutary act without the aid of grace. 


With a special view to faith the same Apostle teaches: 
“For by grace you are saved through faith,? and that 
not of yourselves,'* for it is the gift of God; not of 
works, that no man may glory.” 1° This, too, would be 
false if faith could be traced to a purely natural in- 
stinct or to some meritum de congruo in the Semi- 
pelagian sense.*7 Our Lord Himself, in his famous 
discourse on the Holy Eucharist, unmistakably describes 
faith and man’s preparation for it as an effect of pre- 
venient grace. “No man can come to me, except the 
Father, who hath sent me, draw him.” ?8 The meta- 
phorical expression “come to me,” according to the con- 
text, means “believe in me;’ whereas the Father’s 
“drawing” plainly refers to the operation of prevenient 
grace. Cfr. John VI, 65 sq.: ‘‘ But there are some of 
you that believe not. ... Therefore did I say to you, 
that no man can come to me, unless it be given him 
by the Father.” John VI, 29: “This is the work of 
God,’ that you believe in him whom he hath sent.” Ac- 
cording to our Saviour’s own averment, therefore, 
preaching is of no avail unless grace gives the first impulse 
leading to faith. 


12 Per fidem, Sia wiorews: 17, Cie; Romy thre. Zoi sags Lx. 
13 Non ex vobis, odx é& Dav. 75 sqq. 

14 Det donum, Oeov Td dapov. 18 John VI, 44: ‘‘ Nemo potest 
15 Non ex operibus, ovx é& épyw- venire ad me, nist Pater, qui misit 


16 Eph. II, 8 sq. me, traxertt (EXkvon) eum.” 


19 Opus Dei, 7d Epyov Tov Qeov- 


102 ACTUAL GRACE 


b) As regards the argument from Tradition, it 
will suffice to show that the Fathers who wrote 
before Augustine, ascribed the beginning of faith 
to prevenient grace. 


a) In the light of the Augustinian dictum that “ prayer 
is the surest proof of grace,” ?° it is safe to assume that 
St. Justin Martyr voiced our dogma when he put into the 
mouth of a venerable old man the words: “ But thou 
pray above all that the gates of light may be opened 
unto thee; for no man is able to understand the words 
of the prophets [as praeambula fidei] unless God and His 
Christ have revealed their meaning.” 74 Augustine him- 
self appeals to SS. Cyprian, Ambrose, and Gregory of 
Nazianzus, and then continues: “Such doctors, and so 
great as these, saying that there is nothing of which we 


may boast as of our own, which God has not given 


us; and that our very heart and our thoughts are not 
in our own power, ... attribute these things to the 
grace of God, acknowledge them as God’s gifts, testify 
that they come to us from Him and are not from our- 
pelviens 1/47 

B) Like the Pelagians in their teaching on original 
sin,?? the Semipelagians in their teaching on grace re- 
lied mainly on the authority of St. John Chrysostom, 
from whose writings they loved to quote such perplex- 
ing passages as this: “ We must first select the good, 


20Ep., 177: “ Oratio est clarise stra esse,... haec utique gratiae 


sima gratiae testificatio.” 

21 Dial. c. Tryph. 

22 De Dono Persev., c. 19, N. 50: 
“« Tsti tales tantique doctores dicentes 
non esse aliquid, de quo tamquam de 
nostro quod nobis Deus non dederit 
gloriemur nec ipsum cor nostrum et 
cogitationes nostras in potestate na- 


Dei tribuunt, Det munera agnoscunt, 
ab ipso nobis, non a nobis esse tes- 
tantur.’— For additional Patristic 
texts see Palmieri, De Gratia Div. 
Act., pp. 290 sqq. 

23 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, pp. 239 Sqq. 


JHE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE ‘102 


and then God adds what ‘is of His; He does not forestall 
our will because He does not wish to destroy our lib- 
erty. But once we have made our choice, He gives us 
much help. For while it rests with us to choose and to 
will antecedently, it lies with him to perfect and bring to 
ampissue./ 

To understand St. Chrysostom’s attitude, and that 
of the Oriental Fathers generally, we must remember 
that the Eastern Church considered it one of its chief 
duties to safeguard the dogma of free-will against the 
Manichaeans, who regarded man as an abject slave 
of Fate. In such an environment it was of supreme 
importance to champion the freedom of the will 25 and 
to insist on the maxim: “Help yourself and God will 
help you.” If the necessity of prevenient grace was 
not sufficiently emphasized, the circumstances of the time 
explain, and to some extent excuse, the mistake. St. Au- 
gustine himself remarks in his treatise on the Predestina- 
tion of the Saints: “ What need is there for us to look 
into the writings of those who, before this heresy sprang 
up, had no necessity of dwelling on a question so difficult 
of solution as this, which beyond a doubt they would do 
if they were compelled to answer such [errors as these] ? 
Whence it came about that they touched upon what they 
thought of God’s grace briefly and cursorily in some pas- 
sages of their writings.” 2° Palmieri remarks 2? that it 
would be easy to cite a number of similar passages from 
the writings of the early Latin Fathers before Pelagius, 


24 Hom. in Heb., 12, n. 3. 

25 V. infra, Ch. III, Sect. 1. 

26De Praedest. Sanct., c. 14: 
* Quid opus est ut eorum scrutemur 
opuscula, qui priusquam ista haeresis 
oriretur, non habuerunt necessitatem 
in hac difficili ad solvendum quaes- 


tione versari? Quod procul dubio 
facerent, si respondere talibus coge- 
rentur. Unde factum est, ut de 
gratia Dei quid sentirent breviter 
quibusdam scriptorum suorum locis 
et transeunter aitingerent.’’ 

27 De Gratia Div. Act., p. 288. 


104. ACTUAL. GRACE 


who certainly cannot be suspected of Semipelagian lean- 
ings.*® | 
The orthodoxy of St. Chrysostom 
established by a twofold argument. 
the First recommended him as a reliable defender of 
the Catholic faith against Nestorianism and Pelagian- 
‘ism.2® (2) Chrysostom rejected Semipelagianism as it 
were in advance when he taught: “ Not even faith 1s 
of ourselves; for if He [God] had not come, if He had 
not called, how should we have been able to believe?” *° 
and again when he says in his explanation of the Pau- 
line phrase dpxyyds 79s wiorews: + “ He Himself hath 
implanted the faith in us, He Himself hath given the 
beginning.” *? These utterances are diametrically op- 
posed to the heretical teaching of the Semipelagians.” 


can be positively 


c) The theological argument for our thesis is 
effectively formulated by Oswald * as follows: 
“Tt is faith which first leads man from the sphere 
of nature into a higher domain,—faith is the be- 
ginning of salutary action. That this beginning 
must come wholly from God, and that it cannot 
come from man, goes without saying. By be- 
ginning we mean the very first beginning. 
Whether we call this first beginning itself faith, 
or speak, as the Semipelagians did, of certain pre- 


(1) Pope Celestine | | 


28 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- 
naturali, 1, I, disp. 17, sect. IT. 

29 Ep., 24 (to Maximilian, Pa- 
triarch of Constantinople): “ Se- 
quere priorum, a quibus eruditus es 
et nutritus, exempla pontificum, 
beatissimi Ioannis scientiam, sanctt 
Attici in repugnandis haeresibus vigt- 
lantiam.” 


30 Hom. in 1 Cor., XII, n. 2. 

31 Hom. in Ep. ad Hebr., XII, 2. 

32 A’ros év quiv twiotiy évéOnoer; 
avros THY apxny Edwker. 

33 They are fully explained by Pal- 
mieri, J. c., pp. 295 sqq. 

34 Die Lehre von der Heiligung, 
p. 161, Paderborn 1885. 


His NECESSITY OR ACTUAL GRACE 105 


ambles of faith,—aspirations, impulses, desires 
leading to faith (praeambula fidei: conatus, desi- 
deria, credulitatis affectus), makes no difference. 
Wherever the supernatural domain of salutary 
action begins—and it is divided off from the 
natural by a very sharp line—there it is God who 
begins and not man, there it is grace which pre- 
cedes,—gratia praeveniens, as it has come to be 
_ known by a famous term.” 


Indeed, if man were able by his own power to merit 
for himself the first beginnings of grace, then faith it- 
self, and justification which is based on faith, and the 
_ beatific vision, would not be strictly graces. 

As for the precise moment when prevenient grace be- 
gins its work in the soul, the common Opinion is that 
the very first judgment which a man forms as to the 
credibility of divine revelation (iudicium credubilitatis ) 
is determined by the immediate grace of the intellect,% 
and that the subsequent affectus credulitatis springs from 
the strengthening grace of the will. St. Augustine, 
commenting on 2 Cor. III, 5, demonstrates this as fol- 
lows: 
_ “Let them give attention to this, and well weigh 

these words, who think that the beginning of faith is 
of ourselves, and the increase of faith is of God. For 
who cannot see that thinking is prior to believing? For 
no one believes anything unless he has first thought that 
it is to be believed. . . . Therefore, in what pertains to 
religion and piety [of which the Apostle was speaking], 
if we are not capable of thinking anything as of our- 
selves, but our sufficiency is of God, we are certainly not 


35 V. supra, pp. 19 sqq., 27 sq. 


106 ACTUAL GRACE 


capable of believing anything as of ourselves, since we 
cannot do this without thinking, but our sufficiency, by 
which we begin to believe, is of God.” *° 


Thesis II: The sinner, even after he has received 
the faith, stands in absolute need of prevenient and co- 
operating grace for every single salutary act required 
in the process of justification. 


This proposition also embodies an article of 
faith. 

Proof. The Semipelagians ascribed the dispo- 
sitions necessary for justification to the natural 
efforts of the will, thereby denying the necessity 
of prevenient grace. This teaching was con- 
demned as heretical by the Second Council of Or- 
ange (A. D. 529),*" and again by the Council of 
Trent, which defined: “If any one saith that 
without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy 
Ghost, and without His help, man can believe, 
hope, love, or be penitent as he ought, so that the 
erace of justification may be bestowed upon him; 
let him be anathema.” ** 


36 De Praedest. Sanct., c. 2, N. 5: 


“ Attendant hic et verba perpendant, — 


qui putant ex nobis esse fidet coep- 
tum et ex Deo esse fidei supplemen- 
tum. Quis enim non videat prius 
esse cogitare quam credere? Nullus 
quippe credit aliquid nist prius 
cogitaverit esse credendum...- 
Quod ergo pertinet ad religionem 
atque pietatem, si non sumus idonet 
cogitare aliquid quasi ex nobismet 
ipsis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo 
est, profecto non sumus idonet 


credere aliquid quasi ex nobismet a 


ipsis, quod sine cogitatione non 
possumus, sed sufficientia nostra, qua 
credere incipiamus, ex Deo est.”’— 
Cfr., also the seventh canon of the 
Second Council of Orange (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, mn. 180), and 
Suarez, De Fide, disp. 6, sect. 7 Sq. 
Ipem, De Gratia, III, 7. 

37 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 7. 

38 Sess. VI, can. 3: “Si quis 
dixerit, sine praeveniente Spiritus 
Sancti inspiratione atque eis adiu- 


THE NECESSITY OBJ ACTUAL, GRACE 107 


a) The Scriptural texts which we have quoted 
against Pelagianism *° also apply to the semipelas. 
gian heresy. 


Our Lord’s dictum: “ Without me you can do noth- 
ing,” *° proves the necessity of prevenient and co-operat- 
ing grace, not only at the beginning of every salutary 
act, but also for its continuation and completion. 
St. Augustine clearly perceived this. “ That he might 
tarnish a reply to the future Pelagius,”’ he observes, 

our Lord does not say: Without me you can with dif- 
ficulty do anything; but He says: Without me you can 
do nothing. . . . He does not say: Without me you can 
perfect nothing, but do nothing. For if He had said 
perfect, they might say that God’s aid is necessary, not 
for beginning good, which is of ourselves, but for per- 
fecting it. . For when the Lord says, Without me 
you can a6 nie ae in this one word He comprehends 
both the fernnaay oA the, end://}43 

St. Paul expressly ascribes the salvation of man to 
grace when he says: “... with fear and trembling 
work out your salvation; for it is God who worketh in 
you, both to will and to accomplish.” 4? 

The Tridentine Council, as we have seen, designates 
the four salutary acts of faith, hope, love, and penitence 
as a preparation for justification. Now St. Paul teaches: 


difficile potestis facere, sed ait: Sine 
me nihil potestis facere.... Non 


torio hominem credere, sperare, di- 
ligere aut poenitere posse, sicut 
oportet, ut et iustificationis gratia ait: 


conferatur, anathema sit.’? (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 813.) 

89 Supra, pp. 87 sqq. 

40 John XV, 5: “Sine me nihil 
potestis facere.’’ 

41 Contra Duas Epistolas Pelag., 
II, 8:° “Dominus ut responderet 
futuro Pelagio non ait: Sine me 


sine me nihil potestis perficere, 
sed facere. Hoc uno verbo initium 
finemque comprehendit.’’ 

42 Phil. II, 12 sqi: “ Cum-metu 
et tremore vestram salutem 
(cwrnpiav) operamini; Deus est 
enim quit operatur in vobis et velle 
et perficere.”’ 


108 ACTUAL: GRACE 


“The God of hope fill you with all joy and peace in be- 
lieving, that you may abound in hope and in the power 
of the Holy Ghost;’** and St. John: “Charity is of 
God") 4* 


b) The argument from Tradition is chiefly 
based on St. Augustine, who in his two treatises 
against the Semipelagians, and likewise in his 
earlier writings, inculcates the necessity of grace 
for all stages on the way to salvation. 


Thus he writes in his Enchiridion: “Surely, if no 
Christian will dare to say this: It is not of God that 
showeth mercy, but of man that willeth, lest he should 
openly contradict the Apostle, it follows that the true 
interpretation of the saying (Rom. IX, 16): ‘It is not 
of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of 
God that showeth mercy,’ is that the whole work be- 
longs to God, who both prepares the good will that is to 
be helped, and assists it when it is prepared. For the good 
will of man precedes many of God’s gifts, but not all; and 
it must itself be included among those which it does not 
precede. We read in Holy Scripture, both ‘ God’s mercy 
shall prevent me’ (Ps. LVIII, 11), and ‘ Thy mercy will 
follow me’ (Ps. XXII, 6). It precedes the unwilling to 
make him willing; it follows the willing to render his will 
effectual. Why are we taught to pray for our enemies, 
who are plainly unwilling to lead a holy life, unless it 
be that God may work willingness in them? And why 

48 Rom. XV, 13: “Deus autem Deo est (h dydrn éx Tov Oceov 
spei repleat vos omni gaudio et pace éortwy).’ Cfr. also John VI, 44 saq., 
in credendo (éy r@ miorevery), ut which text is fully explained by 
abundetis in spe (év rq édmld.) et  Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 128 


virtute Spiritus Sancti.’’ sqq. 
447° John IV, 7: “Caritas ex 


tia ee a ae 


Rimeatas= 


SS 


| 
| 
| 
) 
i 


TAB ONECHSSITY) OF ACTUAL GRACE 109 
are we admonished to ask that we may receive, unless 
it be that He who has created in us the wish, may Him- 
self satisfy the same? We pray, then, for our enemies, 
that the mercy of God may precede them, as it has 
preceded us; we pray for ourselves, that His mercy may 
follow us.” 4 

That grace accompanies us uninterruptedly on the 
way to Heaven is also the teaching of St. Jerome: “ To 
will and to run is my own act; but without the constant 
aid of God, even my own act will not be mine; for 
Perxpostie says (Phil. Il, 13): “It is God who work. 
eth in you, both to will and to accomplishy?/ti) tis 
not sufficient for me that He gave it once, unless He 
gives it always.” 

St. Ephraem Syrus prays in the name of the Oriental 
Church: “T possess nothing, and if I possess anything, 
Thou [O God] hast given it to me... . I ask only for 


45 Enchiridion, c. 32: “Porro si 
nullus dicere Christianus audebit: 
Non miserentis est Det, sed volentis 
est hominis, ne Apostolo apertissime 
contradicat, restat ut propterea dic- 
tum intelligatur (Rom. LX Wea 6))i 
“Non volentis neque currentis, sed 
miserentis est Dei,’ ut totum Deo 
detur, qui hominis voluntatem bonam 
et praeparat adiuvandam et adiuvat 
praeparatam. Praecedit enim bona 
voluntas hominis multa Dei dona, sed 
non omnia; quae autem non prae- 
cedit ipsa, in tis est et ipsa. Nam 
utrumque legitur in sanctis eloquiis: 
et (Ps. LVIII, 11): ‘ Misericordia 
eius praeveniet me,’ et (Bs OXOrD 


6): ‘ Misericordia eius subseque- 
tur me.’ Nolentem praevenit, ut 
velit; volentem subsequitur, ne 


frustra velit. Cur enim admonemur 
orare pro inimicis nostris, utique 
nolentibus pie vivere, nisi ut Deus 
in illis operetur et velle? Itemque 


cur admonemur petere ut accipiamus, 
nisi ut ab illo fiat quod volumus, a 
quo factum est ut velimus? Ora- 
mus ergo pro inimicis nostris, ut 
misericordia Dei praeveniat eos, 
sicut praevenit et nos; oramus 
autem pro nobis, ut misericordia 
eius subsequatur nos.” On this im- 
portant passage cfr. J. B. Faure, 
Notae in Enchiridion S, Augustini, 
c. 32. Similar expressions will be 
found in Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., 
II, 9 and De Gratia et Lib. Arb., 
Clty. i i 

46 Ep. ad Ctesiph., 133: “ Velle 
et currere meum est, sed ipsum 
meum sine Det semper auxilio non 
erit meum; dicit enim Apostolus 
(Phil. IT, 13): ‘Deus est enim qui 
operatur in vobis et velle et perfi- 


cere”... Non mihi suffcit, quod 
semel donavit, nisi semper do- 
naverit.” 


TIO ACTUAL GRACE 


grace and acknowledge that I shall be saved through 


Thee. a4 | 
The Second Council of Orange summarizes the teach- 
ing of Tradition on the subject under consideration.” 


c) The theological argument for our thesis is 
based on the character of the adoptive sonship re- 
sulting from the process of justification.*® This 
sonship (filiatio adoptiva) is essentially supernat- 
ural, and hence can be attained only by strictly 
supernatural acts, which unaided nature 1s 
both morally and physically incapable of perform- 


; 50 


ing 


Thesis III: Even in the state of sanctifying grace 
man is not able to perform salutary acts, unless aided 
by actual graces. 


This is likewise de fide. 

Proof. The faculties of the just man are per- 
manently kept in the supernatural sphere by sanc- 
tifying grace and by the habits of faith, hope, and 
charity. Hence the just man in the performance 
of salutary acts does not require the same measure 
of prevenient grace as the unregenerate sinner, 


47 Serm, de Pret. Marg. baptismum cum ipsius adiutorio ea, 
48 Conc. Arausic. II (A.D. 529); quae sibi sunt placita, implere pos- 
“ Hoc etiam salubriter profitemur  simus.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart,  n. 
et credimus, quod in omni opere 200.) 
bono non nos incipimus et postea 49 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 


per Dei misericordiam adiuvamur, thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
sed ipse nobis nullis praecedentibus ural, pp. 192 sqq. 

bonis meritis et fidem et amorem suit 50 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 
prius inspirat, ut et baptismi sacra- vind, pp. 132 Sd 

menta fideliter requiramus et post 


ew 
escola eae 


Ae Pigayte fats =o: 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE | tar 


who lacks all, or at least some, of the habits men- 
tioned. 


The question here at issue, therefore, can only be: 
Is actual grace (as gratia excitans s. vocans, not elevans ) 
absolutely necessary to enable a man in the state of 
sanctifying grace to perform salutary acts? The answer 
is — Yes, and this teaching is so firmly grounded on Sacred 
Scripture and Tradition, and so emphatically sanctioned 
by the Church, that we do not hesitate to follow Per- 
rone in qualifying it as de fide. The councils in 
their teaching on the necessity of grace, assert that neces- 
sity alike for the justified and the unjustified. That of 
Trent expressly declares: ‘“ Whereas Jesus Christ Him- 
self continually infuses His virtue into the justified,—as 
the head into the members, and the vine into the branches, 
—and this virtue always precedes and accompanies and 
follows their good works, which without it could not in 
any wise be pleasing and meritorious before God, we must 
believe that nothing further is wanting to the justi- 
med 2 V7? 52 


a) Our thesis can be easily proved from Holy 
Scripture. We have already shown that the 
Bible and Tradition make no distinction between 
the different stages on the way to salvation, or 
between different salutary acts, but indiscrimin- 


51 Perrone, De Gratia, n. 203: 
“ Quaestio haec non ad scholasticas 
quaestiones pertinet, sed est dogma 


bona eorum opera semper antecedit 
et comitatur et subsequitur et sine 
‘qua nullo pacto Deo grata et 


fidet ab Ecclesia definitum.’’ 


meritoria esse possent, nihil ipsis 


52Sess. VI, cap. 16: “Quum  iustificatis amplius deesse creden- 
enim ille ipse Christus Iesus tam- dum est.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
quam caput in membra et tamquam n. 809.) Cfr. Tepe, Institutiones 


vitis in palmites in ipsos iustificatos 
tugiter virtutem influat, quae virtus 


Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 41 sqq., 


. Paris 1896, 


112 ACTUAL GRACE 


ately postulate for all the illuminating grace of 
the intellect and the strengthening grace of 
the will. It follows that to perform salutary acts 
the justified no less than the unjustified 
need actual grace. Our Saviour’s pithy saying: 
“Without me you can do nothing,” °* was not ad- 
dressed to unbelievers or sinners, but to His Apos- 
tles, who were in the state of sanctifying grace.” 


This interpretation is fully borne out by Tradition. 
St. Augustine, after laying it down as a general princi- 
ple that “‘ We can of ourselves do nothing to effect good 
works of piety without God either working that we 
may will, or co-operating when we will,” * says of jus- 
tied man in particular: “The Heavenly Physician 
cures our maladies, not only that they may cease to ex- 
ist, but in order that we may ever afterwards be able 
to walk aright,—a task to which we should be un- 
equal, even after our healing, were it not for His con- 
tinued help. . . . For just as the eye of the body, even 
when completely sound, is unable to see, unless aided by 
the brightness of light, so also man, even when fully jus- 
tified, is unable to lead a holy life, unless he be ‘divinely 
assisted by the eternal light of righteousness.” °° 

This agrees with the practice of the Church in ex- 


53 John XV, 5. 

54 V. supra, pp. 87 sq. Other per- 
tinent Scriptural texts are: 2 Cor. 
PED se. Phil ae" sqrt aairsqs 
Heb. XIII, 21. 

55 De Gratia et Lib. Arb., c.' 17: 
“Sine illo vel operante vel co- 
operante quum volumus ad bona 
pietatis opera nihil valemus.”’ 

56 De Natura et Gratia, c. 26: 
“Mala nostra non ad hoc solum 


medicus supernus sanat, ut illa iam 
non sint, sed ut de cetero recte 
ambulare possimus, quod quidem 
etiam sani nonnisi illo adiuvante 
poterimus. ... Sicut oculus  cor- 
poris etiam plenissime sanus, nist 
candore lucis adiutus non potest 
cernere, sic et homo etiam perfec- 
tissime iustificatus, nisi aeternae luce 
iustitiae divinitus adiuvetur, recte 
non potest vivere.” 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 113 


horting all men without exception, saints as well as 
sinners, to pray: -“ Precede, we beseech Thee, O Lord, 
our actions by Thy holy inspiration, and carry them on 
by Thy gracious assistance, that every prayer and work 
of ours may begin always from Thee, and through Thee 
be happily ended.” °7 


b) Some theologians have been led by certain 
speculative difficulties to deny the necessity of ac- 
tual grace in the state of justification. 


Man in the state of justification, they argue, is en- 
dowed with sanctifying grace, the supernatural habits 
of faith, hope, and charity, and the infused moral vir- 
tues, and consequently possesses all those qualifications 
which are necessary to enable him to perform salutary 
acts with the supernatural concurrence of God. Why 
should the will, thus supernaturally equipped, require 
the aid of additional actual graces to enable it to per- 
form strictly supernatural, and therefore salutary, ac- 
tions ? *8 

We reply: The necessity of actual grace in the 
state of justification is so clearly taught by divine Reve- 
lation that no theological theory is tenable which denies 
it. Besides, the objection we have briefly summarized 
disregards some very essential considerations, e. g.\ that 
there remains in man, even after justification, concu- 
piscence, which is accompanied by a certain weakness 


57 “ Actiones nostras, quaesumus 
Domine; aspirando praeveni et adiu- 
vando prosequere, ut cuncta nostra 
oratio et operatio a te semper inci- 
piat et per te coepta finiatur.” 
(Missale Romanum.) The argu- 
ment from Tradition is more fully 


developed by Palmieri, De Gratia 
Divina Actuali, thes. 28. 

58 Thus Molina (Concord., qu. 
14, art. 13 disp. 8), Bellarmine 
(De Gratia et Lib. Arb., VI, 15), 


and Thomassin; the question is well 


treated by Ruiz, De Providentia 


‘Divina, disp. 41, sect. 5 sq. 


114 ACTUAL GRACE 


that requires at least the gratia sanans sive medicinalis 
to heal it.°° Furthermore, a quiescent habitus cannot 
set itself in motion, but must be determined from with- 
out; that is to say, in our case, it must be moved by 
the gratia excitans to elicit supernatural thoughts and 
to will supernatural acts. Just as a seed cannot sprout 
without the aid of appropriate stimuli, so sanctifying 
grace is incapable of bearing fruit unless stimulated by 
the sunshine and moisture of actual graces. Man may 
perform purely natural acts even though he be in the 
supernatural state of grace; hence if any particular act 
of his is to be truly supernatural and conducive to eter- 
nal salvation, God must lend His special aid.®° 


Thesis IV: Except by a special privilege of divine 
grace, man, even though he be in the state of sanctify- 
ing grace, is unable to avoid venial sin throughout life. 

This is likewise de fide. 

Proof. The Pelagians held that man is able 
to avoid sin, nay to attain to absolute impecca- 
bility,°t without supernatural assistance. Against 
this error the Second Council of Mileve (A. D. 
416) defined: “It likewise hath pleased [the 
holy Synod] that whoever holds that the words 
of the Our’ Father:': “Forgive us our. tres- 
passes,’ when pronounced by saintly men, are 
pronounced in token of humility, but not truth- 
fully, should be anathema.” ** Still more to the 


59 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 61 Impeccantia, dvapaprnotla. 
matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 62“ Item placuit ut quicunque 
§ 399, Mainz 1897. ipsa verba dominicae orationis, ubt 


60 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super-  dicimus: Dimitte nobis debita nostra, 
naturali, disp. 106, sect. 3 sqq. ita volunt a sanctis dici, ut humili- 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 115 


point is the following declaration of the Council of 
Trent: “If any one saith that a man once 
justified . . . is able, during his whole life, to 
avoid all sins, even those that are venial, except 
by a special grace from God, as the Church holds 
in regard of the Blessed Virgin; let him be 
fandthema,’’ * 


To obtain a better understanding of this Tridentine 
definition it will be well to ponder the following con- 
siderations: 

The Council declares that it is impossible for man, 
even in the state of sanctifying grace, to avoid all sins 
during his whole life, except by virtue of a special priv-_ 
ilege such as that enjoyed by the Blessed Virgin’ Mary.* 
A venial sin is one which, because of the unimportance 
of the precept involved, or in consequence of incom- 
plete consent, does not destroy the state of grace. Such 
a sin may be either deliberate or semi-deliberate, A 
- semi-deliberate venial sin is one committed in haste 
or surprise. It is chiefly sins of this kind that the 
Tridentine Council had in view. For no one would 
seriously assert that with the aid of divine grace a saint 
could not avoid at least all deliberate venial sins for a 
considerable length of time. The phrase “in tota vita” 
indicates a period of some length, though its limits are 
rather difficult to determine. Were a man to die im- 
mediately after justification, the Tridentine canon would 


ter hoc; non veraciter dicatur, ana- ex speciali Dei privilegio, quemad- 
thema sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, modum de beata virgine tenet Eccle- 


n. 108.) sia, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger- 
63 Sess. VI, can. 23: “Si quis Bannwart, n. 833.) 
hominem semel iustificatum dixerit 64 On this privilege of our Blessed 


++. posse in tota vita peccata Lady see Pohle-Preuss, Mariology, 
omnia etiam venialia vitare nisi ‘pp. 72 sqq., St. Louis 1914. 


116 ACTUAL GRACE 


per accidens not apply to him. As the Council says in 
another place that “men, how holy and just soever, at 
times fall into at least light and daily sins, which are also 
called venial,”’ * it is safe practically to limit the period 
of possible freedom from venial sin to one day. Theo- 
retically, of course, it may be extended much farther. 
The phrase “ ommia peccata”’ must be interpreted collect- 
ively, not distributively, for a sin that could not be avoided 
would cease to be a sin. For the same reason the term 
“non posse” must be understood of (moral, not physical) 
disability ; in other words, the difficulty of avoiding sin 
with the aid of ordinary graces for any considerable 
length of time, is insuperable even for the just. This 
moral impossibility of avoiding sin can be removed only 
by a special privilege, such as that enjoyed by the 
Blessed Virgin Mary. It may incidentally be asked 
whether this privilege was also granted to other saints, 
notably St. Joseph and St. John the Baptist. Suarez lays 
it down as a theological conclusion that no human be- 
ing has ever been or ever will be able entirely to avoid 
venial sin except by a special privilege, which must in 
each case be proved. Palmieri maintains that the moral 
impossibility of leading an absolutely sinless life without 
the special assistance of grace is taught by indirection in 
the canons of Mileve (416) and Carthage (418), which 
declare that no such life has ever been led by mortal man 
without that assistance. 


a) The Scriptural argument for our thesis was 
fully developed by the councils just mentioned. 


Cemensy UNE. Caps. SEs yo cadunt.”” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 


quantumvis sancti et iusti in levia 
saltem et quotidiana, quae etiam 
venialia dicuntur, peccata quandoque 


804.) 
66 De Gratia Divina Actuali, p. 
236. 


MBO NECE Soll Y OROACTUAL GRACKH: |), tam 


The careful student will note, however, that those 
texts only are strictly conclusive which positively 
and exclusively refer to venial sins. Thus when 
St. James says: “In many things we all of- 
fend,’ *’ he cannot mean that all Christians now 
and then necessarily commit mortal sin. For St. 
John expressly declares that ““Whosoever abideth 
in him [Christ], sinneth not.” ® 

It follows that not even the just can wheily 
avoid venial sin. Hence the most devout and 
pious Christian may truthfully repeat the petition 
of the Lord’s Prayer which says: “Forgive us 
our trespasses,’° as we forgive those who trespass 
against us.” “° Profoundly conscious of the sin- 
fulness of the entire human race, the author of 
the Book of Proverbs exclaims: ‘Who can say, 
_ My heart is clean, I am pure from sin?” 7 


Other Scripture texts commonly cited in confirmation 
of our thesis lack cogency, because they either deal 
exclusively with mortal sin or do not refer to sin 
at all. Thus Prov. XXIV, 16: “A just man shall fall 
seven times and shall rise again,” is meant of temporal 
adversities.77 Eccles. VII, 21: “ There is no just man 

67 Epistle of St. James, III, 2: dicere: Mundum est cor meum, 
“In multis enim offendimus omnes purus sum a peccato?”? 

(ro\dd yap mralowev &rayres).” 72 On this text cfr. J. V. Bain- 


681 John III, 6: “ Omnis qui in vel, Les Contresens Bibliques des 
eo [scil. Christo] manet, non Prédicateurs, 2nd ed., Dp. 102 sq:, 


peccat.” Paris 1906: “... ces chutes sont 
69 épeuAnuaTa. ; surtout les souffrances, les tribula- 
70 Matth. VI, 12. Cfr. Mark XI, tions. Le contexte Vindique claire- 
25. ; . ment: “N’attaquez pas le juste 


71 Prov. XX, 9: “Quis potest (15); car Dieu le défend, et sil 


118 ACTUAL GRACE 


upon earth, that doth good and sinneth not,’ can 
scarcely be understood of venial sin, because the sacred 
writer continues: “For thy conscience knoweth that 
thou also hast often spoken evil of others.’ 7* 1 John 
I, 8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive our- 
selves, and the truth is not in us,” 7° would be a splen- 
did argument for our thesis, could it be shown that 
the Apostle had in mind only the venial sins com- 
mitted in the state of justification. This is, however, 
unlikely, as the term peccatum throughout St. John’s 


first Epistle “® is obviously employed in the sense of 


mortal sin.77 


b) Tradition is again most effectively voiced 


by St. Augustine, who writes: 


‘There are three 


points, as you know, which the Catholic Church 


tombe il se relévera; mais pour 
Vimpie cest la ruine irréparable,’ 
Peut-on, comme on le fait dordi- 
naire, entendre le texte des chutes 
morales, des péchés vémels? Plu- 
sieurs commentateurs répondent: 
non; et ils citent a Vappui saint 
Augustin: “Septies cadet iustus et 
resurget, itd est, quotiescumque 
cediderit, non peribit: quod non de 
iniquitatibus, sed de tribulationibus 
ad humilitatem perducentibus intel- 
high welt) CCivs ADF isxi,\' 31) — 
Diautres Péres, saint Jéréme par ex- 
emple, sont moins exclusifs; et de 
fait, pourquoi la maxime, dans sa 
plémitude, ne comprendrait-elle pas 
toutes sortes de chutes, péchés ou 
afflictions? En tout cas, c’est aller 
trop loin que de vouloir prouver par 
la la thése catholique sur V’impossi- 
bilité morale d’éviter pendant long- 
temps tout péché de_ fragilité. 
Lécrivain sacré veut dire autre 
chose, et mous avons des textes 
meilleures .. 3” 


78 Eccles: VII, 21: °°‘ Non est 
enim homo iustus in terra, qui 
faciat bonum et non peccet.’ 

74 Ibid., v, 23: “ Scit enim con- 
scientia tua, quia et tu  crebro 
maledixisti aliis.” 

75 rt John -I, 8: “St .dixerimus, 
quoniam peccatum non habemus, 
ipsi nos seducimus et veritas in 
nobis non est.”” 

TUE Gat) John, 1 0,eL ll) Ace he 
8, et passim. 

77 The Johannine text here under 


_ consideration does, however, furnish 


a telling argument against the Pela- 
gians, in so far as they denied the 
necessity of the atonement. The 
passage is effectively employed for 
this purpose by the Second Council 
of Mileve (can. 6, quoted in Den- 
zinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 
106). -Cfr. Chr. Pesch, . Praelec- 
tiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., 
p- 99 and Al. Wurm, Die Irrlehrer 
im ersten Johannesbrief, Freiburg 
1903. 


eS Ee a ae 


HEY NECESSI DY: OM ACTUAL GRACE jag 


chiefly maintains against them [the Pelagians]. 
One is, that the grace of God is not given accord- 
ing to our merits. . . . The second, that no one 
lives in this corruptible body in righteousness of 
any degree without sins of any kind. The third, 
that man is born obnoxious to the first man’s 
Poe. | bo Pelacius) vobjections . ih all 
men sin, then the just must die in their sins,” the 
holy Doctor replies: ‘With all his acuteness he 
| Pelagius] overlooks the circumstance that even 
righteous persons pray with good reason: ‘For- 
give us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.’ . 
Even if we cannot live without sin, we may yet 
die without sin, whilst the sin committed in ignor- 
ance or infirmity is blotted out in merciful for- 
giveness.”*? In another chapter of the same 
treatise he says: “If... wecould assemble all 
the afore-mentioned holy men and women, and 
ask them whether they lived without sin, 
would they not all exclaim with one voice: ‘If 
we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and 
Piceuruth is notin us’ ?’’ °° 


78 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 2, 79 De Natura eét Gratia, c. 35, n. 

n. 4: “Tria sunt, ut scitis, quae 41: “Ubi parum attendit, quum 
maxime adversus eos [scil. Pela- sit acutissimus, non frustra etiam 
gianos| defendit Ecclesia, quorum  iustos in oratione dicere: Dimitte 
est unum, gratiam Dei non secundum nobis debita nostra. ... Etiamsi 
merita nostra dari. .. Alterum est, hic non vivatur sine peccato, licet 
in quantacunque iustitia sine quali- mori sine peccato, dum  subinde 
buscunque peccatis in. hoc corrup- veniad deletur, quod subinde igno- 
tibili corpore neminem vivere. Ter- vrantid vel infirmitate committitur.’” 
tium est, obnoxium nasci hominem 80 Ibid., c. 36. “Si omnes illos 


peccato primi hominis.” . sanctos et sanctas, quum hic vive- 


120 ACTUAL, GRACE 


c) Wecome to the theological argument. The 
moral impossibility of avoiding venial sin for any 
considerable length of time results partly from 
the infirmity of human nature (infrmitas na- 
turae), partly from God’s pre-established plan of 
salvation (ordo divinae providentiae). 


a) The infirmity of human nature flows from four 
separate and distinct sources: (1) concupiscence (fomes 
peccatt) ; (2) imperfection of the ethical judgment (im- 
perfectio iudicu) ; (3) inconstancy of the will (incon- 
stantia voluntatis) ; and (4) the weariness caused by con- 
tinued resistance to temptation. In view of these agencies 
and their combined attack upon the will, theologians speak 
of a necessitas antecedens peccandi;—not as if the 
will were predestined to succumb to any one temp- 
tation in particular, but in the sense that it is morally 
unable to resist the whole series (suppositione dis- 
wncta). The will simply grows weaker and weaker, 
and in course of time fails to resist sin with sufficient 
energy. — , 

Let us exemplify. The proofsheets of a book are ] 
scrutinized by several trained readers, yet in spite of 
the greatest: care and many ingenious devices for the 
elimination of error, a perfect book, 7. e. one entirely | 
free from mistakes, is a practical impossibility. How _ 
much harder must it be for man to avoid moral lapses 
throughout his whole life, considering that he cannot — 
choose his own time for meeting temptations, but must 
rent, congregare possemus et inter- mus, ipsi nos seducimus et veritas 
rogare, utrum essent sine peccato, in nobis non est? ’’— For other con- 


- . nonne una voce clamassent: Si firmatory Patristic texts see Suarez, 
dixerimus quia peccatum non habe- De Gratia, IX, 8. 


THEO NECESSITY OR VACTUAL GRACKH "rt 


keep his mind and will under constant control and be 
prepared to resist the enemy at any moment.*! 

St. Thomas Aquinas says: “Man cannot avoid all 
venial sin, because his sensual appetite is depraved. 
True, reason is able to suppress the individual stirrings 
of this appetite. In fact, it is on this account that they 
are voluntary and partake of the nature of sin. But 
reason is not able to suppress them all [collectively ], 
because, while it tries to resist one, there perhaps arises 
another, and, furthermore, reason is not always in a 
condition to exercise the vigilance necessary to avoid 
such impulses.” 2 ; 

It follows that the necessitas peccandi antecedens 
does not destroy the liberty of the will or the moral 
imputability of those venial sins which a man actually 
commits; for it is merely a necessitas indeterminata, 
which refers not to certain particular instances, but 
to the one or other indeterminately. It follows further 
that God does not command the impossible when He 
insists that we should avoid venial sin, for He does not in 
each single case command something which is physically 
or morally impossible,** but merely demands a perfection 
which in itself is not entirely unattainable hic et nunc 
with the assistance of ordinary grace.S¢ 

8B) The second theological reason for the impossibility 
of avoiding venial sin for any considerable time is based 


81 The above-quoted analogy is 
taken from Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 
matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, p. 
81. 

82 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 109, 
art. 8: “Non potest homo abstinere 
ab omni peccato veniali propter cor- 
ruptionem inferioris appetitus sen- 
sualitatis, cuius motus singulos qui- 
dem ratio reprimere potest, et ex 


hoc habent rationem peccati et vo- 
luntarti, non autem omnes, quia 
dum uni resistere nititur, fortassis 
alius insurgit, et etiam quia ratio 
non potest semper esse pervigil ad 
huiusmodi motus vitandos.” 

83 Sardagna (De Gratia, n. 336) 
incorrectly asserts this. 

84 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. 
Vol. III, pp. 47 sq. 


Theolog., 


122 ACTUAL GRACE 


on the eternal scheme of salvation decreed by Divine 
Providence. This scheme of salvation must not, of 
course, be conceived as a divine precept to commit venial 
sins. It is merely a wise toleration of sin and a just re- 
fusal, on the part of the Almighty, to restore the hu- 
man race to that entirely unmerited state of freedom 
from concupiscence with which it was endowed in Para- 
dise, and which alone could guarantee the moral possi- 
bility of unspotted innocence. Both factors in their 
last analysis are based upon the will of God to exercise 
those whom He has justified in humility and to safe- 
guard us against pride, which is the deadliest enemy 
of our salvation.®® In making this wise decree God, of 
course, infallibly foresaw that no man (with the sole 
exception of those to whom He might grant a special 
privilege) would de facto be able to pass through life 
without committing venial sins. This infallible fore- 
knowledge is based not alone on the scientia media, but 
also on the infirmity of human nature. 

Hence Suarez was entirely justified in rejecting the 
singular opinion of de Vega,®* that the Tridentine defini- 
tion does not exclude the possibility of exceptions.*” 

Nevertheless the faithful are wisely warned against 
both indifference and despondency. “Let no one say 
that he is without sin, but let us not for this reason 
love sin. Let us detest sin, brethren. Though we are 
not without sins, let us hate them; especially let us 


“ .. quia si vel in uno homine 
posset contingere, ut illa duo con- 
tungerentur, scil. carere  specialt 
privilegio et nihilominus cavere 
omne peccatum veniale per totam 


85 Cfr. St. Augustine, Contra 
Iulian., IV, 3, 28: ‘“‘Ideo factum 
est in loco infirmitatis, ne superbe 
viveremus, ut sub quotidiana pecca- 
torum remissione vivamus.” 


s6 Andr. de Vega, De Iustifica- vitam, propositio Concilii esset sim- 
tione Doctrina Universa, 1, XIV,  pliciter falsa; nam est absoluta et 
cap. ult. universalis, ad cuius falsitatem satis 


87 Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 8, 14: 


est quod in uno deficiat.” 


etree 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 123 


avoid grievous sins, and venial sins, too, as much as we 
mican, °° 


Thesis V: No man can persevere in righteousness 
without special help from God. 


This proposition is also de fide. 

Proof. The Semipelagians asserted that man is 
able by his own power to persevere in righteous- 
ness to the end.*® Against this teaching the 
Second Council of Orange defined: “Even those 
who are reborn and holy must implore the help 
of God, in order that they may be enabled to 
attain the good end, or to persevere in the good 
work.” *® This definition was repeated in sub- 
stance by the Council of Trent: “If any one 
‘saith that the justified either is able without the 
special help of God to persevere in the justice re- 
_ ceived, or that, with that help, he is not able; let 
him be anathema.” * 


Perfect perseverance is the preservation of baptis- 
mal innocence, or, in a less strict sense, of the state of 
grace, until death. Imperfect perseverance is a tempor- 


88 Aug., Ep., 181, n. 8: “Nemo 90 Conc. Arausic. II, can. 10: 


itaque dicat, se esse sine peccato, 
sed non tamen ideo debemus amare 
peccatum. Oderimus ea, fratres; 
etsi non sumus sine peccatis, oderi- 
mus tamen ea, et maxime a crimini- 
bus nos abstineamus; abstineamus 
quantum possumus a levibus pecca- 
tis.’— On the whole subject of this 


thesis cfr, Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 


vina, pp. 181 sqq. 
89 V. supra, pp. 98 sqq. 


“ Adiutorium Dei etiam renatis ac 
sanctis semper est implerandum, ut 
ad finem bonum perventre vel in 
bono possint opere perdurare.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 183.) 

91 Sess. VI, can, 22: “Si quis 
dixerit, iustificatum vel sine speciali 
auxilio Dei in accepta iustitia per- 
severare posse vel cum eo non posse, 
anathema _ sit.” (Denzinger-Bann: 
wart, n. 832.) 


124 ACTUAL GRACE 


ary continuance in grace, e. g. for a month or a year, 
until the next mortal sin. Imperfect perseverance, ac- 
cording to the Tridentine Council, requires no special 
divine assistance (speciale auxilium) .°? 

Final perseverance is either passive or active, according 
as the justified dies in the state of grace irrespective of his 
will (as baptized children and insane adults) ,°* or actively 
cooperates with grace whenever the state of grace is im- 
perilled by grievous temptation. The Council of Trent 
has especially this latter case in view when it speaks of 
the necessity of a speciale auxilium, because the special 
help extended by God presupposes cooperation with grace, 
and man cannot strictly speaking codperate in a happy 
death. The Council purposely speaks of an auxilium, not 
a privilegium, because a privilege is by its very nature 
granted to but few, while the special help of grace extends 
to all the elect. This aurilium is designated as speciale, 
because final perseverance is not conferred with sancti- 
fying grace, nor is it a result of the mere power of 
perseverance (posse perseverare). The state of sanc- 
tifying grace simply confers a claim to ordinary graces, 
while the power of perseverance of itself by no means 
insures actual perseverance (actu perseverare). The 
power of perseverance is assured by those merely suffi- 
cient graces which are constantly at the command of 
the righteous. Actual perseverance, on the other hand, 
implies a series of efficacious graces. God is under no 
obligation to bestow more than sufficient grace on any 
man; consequently, final perseverance is a special grace, 
or, more correctly, a continuous series of efficacious graces. 


92Sess, VI, cap. 131: “Deus 93 Cfr. Wisd. IV, 11: ‘“ Raptus 


namque sud gratia semel iustifi- est, ne malitia mutaret intellectum — 


catos non deserit, nisi ab eis prius  eius.” 
deseratur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
n. 804.) 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 125 


The Council of Trent is therefore 
of it as “a great gift.” % 


justified in speaking 


a) Sacred Scripture represents final persever- 
ance as the fruit of prayer and as a special gift 
not included in the bare notion of justification. 


a) Our Divine Saviour Himself says in His prayer 
for His disciples, John XVII, 11: “ Holy Father, keep 
them in thy name whom thou hast given me, that they 
may be one, as we also are.” ® St. Payl teaches in his 
Epistle to the Colossians: “ Epaphras saluteth you . . . 
who is always solicitous for you in prayers, that you 
may stand perfect and full in all the will of God 7%¢ 
Hence the necessity of constantly watching and praying: 
“Watch ye and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”’ 7 

8B) That perseverance is not included in the bare notion 
of justification appears from such passages as these: 
Phil. I, 6: “ Being confident of this very thing, that he 
who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto 
the day of Christ Jesus.” 8 1 Pet. I, 5: “ Who, by the 
_ power of God, are kept by faith unto salvation, ready to 
__ be revealed in the last time.” °° 


Paseesey VI can, 162)! ©.) 2 ana. fecti (iva ornre rédewor) et pleni 
g&num ililud usque in finem per- in omni voluntate Dei.” 
Sseverantiae donum.” On St. Au- 97 Matth, XXVI, 41: “ Vigilate, 


gustine’s teaching in tegard to the 
different heads of doctrine defined 
above, see Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones 
Dogmaticae, Vol, V, 3rd ed., pp. 103 
sqq. 

95 John XVII, tr: “* Pater 
Sancte, -serva eos in nomine tuo 
(ripnoov avrods ép T® dvouart 
gov), quos dedisti mihi, ut sint 
unum, sicut et nos? — 

POOR EN oy gas) < Sata sny vOS 
Epaphras . , . semper sollicitus pro 
vobis in orationibus, ut stetis per- 


et orate, ut non intretis in tenta- 
tionem.”’ 

98 Phil. I, 6: ‘**.... confidens hoc 
ipsum, quia qui coepit in vobis opus 
bonum, perficiet (émireNéoer) usque 
in diem Christi Iesu.? 

OO 2) Ret i Ei ise Mee UR Gagne 
virtute Dei custodimini per fidem 
im salutem, paratam revelari in 
tempore novissimo,’— For Old 
Testament texts in confirmation of 
this thesis see Schiffini, De Gratia 


Divina, pp. 198 sq. 


126 ACTUAL. GRACE 


b) The threads of Tradition run together in 
the hands of St. Augustine, who has written a 
special treatise On the Gift of Perseverance.*”” 


His main argument is based on the necessity of prayer. 
“ Why,” he asks, “is that perseverance asked for from 
God, if it is not given by God? Is it a mocking peti- 
tion inasmuch as that is asked of Him which it is known 
He does not give, but, although He gives it not, is in 
man’s power? ... Or is not that perseverance, per- 
chance, asked for from Him? He who says this, is not to 
be rebuked by my arguments, but must be overwhelmed 
with the prayers of the saints. Is there indeed one among 
them who do not ask for themselves from God that they 
may persevere in Him, when in that very prayer which is 
called the Lord’s — because the Lord taught it — when- 
ever it is prayed by the saints, scarcely anything else is un- 
derstood to be prayed for but perseverance?” *° He then 
proceeds to show, in accordance with St. Cyprian’s little 
treatise On the Lord’s Prayer, that the seven petitions 
of the “ Our Father” are all prayers for perseverance, 
and concludes as follows: “Truly in this matter let 
not the Church look for laborious disputations, but con- 
sider her own daily prayers. She prays that the unbe- 


100 De Dono Perseverantiae. An 
English translation of this treatise 
may be found in The Anti-Pelagian 


quod scitur non ipsum dare, sed ipso 
‘mon dante esse in hominis pote- 
state ...2 An ab illo perseve- 


Works of Saint Augustine, Bishop 
of Hippo, Translated by Peter 
Holmes and R. E. Wallis, Vol. III, 
pp. 171 sqq. (Vol. XV of Dods’ 
translation of the Works of St. 
Augustine), Edinburg 1876. 

101 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 
2, n. 3: “Cur autem perseve- 
rantia ista poscitur a Deo, si non 
datur a Deo? An et ista irrisoria 
petitio est, quum id ab eo petitur 


rantia ista forte non poscitur? Iam 
hoc qui dicit, non meis disputationt- 
bus refellendus, sed sanctorum ora- 
tionibus onerandus est. An vero 
quisquam eorum est, qui non sibt 
poscat a Deo ut perseveret in eo, 
quum ipsa oratione quae dominica 
nuncupatur, quia 
docuit, quando oratur a sanctis, nihil 
paene aliud quam _ perseverantia 
posci intelligatur? ” 


eam Dominus — 


DOB NECHSSUT YY ORPACTUAL: GRACE 127 


lieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. 
She prays that believers may persevere; therefore God 
gives perseverance to the end.’’#°2 And again: “ For 
who is there that would groan with a sincere desire to 
receive what he prays for from the Lord, if he thought 
that he received it from himself and not from the 
eordie: tes 


c) From this teaching flows a corollary of 
great practical importance, to wit: The grace of 
final perseverance cannot be merited by good 
works, but it can be obtained by pious and unre- 
mitting prayer. 


“This gift of God,” says St. Augustine, speaking of 
final perseverance, “may be obtained suppliantly [by 
prayer], but when it has been given, it cannot be lost con- 
tumaciously.” *°* And again: “ Since it is manifest that 
God has prepared some things to be given even to those 
who do not pray for them, such as the beginning of faith, 
and other things not to be given except to those who pray 
for them, such as perseverance unto the end, certainly he 
who thinks that he has this latter from himself, does not 
pray to obtain it.’’ 1% 


102 Op, cit., c. 7, n. 15: “ Prorsus 104 Op. cit., c 6, n. t0: “Hoc 


in hac re non operosas disputationes 


exspectet Ecclesia, sed  attendat 
quotidianas orationes suas. Orat 
ut increduli credant: Deus ergo 


convertit ad fidem. Orat ut cre- 
dentes perseverent; Deus ergo donat 
berseverantiam usque in finem.” 
103 Op. cit., c. 23, n. 63: “ Quis 
enim veraciter gemat desiderans ac- 
cipere quod orat a Domino, si hoc a 


seipso se sumere existimet, non ab 
illo? ’”? 


Dei donum suppliciter emereri pot- 
est, sed quum datum fuerit, amitti 
contumaciter non potest.’ 

LOK Op. Cit Ci t6;) Zoe 
quum constet Deum alia danda 
etiam non orantibus, sicut initium 
fidei, alia nonnisi orantibus” prae- 
barasse, sicut in finem  perseve- 
rantiam, profecto qui ex se ipso se 
hanc habere putat, non orat ut ha- 
beat.” 


128 ACTUAL GRACE 


Between merit (meritum) and prayer (oratio, preces) 
there is this great difference, that merit appeals to God’s 
justice, prayer to His mercy. If man were able to merit 
final perseverance by good works (meritum de con- 
digno), God would be in justice bound to give him this 
precious grace. But this is plainly incompatible with the 
Catholic conception of final perseverance. 

It may be asked: Is God determined by the meritum 
de congruo inherent in all good works to grant the gift 
of final perseverance as a rcward to the righteous? 
Theologians are at variance on this point. Ripalda *°® 
thinks that this is the case at least with the more con- 
spicuous good works performed in the state of grace. 
Suarez modifies this improbable contention somewhat by 
saying that prayer alone can infallibly guarantee final 
perseverance.’°? Our prayers are infallibly heard if we 
address the Father through Jesus Christ, because Christ 
has promised: “If you ask the Father anything in my 
name, he will give it you.” 1°° To insure its being infalli- 
bly heard, prayer for perseverance must be made in the 
state of grace and unremittingly. True, Christ did not 
make sanctifying grace a necessary condition of effica- 
cious prayer. But, as Suarez points out, prayer cannot 
be infallibly efficacious unless it proceeds from one who 
is in the state of grace, because the moral conditions that 
render it efficacious are found only in that state.°° As to 


meritoriis de congruo, sed tantum 
orationi; quare ut fructus huius 


106 De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 
045. “SECts 2. 


107 Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 38: 
*‘ Infallibilitas non convenit merito 
de congruo ratione sui, ut tia dicam, 
sed vatione impetrationis quae proa- 
priae soli orationi, ut talis est, re- 
spondet. Ratio est, quia haec infal- 
libilitas solum fundatur in promis- 
sione divina, quae non invenitur 
facta operibus iustorum quatenus 


meritt certior sit, adiungenda sem- 
per est petitio perseverantiae.” 
108 John XVI, 23. 
109 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 
38; sth EA i 6 Quien se orate 


_ habeat perseverantiam debiiam, per- 


durare debet cum illis circumstan- 
tiis moralibus, quas a_ principio 
habere etiam debuit, ut congrue 


THE NECESSITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 129 


the second point, if we say that prayer for perseverance 
must be unremitting, we mean, in the words of the same 
eminent theologian, that it must continue throughout life 
and must be made with becoming trustfulness and zeal, 
especially when there is a duty to be fulfilled or a tempta- 
tion to be overcome. 


READINGS : — Suarez, De Gratia, 1. I-II.—*Tricassin, O. Cap., 
De Necessaria ad Salutem Gratia.— Byonius, De Gratiae Auciliis, 
in Becanus, Theologia Scholastica, Rouen, 1658— Scheeben 
Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.— IpEM, Dogmatik, Vol. III, § 292- 
2098, Freiburg 1882.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, 
thes. 19-29, Gulpen 1885.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heiligung, 
§ 9-11, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.— Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, 
Vol. III, pp. 8-51, Paris 1896.—*Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische 
Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 306-416, Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, 
Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Freiburg 
1908.— Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, disp. 2, Freiburg 1got. 

On St. Augustine and his teaching cfr, *J. Ernst, Werke 
und Tugenden der Ungléubigen nach Augustinus, Freiburg 1871. 
—F. Worter, Die Geistesentwicklung des hl. Augustinus bis zu 
seimer Taufe, Paderborn 1898.— Wolfsgruber, Augustinus, Pa- 
derborn 1898.— Boucat, Theologia Patrum Dogmatico-Scholastico- 
Positiva, disp. 3, Paris 1718.—*Zaccaria, Dissert. de Adiutorio 
sine quo non, in the Thesaurus Theol., Vol. V, Venice 1762.—O. 
_Rottmanner, O. S. B., Geistesfriichte aus der Klosterzelle, Miin- 
chen 1908.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dog- 
mas, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 306 sqq., 374 sq. 


fieret; unde eo ipso quod novum more detailed information we must 


impedimentum ponitur [peccando] refer the reader to Palmieri, De 
effectui orationis, deficit perseve-  Gratia Divina Actuali, thes, 36, n. 
rantia im orando, saltem debito vi sqq- The theological argu- 
modo.” ment for our thesis is  con- 


110 Ibid., n. 17: “ Igitur perse- 
verantia orationis in tali materia 


vincingly set forth by Gutberlet 
in Heinrich’s Dogmatische Theolo- 
The donum 


requisita est, ut non semel tantum 
aut iterum fiat, set ut toto tempore 
vitae duret, et praesertim ut in 
Ooccurrentibus occasionibus servandi 
mandata aut vincendi 
cum debita fiducia repetatur.’— For 


tentationes 


gie, Vol. VIII, § 404. 
perseverantiae must not be con- 
founded with the confirmatio in 
gratia; on this point see Schiffini, 
De Gratia Divina, pp. 197 saa. 


130 ACTUAL GRACE 


On the heresy of Pelagianism cfr. *F. Worter, Der Pelagia- 
nismus nach seinem Ursprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874. 
—.F, Klasen, Die innere Entwicklung des Pelagianismus, Frei- 
burg 1882— Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., § 60 
sqq., Freiburg 1895—H. Zimmer, Pelagius in Irland, Berlin 
1901. - Warfield, Two Studies in the History of Doctrine, New 
York 1897— Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 
Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).— Pohle in the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. XI, pp. 604-608.— B. J. Otten, S. J.. 4 Manual 
of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, pp. 357 saa. 

On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, Prolegom., V5 
sqq.— Livinus Meyer, De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus.— Wig- 
gers, Geschichte des Semipelagianismus, Hamburg 1835.— A. 
Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von Natur und Gnade, 
Freiburg 1895.—*A. Koch, Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez, 
Stuttgart 1895 Fr. Worter, Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semi- 
pelagianismus, Miinster t1900.— Sublet, Le S emipélagianisme, 
Namur 1897 Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 
Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).— Pohle in the Catholic — 
-Encyclopedia, Vol. XIII, pp. 703-706.— B. J. Otten, S. J.. 4 Man- — 
ual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. 1, pp. 379 sad. af 


On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, De Haeresi Ianseniana, a 


Paris 1645.— Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali, Vol. 11: “Contra 
Baium et Baianos,’ Cologne 1648.— Duchesne, Histoire du 
Baianisme, Douai 1731.—*Linsenmann, Michael Bajus und die 
Grundlegung des Jansenismus, Titbingen 1867 A. Schill, Die 
Konstitution Unigenitus, ihre Veranlassung und thre Folgen, 
Freiburg 1876.— Ingold, Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du 
Jansénisme, Paris 1901.— P. Minges, O. F. M., Die Gnadenlehre 
des Duns Scotus auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semi- 
pelagianismus geprift, Minster 1906.— Lafiteau, Histoire de la 
Constitution Unigenitus, 2 vols., Liege 1738.— Van den Peereboom, 
Cornelius Jansenius, Septiobme Evéque d’Ypres, Bruges 1882— 
J. Forget in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-204— 
B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, — 
Pp. 507 saa. 


SECTION) 2 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL: ‘GRACE 


All grace ex vi termini is a free gift.1 This 
applies particularly to Christian grace, which is 
so absolutely gratuitous that its gratuity, together 
with its necessity, may be called the groundwork 
of the Catholic religion. 

I. STATE OF THE QUESTION.—To show what is 
meant by “gratuity” (gratwitas) we must first 
explain the technical term “merit.” 

a) “Merit” (meritum=that which is earned) 
is that property of a good work which entitles the 
performer to receive a reward from him to whose 
advantage the work redounds. 


a) An analysis of this definition shows that (1) merit 
is found only in such works as are positively good ; 
(2) merit and reward are correlative terms which postu- 
late each other; (3) merit supposes two distinct per- 
sons, one who deserves and another who awards; (4) the 
relation between merit and reward is based on justice, 
not on benevolence or mercy. The last-mentioned de- 
termination is by far the most important of the four.” 

1V. supra, pp. 7 sq. enim merces dicitur quod alicut 

2Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., recompensatur pro retributione operis 


Ia 2ae, qu. 114, art, 1: “* Meritum vel laboris quasi quoddam pretium 
et merces ad idem referuntur. Id ipsius. Unde sicut teddere iustwm 


131 


132 ACTUAL GRACE 


8) Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two 
kinds of merit: (1) condign merit,’ which is merit 
in the strict sense (meritum adaequatum sive de 
condigno),and (2) congruous merit (meritum in- 
adaequatum sive de congruo), so called because 
of the congruity, or fitness, that the claim should 
be recognized. Condign merit presupposes some 
proportion between the work done and the reward 
given in compensation for it (aequalitas s. con- 
digmitas dati et accepti). It is measured by com- 
mutative justice and thus confers a real claim to 
a reward. For example, a conscientious work- 
man has a strict claim to his wage. Owing to the 
lack of intrinsic proportion between service and 
reward, congruous merit can claim a remunera- 
tion only on grounds of fairness. 

A. distinction between these two kinds of 
merit was already made by the Fathers, though 
not in the terms of present-day theology. It was 
known to the older Scholastics and emphasized 
anew by Luther’s famous adversary Johann Eck.* 


pretium pro re accepta ab aliquo est 
actus iustitiae, ita etiam recom- 
pensare mercedem operis vel laboris 
est actus iustitiae.” Cfr. Taparelli, 
Saggio Teoretico del Diritto Na- 
turale, diss. 1, c. 6, n. 130, Palermo 
1842. 


3“ This word is scarcely used in 


modern English, except as express- 
ing that punishment which is fully 
deserved, a usage originating with 
the Tudor Parliaments; but it was 
once commonly used in the language 


in a wider sense, for whatever had 
been justly earned, and some at- 
tempts to revive it have been made 
in recent times; certainly some word 
is wanted to express the idea.” 
(Hunter, Outlines of . Dogmatic 
Theology, Vol. III, pp. 58 sq.) 
Cfr. Dr. Murray’s New English Dic- 
tionary, Vol. II, p. 784, Oxford 
1893. 

4Eck did not, however, approve 
the term meritum de condigno; he 
preferred meritum digni. Cfr. J. 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 133 


No relation of strict justice is conceivable be- 
tween the Creator and His creatures. On the 
part of God there can only be question of a gra- 
tuitous promise to reward certain good works,— 
which promise He is bound to keep because He is 
veracious and faithful.® 

b) Two other terms must also be clearly de- 
fined in order to arrive at a true conception of 
the gratuity of Christian grace. They are prayer 
for grace,’ and a capacity or disposition to receive 
it.’ To pray means to incite God’s liberality or 
mercy by humble supplication. 


a) Despite the contrary teaching of Vasquez® and a 
few other theologians, congruous merit and prayer are 
really distinct because one can exist without the other. 
As the angels in Heaven are able to pray for us without 
earning a meritum de congruo, so conversely, all salutary 
works are meritorious even without prayer. More- 
over, humble supplication does not involve any positive 
service entitled to a reward. 

There is another important and obvious distinction, 
viz.: between purely natural prayer (preces naturae) 
and supernatural prayer inspired by grace (oratio su- 
pernaturalis ). 


8) Capacity or disposition, especially when it 


Greving, Johann Eck als junger His Knowability, Essence, and At- 
Gelehrier, pp. 153 sqq. Miinster tributes, pp. 455 sqq. ; 


1906. 6 Oratio, preces. 
5 Cfr. St. Augustine, In Ps., 86: 7 Capacitas, dispositio. 
“ Debitorem Deus ipse fecit se, non 8 Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol. 


accipiendo, sed promittendo.” On S. Thomae Aquin., 1a 2ae, disp. 216, 
this point consult Pohle-Preuss, God: c. 4. 


134 AGTUALSGRACH 


takes the form of preparation, may be either posi- 
tive or negative. Positive capacity is defined as 
“that real mode by which a subject, in itself indif- 
ferent, becomes apt to receive a new form.” 
Such a capacity or disposition always entails a 
claim to its respective form, 


Positive capacity or disposition differs from both 
prayer or quasi-merit (meritum de congruo). Quasi- 
merit is entitled to a reward on the ground of fairness, 
whereas the capacitas s. dispositio positiva is at most the 
fulfilment of an expectation based upon purely teleolog- 
ical considerations. Again, a reward can be bestowed 
upon some subject other than the one by whom the ser- 
vice was rendered, whereas the introduction of a new 
form necessarily supposes a subject disposed for or 
prepared to receive it. Thus only he who is hungry is 
disposed for the reception of food and entitled to have his 
craving satisfied. | 


_ Negative capacity consists in the absence or re- 
moval of obstacles that impede the reception of 
a new form, as when green wood is dried to 
become fit for burning. 

c) There arises the important question whether 
or not divine grace is an object of merit, and if 
so, to what extent it can be merited by prayer and 
preparation. 

It is of faith that the just man, by the performance of 


supernaturally good deeds, can merit de condigno an in- 
crease in the state of grace and eternal glory, and that 


TAB GR ATO YS ORVANCT OAL GRACH: “aac 


the sinner is able to earn justification de congruo. On 
the other hand, it is also an article of faith that divine 
grace is strictly gratuitous.° The two dogmas seem 
incompatible, but they are not, as will become evident 
if we consider that the good works of the just and the 
salutary works of the sinner are entirely rooted in divine 
grace and consequently the merits which they contain 
are strictly merits of grace in no wise due to nature.?° 
When we speak of the absolute gratuity of grace, there- 
fore, we mean the very first or initial grace (gratia prima 
vocans), by which the work of salvation is begun. Of 
this initial grace the Church explicitly teaches that it is 
absolutely incapable of being merited; whence it fol- 
lows that all subsequent graces, up to and including 
justification, are also gratuitous," 7. e. unmerited by na- 
ture in strict justice, in so far as they are based on the 
gratia prima. 


2. THE GRATUITY OF GRACE PRoveD From 
REVELATION.—Keeping the above explanation 
well in mind we now proceed to demonstrate the 


gratuity of divine grace in five systematic 
theses. | : 


9 Already in the fourth century The dogma was formally defined by 
the Church emphasized the propo- the Council of Trent: “. .. cuius 
sition “Gratiam Christi non secun- tanta est erga omnes homines boni- 
dum merita dari’’ against Pelagius. tas, ut eorum velit esse merita, quae 

10 Cfr. St. Augustine, Ep. 194 ad sunt ipsius dona.” (Sess. VI, cap. 
Sixt., n. 19: “ Vita etiam aeterna, 16, quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s 
quam certum est bonis operibus  LEnchiridion, n. 809.) 
debitam reddi, ab Apostolo tamen 11 For ‘further information on this 
gratia nuncupatur, nec ideo quia point see Palmieri, De Gratia Di- 
meritis non datur, sed quia data  vina Actuali, thes. 35. 
sunt ipsa merita, quibus datur.” 


136 ACTUAL GRACE 


Thesis I: Mere nature cannot, in strict justice (de 
condigno), merit initial grace (gratia prima), nor, con- 
sequently, any of the series of subsequent graces in the 
order of justification. 


This proposition embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. It was one of the fundamental errors 
of Pelagius that grace can be merited by purely 
natural acts.‘? When, at the instance of the bish- 
ops assembled at Diospolis (A. D. 415), he re- 
tracted his proposition that “the grace of God is 
given according to our merits,” 1° he employed 
the term gratia Dei dishonestly for the grace of 
creation. The Second Council of Orange (A. D. 
529) formally defined that grace cannot be mer- 
ited, but is purely and strictly gratuitous.4* And 
the Council of Trent declared: ‘In adults the 
beginning of justification is to be derived from 
the prevenient grace of God through Jesus Christ, 
that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, with- 
out any merits existing on their parts, they are 
called ...”** The non-existence of merits 
prior to the bestowal of the prima gratia vocans, 
so positively asserted in this definition, plainly ex- 
cludes any and all natural merit de condigno. 


12V. supra, pp. 83 sqq. 15°, . . ipsius tiustificationis ex- 
13 “ Gratiam Dei secundum merita ordium in adultis a Dei per Chri- 
nostra dari,’’ stum lIesum. praeveniente gratia 
14“ Debetur merces bonis operi- sumendum esse, h. e. ab eius vo- 


bus, si fiant; sed gratia quae non catione, qua nullis eorum existen- a 


debetur praecedit, ut fiant.” (Ar-  tibus meritis vocantur.’’ (Sess. VI, 
ausic. II, can. 18; see Denzinger- cap. 5. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) 
Bannwart, n. 191.) 


THE GRATUITY, ORVACTUAL ‘GRACE! 137 


a) St. Paul demonstrates in his Epistle to the 
Romans that justification does not result from 
obedience to the law, but is a grace freely be- 
stowed by God. 


The Apostle regards the merciful dispensations of 
Providence in favor of the Chosen People, and of the en- 
tire sinful race of men in general, as so many sheer graces. 
Rom. IX, 16: “So then it is not of him that willeth, 
nor of him that runneth,.but of God that showeth 
mercy.” ** The gratuity of grace is asserted in terms 
that almost sound extravagant two verses further down 
in the same Epistle: “Therefore he hath mercy on 
whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth.” 17 The 
same truth is emphasized in Rom. XI, 6: “And if by 
grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no 
more grace.” ** Lest any one should pride himself on 
having obtained faith, which is the root of justification, by 
his own merits, St. Paul declares in his Epistle to the 
Ephesians: “ For by grace you are saved through faith, 
and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God; not 
of works, that no man may glory. For we are his work- 
manship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which 
God hath prepared that we should walk in them.” 2 
These and many similar passages 2° make it plain that 
grace cannot be merited without supernatural aid. 


LGM OM EOXCVNN TOs anie Igitur non 
volentis neque currentis, sed mi- 


estis salvati per fidem et hoc non 
ex vobis: Dei enim donum est, non 


serentis est Dei,’ 

17 Rom, IX, 18: “Ergo cuius 
vult miseretur et quem vult indurat 
(dpa oty Oéde édeci, 8 Se Oédex 
ok\npvver).” 

18 Rom, XT 6s) $6 .S¢ autem gratia, 
iam non ex operibus (éé épywr)> 
alioquin gratia iam non est gratia.” 

19 Eph, II, 8-10: “‘ Gratié enim 


ex operibus, ut ne quis glorietur. 
Ipsius enim sumus factura (1rol- 
nua), creati in Christo TIesu in 
operibus bonis, quae praeparavit 
Deus, ut in allis ambulemus.” 

20.2, g., 2. Cor.: Vj ‘143. Gal. LI, 
22; 2 Tim, I, 9; Tit. III, 5; 1 Pet, 
TS.'33. te John LV 10, 


138 ACTUAL’ GRACE 


b) The leading champion of the dogma of the 
gratuity of grace among the Fathers is St. Augus- 
tine, who never tires of repeating that “Grace 
does not find merits, but causes them,” 7* and 
substantiates this fundamental principle thus: 
“Grace has preceded thy merit; not grace by 
merit, but merit by grace. For if grace is by 
merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis.” *” 

c) The theological argument is based (1) on 
the disproportion between nature and grace and 
(2) on the absolute necessity of grace for the 
performance of salutary works. 


There is no proportion between the natural and the 
supernatural, and it would be a contradiction to say 
that mere nature can span the chasm separating the two 
orders. ‘To assume the existence of a strict meritum 
naturae for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as 
the supernatural character of grace. To deny these 
would be to deny grace itself and with it the whole super- 
natural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity. 
We know, on the other hand,?* that grace is absolutely 
indispensable for the performance of salutary acts. 
Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace would be to credit 
nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its 
own power, or at least to merit grace by the performance 
of naturally good deeds. In the first hypothesis grace 
would no longer be necessary for salvation ; in the second, 


21 Tract. in TIoa., 86: “Gratia Nam si gratia ex merito, emisti. non 


non invenit, sed efficit merita,” gratis accepisti.”” Other  Patristic 
22 Serm., 169, c. 2: “Gratia texts quoted by Ripalda, De Ente 

praecessit meritum tuum, non gratia Supernatural, disp. 15 sqq. 

ex merito, sed meritum ex gratia. 23V. supra, pp. 50 sqq. 


Se 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 139 


it would be proportionate to natural goodness, and 
therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of 
grace cannot be consistently denied without at the same 
time denying its necessity.?4 


Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by 
which unaided nature could acquire even so much as an 
equitable claim to supernatural grace. 


This proposition may be technically qualified as 
fidet proxima saltem. 

Proof. The Semipelagians held that, though 
nature cannot merit grace in strict justice, it can 
merit it at least congruously, 7. ¢. as a matter of 
fitness or equity.2> This contention was rejected 
by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 520), 
which defined that “God works many good things 
in man that man does not work, but man works no 
good deeds that God does not give him the 
strength to do.” °° And again: “[God] Himself 
inspires us with faith and charity without any pre- 
ceding [natural] merits [on our pact | A ite 
phrase “without any preceding merits” (nullis 
praecedentibus meritis) excludes both the meri- 
tum de condigno and the meritum de congruo. 


24 For a more extensive treatment 
of this important point the reader 
is referred to Heinrich-Gutberlet, 
Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 
§ 418, Mainz 1897. 

25 V. supra, p. 98. : 

26Can. 20: “ Multa Deus facit 


in homine bona, quae non facit - 


homo; nulla vero facit homo bona, 


quae non Deus praestat, ut faciat 
homo.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
193.) ! 

27“ Sed ipse [Deus] nobis nullis 
praecedentibus bonis meritis [sctl. 
naturalibus] et fidem et amorem sui 
prius inspirat.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 200.) 


140 ACTUAL GRACE 


a) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I 
also covers this thesis. 

The Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support 
of their teaching: “To one he gave five talents, and to 
another two, and to another one, to every one according 
to his proper ability.” ?* But this text is too vague 
to serve as an argument in such an important matter. 
Not a few exegetes treat it as a kind of rhetorical figure. 
Others, following the example of the Fathers, take “ tal- 
ents” to mean purely natural gifts, or gratiae gratis 
datae, while by “ability” (virtus) they understand the 
already existing grace of faith or a certain definite meas- 
ure of initial grace.2® But even if virtus meant natural 
faculty or talent, it cannot be identical with“ merit.” 
Considering the common teaching of theologians that the 
angels were endowed with grace according to the meas- 
ure of their natural perfection,®° we may well suppose 


that man receives grace likewise according to his natural 


constitution (gratia sequitur naturam) — a predisposition 
or aptitude which God ordained in His infinite wis- 
dom to be the instrument through which His graces should 
operate either for personal sanctification or the good of 
others. 


perrimsn ais 
Sy a ee ee a 


nt ee veer 


b) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending ~ 


the orthodox faith against the Semipelagians, 
strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace of 
faith, and above all of the initial gratia praeve- 
mens. 


28 Matth, XXV, 15: “Et unt 29 Cfr. Maldonatus’ commentary 
dedit quinque talenta, alii autem on this text. 
duo, alii vero unum, unicuique 30 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
secundum propriam virtutem thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
(éxdorw Kara Tiv idiay Stvamey).” ural, p, 326. 


THE GRATUITY: OF ACTUAL GRACE 


a) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. EN... 9 asy£ol- 
lows: “Nothing is so opposed to this feeling as for 
any one to glory concerning his own merits in such a 
way as if he himself had made them for himself, and 
not the grace of God,—a grace, however, which makes 
the good to differ from the wicked, and is not common 
to the good and the wicked.” + And in another place 
Beysavss) For. it would) not. dn any sense be the 
grace of God, were it not in every sense gratuitous.” 3? 

8) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected 
of Semipelagian leanings because they appear to assign 
the chief rdle in the business of salvation to nature.*% 
A careful study of their writings, however, shows 
that these authors had in mind co-operating, not preven- 
ient grace. The general teaching of the Orientals on 
the gratuity of grace is sufficiently indicated by the de- 
mand made at the Council of Lydda (ALD! ars): that 
Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: “ Gra- 
tiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari.’ The Fathers 
who have been accused of Semipelagian sympathies 
merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite the 
morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine 
grace. 

St. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly asserts the 
absolute gratuity of grace when he says of faith: 


LAL 


“That which is a merit of 


31 De Praedest. Sanct., 3, 10, 31% 
“Nihil huic sensui tam contrarium 
est quam de suis meritis sic quem- 
quam gloriari, tamquam ipse sibi 
ea fecerit, non Dei gratia, sed gra- 
tia quae bonos discernit a malis, 
non quae communis est bonis et 
malis,’’ ; 

32 De Peccato Orig., c. 245-1, 28: 
“Non enim gratia Dei erit ulio 


faith, may not be ascribed 


modo, nist gratuita fuerit omni 
modo,” 

33 Cyril of Jerusalem (Catech., I, 
17), Athanasius (C. Gent., n. 30), 
Basil (Epist., 294: “ Divinum au- 
xilium in nostra situm est pote: 
state’’), Gregory of Nazianzus (Or., 
31), and especially Chrysostom 


(Hom, in Gen., 12; Hom. in Epist, 


ad Rom., 2). 


142 ACTUAL GRACE 
to us, for it is a free gift of God,’ ** and directly con- 
tradicts Cassian and the Massilians when he declares: 
“Thou hast it not of thyself, thou hast received it from 
God. Hence thou hast received whatever thou hast, not 
only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is not thine 
own merit, but the grace of God. Although thou al- 
legest the faith, thou hast received it by vocation.” *° 

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be 
succinctly stated thus: The grace of God is the cause 
of our merits, and hence cannot be itself merited. Being 
the cause, it cannot be an effect.*® 


Thesis III: Nature cannot merit supernatural grace 
even by natural prayer. 


This thesis, like the preceding one, maybe tech- 
nically qualified as fidet proxima saltem. 

Proof. Let us first clearly establish the state 
of the question. Our thesis refers to that partic- 
ular kind of prayer (preces naturae) which by its 
intrinsic value, so to speak, obliges Almighty God 
to grant what the petitioner asks for, as is un- 
doubtedly the case with supernatural prayer, ac- 


34 Hom. in Epist. ad Ephes., 4. cadere sub 


tum 


sic etiam non potest 


35 Hom. in 1 Epist. ad Cor., 12. 
Cir. Palmieri, 
Actuali, thes. 33. 

3¢Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 
Theol., 1a z2ae, qu. 114, art. 5: 
“ Donum gratiae considerart potest 
dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ra- 
tionem gratuiti doni, et sic manife- 
stum est quod omne meritum repu- 
gnat gratiae, quia ut Rom. XI, 9 
Apostolus dicit: ‘Si autem gratia, 
iam non ex  operibus.’ Altero 
modo potest considerari secundum 
naturam ipsius rei, quae donatur, et 


De Gratia Divina . 


merito non habentis gratiam, 
quia excedit proportionem naturae, 
tum etiam quia ante gratiam in 
statu. peccati homo habet impedi- 
mentum promerendt gratiam, scil. 
ipsum peccatum. Postquam autem 
aliquis tam habet gratiam, non pot- 
est gratia iam habita sub merito 
cadere, quia merces est terminus 
operis, gratia autem est principium 
cuiuslibet boni operis in nobis.” 
This is equally true of the meritum 
de condigno and the meritum de 
congruo. 


He GRATUITY OF AGTUAL GRACE 143 


cording to our Saviour’s own promise: “Ask 
and ye shall receive.” ** The inefficacy of nat- 
ural prayer asserted in our thesis, is not, as in the 
case of merit,** due to any intrinsic impossibility, 
but to a positive divine decree to grant supernat- 
ural prayer. 

The Second Council of Orange defined against 
the Semipelagians: “If any one says that the 
grace of God can be obtained by human [/i. e. nat- 
ural] prayer, and that it is not grace itself which 
causes us to invoke God, he contradicts the 
prophet Isaias and the Apostle who say: “TI was 
found by them that did not seek me; I appeared 
openly to them that asked not after me.” 9 

a) Sacred Scripture teaches that, unless we are 
inspired by the Holy Ghost, we cannot pray ef- 
ficaciously. It follows that to be efficacious, 
prayer must be an effect of prevenient grace. 
We should not even know for what or how to 
pray, if the Holy Ghost did not inspire us. Cfr. 
Rom. VIII, 26: “For we know not what we 
should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit him- 
self asketh for us [inspires us to ask]| with un- 
speakable groanings.” * 1 Cor. XII, 3: “No 


87 John XVI, 24: “Petite et vel Apostolo idem dicenti: Inventus 

 accipietis.”’ sum a non quaerentibus me, palam 
38 V, supra, theses I and II. apparut his, qui me non interroga- 
39 Si quis ad invocationem  bant.’? (Can, 3, Denzinger-Bann- 

humanam [i. e. naturalem] gratiam wart, n. 176.) 

_ Dei dicit posse conferri, non autem 40 Rom. VIII, 26: ‘ Quid ore- 

ipsam gratiam facere, ut invocetur mus, sicut oportet, nescimus, sed 

a nobis, contradicit Isaiae prophetae ipse Spiritus postulat [postulare 


144 ACTUAL GRACE 


man can say: Lord God, but by the Holy 
Ghost.” 44 Supernatural union with Christ is an 
indispensable condition of all efficacious prayer. 
John XV, 7: “If you abide in me, and my words 
abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and 
it shall be done unto you.” * 

b) This is also the teaching of the Fathers. 
“Who would truly groan, desiring to receive what 
he prays for from the Lord,” says St. Augus- 
tine,*? “if he thought that he received it from 
himself, and not from God? . . . We understand 
that this is also itself the gift of God, that with a 
true heart and spiritually we cry to God. Let 
them, therefore, observe how they are mistaken 
who think that our seeking, asking, knocking is 
of ourselves, and is not given to us; and say that 
this is the case because grace is preceded by our 
merits; that it follows them when we ask and re- 
ceive, and seek and find, and it is opened to us 
when we knock.” ** 

c) From the theological point of view the in- 
efficacy of purely natural prayer in matters per- 


facit] pro nobis gemitibus imenar- 
rabilibus.” 

At muCor, (lise 3s 
dicere Dominus Deus, nisi in Spiritu 
sancto.” 

42 John XV, 7: “Si manseritis 
in me et verba mea in vobis man- 
serint, quodcunque volueritis, petetis 
et fiet vobis.” 

43 De Dono Perseverantiae, 23, n. 
63 sq.: “ Quis veraciter gemat, de- 


“Nemo potest” 


siderans accipere quod orat a Do- 
mino, si hoc a se ipso sumere exi- 
stimet, non ab illo? ... Ubi intelligi- 
mus et hoc ipsum esse donum Det, ut 
veraci corde et spiritualiter clame- 
mus ad Deum. Attendant ergo, quo- 
modo falluntur, qui putant esse a 
nobis, non dari nobis ut petamus, 
quaeramus, pulsemus, etc.” 

44 Cfr, Palmieri, De Gratia Di- 
vina Actuali, thes. 32. 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 145 


taining to salvation can be demonstrated thus: 
Revelation tells us that the work of salvation re-. 
quires for its beginning an initial supernatural 
grace. Now prayer, that is to say, efficacious 
prayer, is in itself a salutary act. Consequently, 
there can be no efficacious prayer without preve- 
nient grace, and purely natural prayer is ineffica- 
cious for salvation. 


Ripalda holds that, in an economy different from the 
present, natural prayer would have a claim to be heard. 
This opinion can be defended without prejudice to the 
dogma of the gratuity of grace. No doubt God might 
condescend to hear such petitions if He would, though, 
of course, He is not bound to do so by any intrinsic 
power inherent in natural prayer. Unlike merit, prayer 
appeals to the mercy of God, not to His justice. Ri- 
palda’s theory, however, rests upon an unprovable as- 
sumption, namely, that man in the state of pure nature 
would be able to know of the existence, or at least the 
possibility, of a supernatural order and to strive for the 
_ beatific vision as his final end.* 


Thesis IV: Man cannot move God to the bestowal 
of supernatural grace by any positive disposition or 
preparation on his part. 


This thesis may be qualified as propositio certa. 
Proof. Positive preparation or disposition for 
_ Stace (capacitas sive praeparatio positiva) is prac- 
tically on a level with natural prayer. The posi- 


45 On this difficult question con- sect. 3, and De Lugo, De Fide, disp. 
sult Ruiz, De Provid., disp. 18, 12; sect. 35 


146 ACTUAL GRACE 


tive disposition for a natural good sometimes in- 
cludes a certain demand to satisfaction, as e. g. 
thirst demands to be quenched. ‘This is still more 
the case when the disposition has been acquired by 
a positive preparation for the good in question. 
Thus a student, by conscientiously preparing him- 
self for examination, acquires a claim to be ad- 
mitted to it sooner or later. Can this also 
be said of grace? Does there exist in man a 
positive disposition for grace in the sense that 
the withholding of it would grievously injure and 
disappoint the soul? Can man, without supernat- 
ural aid, positively dispose himself for the recep- 
tion of supernatural grace, confident that God 
will reward his efforts by bestowing it on him? 
Both these questions must be answered in the neg- 
ative. 


a) If there were something in the natural make-up of 
man which would move the Almighty to give him grace, 
the bestowal of grace would no longer be a free act of 
God. But to assert the consequent would be Semipela- 
gian, hence the antecedent must be false. 

b) This truth can easily be deduced from the teach- — 
ing of the Fathers in the Semipelagian controversy. | 
They declare, in perfect conformity with St. Paul, that — 
grace is bestowed gratuitously because God can give or 
withhold it as He pleases. St. Augustine says ** that the 
grace of Baptism is granted freely, that is, without re- 
gard to any positive disposition on the part of the bap- 


46 De Praedest. Sanct., c. 12. 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 147 


tized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that 
nature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted 
by original sin.” Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot 
possibly possess the power of meriting divine grace. 

c) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that 
pure nature needs actual grace to save itself, and conse- 
quently has a claim to such grace at least ex decentia 
Creatoris and ex lege iustissimae providentiae, perilously 
resembles Baius’ condemned proposition that the state of 
pure nature is impossible.*8 


Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for 
the reception of supernatural grace by not putting any 
obstacles in its way. 


This proposition is held by a majority of Cath- 
olic theologians (sententia commumnior ). 

Proof. The solution of this question is inti- 
mately connected with the famous Scholastic 
axiom: “Facienti quod est in se Deus non dene- 
gat gratiam,” that is, to the man who does what 
he can, God does not refuse grace. This axiom 
is susceptible of three different interpretations. 

a) It may mean: Facienti quod est in.se cum 
auxilio gratiae Deus confert ulteriorem gratiam, 
1. €., to him who does what he can with the help of 
supernatural grace, God grants further and more 
powerful graces up to justification. This is 
merely another way of stating the indisputable 


47 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 
pp. 226 saq. 
48 Op. cit., pp. 228 sq. 


148 ACTUAL GRACE 


truth that, by faithfully codperating with the 
grace of God, man is able to merit additional 
graces, and it holds true even of infidels and 
sinners. The first freely performed salutary 
act establishes a meritum de congruo towards 
other acts disposing a man for justification. And 
since the first as well as all subsequent salutary 
acts, in this hypothesis, are pure graces, this in- 
terpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible 
with the dogma of the gratuity of grace.*° 

b) Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturali- 
bus Deus non denegat gratiam (to him who 
does what he can with his natural moral 
strength, God does not refuse grace.) This does 
not mean that, in consequence of the efforts of 
the natural will, God may not withhold from 
anyone the first grace of vocation. In this sense 
the axiom would be Semipelagiam, and has been 
rejected by a majority of the Schoolmen. It 1s 
said of Molina that he tried to render it acceptable 
by the hypothesis that God bound Himself by a 
contract with Christ to give His grace to all men 
who would make good use of their natural facul- 
ties. But how could the existence of this imagin- 
ary contract be proved? In matter of fact Molina 
taught, with a large number of other divines,”° 
that God in the bestowal of His graces freely 


49 Further information on _ this 50 Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 
head infra, Part II, Ch, III, Viole V519td véd., ppsat7sdG. 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 149 


bound Himself to a definite rule, which coincides 
with His universal will to save all mankind. 
In the application of this law He pays no re- 
gard to any positive disposition or preparation, 
but merely to the presence or absence of obstacles 
which would prove impediments to grace. In 
other words, God, generally speaking, is more in- 
clined to offer His grace to one who puts no 
obstacles in its way than to one who wallows in 
sin and neglects to do his share.>! 

c) Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturae 
negative se disponendo [1. e. obicem non po- 
nendo| Deus non denegat gratiam (to the man 
who does what he can with his natural moral 
strength, disposing himself negatively [7. e., by 
not placing any obstacle] God does not deny grace. 
In this form the axiom is identical with our thesis. 
The question arises: Can it be made to square 
with the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace? 
Vasquez,°” Glossner,®? and some others answer 


51A titre de curiosité we may 
note the opinion of Ripalda (De 
Ente Supernat., disp. 17, sect. 1) 
and Vasquez (Comment. in S. 
Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 10) that 
some pre-Tridentine theologians as- 
scribed to nature the ability of 
positively disposing itself for actual 
graces and thereby, though in 
perfect good faith, entertained 
Semipelagian views. Even St 
Thomas has been accused of con- 
- ceding too much to Semipelagian- 
_ism in two of his earlier works 
(Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., 


II, dist. 28, qu. 1, art. 4, and De 
Veritate, qu. 14, art. 11), though 
his teaching in the Summa is admit- 
tedly orthodox. On the extremely 
doubtful character of such a sum- 
mary indictment see Palmieri, De 
Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 34; 
Schiffni, De Gratia Divina, pp. 495 
sqq., 542 sqq.; Glossner, Die Lehre 
des hl. Thomas von der Gnade, 
Mainz 1871. 

52 Vasquez, Comment. in S, 
Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 10-11. 

53 Dogmatik, Vol. II, pp, 191 sq., 
Ratisbon 1874, 


150 ACTUAL GRACE 


this question in the negative, whereas the great 
majority of Catholic theologians hold with 
Suarez °* and Lessius,” that there is no contra- 
diction between the two. Though Lessius did 
not succeed in proving his famous contention that 
the axiom Facientt quod est in se Deus non dene- 
gat gratiam, was for three full centuries under- 
stood in this sense by the schools,’® there is no 
doubt that many authorities can be cited in favor 
of his interpretation.”’ 
The theological argument for our thesis may 
be formulated thus: The gratuity of grace does 
not imply that the recipient must have no sort of 
disposition. It merely means that man is posi- 
tively unworthy of divine favor. Otherwise the 
Church could not teach, as she does, that the 


grace bestowed on the angels and on our first: 


parents in Paradise was absolutely gratuitous, 
nor could she hold that the Hypostatic Union of 
the two natures in Christ, which is the pattern 
and exemplar of all true grace,’* was a pure grace 
in respect of the humanity of our Lord. The 
dogma of the gratuity of grace is in no dan- 
ger whatever so long as the relation between 
negative disposition and supernatural grace is 
conceived as actual (facienti=qui facit), not cau- 


54 De Aucxil., III, 2, 3. 57 Cfr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 

55 De Gratia Effic., c. to. Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 119 saq. ) 

56 Disproved historically by Pal- 58 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Prae- — 
mieri. dest. Sancte, \(¢.) 15. 


oe ae 


THE GRATUITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 151 


sal (facienti=quia facit). The motive for the 
distribution of grace is to be sought not in the 
dignity of human nature, but in God’s will to save 
all men. We must, however, guard against the 
erroneous notion that grace is bestowed accord- 
ing to a fixed law or an infallible norm regulating 
the amount of grace in accordance with the con- 
dition of the recipient. Sometimes great sin- 
fers are miraculously converted, while others of 
fairly good antecedents perish. Yet, again, who 
could say that to the omniscient and all-wise God 
the great sinner did not appear better fitted to 
_Teceive grace than the “decent” but self-sufficient 
pharisee? 


REApINGs : — Hurter, C ampendium Theologiae Dogmaticae, Vol. 
IT, thes. 187.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heitligung, § 8, Pader- 
born 1885.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, c. 3, Gulpen 
1885.— Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, 
§ 417-420, Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones Dogmaticae, 
. Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 105 sqq., Freiburg 1908.— Schiffini, De Gratia 
- Divina, pp. 468 sqq., Freiburg 1901. 


SECTION 3 


THE UNIVERSALITY OF ACTUAL GRACE 


The gratuity of grace does not conflict with 
its universality. Though God distributes His 
graces freely, He grants them to all men with- 
out exception, because He wills all to be saved. 


This divine “will to save” (voluntas Dei salvifica) 
may be regarded in relation either to the wayfaring state 
or to the status termint. Regarded from the first-men- 
tioned point of view it is a merciful will (voluntas 
misericordiae) and is generally called first or antecedent 
will (voluntas prima s. antecedens) or God’s salvific will 
(voluntas Dei salvifica) in the strict sense of the word. 
Considered in relation to the status termini, it is a just 
will, as God rewards or punishes each creature according 
to its deserts. This second or consequent will (voluntas 


ne ge Fa em 


secunda s. consequens) is called “ predestination” in so ~ 
far as it rewards the just, and “ reprobation”” in so far as — 


it punishes the wicked. 
God’s ‘‘ will to save”? may therefore be defined as an 
earnest and sincere desire to justify all men and make 


b 


them supernaturally happy. As voluntas antecedens it is i 


conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man; 
as voluntas consequens, on the other hand, it is absolute, 
because God owes it to His justice to reward or punish 
every man according to his deserts.* 


1Cfr. St. Augustine, Tract. in sed primo salvare, postea iudicare, — 


Ioa., 36, n. 4: “Venit Christus, eos iudicando in poenam, qui salvari 
152 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 153 


Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, 
(1) Of the universality of God’s will to save; 
(2) Of the divine voluntas salvifica as the will to 
give sufficient graces to all adult human beings 
without exception; (3) Of predestination, and 
(4) Of reprobation. 


ARTICLE \1 


THE UNIVERSALITY OF GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 


Although God’s will to save all men is practically iden- 
tical with His will to redeem all? a formal distinction 
must be drawn between the two, (a) because there is 
a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either is 
supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of 
the fallen angels, while the former suggests a question 
peculiar to itself, viz. the fate of unbaptized children. 


Thesis I: God sincerely wills the salvation, not only 
of the predestined, but of all the faithful without excep- 


~ tion. 


This proposition embodies an article of faith. 
Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists 
and the Jansenists, who heretically maintain that 
God wills to save none but the predestined. 
Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: 
“If any one saith that the grace of justification 


noluerunt, eos perducendo ad vitam, 2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, 
qui credendo salutem non respue- pp. 75 sqq., St. Louis 1914, 
runt,” 


154 ACTUAL GRACE 


is attained only by those who are predestined 
unto life, but that all others who are called, are 
called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by 
the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him 
be anathema.”’ ® 

The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died ex- 
clusively for the predestined,* was censured as 
“heretical” by Pope Innocent X. Hence it 
is of faith that Christ died for others besides the 
predestined. Who are these “others”? As the 
Church obliges all her children to pray: “| Christ] 
descended from heaven for us men and for our 
salvation,” © it is certain that at least all the faith- 
ful are included in the saving will of God. We 


say, “at least all the faithful,’ because in matter 


of fact the divine voluntas salvifica extends to all 
the descendants of Adam, as we shall show 
further on.° 

a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a 
number of passages that God wills the salvation 
of all believers, whether predestined or not. 
Jesus Himself says in regard to the Jews: 
Matth. XXIII, 37: “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou 
that killest the prophets, and stonest them that 


3 Sess. VI, can. 17: “St quis 
sustificationis gratiam nonnist prae- 
destinatis ad vitam contingere  di- 


4 Prop. 5, apud Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 1096. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
Soteriology, p. 76. 


xerit, reliquos vero omnes qui vocan- 
tur, vocart quidem, sed gratiam non 
accipere, utpote divinad potestate 
praedestinatos ad malum, anathema 
sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.) 


5“ Qui propter nos homines et 
propter nostram salutem descendit de 
coelis.” (Credo). 

6V. infra, Thesis II. 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 155 


are sent unto thee, how often would I (volut) 
have gathered together thy children, as the hen 
doth gather her chickens under her wings, and 
thou wouldst not (nolwisti).’ Two facts are 
stated in this text: (1) Our Lord’s earnest desire 
to save the Jewish people, anciently through the 
instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His 
own person; (2) the refusal of the Jews to be 
saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the 
New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John 
(III, 16): “God so loved the world, as to give 
his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth 
in him‘ may not perish, but may have life ever- 
lasting.” However, since many who believe in 
Christ do actually perish,® the divine voluntas 
salvifica, in principle, extends not only to the pre- 
destined, but to all the faithful, 7. e. to all who 
have received the sacrament of Baptism. 

b) The teaching of the Fathers can be 
- gathered from the quotations given under Thesis 
II, infra. 


c) The theological argument may be briefly summar- 
ized as follows: God’s will to save is co-extensive with 
the grace of adoptive sonship (filiatio adoptiva), which 
is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity. 
Now, some who were once in the state of grace are 
_ eternally lost. Consequently, God also wills the salvation 


Tras 6 micrebwy eis avror, 
8 Among them was one of our Lord’s own chosen Apostles, 


156 ACTUAL GRACE 


of those among the faithful who do not actually attain 
to salvation and who are, therefore, not predestined. 


Thesis II: God wills to save every human being. 


This proposition is fidet proxima saltem. 

Proof. The existence of original sin is no 
reason why God should exclude some men from 
the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by 
the Calvinistic ‘“Infralapsarians.” Our thesis is 
so solidly grounded on Scripture and Tradition 
that some theologians unhesitatingly call 1t an ar- 
ticle of faith. 

a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstra- 
tion to two classical passages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. 
and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq. 

a) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling God’s j 
omnipotence, says of His mercy: “But thou hast 
mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, — 
and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of © 
repentance. For thou lovest all things that are, 
and hatest none of the things which thou hast : 
made. ... ., Vhou.,sparest “all; because they are 
thine, O Lord, who lovest souls.” ® 


In this text the mercy of God is described as universal. — 
Misereris omnium, parcis omnibus. This universality 
is based (1) on His omnipotence (quia ommia potes), — 
which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally bound- 


9 Wisd. XI, 24 sqq.: “Sed mi- quae sunt et nthil odisti eorum quae 


sereris omnium, quia omnia potes, et _fecisti. . . . Parcis autem omnibus, — 


dissimulas peccata hominum propter  quoniam tua sunt, Domine, qui 
poenitentiam. Diligis enim omnia amas animas.”’ 


GOD'S WILL) TO SAVE 157 


less, must therefore include all men without exception. 
The universality of God’s mercy is based (2) on His 
universal over-lordship and dominion (quoniam tua sunt; 
diligis omnia quae fecisti). As there is no creature that 
does not belong to God, so there is no man whom He 
does not love and to whom He does not show mercy. 
The universality of God’s mercy in the passage quoted is 
Paced) (3) on His love for souls (quit amas animas). 
Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or 
adult, Christian, pagan or Jew), God is at work to save it. 
Consequently the divine voluntas salvifica is universal, not 
only in a moral, but in the physical sense of the term, 
that is, it embraces all the descendants of Adam. 

6) t Tim. I, 2 sqq.: “I desire therefore, first of all, 
that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgiv- 
ings be made for all men. . . . For this is good and ac- 
ceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have 
all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of 
the truth. For there is one God, and one mediator of 
God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a 
redemption for all.” 1° 

The Apostle commands us to pray “for all men,” be- 
cause this practice is “ good and acceptable in the sight of 
God.” Why is it good and acceptable? Because God 
* will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowl- 
edge of the truth.” In other words, God’s will to save 
is universal. . 

The question arises: Is the universality of the divine 


eye Lim. 1T,.:% sqq.:' “ Obsecro (ds mdvras avOpmmous Oéder ow- 
igitur primum omnium fieri obsecra- Onvat) et ad agnitionem veritatis 
tiones, _ orationes, postulationes, venire: unus enim Deus (eis yap 
gratiarum actiones pro omnibus Oeds), unus et mediator (els Kat 
hominibus (irép ravrwy avOporwy) fecirns) Dei et hominum homo 
--. Hoc enim bonum est et ac-_ Christus Tesus, qui dedit redemp- 
ceptum coram Salvatore. nostro Deo, tionem semetipsum pro omnibus 
qui omnes homines vult salvos fieri (imép mdvtwy).” 


158 ACTUAL GRACE 

voluntas salvifica, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, 
or is it physical, admitting of no exceptions? The 
answer may be found in the threefold reason given 
by the Apostle: the oneness of God, the mediator- 
ship of Christ, and the universality of the Redemption. 
(1) “For there is [but] one God.” 21 As truly, there- 
fore, as God is the God of all men without exception, 
is each and every man included in the divine vo- 
luntas salvifica. (2) “ There is [but] ... 
of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.” The human 
nature which Christ assumed in the Incarnation is com- 
mon to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus 
Christ for his mediator? (3) Christ “gave himself a 
redemption [i. e. died] for all.” That is to say, God’s 
will to save is co-extensive with His will to redeem. The 
latter is universal,’? consequently also the former.” 


b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers 
were wont to base their teaching in this matter 


on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated q 
that they regarded the truth therein set forth as — 


divinely revealed. Passaglia * has worked out 


the Patristic argument in detail, quoting no less ‘i 


than two hundred authorities. 


a) We must limit ourselves to a few specimen cita- — 
St. Ambrose declares that God wills to save 4 
“He willed all to be His own whom He © 


tions. 
all men. 


11“ Unus enim Deus.’ Cfr. Rom. 


one mediator 


proved in Soteriology, pp. 77 sd4- ip 


TTA; 207/8a.5 7 2X, | 128 

12 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, 
pp. 77 sqq. 

18 Cfr. Matth, XVIII, 11; 2 Cor. 
V, 18. That God’s will to redeem 
mankind is universal has been 


14 Cfr. on this text Estius, Com- — 


ment. in Epist. S. Pauli, h. 1. 


15In his work De Partitione Vo- us 
luntatis Divinae in Primam et Se 


cundam, Rome 1851. 


fe GOD'S’ WILL TO SAVE 159 


established and created. O man, do not flee and hide 
thyself! He wants even those who flee, and does" 
not will that those in hiding should perish.’2% St. 
Gregory of Nazianzus holds God’s voluntas salvifica to 
be co-extensive in scope with original sin and the atone- 
ment. “The law, the prophets, and the sufferings of 
Christ,” he says, “ by which we were redeemed, are com- 
mon property and admit of no exception: but as all [men] 
are participators in the same Adam, deceived by the ser- 
pent and subject to death in consequence of sin, so by the 
heavenly Adam all are restored to salvation and by the 
wood of ignominy recalled to the wood of life, from 
which we had fallen.’*7 St. Prosper concludes that, 
since all men are in duty bound to pray for their fellow- 
men, God must needs be willing to save all without excep- 
tion. “ We must sincerely believe,” he says, “that God 
wills all men to be saved, since the Apostle solicitously 
prescribes supplication to be made for all.’18 The 
question why so many perish, Prosper answers as 
follows: “ [God] wills all to be saved and to come to 
the knowledge of truth, . . . so that those who are saved, 
are saved because He wills them to be saved, while those 
who perish, perish because they deserve to perish.” 1° 
In his Responsiones ad Capitula Obiectionum Vin- 
centianarum the same writer energetically defends St. 
Augustine against the accusation that. his teaching on 


16Iu Ps.; 39, mn. 20:3, “lle | siquidem Apostolus sollicite prae- 
omnes suos vult esse, quos condidit cipit, ut Deo pro omnibus supplice- 


et creavit. Utinam tu homo non fu- tur.’ 

gias et te abscondas! Ille etiam 19° OD).-| Cita Can eeauininn qui et 

_ fugientes requirit et absconditos non omnes vult salvos fieri et ad -agni- 

vult perire.’’ tionem veritatis venire,... ut et 
dt Orat,,'' 33) ts. 94 qui salvaniur ideo salvi sint, quia 
18 Resp. ad Capitula Gallor., c. 2:  illos volwit Deus salvos fieri, et qui 


_ “ Sincerissime credendum est, Deum pereunt, ideo pereant, quia perire 
velle ut omnes homines salvi fiant, meruerunt.” 


160 ACTUAL GRACE 


predestination is incompatible with the orthodox doc- 
trine of the universality of God’s saving will.”° 

B) St. Augustine aroused suspicion in the camp of 
the Semipelagians by his general teaching ‘on predes- 
tination and more particularly by his interpretation of 
1 Tim. II, 4. The great Bishop of Hippo interprets this 
Pauline text in no less than four different ways. In 
his treatise De Spiritu et Litera he describes the divine 
voluntas salvifica as strictly universal in the physical 
sense.2t. In his Enchiridion he restricts it to the pre- 
destined.22, In his Contra Iulianum he says: “ No one 
is saved unless God so wills.” 2 In his work De Cor- 
reptione et Gratia: “ God wills all men to be saved, be- 
cause He makes us to will this, just as He sent the spirit 
of His Son [into our hearts], crying: Abba, Father, that 
is, making us to cry, Abba, Pathet:? 34) How -didviot. 
Augustine come to interpret this simple text in so many 
different ways? Some think he chose this method to 
overwhelm the Pelagians and Semipelagians with Scrip- 
tural proofs. But this polemical motive can hardly have 
induced him to becloud an obvious text and invent inter- 
pretations which never occurred to any other ecclesiasti- 
cal writer before or after his time. The conundrum can 
only be solved by the assumption that Augustine believed 
in a plurality of literal senses in the Bible and held that 
over and above (or notwithstanding) the sensus obvius 


22 Enchiridion, c. 103. 
23 Contra Iulian., IV, 8, 42: 


20 For further information on this 
subject consult Ruiz, De Voluntate 


Dei, disp. 19 sqq.; Petavius, De Deo, 
X, 4 sq. 

21 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 33; 
n. 58: “Vult Deus omnes homines 
salvos fieri et ad agnitionem veritatis 
venire; non sic tamen ut iis adimat 
liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel 
male utentes iustissime iudicentur.” 


“ Nemo salvatur nisi volente Deo.” 

24 De Corrept. et Gratia, c. 15, n. 
47: “Omnes homines vuli Deus 
salvos fieri, quoniam nos facit velle, 
sicut misit Spiritum Filii sui claman- 
tem: Abba, pater, i. e. nos clamare 
facientem.” 


GOD'S WALI FO! SAVE } 161 


every exegete is free to read as much truth into any given | 
passage as possible, and that such interpretation lay with- 
in the scope of the inspiration of the Holy Ghost quite 
as much as the sensus obvius. In his Confessions ?® he 
actually argues in favor of a pluralitas sensuum. He 
was keen enough to perceive, however, that if a Scrip- 
tural text is interpreted in different ways, the several con- 
structions put upon it must not be contradictory. As he 
was undoubtedly aware of the distinction between vo- 
luntas antecedens and consequens,* his different inter- 
pretations of 1 Tim. II, 4 can be reconciled by assum- 
ing that he conceived God’s voluntas ‘salvifica as 
antecedens in so far as it is universal, and as consequens 
in so far as it is particular. St. Thomas solves the dif- 
ficulty in a similar manner: “The words of the Apos- 
tle, “God will have all men to be saved, etc.,’ can be un- 
derstood in three ways: First, by a restricted applica- 
tion, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says, 
‘God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not be- 
cause there is no man whom he does not wish to be 
saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation 
He does not will” Secondly, they can be understood as 
applying to every class of individuals, not of every indi- 
vidual of each class; in which case they mean that ‘ God 
wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, 
males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but 
not all of every condition.’ Thirdly, according to the 
Damascene, they are understood of the antecedent will of 
God, not of the consequent will. The distinction must 
not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which 
there is nothing antecedent or consequent; but to the 


25 Confessiones, XII, 17 sqq. Notae in Enchiridion S, Augustini, 
26 Faure has proved this in his c. 103, Naples 1847, pp. 195 sqq. 


162 ACTUAL GRACE 


things willed. To understand which we must consider 
that everything, so far as it is good, is willed by God. 
A thing taken in its strict sense, and considered absolutely, 
may be good or evil, and yet when some additional cir- 
cumstance is taken into account, by a consequent con- 
sideration may be changed into its contrary. Thus, that 
men should live is good; and that men should be killed 
is evil, absolutely considered. If in a particular case it 
happens that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, 
to kill him becomes good, to let him live an evil. Hence 
it may be said of a just judge that antecedently he wills 
all men to live, but consequently he wills the murderer to 
be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all 
men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be 
damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply 
what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a 
qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they 
are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under 
particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply 
in as much as we will it when all particular circumstances 
are considered ; and this is what is meant by willing conse- 
quently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills 
simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified man- 
ner he would will him to live, inasmuch as he is a man. 
Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather 
than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever 
God simply wills takes place; although what He wills 
antecedently may not take place.” *” 

27 Summa Theol., ta, qu. 19, att. 51 sq., and, less favorably, Barden- 


6, ad 1. On Augustine’s teaching hewer-Shahan, Patrology, pp. 498 
see Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes.  sqq., Freiburg 1908. 


GOD'S "WILL TO SAVE 163 


Thesis III: The lot of unbaptized infants, though - 
difficult to reconcile with the universality of God’s sav- 
ing will, furnishes no argument against it. 


Proof. The most difficult problem concerning 
the divine voluntas salvifica—a real crux theolo- 
gorum—is the fate of unbaptized children. The 
Church has never uttered a dogmatic definition 
on this head, and theologians hold widely diver- 
gent opinions. 

Bellarmine teaches that infants who die with- 
out being baptized, are excluded from the divine 
voluntas salvifica, because, while the non-recep- 
tion of Baptism is the proximate reason of their 
damnation, its ultimate reason must be the will 
of God. 

a) This rather incautious assertion needs to be 
carefully restricted. It is an article of faith that 
God has instituted the sacrament of Baptism as 
the ordinary means of salvation for all men. On 
the other hand, it is certain that He expects 
parents, priests, and relatives, as his representa- 
tives, to provide conscientiously for its proper and 
timely administration. Sinful negligence on the 
part of these responsible agents cannot, therefore, 
be charged to Divine Providence, but must be laid 
at the door of those human agents who fail to do 
their duty. In exceptional cases infants can be 
saved even by means of the so-called Baptism of 
blood (baptismus sanguinis), 1. e. death for 


164 ACTUAL GRACE 


Christ’s sake. On the whole it may be said that 
God has, in principle, provided for the salvation of 
little children by the institution of infant Bap- 
tism. 


b) But there are many cases in which either invinci- 
ble ignorance or the order of nature precludes the ad- 
ministration of Baptism. The well-meant opinion of 
some theologians 7° that the responsibility in all such cases 
lies not with God, but with men, lacks probability. Does 
God, then, really will the damnation of these innocents? 
Some modern writers hold that the physical order of 
nature is responsible for the misfortune of so many 
innocent infants; but this hypothesis contributes nothing 
towards clearing up the awful mystery.” For God is 
the author of the natural as well as of the supernatural 
order. To say that He is obliged to remove existing 
obstacles by means of a miracle would disparage His 
ordinary providence.®° Klee’s assumption that dying 
children become conscious long enough to enable them 
to receive the Baptism of desire (baptismus flaminis), 
is scarcely compatible with the definition of the Council 
of Florence that “the souls of those who die in actual 
mortal sin, or only in original sin, forthwith descend to 
hell.” 3 A still more unsatisfactory supposition is that 


28 E. g. Arrubal (Comment. in S. — siastica traditione didicerunt. Nam 


Theol., 1a, disp. 91, c. 3 sq.) and 


Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg., De Deo, ~ 


Gisp, ta pes’ 2,, arta ns). 

29 Cfr. Albertus a Bulsano, Theol. 
Dogmat., ed. Graun, Vol. II, p. 141, 
Innsbruck 1894. 

30 Cfr, Bellarmine, De Gratia et 
Libero Arbitrio, II, 12: ‘. .. haec 
vesponsio non videtur digna Chri- 
tianis, qui providentiam Dei erga 
homines ex sacris literis et eccle- 


si non cadit passer in terram sine 
Patre nostro, qui in coelis est, quanto 
magis nos apud Deum pluris sumus 
illis? ” 

31 “Definimus illorum animas, qui 
in actuali mortali peccato vel solo 
originali decedunt, mox in infer- 
num descendere.”’ (Decret. Unio- 
nis, quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, 
n. 693.) 


GOD Si WILE ETO SAVE 165 


the prayer of Christian parents acts like a baptism of de- > 
sire and saves their children from hell. This theory, es- 
poused by Cardinal Cajetan, was rejected by the Fathers 
of Trent,*’ and Pope Pius V ordered it to be expunged 
from the Roman edition of Cajetan’s works.* 

A way out of the difficulty is suggested by Gutberlet and 
others, who, holding with St. Thomas that infants that 
die without Baptism will enjoy a kind of natural beati- 
tude, think it possible that God, in view of their suffer- 
ings, may mercifully cleanse them from original sin and 
thereby place them in a state of innocence.’ This the- 
ory is based on the assumption that the ultimate fate 
of unbaptized children is deprivation of the beatific 
vision of God and therefore a state of real damnation 
(poena damm, infernum), and that the remission of orig- 
inal sin has for its object merely to enable these un- 
fortunate infants to enjoy a perfect natural beatitude, 
which they could not otherwise attain. It is reasonable 
to argue that, as these infants are deprived of celestial 
happiness through no guilt of their own, the Creator can 
hardly deny them some sort of natural beatitude, to 
which their very nature seems to entitle them. “Hell” 
for them probably consists in being deprived of the beatific 
vision of God, which is a supernatural grace and as such 
lies outside the sphere of those prerogatives to which hu- 
man nature has a claim by the fact of creation. This 
theory would seem to establish at least some manner of 
salvation for the infants in question, and consequently, 
to vindicate the divine voluntas salvifica in the same meas- 
ure. Needless to say, it can claim no more than prob- 

32 Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Conc. 34 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 
rid. TX. ‘8. matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, p. 


33 It occurs in his commentary on 295, Mainz 1897. 
the Summa, 3a, qu. 68, art. 2, 11. 


166 | ACTUAL GRACE 


ability, and we find ourselves constrained to admit, at the 
conclusion of our survey, that there is no sure and per- 
fect solution of the difficulty, and theologians therefore 
do well to confess their ignorance.*° 


c) The difficulty of which we have spoken does 
not, of course, in any way impair the certainty 
of the dogma. The Scriptural passages cited 
above *° clearly prove that God wills to save 
all men without exception. In basing the univer- 
sality of God’s mercy on His omnipotence, His 
universal dominion, and His love of souls, the 
Book of Wisdom *’ evidently implies that the un- 
baptized infants participate in that mercy in all 
three of these respects. How indeed could Di- 
vine Omnipotence exert itself more effectively 
than by conferring grace on those who are in- 
evitably and without any fault of their own de- 
prived of Baptism? Who would deny that little 
children, as creatures, are subject to God’s uni- 
versal dominion in precisely the same manner as 
adults? Again, if God loves the souls of men, 
must He not also love the souls of infants? 

1 Tim. II, 4°% applies primarily to adults, 
because strictly speaking only adults can “come 
to the knowledge of the truth.” But St. Paul 
employs certain middle terms which undoubtedly 


35 On the probable fate of unbap- 36 Thesis IT. 
tized infants cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God 37 Quoted supra, p. 156. 
the Author of Nature and the Su- 88 Quoted supra, p. 157. 


pernatural, pp, 300 sqq. 


GOD'S WILE TO SAVE 167 


comprise children as well. Thus, if all men have > 
but ‘one God,” this God must be the God of in-. 
fants no less than of adults, and His mercy and 
goodness must include them also. And if Jesus 
Christ as God-man is the ‘one mediator of God 
and men,” He must also have assumed the human 
nature of children, in order to redeem them from 
original sin. Again, if Christ “gave himself a 
redemption for all,” it is impossible to assume that 
millions of infants should be directly excluded 
from the benefits of the atonement.*? 


ARAL Bi) 2 


GOD’S WILL TO GIVE SUFFICIENT GRACE TO ALL ADULT 
HUMAN BEINGS IN PARTICULAR 


In relation to adults, God manifests His saving will 
by the bestowal of sufficient grace upon all.1| The be- 
stowal of sufficient grace being evidently an effluence of 
the universal voluntas salvifica, the granting of such grace 
to all who have attained the use of reason furnishes an- 
other proof for the universality of grace. 

God gives all men sufficient graces. But He is not 
obliged to give to each efficacious graces, because all that 
is required to enable man to reach his supernatural des- 
tiny is codperation with sufficient grace, especially 
with the gratia prima vocans, which is the beginning of all 
salutary operation. 

To prove that God gives sufficient grace to all adult 

39 On the whole question consult 1 On the notion and existence of 


Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 53, sufficient grace see supra, Ch. I, 
3rd ed., Rome 1883. Sect. 2, No, 6, 


168 ACTUAL GRACE 


human beings without exception, we must show that He 
gives sufficient grace (1) to the just, (2) to the sinner, 
and (3) to the heathen. This we shall do in three dis- 
tinct theses. 


Thesis I: God gives to all just men sufficient grace 
to keep His commandments. 


This 1s de fide. 

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches: “If 
any one saith that the commandments of God are, 
-even for one that is justified and constituted in 
grace, impossible to keep; let him be anathema.” ? 

A contrary proposition in the writings of Jan- 
senius * was censured by Pope Innocent the Tenth 
as “foolhardy, impious, blasphemous, and hereti- 
cal 


The Church does not assert that God gives to the just 
sufficient grace at all times. She merely declares that 
sufficient grace is at their disposal whenever they are 
called upon to obey the law (urgente praecepto). Nor 
need God always bestow a gratia proxime sufficiens; in 
many instances the grace of prayer (gratia remote 
sufiiciens) fully serves the purpose.* 

This dogma is clearly contained in Holy Scripture. 
We shall quote the most important texts. 


bus iustis volentibus et conantibus 
secundum praesentes, quas habent 


2Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 
18: “ Si quis dixerit, Det praecepta 


homini etiam iustificato et sub gratia 
constituto esse ad observandum im- 
possibilia, anathema sit.” (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 828). Céfr. 
Sess. VI, cap. 11 (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 804). 

3“ Aliqua Dei praecepta homini- 


vires, sunt wnpossibilia: deest quoque 
illis gratia, qua possibilia fiant.’’ 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1092.) 

4QOn the distinction between 
gratia proxime sufficiens and gratia 
remote sufficiens, cfr. supra, pp. 43 
sq. 


GODS; WiLL iO SAVE 169 


-a) 1 John V, 3 sq.: “For this is the charity - 
of God, that we keep his commandments, and his 
commandments are not heavy. For whatsoever 
is born of God, overcometh the world.”® Ac- 
cording to this text the “charity of God” mani- 
fests itself in “keeping his commandments” and 
“overcoming the world.” This is declared to be 
an easy task. Our Lord Himself says: “My 
yoke is sweet and my burden light.”*® Hence 
it must be possible to keep His commandments, 
and therefore God does not withhold the abso- 
lutely necessary graces from the just. 

St. Paul consoles the Corinthians by telling 
them that God will not suffer them to be tempted 
beyond their strength, but will help them to a 
happy issue, provided they faithfully codperate 
with His grace. 1 Cor. X,13:. “God is faithful, 
who will not suffer you to be tempted above that 
which you are able, but will make also with temp- 
tation issue, that you may be able to bear it.”? 
As it is impossible even for the just to overcome 
grievous temptations without supernatural aid,° 
and as God Himself tells us that we are able to 
overcome them, it is a necessary inference that He 


or Jonn), V,\ 3. sq.3 |" Haec est 71 Cor. X, 13: “ Fidelis autem 


_ caritas Det, ut mandata eius custo- 


diamus et mandata eius gravia non 
sunt (ai évrodal avrov Bapetar 
ovx elgiv): quoniam omne quod 
natum est ex Deo [= tustus] vincit 
mundum.” 

6 Matth. XI, 30, 


Deus est, qui non patietur vos ten- 

tari supra id quod potestis (meipac- 

Onvat vrép 6 Sivacbe), sed faciet 

etiam cum tentatione proventum 

(ExBacw), ut possitis sustinere.” 
8 V. supra, pp. 65 sq. 


170 ACTUAL GRACE 
bestows sufficient grace. The context hardly 
leaves a doubt that St. Paul has in mind the just, 
for a few lines further up he says: “Therefore he 
that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed 
lest he fall.” ® But there is no exegetical objec- 
tion to applying the text to all the faithful with- 
out exception.’® 

b) This dogma is clearly set forth in the writ- 
ings of the Fathers. Some of them, it is true, 
when combating the Pelagians and Semipelagians, 
defended the proposition that “grace is not given 
to all men,” * but they meant efficacious grace. 


a) A typical representative of this group of ecclesias- 
tical writers is the anonymous author of the work De 
Vocatione. Omnium Gentium,2 whom Pope Gelasius 
praised as “ probatus Ecclesiae magister.’ This fifth- 
century writer, who was highly esteemed by his contem- 
poraries, discusses the question whether and in what sense 
all men are called, and why some are not saved. tie 
begins by drawing a distinction between God’s general and 
His special providence.* “It so pleased God,” he says, 
“to give His efficacious grace to many, and to withhold 
His sufficient grace from none, in order that it might ap- 
pear from both [actions] that what is conferred upon a 
portion is not denied to the entire race.” ** 


91 Cor. X, 12: “ Itaque qui se 
existimat stare, videat ne cadat.” 

10 V. infra, Thesis II. Cfr. also 
Ecclus. II, 11 sqq.; John VI, 373 
2 Pet I, 10 sq. 

11 Gratiam non omnibus dari.’’ 

12 Migne, P. L., XVII, 1073 saq- 
Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- 
OfY, DP» 515. 


13 Benignitas Dei generalis — spe- 
cialis Det misericordia. 

14“ Deo autem placuit et hanc 
[gratiam efficacem] multis tribuere 
et illam [suficientem] a nemine 
submovere, ut ex utraque appareat, 
non negatum universitati, quod col- 
latum est portioni.” (De b’ocatione 
Omnium Gentium, II, 25.) For 


_ further information on the doctrinal 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 171 

B) The Jansenists appealed in favor of their teach- 
ing to such Patristic passages as the following: ‘ After 
the withdrawal of the divine assistance he [St. Peter] 
was unable to stand;” ** and: “ He had undertaken more 
than he was able to do.” *® But the two Fathers from 
whose writings these passages are taken (SS. Chrysos- 
tom and Augustine) speak, as the context evinces, of 
the withdrawal of efficacious and proximately sufficient 
grace in punishment of Peter’s presumption. Had St. 
Peter followed our Lord’s advice!” and prayed in- 
stead of relying on his own strength, he would not have 
fallen. That this was the mind of St. Augustine clearly 
appears from the following sentence in his work De Umni- 
tate Ecclesiae: “Who shall doubt that Judas, had he 
willed, would not have betrayed Christ, and that 
Peter, had he willed, would not have thrice denied his 
Master?” 18 


c) The theological argument for our thesis 
may be formulated as follows: Since the state 
of grace confers a claim to supernatural happi- 
ness, it must also confer a claim to those graces 
which are necessary to attain it. 


To assert that God denies the just sufficient grace 
to observe His commandments, to avoid mortal sin, and 
to persevere in the state of grace, would be to gainsay 


17 Matth, XXVI, 41: ‘“ Watch 


character of this work see Fr. ye and pray that ye enter not into 


_ Worter, Zur Dogmengeschichte des 

Semipelagianismus, Miinster 1900. 
15 Chrysostom, Hom. in Matth., 

Say Te 

16 Augustine, Serm., 296: ‘ Plus 

 ausus erat, quam eius capacitas sus- 

 tinebat.” 


temptation.”’ 

18 Lib, de Unitate Ecclesiae, 9: 
“Quis  dubitaverit quod Iudas 
Christum, si voluisset, non utique 
tradidisset, et Petrus, si voluisset, ter 
Dominum non negasset?”’ 


172 ACTUAL GRACE 


His solemn promise to His adopted children: “ This is 
the will of my Father that sent me: that every one who 
seeth the Son and believeth in him, may have life ever- 
lasting, and I will raise him up in the last day.” 7": Con- 
sequently, God owes it to His own fidelity to bestow suf- 
ficient graces upon the just. 

Again, according to the plain teaching of Revelation, 
the just are obliged, under pain of sin, to observe the 
commandments of God and the precepts of His 
Church.2° But this is impossible without the aid of 
grace. Consequently, God grants at least sufficient 
grace to his servants, for ad impossibile nemo tene- 
tur. 


Thesis II: In regard to Christians guilty of mortal 
sin we must hold: (1) that ordinary sinners always 
receive sufficient grace to avoid mortal sin and do 
penance; (2) that God never entirely withdraws His 
grace even from the obdurate. 


The first part of this thesis embodies a theo- 
logical conclusion; the second states the common 
teaching of Catholic theologians. 

1. Proof of the First Part. The distinction 
here drawn between “ordinary” and “obdurate”’ 
sinners has its basis in revelation and is clearly 
demanded by the different degrees of certainty 
attaching to the two parts of our thesis. 


An “ ordinary ” sinner is a Christian who has lost sanc- 
tifying grace by a grievous sin. An“ obdurate”’ sinner 
19 John VI, 4o. 21 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 


20 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI,  vina, pp. 573 Sdq. 
can. 19-21. 


GOD'S WILL TO SAVE 173 


is one who, by repeatedly and maliciously transgressing — 
the laws of God, has dulled his intellect and hardened his 
will against salutary inspirations. A man may be an 
habitual sinner (consuetudinarius) and a backslider, with- 
out being obdurate, or, which comes to the same, impeni- 
tent. Weakness is not malice, though sinful habits often 
beget impenitence, which is one of the sins against the . 
Holy Ghost and the most formidable obstacle in the way 
of conversion. 


With regard to ordinary sinners, our thesis 
asserts that they always receive sufficient grace 
to avoid mortal sin and do penance. 

a) Experience teaches that a man falls deeper 
and deeper if he does not hasten to do penance 
after committing a mortal sin. But this is not 
the fault of Almighty God, who never withholds 
His grace; it is wholly the fault of the sinner who 
fails to cooperate with the proffered supernatural 
assistance. 

a) A sufficient Scriptural argument for this 
part of our thesis is contained in the texts cited in 
support of Thesis I. If it is true that God suf- 
fers no one to be tempted beyond his strength,” 
this must surely apply to Christians who have had 
the misfortune of committing mortal sin. St. 
John says that the commandments of God “are 
not heavy” and that faith is “the victory which 
overcometh the world.” * Faith in Christ re- 
mains in the Christian, even though he be guilty 

Sarit it (Cor, «X23. 231 John V, 3 sq. 


174 ACTUAL GRACE 


of mortal sin, and consequently if he wills, he is 
able, by the aid of sufficient grace, to overcome 
the “world,” 7. e. the temptations arising from 
concupiscence,”* and thus to cease committing 
mortal sins. 

B) As for the teaching of Tradition, St. Au- 
gustine lays down two theological principles 
which apply to saint and sinner alike. 


“ God does not enjoin impossibilities,” he says, “ but in 
His injunctions counsels you both to do what you can for 
yourself, and to ask His aid in what you cannot do.” *° 
It follows that the sinner always receives at least the grace 
of prayer, which Augustine therefore calls gratia initialis 
sive parva, and of which he says that its right use en- 
sures the gratia magna. 

The second principle is this: “Cum lege comiuncta 
est gratia, qua lex observari possit.” That is, every 
divine law, by special ordinance, carries with it the grace 
by which it may be observed. In other words, the laws 
of God can always be obeyed because the lawgiver never 
fails to grant sufficient grace to keep them.” 


b) That the sinner always receives sufficient 
grace to be converted, follows from the Scrip- 
tural injunction of conversion. If conversion to 
God is a duty, and to comply with this duty is 
impossible without the aid of grace,” the divine 


24 Cfr. 1 John II, 16. 

.25 De Natura et Gratia, c. 43, 
n. so: “Deus impossibilia non 
iubet, sed iubendo admonet, et facere 
quod possis et petere quod non pos- 
Oh Neg 7 


26 For an explanation of certain 
difficult passages bearing on this 
point in the writings of St. Au- 
gustine, see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 
vind, pp. 531 saqq. 

27V. supra, pp. 104 sq 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 175 
command obviously implies the bestowal of suffi- 
cient grace. 


That conversion is a duty follows from such Scriptural 
texts as these: “As I live, saith the Lord God, I desire 
not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn 
from his way and live. Turn ye, turn ye from your 
evil ways!” #8 “The Lord delayeth not his promise, as 
some imagine, but dealeth patiently for your sake, not 
willing that any should perish, but that all should return 
to penarice.’?7° 

This teaching is faithfully echoed by Tradition. 


2. Proof of the Second Part. Obduracy is a 
serious obstacle to conversion because the ob- 
durate sinner has confirmed his will in malice *° 
and by systematic resistance diminished the in- 
fluence of grace. The question here is whether 
or not God in such cases eventually withdraws His 
erace altogether. 


Some rigorists hold that He does so, with the purpose 
of sparing the sinner greater tortures in hell.+ Though 
this assertion cannot be said to contravene the dogma of 
the universality of God’s salvific will, (its defenders do 
not deny that He faithfully does His share to save these 
unfortunate reprobates), we prefer to adopt the sententia 


28'Ez. XXXIII, 11: “Vivo ego, 
dicit Dominus Deus, nolo mortem 


aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poent- 
tentiam revertti (un Bovdduevds 


impit, sed ut convertatur impius a via 
sua et vivat. Convertimini, converti- 
Mini a viis vestris pessimis,” 

29%2)) Pet, Til, 9:° “Non tardat 
Dominus promissionem suam, sicut 
quidam existimant, sed patienter agit 
(uaxpoOuvpet) propter vos, nolens 


Tivas admodk€obat, GANA wavras eis 
peTavoway xwpnoar).” 
30'CinwisiiVeleos 
31 According to Ruiz (De- Prae- 
dest., disp. 39, sect. 1), there are 
but very few divines (valde pauct) 
who hold this view. 


176 | ACTUAL GRACE 


communis, that God grants even the most obdurate sin- 
ner — at least now and then, e. g. during a mission or on 
the occasion of some terrible catastrophe — sufficient 
grace to be converted. The theological reasons for this 
opinion, which we hold to be the true one, coincide in 
their last analysis with those set forth in the first part 
of our thesis. 


a) Sacred Scripture, in speaking of the duty of 
repentance, makes no distinction between ordinary 
and obdurate sinners. On the contrary, the Book 
of Wisdom points to one of the most wicked 
and impenitent of nations, the Canaanites, as a 
shining object of divine mercy and patience.*? 
‘According to St. Paul, God calls especially upon 
hardened and impenitent sinners to do penance. 
Rom. II, 4 sq.: “Or despisest thou the riches 
of his goodness, and patience, and long suffering ? 
Knowest thou not that the benignity of God lead- 
eth thee to penance? But according to thy hard- 
ness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to 
thyself wrath, against the day of wrath, and reve- 
lation of the just judgment of God, who will ren- 
der to every man according to his works.” * 


There are some Scriptural passages which seem to 
imply that God withdraws His grace from those who are 


32 Wisd. XII, ro. anra) tuam et impoenitens cor 
33 Rom. II, 4 sq.: “An divitias (dmeravonrov Kapdlav) thesaurizas 
bonitatis cius et patientiae et longa-  tibi iram in die irae et revelationts 
nimitatis contemnis? Ignoras quo-  iusti iudicii Dei, qui reddet unicut- 


niam benignitas Dei ad poenitentiam que secundum opera eius.’ Cfr. 
(els perdvoiay) te adducit? Se- Prov. I, 20 sqq. 
cundum autem duritiem (oKdnpd- 


ep Saree 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 177 


obdurate, nay, that He Himself hardens their hearts in 
punishment of sin. Thus the Lord says of Pharao: “I 
shall harden his heart,’ ** and Moses tells us: “ The 
Lord hardened Pharao’s heart, and he harkened not unto. 
them.” *° But it would be wrong to assume that this de- 
notes a positive action on the part of God. Pharao, as 
we are told further on, ‘‘ hardened his own heart” (1m- 
gravavit cor suum).*° The fault in all cases lies with the 
sinner, who obstinately ‘resists the call of grace. God’s 
co-operation in the matter is merely indirect. The 
greater and stronger graces which He grants to ordinary 
sinners, He withholds from the obdurate in punishment 
of their malice. This is, however, by no means tanta- 
mount to a withdrawal of sufficient grace.*” 


b) The Fathers speak of God’s way of dealing 
with obdurate sinners in a manner which clearly 
shows their belief that He never entirely with- 
draws His mercy. ‘They insist that the light 
of grace is never extinguished in the present 
Hie), God, gave jthem jover to. a, reprobate 
mind,” says St. Augustine, “for such is the blind- 
ness of the mind. Whosoever is given over 
thereunto, is shut out from the interior light of 
God: but not wholly as yet, whilst he is in this 
life. For there is ‘outer darkness,’ which is un- 
derstood to belong rather to the day of judg- 
ment; that he should rather be wholly without 


34Ex. VII, 3: “Ego indurabo 36) Boxy AV Lhd ey 
cor eius.” 87 For the solution of other diffi- 
85 Ex. IX, 12: “Induravitque culties see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 


_ Dominus cor Pharaonis, etc.’ vind, Pp. 529 Sq. 
? 


178 ACTUAL GRACE 


God, whosoever, whilst there is time, refuses cor- 
rection.” *° 

It follows that no sinner, how desperate soever 
his case may appear, need be despaired of. As 
long as there is life there is hope.*® The Fathers 
consistently teach that the reason why reprobates 
are lost is not lack of grace but their own 
malice. Thus St. Chrysostom comments on 
Isaias’ prophecy regarding the impenitence of the 
Jews: “The reason they did not believe was 
not that Isaias had predicted their unbelief, but 
his prediction was based on the fact that they 
would not believe. They were unable to believe, 
i. e. they had not the will to believe.” ® 


c) The theological argument for our thesis is well 
stated by St. Thomas. He distinguishes between ob- 
stinatio perfecta and obstinatio imperfecta and says: 
Perfect obstinacy exists only in hell. Imperfect obstinacy 
is that of a sinner who has his will so firmly set on evil 
that he is incapable of any but the faintest impulses to- 
wards virtue, though even these are sufficient to prepare 
the way for grace.*t “If any one falls into sin after 


Alon De quocunque quamvis 
pessimo homine hac in vita consti- 


38 St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 
VI, n. 8: “ Dedit illos in repro- 


bum sensum (Rom. 1, 28); nam ea 
est caecitas mentis. In eam quis- 
quis datus fuerit, ab interiore Det 
luce secluditur, sed nondum penitus, 
quum in hac vita est. Sunt enim 
tenebrae exteriores, quae magis ad 
diem iudicit pertinere intelliguntur, 
ut penitus extra Deum sit, quisquts, 
dum tempus est, corrigi noluerit.” 

39 St. Augustine, Retractationes, 


tuto non est desperandum.” 


40 Tract. in Ioa., XII, 39. Simi- 
larly ibid., LIII, n. 6. For a com- 
plete exposition of St. Augustine’s 
teaching on this point consult De- 
champs, De Haeresi Ianseniana, 
III, 6 sqq., and Palmieri, De Gra- 
tia Divina Actuali, thes. 4o. 

41 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, 
qu. 24, art. 11: “ Haec est ob- 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 179 


having received Baptism,” says the Fourth Lateran Coun- 
cil, “he can always be restored by sincere penance.” * 
As the power of the keys comprises all sins, even those 
against the Holy Ghost, so divine grace is held out to all 
sinners. The Montanistic doctrine of the unforgivable- 
ness of the “three capital sins” (apostasy, murder, and 
adultery) was already condemned as heretical during the 
life-time of Tertullian. The sinner can obtain forgiveness 
only by receiving the sacrament of Penance or making an 
act of perfect contrition.*? Justly, therefore, does the 
Church regard despair of God’s mercy as an additional 
grievous sin. If the rigorists were right in asserting 
that God in the end absolutely abandons the sinner, there 
could be no hope of forgiveness, and despair would be 
justified. 


Thesis III: The heathens, too, receive sufficient 
graces for salvation. 


This proposition may be qualified as certa. 

Proof. The “heathens” are those whom the 
Gospel has not yet reached. They are called in- 
fideles negativi in contradistinction to the infideles 
positivt, 1. e. apostates and formal heretics who 
have fallen away from the faith. We assert that 
God gives to the heathens sufficient grace to know 
the truth and be saved. Pope Alexander VIII, 


stinatio imperfecta, qua aliquis potest 42 Conc. Lateran. IV (1215), cap. 
esse obstinatus in statu viae, dum “ Firmiter’’: “Et st post suscep- 
scilicet habet aliquis ita firmatam tionem baptismt quisquam prolapsus 
voluntatem in peccato, quod non sur- fuerit in peccatum, per veram potest 
gunt motus ad bonum nisi debiles. semper. poenitentiam reparart.” 
Quia tamen aliqui surgunt, ex tis (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 430.) 

_datur via, ut praeparentur ad gra- 43 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 


tiam.” : T43 Sess. AAV caper. 


180 ACTUAL GRACE 


on December 7, 1690, condemned Arnauld’s Jan- 
senistic proposition that “pagans, Jews, heretics, 
and others of the same kind experience no influ- 
ence whatever from Christ, and it may therefore 
be rightly inferred that there is in them a nude 
and helpless will, lacking sufficient grace.” “* <A 
proposition of similar import, set up by Quesnel, 
was censured by Clement XI.#°. Though not for- 
mally defined, it is a certain truth—deducible 
from the infallible teaching of the Church—that 
God does not permit any one to perish for want 
of grace. 

a) The Biblical argument for our thesis 1s 
based on the dogma that God wills all men to be 
saved. 1 Tim. II, 4: “[God] will have all men 
to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the 
truth [7. e. the true faith].” In speaking of the 
“day of wrath,” St. Paul emphasizes the fact that 
the Almighty Judge “will render to every man ac- 
cording to his works,’’—eternal life to the good, 
wrath and damnation to the wicked.*® And he 
continues: ‘But glory, and honor, and peace to 
every one that worketh good, to the Jew first, and 
also to the Greek; for there is no respect of per- 


44 Pagani, Iudaei, haeretici alii- sine omni gratia sufficientt.”” (Den- 
que huius generis nullum omnino zinger-Bannwart, n. 1295.) 
accipiunt a LIesu Christo influxum, 45‘ Extra ecclesiam nulla con- 
adeoque hinc recte inferes, in tllis ceditur gratia.” (Denzinger-Bann- 


esse voluntatem nudam et inermem wart, n. 1379.) 
46 Rom. II, 6 sqq. 


GOD'S WILL; TO: SAVE 181 


sons with God!?*” “Greek” is: heré. evidently 
synonymous with gentile or heathen. It follows 
that the heathens are able to perform supernat- 
ural salutary acts with the aid of grace, and 
that they will receive the reward of eternal beati- 
tude if they lead a good life. 

In another passage (1 Tim. IV, 10) the Apos- 
tle calls Christ “the Saviour of all men, especially 
of the faithful.” ** Consequently, Christ is the 
Saviour also of unbelievers and heathens.*® 

b) St. Paul’s teaching is faithfully echoed by 
the Fathers. Thus St. Clement of Rome,’ in 
commenting on the penitential sermons of Noé 
and the prophet Jonas, says: “We may roam 
through all the ages of history and learn that 
the Lord in all generations °* gave opportunity for 
penance to all who wished to be converted, ... 
even though they were strangers to him.” °” 


- St. Chrysostom says in explanation of John I,9: “If 
He enlightens every man that comes into this world, how 
is it that so many are without light? For not all know 
Christ. Most assuredly He illumines, so far as He is 
concerned. ... For grace is poured out over all. It 
flees or despises no one, be he Jew, Greek, barbarian 
or Scythian, freedman or slave, man or woman, old or 


47 Rom. II, 10 sq.: “Gloria au- 48 qowTnp TwavTwv avOpwTwr, 
tem et honor et pax omni operantt pdadwora TiaTwr. 
bonum, Iudaeo primum et Graeco 49 Cfr, 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.; John I, 9. 
(’ENAnve = pagano); non enim est 50 Ep. ad Cormihs. 1,7. .- 


acceptio personarum (mpocwrro- 51 év yeveg Kal yeveq. 
Anvla) apud Deum.” 52 dd\NOrploe TOV Qeod. 


182 ACTUAL) GRACE 


young. It is the same for all, easily attainable by all, 
it calls upon all with equal regard. As for those who 
neglect to make use of this gift, they should ascribe 
their blindness to themselves.” °* 

Similar expressions can be culled from the anonymous 
work De Vocatione Omnium Gentium*®* and from the 
writings of SS. Prosper and Fulgentius, and especially 
from those of Orosius, who says that grace is given to 
all men, including the heathen, without exception and at all 
times.°° 


c) Catholic theologians have devoted consider- 
able thought to the question how God provides 
for the salvation of the heathen. | 


To the uncivilized tribes may be applied what has been 
said regarding the fate of unbaptized infants. The real 
problem is: How does the merciful Creator provide for 
those who are sufficiently intelligent to be able to 
speculate on God, the soul, the future destiny of man, 
etc.? Holy Scripture teaches: “ Without faith it is 
impossible to please God, for he that cometh to 
God must believe that he is, and is a rewarder to them 
that seek him.” ®* Faith here means, not any kind of 
religious belief, but that theological faith which the Tri- 
dentine Council calls “ the beginning, the foundation, and 
the root of all justification.” ** Mere intellectual assent 
to the existence of God, immortality, and retribution 
would not be sufficient for salvation, even if elevated to the 
supernatural sphere and transfigured by grace. This is 


53 Hom. in Ioa., VIII, 1. 56 Heb. XI, 6. 
BAT, Cc.) St. 57“ Initium, fundamentum — et 
55 De Arbitrii Libertate, n. 19: radix omnis tustificationis.”’ Sess, 


“ss 
. 


. quotidie per tempora, per VI, cap. 8, apud Denzinger-Bann- 
dies, per momenta, per &roua et wart, n. 801, 
cunctis et singulis,” 


GOD'S: WIEE: TO; SAVE 183 


evident from the condemnation, by Pope Innocent XI, of 
the proposition that ‘‘ Faith in a wide sense, based on the 
testimony of the created universe, or some other similar 
motive, is sufficient unto justification.” °* The only sort 
of faith that results in justification, according to the Vati- 
can Council, is “a supernatural virtue, whereby, inspired 
and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the 
things which He has revealed are true; not because of the 
intrinsic truth of the things, viewed by the natural light 
of reason, but because of the authority of God Himself, 
who reveals them, and who can neither be deceived nor 
deceive.” °° Of special importance is the following dec- 
laration by the same Council: ‘“ Since without faith it is 
impossible to please God and to attain to the fellowship 
of His children, therefore without faith no one has ever 
eeraimed  justifications:. 3. 2° °° 

The Catechism demands of every one who desires to 
be saved that he have a supernatural belief in six distinct 
truths: the existence of God, retribution in the next 
world, the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the im- 
mortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. The 
first two are certainly necessary for salvation, both fide 
explicita and necessitate medu. With regard to the other 
four there is a difference of opinion among theologians. 
We base our argumentation on the stricter, though not 
absolutely certain view, that all six articles must be be- 
lieved necessitate medu. On this basis God’s method of 


58“ Fides late dicta, ex testi- ter auctoritatem ipsius Dei revelan- 


monio creaturarum similive motivo, 
ad wstificationem sufficit.” (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 1173.) 

59“, . . fides, qua Det aspirante 
et adiuvante gratia ab eo revelata 
vera esse credimus, non propter in- 
trinsecam rerum veritatem naturali 
rationis lumine perspectam, sed prop- 


tis, qui nec falli nec fallere potest.’ 
(Sess. III, cap. 3; Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 1789.) 

60 “ Quoniam vero sine fide im- 
possible est placere Deo, ... ideo 
neminti unquam sine illa contigit 
iustificatio.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
Nn, 17:93.) 


184 ACTUAL GRACE 


providing sufficient graces for the heathen may be ex- 
plained in one of two ways, according as a fides explicita 
is demanded from them with regard to all the above- 
mentioned dogmas, or a fides implicita is deemed sufficient 
in regard to all but the first two. By fides explicita we 
understand the express and fully developed faith of de- 
vout Christians; by fides implicita, an undeveloped be- 
lief of desire or, in other words, general readiness to be- 
lieve whatever God has revealed. 


a) The defenders of the fides explicita theory 
are compelled to assume that God must somehow 
reveal to each individual heathen who lives ac- 
cording to the dictates of his conscience, the six 
truths necessary for salvation. ‘Faith cometh by 
hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ.” “ 


But how can the gentiles believe in a revelation that 
has never been preached to them? Here is an undeniable 
difficulty. . Some theologians say: God enlightens them 
interiorly about the truths necessary for salvation; or 
He miraculously sends them an apostle, as He sent 
St. Peter to Cornelius; or He instructs them through 
the agency of an angel.®* None of these hypotheses can 
be accepted as satisfactory. ‘‘ Interior illumination ogre | 
the kind postulated would practically amount to private 


revelation. That God should grant a special private — 


revelation to every conscientious pagan is highly improb- 
able. Again, an angel can no more be the ordinary 
means of conversion than the miraculous apparition of a 
missionary. Nevertheless, these three hypotheses admir- 
ably illustrate the firm belief of the Church in the uni- 


61 Rom. X, 17. 63 Card. Toletus, Comment. in S. 
62 Cfr. Acts X, 1 sqq. Ths edu natal. 


ee ee 


os 


aa 
a3 


Ce a ee oe 
= 
er 


= 


see aes 


= Spares 


eal Ss 
"y = a 


GOD’S WILL TO SAVE 185 


versality of God’s saving will, inasmuch as they express | 
the conviction of her theologians that He would work a 
miracle rather than deny His grace to the poor benighted 
heathen.®* The difficulties to which we have adverted 
constitute a strong argument in favor of another theo- 
logical theory which regards explicit belief in the Trinity 
and the Incarnation merely as a necessitas praecepti, from 
which one may be dispensed. 


8B) The fides implicita theory is far more plaus- 
ible, for it postulates no miracles, implicit faith 
(or fides in voto) being independent of the ex- 
ternal preaching of the Gospel, just as the baptism 
of desire (baptismus in voto) is independent of 
the use of water. 


Cardinal Gotti regards the first-mentioned of the two 
theories as safer (tutior), but admits that the other is 
highly probable, because it has the support of St. Thomas.** 
However, a great difficulty remains. Though it may 
suffice to hold the dogmas of the Trinity and the In- 
carnation, and a fortiori those of the immortality of the 
soul and the necessity of grace, with an implicit faith, it is 


64 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Verit., qu. 
Peart nT ennaG Tm OC. Nad 
divinam providentiam pertinet, ut 
cuilibet provideat de necessaris ad 
salutem, dummodo ex parte eius non 
impediatur. Si enim aliquis taliter 
(in silvis vel inter bruta animalia) 
nutritus ductum naturalis rationis 
sequeretur in appetitu boni et fuga 
mali, certissime est tenendum quod 
et Deus vel per internam inspiratio- 
nem revelaret ea, quae sunt ad cre- 
dendum necessaria, vel aliquem fider 
praedicatorem ad eum dirigeret, sicut 
misit Peitrum ad Cornelium.” 


65 Gotti, De Fide, qu. 2, dub. 4, 
§ 1): “Sententia negans fidem ex- 
plicitam Christi et Trinitatis esse ita 
necessariam, ut sine ea nemo tustifi- 
cart vel salvari queat, valde proba- 
bilis est. Eam enim videtur docere 
S. Thomas tum 2—2 p., qu. to, art. 
4, tum 3 p:, qu. 69, art. 4, ubi de 
Cornelio Centurione ait: Ante bap- 
tismum Cornelius et alii similes con- 
sequuntur gratiam et virtutes per 
fidem Christi et desiderium bap- 
tismi implicite vel explicite.” 


186 ACTUAL GRACE 


the consentient teaching of Revelation, the Church, and 
Catholic divines that the two principal truths of religion, 
vig.: the existence of God and retribution, must be held 
fide explicita and necessitate meduw, because a man can- 
not be converted to God unless He knows Him. But 
how is he to acquire a knowledge of God? Does this 
not also necessitate a miracle (e. g. the sending of an angel 
or of a missionary, which we have rejected as improb- 
able)? There can be but one answer to this question. 
Unaided reason may convince a thoughtful pagan of the 
existence of God and of divine retribution, and as these 
two fundamental truths have no doubt penetrated to the 
farthest corners of the earth also as remnants of primi- 
tive revelation, their promulgation may be said to be 
contained in the traditional instruction which the heathen 
receive from their forebears. This external factor of 
Divine Revelation, assisted by interior grace, may en- 
gender a supernatural act of faith, which implicitly in- 
cludes belief in Christ, Baptism, etc., and through which 
the heathen are eventually cleansed from sin and attain to 
justification.*® 

‘Some theologians hold that those to whom the Gospel 
has never been preached, may be saved by a quasi-faith 
based on purely natural motives.** 

For the rest, no one will presume to dictate to Al- 
mighty God how and by what means He shall com- 


municate His grace to the heathen. It is enough, and very | 


consoling, too, to know that all men receive sufficient 


66 Cfr. Fr. Schmid, Die ausseror- let, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
dentlichen Heilswege fiir die gefal- VIII, pp. 491 saa. On their teach- 
lene Menschheit, pp. 225 sqq., ing see P. Minges, O. F. M., Com- 
Brixen 1899. pendium  Theologiae Dogmaticae 

67 A, Fischer, De Salute Infide- Generals, pp. 270 sdq. Munich 
lium, Essen 1886; Heinrich-Gutber- 1902, 


PREDESTINATION 187 


grace to save their souls, and no one is eternally damned 
except through his own fault.** ‘ 

Reapincs: —*Didacus Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, disp. 19 sqq.— 
Petavius, De Deo, X, 4 saq.; De Incarnatione, XIII, 1 sqq.— 
Fontana, Bulla “Unigenitus” Dogmatice Propugnata, prop. 12, 
c. 5, Rome 1717.— Passaglia, De Partitione Voluntatis Divinae 
in Primam et Secundam, Rome 1851.—*Franzelin, De Deo Uno, 
thes. 49-51, Rome 1883.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actual, 
thes. 59-62, Gulpen 1885.— A. Fischer, De Salute Infidelium, Essen 
1886.—*J. Bucceroni, De Auxilio Sufficiente Infidelibus Dato, 
Rome 1890.— Fr. Schmid, Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege fur 
die gefallene Menschheit, Brixen 1899.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones 
Dogmaticae, Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 144 saqq., Freiburg 1906.— L. 
Capéran, Le Probléme du Salut des Infidéles, Paris 1912.— A. 
Wagner, Doctrina de Gratia Sufficiente, Graz 1911.— J. Bainvel, 
S. J., Is There Salvation Outside the Catholic Church? (tr. J. L. 
Weidenhan), St. Louis 1917. 


ARTICLE 3 


THE PREDESTINATION OF THE ELECT 


1. Wuat 1s MEANT BY PREDESTINATION.— 
We have shown that God antecedently wills to 
save all men,’ and that He gives to all sufficient 
grace to work out their eternal salvation. 

On the other hand, Sacred Scripture assures us 
that some are lost through their own fault. Céfr. 
Matth. XXV,41: “Depart from me, you cursed, 
into everlasting fire.” 3 

It follows that God’s will to save, considered 
as voluntas consequens, remains ineffective with 
regard to a portion of the human race, and con- 


68 With regard to certain other 535 sqq., and Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
controversies on this subject con- Vol. III, pp. 109 sqq., Paris 1896. 
sult Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 1 See Articles 1 and 2, supra. 


188 ACTUAL GRACE 


sequently, in this respect, is no longer universal 
but particular. 

Being omniscient, God has foreseen this from 
all eternity and disposed His decrees accordingly. 
It is in this sense that Catholic theology teaches 
the existence of a twofold predestination: one to 
Heaven, for those who die in the state of grace, 
another to hell, for those who depart this life in 
mortal sin. 

Present-day usage reserves the term predes- 
tination for the election of the blessed. 


a) Rightly does the Council of Trent call predesti- 
nation a “hidden mystery.”2 For in the last analysis 
it rests solely with God, who are to be admitted to Heaven 
and who condemned to hell. But why does God give 
to some merely sufficient grace, with which they neglect 
to codperate, while on others He showers efficacious 
graces that infallibly lead to eternal salvation? In this 
unequal distribution of efficacious grace lies the sub- 
lime mystery of predestination, as St. Augustine well 
knew, for he says in his treatise On the Gift of Perse- 
verance: “Therefore, of two infants equally bound by 
original sin, why the one is taken and the other left; 
and of two wicked men already mature in years, why 
one should be so called that he follows Him that calleth, 


while the other is either not called at all, or is not called _ 


in such a manner,—are unsearchable judgments of 
Godi"* 


2Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 12: “Ex duobus parvulis originali pec- 
“ Arcanum divinae praedestinationis  cato pariter obstrictis cur iste as- 
mysterium.” sumatur, ille relinquatur et ex duo- 


3.De Dono Perseverantiae, n. 21: bus aetate iam grandibus impiis, cur 


PREDESTINATION 189 


b) What is meant by “ predestination of the elect”? 
In view of the many errors that have arisen with regard 
to this important dogma, it is necessary to start with 
clearly defined terms. : 

Predestination may mean one of three different tee, 
A man may be simply predestined to receive certain graces 
(praedestinatio ad gratiam tantum) ; or he may be pre- 
destined to enjoy eternal happiness without regard to 
any merits of his own (praedestinatio ad gloriam tan- 
tum) ; or, again, he may be predestined to both grace and 
glory, glory as the end, grace as a means to that end — 
vocation, justification, and final perseverance. When the 
concepts of grace and glory are considered separately, and 
each is made the object of a special predestination, we 
have what is called incomplete or inadequate predestina- 
tion (praedestinatio incompleta sive inadaequata). It 
is this incomplete predestination that St. Paul? and St. 
Augustine * have in mind when they apply the term to the 
vocation of men to grace, faith, and justification. Theo- 
logians speak of praedestinatio ad gloriam tantum, that 
is, ante praevisa merita, as a true predestination, but dis- 
agree as to its existence.® 

The dogma of predestination, which mainly concerns 
us here, has for its sole object predestination in the com- 
plete or adequate sense of the term, which is explained 
by St. Augustine as follows: “ Predestination is noth- 
ing else than the foreknowledge and the preparation of 


iste ita vocetur ut vocantem sequa- 
tur, ille autem aut non vocetur 
[praedicatione fidei] aut non ita 
vocetur, inscrutabilia sunt iudicia 
Dei.” On this mysterious dispen- 
sation see Scheeben, Die Mysterien 
des Christentums, §99-103, 3rd _ ed., 
Freiburg 1912, and Palmieri, De 
Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 62. 


4Eph. I, 3° sqq.; and in. other 
passages. 

5 De Dono Persev., c. 
“* Praedestinatiod 
paratio, 
natio.” 

6 V. infra, pp. 199 sqq. 


PONTO) 5 
est gratiae prae- 
gratia vero tam ipsa do- 


190 ACTUAL GRACE 


those gifts of God whereby they who are delivered are 
most certainly delivered [i. e. saved].”* St. Thomas ex- 
presses himself more succinctly: “ Predestination is 
the preparation of grace in the present, and of glory in 
the future.’ ® 


2. THE Docma.—Complete predestination in- 
volves: (a) the first grace of vocation (gratia 
prima praeveniens), especially faith as the be- 
ginning, foundation, and root of justification ; 
(b) a number of additional actual graces for the 
successful accomplishment of the process; (c) 
justification itself as the beginning of the state of 
grace; (d) the grace of final perseverance; (e) 
eternal happiness in Heaven. 

The question arises: Do men really seek and 
find their eternal salvation with infallible cer- 
tainty by passing through these successive stages 
—not merely in the foreknowledge of God 
(praescientia futurorum), but by virtue of an 
eternal decree (decretum praedestinationis ) ¢ 


The Pelagians asserted that man works out his eternal 
salvation of his own free will, and that consequently 
God merely foreknows but does not fore-ordain who shall 
be saved. The Semipelagians held that the beginning of 


faith (initium fidei) and final perseverance (donum per- = 


7 De Dono Persev., c. 14, 1% 35: “ Praedestinatio est praeparatio gra- 


“ Praedestinatio nihil est aliud quam 
praescientia et praeparatio bene- 
ficiorum Dei, quibus certissime  li- 
berantur [scil. salvantur] quicunque 
liberantur.” 


8 Su DPheol., 18, Qu... 23, arti zs 


tiae in praesenti et gloriae in fu- 
turo.2 On the Biblical, the Pa- 


tristic, and the theological use of 


the term, see Chr. Pesch, Prae- 
lect. Dogmat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., pp. 
189 sqq., Freiburg 1906. 


PREDESTINATION 191 
severantide) are not pure.graces but may be obtained by 
natural means, without special aid from above. Against 
these heretics the Catholic Church has always taught the 
eternal predestination of the elect as an article of faith 


a) St. Paul says explicitly: ‘‘We know that to 
them that love God, all things work together unto 


_. good, to such as, according to his purpose, are 


called to be saints. For whom he foreknew, he 
also predestinated to be made conformable to the 
image of his Son; that he might be the firstborn 
amongst many brethren. And whom he pre- 
destinated, them he also called. And whom he 
called, them he also justified. And whom he jus- 
tified, them he also glorified.” 1° Here we have 
all the elements of complete predestination: God’s 
eternal foreknowledge (praescivit, mpoéy), an 
eternal decree of the divine will (praedestinavit, 
mpowpice), and the various stages of justification, 
beginning with vocation (vocavit, éxédyce) up to 
justification proper (iustificavit, xaiwoe), and 
eternal beatitude (glorificavit, ®0gacev) 14 

b) The Fathers of the fifth century undoubt- 
edly taught the predestination of the elect as an 
article of faith, Thus St. Augustine says: 


9 The Tridentine Council presup- 
- poses it as an unquestioned dogma 
(Sessy\- Vi," caps 12). 

10 Rom. VIII, 28 sqq.: “ Scimus 
autem quoniam diligentibus Deum 
omnia cooperantur in bonum, iis 


_ qui secundum propositum vocati sunt 


sancti (kard mpd0ec. KXnToIs 


ovow). Nam quos praescivit, et 
praedestinavit conformes fieri ima- 
gims Filti sui, ut sit ipse primogeni- 
tus in multis fratribus; quos autem 
praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos 
vocavit, hos et iustificavit: quos au- 
tem tustificavit, illos et glorificavit.” 
22 Ciro Ephe Ty 4srr. 


192 ACTUAL GRACE 


“There never was a time when the Church of 
Christ did not hold this faith in predestination, 
which is now defended with fresh solicitude 
against the new heretics.” ** His faithful dis- 
ciple St. Prosper writes: “No Catholic denies 
predestination by God.” And again: “It 
would be as impious to deny predestination as to 
oppose grace itself.” ™ 

c) Several important theological corollaries 
follow from the dogma of predestination. 

a) The first is the immutability of the divine 
decree of predestination. This immutability is 
based on God’s infallible foreknowledge that cer- 
tain individuals will die in the state of grace, and 
on His unchangeable will to reward them with 
eternal happiness. 

St. Augustine says: “ If any one of these [the pre- 
destined] perishes, God is mistaken; but none of them 
perish because God is not mistaken.” *° 


God’s unerring foreknowledge is symbolized by the 
“ Book of Life.” 1° Christ Himself said to His Apostles: 
12De Praedestinatione Sancto- 


rum, Cc. 25: “~~ Praedestinationis hu- 
ius fidem, quae contra novos haere- 


7,n, 14: “ Horum si quisquam pe- 
rit, fallitur Deus; sed nemo eorum 
perit, quia non fallitur Deus.” On 


ticos nova nunc solicitudine defen- ~ 


ditur, nunquam Ecclesia Christi non 
habuit.”” 

13 Resp. ad Obiect. Gallor., 1: 
“ Praedestinationem Dei nullus 
Catholicus negat.” 

14 Ep. ad Rufin.:  “ Praedestina- 
tionem tam impium est negare quam 
ipsi gratiae contraire.” 

15 De Correptione et Gratia, ¢ 


the question how this infallible fore- 
knowledge is compatible with the 
dogma of free-will, see Pohle-Preuss, 
God, His Knowability, Essence, and 
Attributes, pp. 364 sda. 

16 Cfr. Apoc. XVII, 8: “ Liber 
vitae, Td BiBdlov THs was.” Ctr 
St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei, XX, 13: 
“ Praescientia Dei, quae non potest 
falli, liber vitae est.” 


oe a 


Se 


Se ee oe een 


-PREDESTINATION 193 


“Rejoice’ in this, that your names are written in 
heaven.” 17 The “ Book of Life” admits neither addi- 
tion nor erasure. This does not, however, mean that 
a man is unable to change God’s hypothetical decree 
of predestination with regard to himself into an 
absolute one. He can do this by prayer, good works, 
and faithful co-operation with grace.1® Whatever pro- 
motes our salvation is included in the infallible foreknowl- 
edge of God, and consequently also in the scope of pre- 
destination. In this sense, but in no other, can we accept 
the somewhat paradoxical maxim: “If you are not pre- 
destined, conduct yourself so that you may be predes- 
tined.” Sacred Scripture occasionally refers to another 
“Book of Life,’ which contains the names of all 
the faithful, irrespective of their predestination. This 
“book,” of course, is capable of alterations. Cfr. Apoc. 
III, 5: “I will not blot out his name out of the book 
of life.” 1° Finally, there is the “ Book of Reprobation,” 
which records the wicked deeds of men and by which the 
unrepentant sinners will be judged. This is the “liber 
scriptus” of the “ Dies Irae”: 


“ Liber scriptus proferetur. 
In quo totum continetur.” *° 


B) If the divine decree of predestination is im- 
mutable, the number of the elect must be defini- 
tively fixed. ‘‘The number [of those who are 
predestined to the kingdom of God] is so certain,” 


17 Luke X, 20: “ Gaudete quod 
nomina vestra scripta sunt in coe- 


19 Apoc. III, 5: “Non delebo 
nomen eius de libro vitae.’ Céfr. 


ange 

ae'Ctr, (2) Pet 1; 102. “* Satagite, 
ut per bona opera certam (BeBalav) 
vestram vocationem et electionem 
_ faciatis.”’ 


Ex, XX XI 420 Ps "Lx VILL, 20, 
20On the hber vitae, cfr. St. 
Thomas; SJ>a We ol iras) dus 24, arts 
1-3; and Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogma- 
tische Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 435. 


194. ACTUAL GRACE 


says St. Augustine, “that no one can either be 
added to or taken from them.’ ?4 We must dis- 
tinguish between the absolute and the relative 
number of the predestined. 


God, being omniscient, knows not only the abstract 
number of the elect, but every individual predestined to 
Heaven. To us the number of the elect is wrapped in 
impenetrable mystery. St. Thomas justly observes: 
“Some say that as many men will be saved as angels 
fell: some, so many as there were angels left; others, 
in fine, so many as the number of angels who fell, added 
to that of all the angels created by God. It is, how- 
ever, better to say that ‘God alone knows the number 
for whom is reserved eternal happiness,’ as the prayer 
for the living and the dead expresses ite Wet nee 
God will round out the number of the elect by suddenly 
precipitating the end of the world or by a sort of “ natu- 
ral selection,” is an open question. To assume the latter 
could hardly be reconciled with the dogma of the 
universality of His saving will. St. Augustine seems to 
favor the former.”* 

As regards the relative number of the elect, some 
writers (e. g. Massillon) represent it as so infinitesimally 


runt et insuper tot quot fuerunt 
angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur 


21 De Corrept. et Grat., c. 13: 
“ . . quorum ita certus est nume- 


rus, ut nec addatur eis quisquam 
mec minuatur ex eis.” 

22) Si Pheole,) Las, (ile) S3araliee tas 
“De numero omnium praedestina- 
torum hominum quis sit, dicunt qui- 
dam quod tot ex hominibus salvabun- 
tur, quot angeli ceciderunt; quidam 
vero, quod tot ex hominibus salva- 
buntur, quot angeli remanserunt; 
quidam vero, quod tot ex homini- 
bus salvabuntur, quot angeli cecide- 


quod soli Deo est cognitus nume- 


_yus electorum in superna felicitate 


locandus, ut habet collecta pro vivis 
et defunctis.”” 

23De Bono Viduitatis, n. 28: 
““ Quasi propter aliud retardetur hoc 
saeculum, nisi ut impleatur prae- 
destinatus numerus ille sanctorum, 
quo citius impleto profecto nec ter- 
minus saeculi differetur.” 


PREDESTINATION 195 


small that it would almost drive a saint to despair,—“ as 
if the Church had been established for the express pur- 
pose of populating hell.” ** Even St. Thomas held that 
relatively few are saved.?®> But the arguments adduced 
in support of this contention are by no means convinc- 
ing.® Recently, the Jesuit Father Castelein®’ im- 
pugned the rigorist theory with weighty arguments. He 
was sharply attacked by the Redemptorist Godts,?* who 
marshalled a great number of authorities in favor of 
the sterner view. The controversy cannot be decided 
either on Scriptural or traditional grounds. In our 
pessimistic age it is more grateful and consoling to 
assume that the majority of Christians, especially 
Catholics, will be saved.2® If we add to this number not 
a few Jews, Mohammedans, and heathens, it is probably 
safe to estimate the number of the elect as at least equal 
to that of the reprobates. Were it smaller, “it could 
be said to the shame and offense of the divine majesty 
and mercy, that the [future] kingdom of Satan is larger 
than the kingdom of Christ.” °° 


3. THE Motive oF PREDESTINATION.—The 
efficient cause of predestination is God; its instru- 


24 Dieringer, Epistelbuch, ‘* Fest 29 Cfr. 1 Tim. -IV, 10: owrip 


Allerheiligen.” 

BEOSE TMEDL., tas, Ai. 235, atts: 7» 
ad 3: “Pauciores sunt qui sal- 
vantur.” 

26 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 
mat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 363 
sqq., and W. Schneider, Das andere 
Leben, oth ed., pp. 476 sqq., Pader- 
born 1908. 

27 Le Rigorisme, le Nombre des 
Elus et la Doctrine du Salut, 2nd 
ed., Bruxelles 1899. 
28De Paucitate 
quid Docuerunt 
Bruxelles 1899. 


Salvandorum 
Sancti, 3d ed., 


ravrev avOpwrwv, pmadioTa Te 
orav. This opinion is convincingly 
defended by the Spanish theologian 
Genér (Theol. Dogmat. Scholast., II, 
342 saq., Rome 1767.) ‘Timid souls 
may profitably ponder what Thomas 
a Kempis says in the Imitation, I, 
Be 7 

30 Genér, Theol. Dogmat. Scho- 
last., II® 342: “... ne dici possit 
cum dedecore et iniuria divinae maie- 
statis et clementiae, maius esse im- 
perium daemonis quam Christi.” 


196 ACTUAL GRACE 


mental cause, grace; its final cause, the divine 
glory; its primary meritorious cause, the merits 
of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. On these 
points all theologians are agreed. Not so as to 
the motive that induced God to predestine certain 
individuals to the exclusion of others. The ques- 
tion narrows itself down to this: What influ- 
ence, if any, do the merits of a man exert on the 
eternal decree of predestination?—and may be 
formulated in three different ways. 

a) What influence do the merits of a man ex- 
ert on his predestination to the initial grace of 
vocation? Recalling the dogma of the absolute 
gratuity of grace, our answer must be: None. 
For whatever merits one may have acquired 
before he receives the initial grace of voca- 
tion, must be purely natural, and consequently 
worthless in the eyes of God for supernatural 
predestination. ‘To assume,” says St. Thomas, 
“that there is on our part some merit, the fore- 
knowledge of which [on the part of God] would 
be the cause [motive] of our predestination, 
would be to assume that grace is given to us [as 
a reward] of our [natural] merits.” °** 

b) What influence do the merits of a man 
exert on his predestination to grace and glory? 


31 Lect. in Ep. ad Rom., VIII, 6: motivum] praedestinationis, nihil est 
“Unde ponere quod aliquod meri- aliud quam supponere gratiam dart 
tum ex parte nostra praesupponatur, ex meritis nostris [scil. natwrals- 
cuius praescientia sit ratio [scil  bus].” V. supra, Ch. II, Sect. 2. 


a A as CE a ca 


i — —— ——— 
CSAS SS SS 


Set 


Se ao 
a aa ns a 


= 
a 


Py 


PREDESTINATION 197 


Catholic theologians are unanimous in hold- 
ing that, since grace is absolutely gratuitous and 
inseparably connected with glory as its effect, the 
union of both can no more be based upon natural 
merit than the initial grace of vocation itself, 
which transmits the quality of gratuitousness to 
each and every one of the graces that follow in 
its wake, up to and including justification and 
eternal beatitude. Those among the Fathers who 
defended the gratuity of predestination against 
the Pelagians and Semipelagians, really aimed at 
safeguarding the gratuity of initial grace, in or- 
der not to be constrained to say with Pelagius 
that “the grace of God is given as a reward of 
merit.” °2 “What compelled me in this work of 
mine [De Dono Perseverantiae| to defend more 
abundantly and clearly those passages of Scrip- 
ture in which predestination is commended,” says 
St. Augustine, “if not the Pelagian assertion that 
God’s grace is given according to our [natural] 
merits?” °* Obviously these Fathers did not 
have in view the praedestinatio ad gloriam 
tantum, as the champions of the praedestinatio 
ante praevisa merita mistakenly assert, but what 
they meant was that complete predestination 


32 Gratiam Dei secundum merita mendata est, copiosius et enucleatius 
dari.”’ isto nostro labore defendi, nisi quod 

33 De Dono Perseverant., n. 53: Pelagiani dicunt, gratiam Dei secun- 
“ Quid autem coegit loca Scriptura- dum merita nostra [naturalia] dari?” 
rum, quibus praedestinatio com- 


198 ACTUAL GRACE 


which comprises grace and glory as one whole. 
Similarly, the early Schoolmen, when they speak 
of the “gratuity of predestination,” usually mean 
complete predestination.** D’Argentré’s _ re- 
searches show how necessary it is to draw sharp 
distinctions and carefully to establish the real 
state of the question before claiming the common 
teaching of the Scholastics in favor of any partic- 
ular theory of predestination. 

c) What inflitence do the supernatural merits 
of a man exert on his predestination to glory as 
such? Here the controversy begins. Predes- 
tination may be considered either as the cause of 
supernatural merit or as its effect. If it is con- 
sidered as the cause, the problem takes this shape: 
Did God, by an absolute decree, and without any 
regard to their future supernatural merits, eter- 
nally predestine certain men to the glory of heaven, 
and only subsequently decide to give them the 
efficacious graces necessary to reach that end, par- 
ticularly final perseverance? If, on the other 
hand, predestination be considered as an effect of 
supernatural merit, the question will be: Did 
God predestine certain men to the glory of Heaven 
by a merely hypothetical decree, making His will 


34 Charles Du Plessis d’Argentré gratiam et ad gloriam praecipue 
(d. 1740), after a careful study of agebant. Ideo nolebant eam esse 
all Scholastic works written between ex praevisis meritis, quia gratia, quae 
1120 and 1708, concluded: “ Ve- in ea includitur, non datur nec proin 
teres Scholastici de causa praede- praedestinatur ob praevisa merita.” 
stinationis omnino considerate et ad (De Praedest., c. 10, § 1). 


ee 


ree, 


PREDESTINATION 199 


to save them dependent on His infallible fore- 
knowledge of their supernatural merits? The 
lack of decisive Scriptural and Patristic texts on 
this subject has led to a division of Catholic opin- 
ion, some theologians favoring absolute predesti- 
nation ante praevisa merita, others hypothetical 
predestination post praevisa merita. Without 
concealing our conviction that absolute pre- 
destination is untenable, we shall set forth both 
theories impartially and examine the arguments 
on which they rely: 

4. ORTHODOX PREDESTINATIONISM, OR THE 
THEORY OF PREDESTINATION ANTE PRAEVISA 
Merita.—Some theologians conceive the divine 
scheme of salvation in this wise: (a) Jn ordine 
intentionis, God, by an absolute decree, first pre- 
destines certain men to eternal salvation, and 
then, in consequence of this decree, decides to give 
them all the graces necessary to be saved; 
(b) in time, however, or in ordine executions, 
He observes the reverse order, that is to say, He 
first bestows the pre-appointed graces and subse- 
quently the glory of heaven as a reward of super- 
natural merit acquired by the aid of those graces. 


This theory reverses the relation of grace and 
glory. While it correctly *° represents glory as the fruit 
and reward of supernatural merit in the order of execu- 
‘tion, it wrongly represents it in the order of intention as 


35 V. infra, Part II, Ch. III, Sect. 3. 


200 ACTUAL GRACE 


Ms 
the cause of supernatural merit, whereas it is merely an 
effect. This opinion is championed by most Thomists,** 
some Augustinians,” and a few Molinists.** Their argu- 
ments may be sketched as follows: 


a) In innumerable passages of Sacred Scrip- 
ture predestination to eternal happiness is repre- 
sented as a work of pure mercy, nay, even as an 
arbitrary act of God. Take, e. g., Matth. XXIV, 
22 sqq.: “And unless those days had been short- 
ened, no flesh should be saved: but for the sake of 
the elect those days shall be shortened. . . . For 
there shall arise false Christs and false prophets, 
and shall show great signs and wonders, inso- 
much as to deceive (if possible) even the elect.” *° 
Here, it is claimed, the elect are represented as so 
thoroughly confirmed in faith and in good works 
as to be proof against error. 


This conclusion is unwarranted. The phrase “those 
days” manifestly refers either to the destruction of Jeru- 
salem or to the end of the world. If it refers to the de- 
struction of Jerusalem, the “ elect,” according to Biblical 
usage,’ are the faithful Christian inhabitants of the Holy 
City, for whose sake God promises to shorten the terrible 
siege. If it referred to the end of the world, electi would 
indeed stand for praedestinati, but the context would not 


36 FE. g., Banez, Alvarez, Lemos, 
Gonet, Contenson, Goudin, 

37 E. g., Berti and Norisius. 

88 BE. g., Suarez, Ruiz, De Lugo, 
Bellarmine, 

39 “ Nist breviati fuissent dies illi, 
non fieret salva omnis caro, sed 


propter electos (Sia robs éxXexrovs) 
breviabunitur dies ill, ... Surgent 
enim pseudochristi,... ita ut im 
errorem inducantur, si fiert potest, 
etiam electi,’’ 

£0'C Er. Col.. DL nes a rPetleere 


PREDESTINATION 201 


forbid us to interpret their predestination hypothetically, 
as merely indicating the immutability of the divine decree, 
which is not denied by the opponents of the theory. 
Another text quoted in favor of absolute predesti- 
nation ante praevisa merita, is Acts XIII, 48: “ As many 
as were ordained (praeordinati, reraypévor) to life ever- 
lasting, believed.” Here, we are told, predestination to 
eternal life is given as the motive why many believed. 
But the text really says nothing at all about predestination. 
Teraypevo. is not synonymous with poteraypévo. oF 
mpowpiopevot. The more probable explanation is the fol- 
lowing: As many believed as were disposed to receive 
the faith. It is wellnigh impossible to assume that all 
who received the faith at that time were predestined, 
while those that refused to be converted were without 
exception reprobates. But even if praeordinati were 
synonymous with praedestinati, the text would merely 
say that certain predestined souls embraced the faith, 
without affording any clue as to the relation between 
conversion and predestination. | | 
The ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans 
is the main reliance of the advocates of absolute pre- 
destinationism, though the passage is unfit to serve as a 
locus classicus because of its obscurity. Let us exam- 
ine a few of the verses most frequently quoted. Rom. 
IX, 13: “Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated,” 
is alleged to prove the absolute predestination of Jacob 
and the negative reprobation of Esau. But many theo- 
logians hold that Esau was saved, and, besides, the 
Apostle is not dealing with predestination to glory, but 
with Jacob’s vocation to be the progenitor of the Mes- 
sias.- Esau, who was not an Israelite but an Idumaean, 
was simply passed over in this choice (odio habere = 


202 ACTUAL GRACE 


minus diligere; cfr. Matth. X, 37). If the passage is 
interpreted typically, it should be done in harmony 
with the context, that is to say, as referring to the gratu- 
ity of grace, not to predestination. 

The same may be said of Rom. IX, 16 and 18: “It is 
not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of 
God that showeth mercy. . . . He hath mercy on whom 
he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.” * 

The strongest text alleged by the advocates of absolute 
predestination is Rom. IX, 20 sq.: “O man, who art 
thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed 
say to him that formed it: Why hast thou made me 
thus? Or hath not the potter power over the clay, of 
the same lump to make one vessel unto honor and an- 
other unto dishonor?” Here the Apostle really seems 
to have thought of predestination. But the simile must 
not be pressed, lest we arrive at the Calvinistic blasphemy 
that God positively predestined some men to heaven and 
others to hell. The tertiwm comparationis is not the act 
of the Divine Artificer, but the willingness of man to 
yield his will to God like clay in the hands of a potter. 

Nor is it admissible to read into the Apostle’s thought 
even a negative reprobation of certain men. For the 
primary intention of the Epistle to the Romans is to 
insist on the gratuity of man’s vocation to Christianity 
and to reject the presumption that the Mosaic law and 


yen 2a Z a Sia _ 


- 
.. 
—= 


— en Naren 


= 


wy 
. 


their bodily descent from Abraham gave the Jews prefer- 


ence over the heathens. The Epistle to the Romans has 
no bearing whatever on the speculative question whether 
or not the free vocation of grace is a necessary result of 
eternal predestination to glory. 


41 Non volentis neque currentis, durat.” On the meaning of this’ ae 


sed miserentis est Dei... Cuius text v. supra, pp. 137, 177. 
vult miseretur, et quem vult in- 42Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, 


PREDESTINATION 203 


b) Among the Fathers the only one to whom 
the advocates of absolute predestinationism can 


appeal with some show of justice is St. Augus- 


thes. 


tine, who, with the possible exception of Prosper. 
and Fulgentius, was the most rigorous among 
early ecclesiastical writers,—so rigorous, in fact, 
that Oswald does not hesitate to call him ‘‘the 


head and front of all rigorists in the Church.” * 


However, this is saying too much. Augustine’s genu- 


‘ine teaching is still in dispute among our ablest theo- 
_ logians. 


Some ** deny that he broke with the almost 
unanimous teaching of his predecessors, while others 


_ think that in the treatises De Dono Perseverantiae and De 


Praedestinatione Sanctorum, and in several of his letters, 
the Saint frankly taught absolute predestinationism. The 
latter group of writers is split into two classes. A num- 
ber of Thomists and Cardinal Bellarmine not only assert 
that Augustine taught absolute predestination, but boldly 
adopt his supposed teaching. Petavius, Maldonatus, 


_Cercia, Oswald, and others censure this view. Fran- 


zelin *° undoubtedly strikes the right note when he says: 
“Tf there were a manifest discrepancy between Augus- 


65; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- Lessius, Gregory of Valentia, Fran- 


“Val. 


mat. Theol., Vol. VIII, pp. 345 saq.3 
Chr. Pesch, Prael. Dogmat., Vol, II, 
3rd ed., pp. 212 sqq., Freiburg 1906; 
Weber, Kritische Geschichte 
der Exegese des 9. Kapitels des 
Roémerbriefes, Wiirzburg 1889. 

43 Die Lehre von der Heiligung, 
Pp. 242, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885. 


44F, g., Petrus de Comitibus, O. 
S$. A. (De Praedest. et Reprobat., 
idisp.. “3, ‘art. 


i 4 saqq.), Tricassinus 
(De Praedest.), and the Jesuits 


zelin, and Schrader. 

45 De Deo Uno, p. 677: “ Si 
vero dissensus esset manifestus, ut 
prudenter [cum ceteris patribus] 
conciliart non posset; tum sane non 
dubitarem, cum Pighio, Catharino, 
Osorio, Camerario, Maldonato, 
Toleto, Petavio, reverenter ab Au- 
gustino discedere, quum haec non 
posset esse nist privata eius Sen- 
tentia,” 


204 ACTUAL GRACE 


tine’s teaching and that of the other Fathers, I should not 
hesitate to follow Pighius, Catharinus, Osorius, Came- 
rarius, Maldonatus,** Toletus, #7 and Petavius *° in rever- 
ently departing from his doctrine, because in that case we 
should be dealing merely with a private opinion.” ® 
Under these circumstances the Patristic argument for the 
theory of absolute predestination evidently lacks con- 
vincingness.”° 


c) It was probably because they felt its weak- 
ness that some of the later champions of the 
theory attempted to prove absolute predestination 
ante praevisa merita by philosophical arguments. 
Gonet reasons as follows: ‘He who proceeds in 
an orderly way, wills the end before he wills the 
means necessary to attain it. But God proceeds 
in an orderly way. Therefore he wills the end 
before the means. Now, glory is an end, and 


merits are means to attain that end. Conse- 
quently, God wills glory before He wills merits, — 
and a man’s preélection to glory cannot be based ~ 


99 51 


on foreknowledge of his merits. 


46 De Praedest., qu. 4. 

47 Comment. in S. Theol. S. 
Thomae Aqu., I, qu. 23, art. 5, con- 
clus. 2. 

48 De Deo, X, col. 9. 

49 A careful analysis of the Au- 
gustinian texts bearing on this ques- 
tion will be found in the Theol. 
Wirceburg., De Deo Uno, n. 231 
sqq., and Franzelin, De Deo Uno, 
thes. 53. 

50 Cfr. 


Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 


This argu- | 


mat. Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 351 


sqq 


GSD. 4625 i, 8 Sp | ett 20 
dinate vult, prius vult finem quam 


media ad finem. Sed Deus ordinate — 


vult. Ergo prius vult finem quam 
media ad illum. Atqui gloria est 
finis et merita sunt media ad illum 
conducentia. 
riam quam merita, et consequenter 


51 Clypeus Thomist., De Praedest., ; 
“Qui ore = 


ate 


Ergo prius vult glo- 


electio ad gloriam non potest esse 


ex praevisione meritorum.” 


PREDESTINATION 205 


ment, if it proved anything, would prove the 
logical impossibility of conditional predestination. 
But it overshoots the mark and consequently 
proves nothing at all. Qui nimium probat, nihil 
probat. 


Gonet moreover assumes what he sets out to prove, 
namely, that God voluntate antecedente decreed the 
glory of certain men to the exclusion of others. This 
petitio principii vitiates the entire polysyllogism. God’s 
will to save is universal. He wills the eternal hap- 
piness of all men antecedenter, and the reprobation of 
some only consequenter; hence eternal predestination is 
not absolute, but hypothetical, that is, it depends on merit. 
That the divine scheme of grace can take a different 
course in ordine intentionis from that in ordine executionis 
is a mere fiction. If eternal salvation in the order of 
temporal execution is given only as a reward of merit, 
it must be a reward of merit also in the order of inten- 
tion. In both cases predestination depends upon a future 
condition. 

Perhaps the worst feature of the theory of absolute pre- 
destination is the fact that it involves the absolute repro- 
bation of those not predestined to glory. “If it could 
be validly argued,” says Gutberlet, “that, since the end 
must be willed before the means, salvation must be 
decreed before the means to its attainment (i. e. merits ), 
the argument would be applicable also to the damned. 
If God voluntate antecedente wills to lead only a few to 
salvation, and if this intention must precede every other, 
then He must likewise voluntate antecedente have in view 
the end of the reprobates, which is His own glorification 
through the manifestation of His justice and mercy. 


206 ACTUAL GRACE 


Hence He must also decree the means necessary to obtain 
this end, i. e. He must cause these unfortunate creatures to 
sin, in order that they may reach the end for which He 
has predestined them; in other words, He must pre-ordain 
them to sin and eternal damnation,” ®? which is what Cal- 
vin teaches. The advocates of the theory naturally shrink 
from adopting such a blasphemous conclusion, and fall 
back upon the theory of negative reprobation, which, how- 
ever, amounts practically to the same thing.”® 


5. THe THrEory OF HyPpoTHETICAL PREDES- 
TINATION POST PRAEVISA Merita.—Predestina- 
tion, like God’s will to save all men, is based 
on a hypothetical decree. Those only are pre- 
destined to eternal happiness who shall merit it 
asareward. It is solely by reason of His infalli- 
ble foreknowledge of these merits that God’s hy- 
pothetical decree of predestination becomes abso- 
lute. Or, as Becanus puts it, “God first prepared 
the gifts of grace, and then elected to eternal life 
those whose good use of the gifts He fore- 
Sawn ay 


This view, which strongly appeals to us for the reason 
that it sets aside the cruel theory of “negative reproba- 
tion,” was defended by such earlier Scholastics as Alexan- 
der of Hales and Albertus Magnus, and by many eminent 
later writers, e. g. Toletus, Lessius, Frassen, Stapleton, 

52Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- BLO rE WP raed... Ca) | Tel Degas 
mat. Theol,, Vol. VIII, p. 330. “ Deus primo praeparavit dona gra- 

53 V. Art. 4, No. 2, infra. The  tiae ac deinde eos, quos praevidebat 
opposite opinion is defended by bene usuros eiusmodi donis, elegit 


Billuart (De Deo, diss. 9, art. 4, ad vitam aeternam.” 
§ 3 (ed. Lequette, p. 386). 


Se Te OE ee a ee oS bs [= 
nee er ein a eS See —s aa = 
siete — Se ie Ea Ses : 


ahs 


eS 


oa 


alanis 
vy dpa = 


cose 
Loe 


PREDESTINATION 207 


Tournely, and is held to-day by nearly all theologians out- 
side the Thomist school. What gave it special authority 
in modern times was the recommendation of St. Francis de 
Sales, who, in a letter to Lessius (Aug. 26, 1618) 
described the theory of conditional predestination post 
praevisa merita as “ more in harmony with the mercy and 
grace of God, truer and more attractive.” °° This view 
has a solid basis both in Scripture and Tradition. 


a) Holy Scripture clearly teaches the univer- 
sality of God’s saving will. Now 1f God volun- 
tate antecedente wills the eternal salvation of all 
men without exception,°® He cannot possibly in- 
tend that only some shall be saved. 


It is further to be noted that the Bible makes not only 
the temporal realization but likewise the eternal promise 
of glory dependent on the performance of good works. 
St. Paul, whose Epistle to the Romans is cited as a locus 
classicus by the advocates of the theory,’ wrote towards 
the end of his life to Timothy: “I have fought a 
good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the 
faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown 
of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to 
me in that day.”** In writing these lines the Apos- 
tle no doubt had in mind the sentence of the Universal 


55“, . . sententiam illam  anti- 
quitate, suavitate ac Scripturarum 


57V. supra, No. 4. 
582 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “ Bonum 


nativa auctoritate nobilissimam .de 
praedestinatione ad  gloriam post 
praevisa merita semper ut Det mise- 
ricordiae ac gratiae magis consen- 
taneam, veriorem ac amabiliorem exi- 
stimaui.”” (Cfr. Traité de Amour 
de Dieu, IIl, 5). 
56 V. supra, pp. 153 sqq. 


certamen certavi, cursum consum- 
mavi, fidem servavi; in reliquo re- 
posita est (daréxetrat=praeparata ab 
aeterno) mihi corona iustitiae, quam 
reddet (amrodwcer) mhi Dominus 
in illa die, wstus tudex.’ Cfr. 1 
Cor. IX, 24 saqq.; Apoc. II, 7, 26. 


208 ACTUAL ‘GRACE 


Judge: “ Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the 
kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the 
world,” °®— which may with far greater reason be termed 
a “classical” text than the obscure ninth chapter of the 
Epistle to the Romans. To prepare for men the kingdom 
of heaven from the foundation (1. e. beginning) of the 
world, is to predestine them to eternal happiness. Now, 
God has “ prepared” the kingdom of heaven for men in 
view of their foreseen merits, that is to say, conditionally. 
The causal conjunction enim in the sentence following the 
one just quoted (Matth. XXVI, 25): “ Esurivi enim et 
dedistis mihi manducare, etc.,” refers to the entire pre- 
ceding sentence, not only to the possidete in time, but 
also to the paratum in eternity. Consequently, the 
eternal decree of predestination itself, like its temporal 
execution, depends on good works or merit. This inter- 
pretation of Matth. XXV, 34-36 is confirmed by the 
sentence pronounced upon the reprobates, Matth. XXV, 
AI sqq.: “ Depart from me, you cursed, into everlast- 
ing fire, which was prepared for the devil and his an- 
gels. For I was hungry, and you gave me not to eat, 
etc.” The “everlasting fire” is manifestly decreed 
from all eternity in the same sense in which it is in- 
flicted in time, namely, propter et post praevisa merita. 
Billuart’s contention ®° that hell has been prepared solely 
for “the devil and his angels” is untenable, because in 
several other Scriptural passages 6t the reprobates are 
expressly classed among the followers of Satan. If we 
add to this that our Divine Lord, in foretelling the last 
judgment, had naturally to formulate his prediction so as 
59 Matth. XXV, 34 saq.: “ Ve- 60 De Deo, ed. Lequette, p. 391. 
nite, benedicti Patris mei, possidete 61 For instance, John VIII, 44; x 


paratum vobis regnum a constitu- John III, 8; Acts XIII, 10. 
tione mundi,” 


PREDESTINATION 209 
not only to show its absolute justice but likewise to inti- 
mate that, had they so willed, the damned might have had. 
their place on the right hand of the Great Judge, we 
must admit that the theory of predestination post praevisa 

merita has a solid foundation in Scripture.® es 


b) The Greek Fathers unanimously favor hy- 
pothetical predestination, which fact has caused 
the theory to be commonly referred to as “sen- 
tentia Graecorum.” °° 


Thus St. Chrysostom interprets the judgment of the 
Son of Man as follows: “Possess ye the king- 
dom [of heaven] as your own by heredity, as a paternal 
heritage, as a gift long due to you; for it was pre- 
pared and arranged for you before you came into exist- 
ence, because I knew beforehand that you would be 
what you are.” ** Theodoret says: “ He did not sim- 


__ ply predestine [men], but He predestined them because 


He foreknew [their merits].” 

The Latin Fathers before St. Augustine all with- 
out exception taught hypothetical predestination. St. 
Hilary says: “ Many are called, but few are chosenuiie. 
Hence election is not a matter of indiscriminate choice, 
but a selection based on merit.”®* And St. Ambrose: 


62 Cfr. Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. quam enim existeretis, haec vobis 


III, pp. 289 sqq., Paris 1896; Hein- 
rich-Gutberlet, Dogmat. Theol., Vol. 
VIII, § 430. 

63 Lessius, Antapol., prop. 8: 
“Tenent hanc sententiam omnes 
- Patres Graeci, adeo ut communiter 
dicatur esse sententia Graecorum.” 

64 Hom. in Matth., 80, n, 2: 
** Haereditate possidete regnum quasi 
proprium, quasi paternum et ve- 
strum, iam olim vobis debitum; prius- 


parata erant et disposita, quia ego 
vos tales futuros esse praescivi.” 
65In Rom., VIII, 29 (Migne, 
P. G., LXXXII, 142): “Non sim- 
pliciter praedestinavit, sed quum 
praescivisset, praedestinavit.” 

66 In Ps., 64,n. 3: “ Multi vocati 
sunt, sed pauci electi.... Itaque 
non res indiscreti indicii est electio, 
sed ex meriti delectw facta discretio 
est,” 


210 ACTUAL GRACE 


“Therefore the Apostle says: ‘Whom he foreknew he 
also predestined’ (Rom. VIII, 29) ; for He did not pre- 
destine before He foreknew, but He predestined a reward 
to those whose merits He foresaw.” ® | 

The question cannot, as Bellarmine contends,®* be 
decided on the sole authority of St. Augustine, because 
he is claimed by both parties to the controversy.®° 

On account of the existing differences of opinion it 
is impossible to establish the theory of hypothetical pre- 
destination on the basis of Scholastic teaching.”° The 
opinion of St. Thomas is in dispute; 7 likewise that of 
St. Bonaventure. Scotus in his controversy with Henry 
of Ghent shows a disposition to favor absolute predesti- 
nation, but leaves the question open. ‘Let every 
one,’ he says,’? “choose whichever opinion suits him 
best, without prejudice to the divine liberty, which must be 
safeguarded against injustice, and to the other truths 
that are to be held in respect of God.” ™* 


6. A ComMproMIsE THEORY.—For the sake of 
completeness we will add a few words on a theory 
which takes middle ground between the two just 


67 De Fide, V, 6, 83: “‘ Unde et 
Apostolus ait: quos praescivit, et 


70 V. supra, pp. 200 sqq., 216 sqq. 
71 Cfr. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, 


praedestinavit (Rom. VIII, 29); non 
enim ante praedestinavit quam prae- 
scivit, sed quorum merita praescivit, 
eorum  praemia  praedestinavit.’”’ 
Cir. Franzelin, De Deo Uno, thes. 
59; Lessius, De Praedest. 
prob., sect. 2, n. 7 sqq. 

68 De Gratia, II, 11. 

69 Cfr. O, Rottmanner, O. S. B., 
Der Augustinismus, Miinchen 1892; 
O. Pfulf, S. J., “Zur Priadestina- 
tionslehre des hl. Augustinus’’ in 
the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath, 
» Theologie, 1893, pp. 483 sqq. 


et Re- - 


thes. 64. 

72 Comment. in IV Libros Sent., 
1, dist. 41: “ Eligatur [ea sen- 
tentia] quae magis placet, dum 
tamen salvetur libertas divina sine 


aliqua iniustitia et alia quae sal- — 


vanda sunt circa Deum.’ 

73 Many Scholastic utterances 
bearing on this subject have been 
collected by Lessius, De Praedest. et 
Reprob., sect. 2, n. 7 (Opusc. II, 
pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1878). 


PREDESTINATION 2i1 


reviewed, holding that, while the common run of 
humanity is predestined hypothetically, a few 
exceptionally favored Saints enjoy the privilege of 
absolute predestination. | ie 


‘6 


Among the champions of this “eclectic”? theory may 
be mentioned: Ockam,™ Gabriel Biel,7> Ysambert,’® and 
Ambrosius Catharinus.”7 The Saints regarded by these 
writers as absolutely predestined to eternal glory are: the 
Blessed Virgin Mary, the prophets and Apostles, St. Jo- 
seph, St. Aloysius, and a few others, as well as all infants 
dying in the grace of Baptism. Billuart,7* Dominicus 
Soto, and certain other divines attack this theory on the 
ground that it makes the salvation of the great majority 
of the elect a matter of chance and thereby imperils the 
dogmatic teaching of the Church. This objection is un- 
founded. For though the “ eclectic” theory has little or 
no support either in Revelation or in reason, it sufficiently 
safeguards the dogma of predestination by admitting that 
voluntate consequente none but the predestined can attain 
to eternal beatitude. , 

Only with regard to the Blessed Virgin Mary are we 
inclined to make an exception. It is probable that she 
was predestined to eternal glory ante praevisa merita, be- 
cause, in the words of Lessius, the privileges she enjoyed 
“exceed all measure and must not be extended to any 
other human being.” 7° 


74 Comment. in Quatuor Libros  tione, dedicated to the Council of 


Werriaits) distal 4 ty) dus i. 

75 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
Sent., 1, dist. 41, art. 2. 

76)S.)/dineot., \ta,). qui 23, disp. 3, 
art. 4, 

77In his treatise De Praedestina- 


Trent. ; 

78 De Deo, disp. 9, art. 3. 

79 De Praedest. et Reprob., Paris 
edition of the Opuscula, 1878, p. 
412: “... privilegia eius omnem 
modum superant et ad nullum alium 
sunt extendenda,” 


212 ACTUAL GRACE 


ARTICLE 4 


THE REPROBATION OF THE DAMNED 


The reprobation of the damned is sometimes called 
praedestinatio ad gehennam, though, as we have re- 
marked, the term “ predestination” should properly be 
restricted to the blessed. 

There can be no absolute and positive predestina- 
tion to eternal punishment, and the pains of hell can 
be threatened only in view of mortal sin. Hence repro- 
bation may be defined, in the words of Peter Lombard, as’ 
“God’s foreknowledge of the wickedness of some crea- 
tures and the preparation of their damnation.” * 

A distinction must, however, be made (at least in the- 
ory), between positive and negative reprobation. To 
teach positive reprobation would be heretical. Negative 
reprobation, on the other hand, is defended by all those 
Catholic theologians who advocate the theory of absolute 
predestination ante praevisa merita.” 


1. HERETICAL PREDESTINARIANISM OR THE 
THEORY OF THE POSITIVE REPROBATION OF THE 
Damnep.—Heretical Predestinarianism was 
taught by Lucidus, Gottschalk, Wiclif, Hus, the 
younger Jansenius, and especially by Calvin. 
The latter asserted that the salvation of the elect 
and the damnation of the reprobate are the effects 
of an unconditional divine decree.” 


1Sent., 1, dist. go: “... est 3 Calvin’s teaching in his Inst., 
praescientia iniquitatis quorundam AW det es. an, 240 Om Arminianism 
et pracparatio damnationis eorum- see J. F. Loughlin in the Catholic 
dem.” Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 740 sda 
2 Supra, Art. 3, No. 4. 


REPROBATION 213 


According to this abominable heresy, the sin of Adam 
and the spiritual ruin which it entailed upon his descend- 
ants are attributable solely to the will of God. God pro- 
duces in the reprobate a “semblance of faith,’ only to 
make them all the more deserving of damnation. In the 
beginning of the seventeenth century Arminius and a few 
other theologians of the Dutch Reformed Church, repelled 
by Calvin’s decretum horribile, ascribed the positive rep- 
robation of the damned to original sin (Japsus). These 
writers, called Infralapsarians or Postlapsarians, were 
opposed by the strict school of Calvinist divines under 
the leadership of Gomarus. The great Calvinist Synod of 
Dordrecht (1618-1619) condemned the principles of Ar- 
minius, and subsequently his adherents were driven from 
Holland. 


The Catholic Church condemned Predestinar- 
ianism as early as 529 at the Second Council of 
Orange, which among other things declared: 
“We not only refuse to believe that some men are 
by divine power predestined to evil, but i 
there be any who hold such a wicked thing, we 
condemn them with utter detestation.” * 

The Tridentine Council defined against Calvin: 
“Tf any one saith that the grace of justification 
is attained to only by those who are predestined 
unto life, but that all others who are called, are 
called indeed, but receive not grace, as being by 


4“ Aliquos vero ad malum divina lint, cum omni detestatione illis 
potestate praedestinatos esse non anathema dicimus.” (Denzinger- 


 solum non credimus, sed etiam, si Bannwart, n. 200.) 


sunt qui tantum malum credere ve- 


214 ACTUAL GRACE 


divine power predestined unto evil; let him be 
anathema.” ° 

Calvinism, both supra- and infra-lapsarian, is 
easily refuted from Revelation and Tradition. 

a) It runs counter to all those texts of the 
Bible which assert the universality of God’s 
saving will,° the bestowal of sufficient grace 
on all sinners,’ and the divine attribute of holli- 
ness.° 


Calvin endeavored to prove his blasphemous doctrine 
chiefly from the ninth chapter of St. Paul’s Epistle to the 
Romans.® His disciple Beza relied mainly on 1 Pet. II, 
7 sq.: “ But to them that believe not, the stone which 
the builders rejected, the same is made the head of the 
corner: and a stone of stumbling, and a rock of scandal, 
to them who stumble at the word, neither do believe, 
whereunto also they are set,” 1° 7. e., according to Beza, 
predestined not to believe. But this interpretation is 
obviously wrong. For we know from Is. VIII, 14” 
and Matth. XXI, 44," that those who fall on this stone 


5Sess. VI, can. 17: “Si quis fensionis... qui offendunt verbo 


iustificationis gratiam nonnisi prae- 
destinatis ad vitam contingere dixerit, 
reliquos vero omnes qui vocantur, 
vocari quidem, sed gratiam non ac- 
cipere, utpote divinad potestate prae- 
destinatos ad malum, anathema sit,” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 827.) 

6 V. supra, Art. 1. 

7 V. supra, Art. 2, Thesis II. 

8 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
butes, pp. 251 sqq. 

9V. supra, pp. 201 sqq. 

101 Pet. II, 7 sq.: ‘“‘ Non creden- 
tibus autem [Christus] ... lapis of- 


nec credunt, in quo (eis 6) et positt 
sunt.” 

11 “In hoc positi, 1 e. praede- 
stinatt sunt, ut non credant.”’ 

12 ‘* And he shall be a sanctifica- 
tion to you. But for a stone of 


. stumbling and for a rock of offense 


to the two houses of Israel, for a 
snare and a ruin to the inhabitants 
of Jerusalem,” 

13 And whosoever shall fall on 
this stone, shall be broken: but on 
whomsoever it shall fall, it shall 
grind him to powder,” 


REPROBATION 21s 


are ground to powder as a punishment for the sin of un- 
Helier .1¢ 


b) The Fathers, especially those of the East, 
are unanimous in upholding the orthodox teach-. 
ing of the Church. The only one whom adher- 
ents of Predestinarianism have dared to claim is 
St. Augustine. 


‘ 

Yet the “ Doctor of Grace” expressly teaches: “ God 
is good, God is just. He can deliver some without 
merits because He is good; but He cannot damn any one 
without demerits, because He is just.” 1° St. Prosper re- 
echoes this teaching when he says of the reprobates: 
“ Of their own will they went out; of their own will they 
fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they were not 
predestined. They would, however, be predestined if 
they were to return and persevere in holiness ; hence God’s 
predestination is for many the cause of perseverance, for 
none the cause of falling away.” 7* St. Fulgentius ex- 
presses himself in similar language.*’ 


2. THe THEORY oF “NEGATIVE REPROBATION.” 
—Negative reprobation is defined by its defend- 
ers as an eternal decree by which God excludes 


14 Cfr. Oecumen., in h, 1: “ Ad 
quod positi sunt, non dicitur, quasi a 
Deo ad hoc essent destinati; nulla 
enim causa perditionis ministratur 
ab e0, qui omnes homines vult salvos 
fieri.’’ 

15 Contr. Iulian., III, 18, 35: 
“Bonus est Deus, iustus est Deus: 
potest -aliquos sine bonis meritis h- 
berare, quia bonus est; non potest 
quemquam sine malis meritis dam- 
nare, quia iustus est.” 


16 Resp. ad XII Object. Vincent.: 
 Voluntate exierunt, voluntate ceci- 
derunt, et quia praesciti sunt casuri, 
non sunt praedestinati; essent autem 
praedestinati, si essent reversuri et 
in sanctitate remansuri, ac per hoc 
praedestinatio Dei multis est causa 
standi, nemini est causa labendi.” 

17 Ad ‘Monims ie. Cire i Peta- 
vius, De Deo, X, 7 sqq. 


216 ACTUAL GRACE 


from Heaven those not absolutely predestined, in 
other words, determines not to save them. | 


a) Gonet explains the difference between negative and 
positive reprobation in Scholastic terminology as follows: 
“. .. quod haec [1. e. positiva] habet non solum terminum 
a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam terminum ad 
quem, scil. poenam sive damni sive sensus; illa vero 
[1. e. negativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe ex- 
clusionem a gloria ut beneficio indebito, non vero termi- 
num ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut sic praecise et ut 
habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur reprobus 
esse damnandus aut ulli poenae sive damni sive sensus 
deputandus.” 18 | 

The general principle laid down in this quotation is 
variously developed by Thomist theologians. 

The rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Syl- 
viuis) assign as the motive of reprobation the sovereign 
will of God. God, they say, without taking into account 
possible sins and demerits, determined a priori to exclude 
from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, 
Gotti, Gonet, Gazzaniga, and others condemn this view as 
incompatible with the teaching of St. Thomas, and, ap- 
pealing to St. Augustine’s doctrine of the massa dam- 
nata, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the 
reprobates from heaven in original sin, in which God, 
without being unjust, could leave as many as He saw 
fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others assume that 
the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory 
but merely from “ effective election ” thereunto, God sim- 
ply having decreed ante praevisa merita to leave them to 
their weakness.?° 


18 Clypeus Thomist., Vol. II, tr..5, Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. 
disp. 5, art. 2, n. 23. Theologie, 1879, pp. 203 sqq. 
19\Girs) Limbourg)S. J,;) an) the 


REPROBATION 217 


While the Thomists found no difficulty in harmoniz-. 
ing this view with their theory of physical premo- 
tion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard put 
in trying to square it with the scientia media.”® On the 
whole these Molinists endorse the third and mild- 
est of the above-quoted opinions, which differs only 
theoretically from the rigoristic view described in the first 
place. Practically it makes no difference whether God 
directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give 
him the graces necessary to attain it. 

Surveying all three of the theories under considera- 
tion we cannot but regard the first and third as heart- 
less and cruel, because they attribute eternal reprobation 
to a positive decree that takes effect independently of 
sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original 
sin), is open to the serious dogmatic objection that it con- 
tradicts the teaching of St. Paul and the Tridentine dec- 
laration that “there is no condemnation (mhil damna- 
tionis) in those who are truly buried together with Christ 
by baptism into death.” 7 


b) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as 
the logical counterpart of absolute predestina- 
tion.” If Almighty God, by an absolute decree, 
without regard to any possible merits, merely to 
reveal His divine attributes and to “embellish the 
universe,” had determined that only those could 
enter the “Heavenly Jerusalem” who were ante- 
cedently predestined thereto, it would inevitably 
follow that the unfortunate remainder of human- 


20 Cfr. Suarez, De Praedest., V, 22 Which explains why both the- 
4 sqq. ories have the same defenders. V. 
21 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5. supra, Art. 3, No. 4. 


218 | ACTUAL GRACE 


ity by the very same decree were “passed over,” 
“omitted,” ‘“‘overlooked,”’ “not elected,’ or, as 
Gonet honestly admits, “excluded from Heaven,” 
which is the same thing as being negatively con- 
demned to hell. 


The logical distinction between positive and negative 
reprobation, therefore, consists mainly in this, that the 
former signifies absolute damnation to hell, the latter 
(equally absolute) non-election to Heaven. To protect 
the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against 
unjust aspersions, however, it is necessary to point out 
certain fundamental differences between their theory and 
the heresy of Calvin. 

Calvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality 
both of God’s saving will and of the atonement; they re- 
fuse to admit the actual bestowal of sufficient grace upon 
those fore-ordained to eternal damnation; and claim 
that the human will loses its freedom under the predom- 
inance of efficacious grace or concupiscence. The Cath- 
olic defenders of negative reprobation indignantly reject 
the charge that their position logically leads to any such 
heretical implications. 


c) The theory of negative reprobation can be 
sufficiently refuted by showing that it is incom- 
patible with the universality of God’s will to save 
all men. For if God willed absolutely and ante- 
cedently to ‘exclude some men from Heaven,” 
as Gonet asserts, or ‘not to elect them to eternal 
glory,” as Suarez contends, then it would be His 
absolute will that they perish. 


REPROBATION 219 


a) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphys- 
ically impossible to attain eternal salvation. To hold 
otherwise would be tantamount to assuming that an 
essentially absolute decree of God can be frustrated. © 
This consideration led certain Thomists ** to describe the 
divine voluntas salvifica as rather an ineffectual velleitas.?* 
But this conflicts with the obvious teaching of Revela- 
tion.”” Suarez labors in vain to reconcile the sincerity of 
God’s salvific will with the theory of negative reprobation. 
The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could God 
sincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as 
Suarez says, that “it is not in man’s power to work out 
his eternal salvation in case he falls under non-election, 
non-predestination, or, which amounts to the same thing, 
negative reprobation ”’? ?¢ 

B) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative 
reprobation becomes fully apparent when we consider 
the attitude it ascribes to God. Gonet writes: “ Fore- 
seeing that the whole human race would be depraved by 
original sin, God, in view of the merits of Christ who 
was to come, elected some men to glory and, in punish- 
ment of original sin and to show His justice towards 
them and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted 
others to miss the attainment of beatitude, in other words, 
He positively willed that they should not attain it... . 
In virtue of this efficacious intention He devised appro- 
priate means for the attainment of His purpose, and see- 
ing that some would miss beatitude by simply being left 


23 Bafiez, Alvarez, Gonet. 

24“ Deus non serio vult, sed vellet 
-salvare etiam reprobos, nisi per hoc 
impediretur pulchritudo universi.’’ 

25 V. supra, Art. t and 2. 


26 De Praedest., V, 8, 8: ‘Non 


est in potestate hominis, cum non- 


electione seu cum non-praedestina- 
tione aut, quod idem est, cum re- 
probatione negativa actu ponere seu 
componere suam aeternam salutem.” 
Cfr, Franzelin, De Deo Uno, p. 583, 
3rd ed., Rome 1888, 


220 ACTUAL GRACE 


in the state of original sin, and others by being permitted 
to fall into actual sins and to persevere therein, He 
formally decreed this permission, and finally... bya 
command of His intellect ordained these means towards 
the attainment of the aforesaid end.” 2” Translated into 
plain every-day language this can only mean that God tries 
with all His might to prevent the reprobate from attain- 
ing eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the 
state of sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing 
Gonet’s teaching as “incompatible with sound doc- 
trine.’ 28 But his own teaching is equally unsound and 
cruel. For he, too, is compelled to assert: “ Predestina- 
tion to glory is the motive for which efficacious or infalli- 
ble means towards attaining that end are bestowed. 
Hence to refuse to predestine a man for glory is to deny 
him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to 
attain that end.” ° 

Holy Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. 
It describes God as a loving Father, who “wills not 
that any should perish, but that all should return to 
penance.” *° 

27“ Deus ex omnibus hominibus, 


quos infectos originali peccato prae- 
vidit, efficaciter ex meritis Christi 


severent, has permissiones per sub- 
sequentem  electionem approbavit. 
Et tandem... per actum imperit 


venturi quosdam elegit ad gloriam, 
et alios in poenam eiusdem origi- 
nalis peccati et ad ostensionem suae 
iustitiae erga illos et matoris miseri- 
cordiae erga electos voluit permit- 


tere, ut deficerent a consecutione 


gloriae seu positive eis non voluit 
gloriam.... Ex vi huius inten- 
tionis efficacis excogitavit media apta 
ad consecutionem talis finis, et vt 
dens in aliquibus hominibus esse 
aptum medium in solo originali 
peccato eos relinquere, in aliis vero 
permittere, ut cadant in haec. vel 
illa peccata actualia ac in illis per- 


sui intellectus haec media ad prae- 
dictum finem ordinavit.” Clyp. Tho- 
mist., Vol. II, disp. 5, art. 4, MN. 155. 

28 De Reprob., c. 3, n. 6. 

29 De Praedest., V, 7, 14: “‘ Elec- 
tio ad finem est ratio dandi media 
efficacia seu infallibilia ad illum ; 
ergo negatio illius electionis erit 
suo modo ratio non dandi media, 
quae cognoscuntur congrua et in- 
fallibilia ad illum finem consequen- 
dum.” 

302 Pet. III, 9: “... nolens 
aliquos perire, sed omnes ad poent- 
tentiam reverti.” 


REPROBATION Bar 


y) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is 
positively condemned to eternal damnation, as Calvin 
and the Jansenists assert, or negatively excluded from 
Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom we 
have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive 
and negative reprobation is “a distinction without a dif- 
ference.” For an adult to be excluded from Heaven sim- 
ply means that he is damned. There is no such thing as a 
middle state or a purely natural beatitude. Lessius justly 
says that to one reprobated by God it would be all the 
same whether his reprobation was positive or negative, 
because in either case he would be inevitably lost. 


READINGS : —*Ruiz, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, Lyons 
1628.— Ramirez, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione, 2 vols., 
Alcala 1702.—*Lessius, De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis, 
XIV, 2.—*Ipem, De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione (Opusce., 
Vol. II, Paris 1878).— Tournely, De Deo, qu. 22 sqq.— Schrader, 
Commentarii, I-II, De Praedestinatione, Vienna 1865.—J. P. 
Baltzer, Des hl. Augustinus Lehre iiber Pridestination und Re- 
probation, Vienna 1871— Mannens, De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et 
Praedestinatione, Louvain 1883 O. Rottmanner, O. S. B.,. Der 
Augustinismus, Miinchen 1892— O. Pfiilf, S. J., “Zur Pradesti- 
nationslehre des hl. Augustinus,’ in the Innsbruck Z ettschrift fir 
kath. Theologie, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual 
of the History of Dogmas, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 281, 378, 
382 sqq. 


31De Praedest., sect. 2, n. 13: 
“ Secundum communem aestimatio- 
nem hominum paria videntur, Deum 
velle ut pereas et nolle te ponere 
in electorum suorum numero neque 
gratiam congruam et perseverantiam 


censeret sibi esse indifferens, utrum 
eligatur, quum utrumque ante prae- 
visionem operum sit conceptum.’ 
The teaching of St. Augustine 
and that of St; Thomas on this 
point is in dispute. See Chr. Pesch, 


dare; aeque enim infallibiliter ex 
huiusmodi decretis sequeretur dam- 
natio. Et si alterutrum horum de- 
cretorum esset subeundum, quivis 


Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., 
Ppp. 230 sqq., and Heinrich-Gutber- 
let, Dogmatische Theol., Vol. VIII, 
§ 433. ; 


CHAPTER ALM 


GRACE IN ITS RELATION TO FREE-WILL 


When we speak of the relation of grace to 
free-will, we mean efficacious grace; merely suf- 
ficient grace, as such, does not involve consent. 

The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists 
denied the freedom of the human will under the 
influence of efficacious grace. 

Catholic theologians have always staunchly up- 
held both the freedom of the will and the efficacy 
of grace, but they disagree in explaining the 
mutual relations between grace and free-will. 


222 


SECTION: 5 


PE EVERESY OF CHE PROTESTANT REFORMERS AND 
THE JANSENISTS 


1. THE HERETICAL Errors OF LUTHER, CAL- 
VIN, AND JANSENIUS CoNTRASTED WITH THE OR- 
THODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Luther 
and Calvin asserted that the freedom of the will 
was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius 
taught that the will is overcome by efficacious 
grace in exactly the same way as it is overpowered 
by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against 
both these heresies the Church has always main- 
tained that the will remains free under the influ- 
ence of efficacious grace. 


a) Luther taught? that original sin has so completely 
annihilated man’s free-will that he resembles a horse com- 
pelled to go in whatever direction it is driven (according 
as “ God or the devil rides him’’),? and that the grace of 
Christ, far from restoring man’s liberty, compels him 
to act with intestine necessity. | 7 

Calvin ® carried this teaching to its logical conclusions 
by asserting: (1) that the will of our first parents was 

4 In his treatise De Servo Arbi- ium in der ersten Picecbiine| Vol. 
trio. J, Mainz 1904. 
2 Cir. Denifle, Luther und Luther- 3 Instit. Christ. Religionis, 1, II. 
223 


"224 ACTUAL GRACE 


free in Paradise, but lost its freedom by original sin; (2) 
that we cannot be delivered from the slavery of Satan 
except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, 
restore liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; 
(3) that, though the will under the influence of grace iS 
passive, and must needs follow the impulse to which it 
is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous." 


Against these heresies the Council of Trent 
maintained the existence of free-will both in the 
state of original sin® and under the influence of 
efficacious grace: “If any one saith that man’s 
free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting 
to God exciting and calling, . . . cannot refuse 
its consent if it would, but that, as something in- 
animate, it does nothing whatever and is merely 
passive: let him be anathema.” ° 


b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin 
mainly in drawing a sharper distinction between 
freedom from external constraint (libertas a 
coactione) and freedom from internal compulsion 
(libertas a necessitate), and maintaining that the 
will, when under the influence of grace, is exempt 
from external constraint, though not from in- 
terior compulsion, and that the libertas a coactione 


4 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 
pp. 378 saqq. 

5 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, pp. 291 sdq. 

6Sess.. VI; ‘can. 4! “St quis 
dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium 


a Deo motum et excitatum nihil 
cooperari assentiendo Deo vocantt 

. neque posse dissentire, si velit, 
sed velut inanime quoddam nihil 
omnino agere mereque passive sé 
habere, anathema sit.” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 814.) 


~ 
GRACE AND FREE-WILL 225 


is entirely sufficient to gain merit or demerit in| 
the fallen state.’ 


The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may 
be outlined as follows: (1) By original sin man lost 
the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in Paradise 
and became subject to a twofold delectation — delectatio 
coelestis victrix and delectatio terrena sive carnalis 
victrix. (2) These two delectations are continually 
contending for the mastery; the stronger always de- 
feats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer 
resistance, is alternately overpowered now by the one 
and then by the other. (4) In each case the delec- 
tatio coelestis is either stronger than the delectatio terrena, 
or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it is 
stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that 
case becomes efficax or irresistibilis. When it is weaker, 
the will simply must sin, because the delectatio coelestis 
is too weak to overcome the delectatio terrena. The grace 
given to a man under such conditions is called by the 
Jansenists gratia parva sive sufficiens. When the two 
delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself un- 
able to come to a definite decision. 

This false teaching inspired the famous “five propo- 
sitions ” of Jansenius, to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep 
some of God’s commandments for want of grace; 
(2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists 
interior grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of 
fallen nature it is sufficient to be free from external 
constraint; (4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in as- 

7 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit. (note Gal., n. 49: “Quod amphus nos 
5), PP. 295 sq. delectat, secundum id operemur 


8In support of this contention mnecesse est.” 
Jansenius quoted St. Augustine, In 


A 


226 ACTUAL GRACE 


suming the existence of a grace which man may either 
obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, 
but solely for the predestined. | | 


These propositions were condemned as heret- 
ical by Pope Innocent X in his dogmatic Bull 
“Cum occasione,’ of May 31, 1653. All five are 
implicitly contained in the second, viz.: In the 
state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior 
race: || bt This tr we that fallen man never resists © 
interior grace (second proposition), it follows 
that a just man who violates a commandment of 
God has not had the grace to observe it, that he 
therefore transgressed it through inability to ful- 
fil it (first proposition). If, however, he has 
sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is clear that 
the liberty of indifference is not a requisite con- _ 
dition of demerit, and what is said of demerit is 
likewise true of its correlative, merit (third 
proposition). On the other hand, if grace is 
wanting to the just whenever they fall, it is want- 
ing still more to sinners; it is therefore impossible 
to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured 
to every man the graces necessary for salvation 
(fifth proposition). As a further consequence, 
the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the 
universal distribution of a grace which may be 
resisted (fourth proposition ).”’ ° 


9J. Forget in the Catholic Ency- On Jansenism see Hergenrother, 
clopedia, Vol. VIII, pp. 288 saq- Kirchengeschichte, 4th ed., ed. by J. 


GRACE AND FREE-WILL B27 


2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED 
rrom REVELATION.—Far from favoring the de- 
terminism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the 
Bible and Tradition positively contradict the con- 
tention that free-will is overpowered by grace. 

a) The operation of grace and the liberty of 
the will never appear in Sacred Scripture as mu- 
tually exclusive, but invariably as cooperating fac- 
tors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, 
and sometimes the other, according to the purpose 
the sacred writer happens to have in view. 


The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to 
this: 2° “‘ When it is said in the sacred writings, ‘Turn 
ye to me, and I will turn to you,’ 14 we are admonished 
of our liberty; and when we answer: ‘Convert us, O 
God, to thee, and we shall be converted,’ 1* we confess 
that we are forestalled by the grace of God.” 

St. Paul, it is true, asks: “ Who resisteth his [God’s] 
will?” 28 But he also admonishes his favorite disciple 
Timothy: ‘Exercise thyself unto godliness.” ** St. 
Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost does 
not compel the will. “You always resist the Holy 
Ghost,” he tells the Jews; “as your fathers did, so do 
you also.” +> Our Lord Himself teaches that grace exerts 


Po Karsch, «Vols ItT, pp. 386 saq-, 
466 sqq., Freiburg 1909. 

10 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “ Unde in 
sacris literis quum dicitur: ‘ Con- 
vertimini ad me et ego convertar ad 
vos, libertatis nostrae admonemur; 
quum respondemus: ‘ Converte nos, 
Domine, ad te et convertemur, Dei 
nos gratia praevenirt confitemur.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 797.) Cfr. 


Oswald, Die Lehre von der Heili- 
gung, 3rd ed., pp. 186 sq. 

Zach) Lt anoen 

13° Jer., XAT, 20. 

13 Rom. LX; 19: “ Voluntatt 
enim ems quis resistit?”’ 

144° Tim, (EV. 72.° Exerce au- 
tem teipsum (yiuvate 6€ ceauTov) 
ad pietatem.” 


15 Acts VII, 51: “‘ Vos semper 


228 ACTUAL GRACE 


no interior compulsion but invites free coopera- 
tion: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- 
ments.” The exhortations, promises, and threats ut- 
tered in various portions of Holy Writ would be mean- 
ingless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.”” 


b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers 
who wrote before St. Augustine defended the 
freedom of the will so energetically that they 
were subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian | 
and Semipelagian errors.** Calvin himself ad- 
mits that with but one exception the Fathers 
are unanimously opposed to his teaching.” 


The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both 
Calvin and Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It 
should be noted, however, that the point which chiefly 
concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with the 
Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and 
gratuity of grace, not its relation to free-will. Where he 
incidentally touches upon the latter, he shows by the man- 
ner in which he formulates his sentences that he regards 
the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But 
he does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in 


Spiritui Sancto resistitis (Cdvrumt- 
arere), sicut patres vestri, ita et 
vos.” 

16 Matth. XIX, 17: “Sit autem 
vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- 
data.) Cir Apoc. LV, ).20%)) |" Bece 
sto ad ostium et pulso; si quis au- 
dierit vocem meam et aperuerit 
mihi ianuam, intrabo ad illum.” 

17 Cfr. the Scriptural argument 
for the existence of sufficient grace, 
supra, pp. 45 sq. 

18 V. supra, pp. 102 Sq., 141 sq. 

RO TASHE., V1. ATC) 5/9," ‘sect. | 10s 


i “ Voluntatem movet [gratia Christi], 


non qualiter multis saeculis tradi- 
tum est et creditum, ut nostrae 
postea sit electionis, motioni aut 
obtemperare aut refragari, sed tllam 
eficaciter afficiendo. Illud ergo to- 
ties a Chrysostomo repetitum repu- 
diarit necesse est: ‘Quem trahit, vo- 
lentem  trahit.” Many  Patristic 
texts of similar tenor have been 
gathered and explained by Cardinal 
Bellarmine in his treatise De Gra- 
tia et Libero Arbitrio, VI, 11. 


GRACE AND FREE-WILL 229 


which Alexander the Great cut the Gordian knot. He 
does not declare: Grace is everything, free-will is noth- 
ing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the 
human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.”° 
Possibly St. Augustine in the heat of controversy 
now and then expressed himself in language open to 
misinterpretation, as when he said: “ Therefore aid was 
brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it 
might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by di- 
vine grace.” *4_ But this and similar phrases admit of a 
perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the context shows, 
Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of 
grace in all things pertaining to salvation, and to empha- 
size the fact that free-will, strengthened by grace, is 
able to resist even the most grievous temptations.22. At 
no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom 
of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote 
but two out of many available passages in proof of this 
statement. “To yield consent or to withhold it, when- 
ever God calls, is the function of one’s own will.’ 28 
“For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because 
the will is aided; but it is aided precisely for the rea- 


20 Cfr. De Gratia Christi, c. 47:  conemur, non quasi ut non velimus. 


“Tsia quaestio, ubi de arbitrio volun- 
tatis et Det gratia disputatur, ita est 
ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando 
defenditur liberum arbitrium, negari 
Dei gratia videatur; quando autem 
asseritur Dei gratia, liberum arbi- 
trium putetur auferri.’”’ 

21 De Corrept. et Gratia, XII, 38: 
* Subventum est infirmitati volunta- 
tis humanae, ut divind gratia inde- 
clinabiliter et insuperabiliter agere- 
tur.” 

22 Cfr. his Sermones, 163, c. 11, 
n. 13: “‘ Totum ex Deo, non tamen 
quasi dormientes, non quasi ut non 


Sine voluntate tua non erit in te 
tustitia Dei. Voluntas quidem non 
est nisi tua, iustitia non est nist 
Dei... Sine te fecit te Deus. 
Non enim adhibuisti aliquem con- 
sensum, ut te faceret Deus. Quo- 
modo consentiebas, qui non eras? 
Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te 
iustificat sine te. Ergo fecit ne- 
scientem, iustificat volentem. Tamen 
ipse tustificat, ne sit iustitia tua.” 

23 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 34: 
“ Consentire vocationi Dei-vel ab 
ipsa dissentire propriae voluntatis 
est.”” 


230 ACTUAL GRACE 
son that it remains free.” ** St. Bernard of Clairvaux 
echoes this teaching when, in his own ingenious way, he 
summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: “Take 
away free will and there will be nothing left to save; 
take away grace and there will be no means left of sal- 
VAtIONy i (05 


Reapincs: —*Bellarmine, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio (Opera 
Omnia, ed. Févre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873) .—*Dechamps, 
S. J.. De Haeresi Ianseniana, Paris 1645.— F. Worter, Die christ- 
liche Lehre tiber das Verhéltnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf 
Augustinus, Freiburg 1856.—*Palmieri, De Gratia Divina Actuali, 
thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.— S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 387 
sqq., 377 sdq., Freiburg 1901—B. J. Otten, S. J. A Manual of 
the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 saqq. 


erit, quod salvetur; tolle gratiam et 
non erit, unde salvetur.” On other 


24 Ep., 187, 2, 10: “ Neque enim 
voluntatis arbitriunm ideo tollitur, 


quia iuvatur; sed ideo iuvatur, quia 
non tollitur.’ (Migne, P. L., 
XXXII, 677). 

25 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I, 
2: “ Tolle liberum arbitrium et non 


difficult passages in the writings of 
St. Augustine cfr. Mausbach, Die 
Ethik des hl. Augustinus, Vol. II, 
pp. 208 sqq., Freiburg 1909. 


SECTION: 2 


THEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS ‘DEVISED TO HARMONIZE 
THE DOGMAS OF GRACE AND FREE-WILL 


The relation of grace to free-will may be re- 
garded from a twofold point of view. We may 
take grace as the primary factor and trace it in 
its action on the human will; or, starting from 
the latter, we may endeavor to ascertain how free- 
will is affected by grace. 


The first-mentioned method has given birth to two 
closely related theological systems, Thomism and Augus- 
tinianism; the latter to Molinism and Congruism, which 
are almost identical in substance. 

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries 
to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called 
eclectic. 

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influ- 
ence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted 
by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how 
grace and free-will codperate, that the above-mentioned 
schools differ. Pe 

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure 
problem we consider it our duty to warn the student 
against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the 
different systems which we are about to examine are all 
tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more 

~ 231 


232. 4 ACTUAL GRACE 


important things are at stake and the faith is viciously 
assailed from without, the ancient controversy between 
Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance. 


ARTIC Bs 


THOMISM AND AUGUSTINIANISM 


Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on 
the concept of gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per 
se, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not 
admit even the existence of such a grace. 

1. THE THomistTic THEORY OF GRACE.—The 
true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. 
Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the 
Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian 
Bafiez (1528-1604). His teaching may be 
summarized as follows: 


a) God is-the First Cause (causa prima) and Prime 
Mover (motor primus) of all things, and all created or 
secondary causes (causae secundae) derive their being 
and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any 
creature could act independently of God, God would 
cease to be causa prima and motor primus.* 

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that 
is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception, 
—necessary and free, good and bad,— because no sec- 
ondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion 
by the motor primus. 

In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts 

1Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. nisi sit efficaciter determinata a 


Thelo\2) py gu. t4) art. 3233 prima.” 
* Nulla secunda causa potest operari, 


THOMISM 233 
himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary 
causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, 
freely. All receive from Him their substance and their 
mode of action.? The rational creature, therefore, though 
subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect 
freedom, just as if it were not moved. 

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which 
God exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible be- 
cause it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being 
whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills 
infallibly happens.? 

Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves 
the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move 
Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives 
solely from the free will of man.‘ 

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all 
creatural acts, God’s concurrence with creatural causes 
(concursus generalis) must be conceived as prevenient, 
not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only 
makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by mov- 
ing the will from potentiality to actuality.» Consequently, 
the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His 
creatures is not a mere motio, but a praemotio,— and not 


2Cfr, Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, 
art. 4: “ Movet nempe Deus non 
solum ad substantiam actus, sed 
etiam ad modum eius, qui est liber- 
tas.” 

3Cfr. Alvarez, De Auxiliis, disp. 
83, n. 9: “ Quando agens infinitae 
virtutis movet aliquod subiectum, 
tale subiectum infallibiliter movetur, 
quia tunc resistentia passi non su- 
perat nec adaequat virtutem agentis. 
Sed Deus est agens infinitae virtutis. 
Ergo motio Dei efficax respectu cu- 
quscumque hominis in  quibuslibet 
circumstantus positi erit medium 


congruum et aptum, ut infallibiliter 
inducat effectum, ad quem ex Dei 
intentione datur.” 

4Cfr. Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, 
art. 5: ‘‘ Restat ergo tertia sen- 
tentia, scilicet Deum praemovere 
physice ad entitatem peccati et sic 
se effecturum definivisse decreto 
positivo et effectivo; operatur enim 
omnia secundum consilium volun- 
tatis suae.”’ 

5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, pp. 73 sqq. 


234 ACTUAL GRACE 

merely moral, but physical (praemotio physica).® It is 
by physical premotion that God’s prevenient influence 
effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard 
to their assent.’ Free-will is predetermined by God be- 
fore it determines itself.* 

d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in 
so far as they are created entities, we find that they are 
nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal 
decrees, embodied in the praedeterminatio physica. It 
is the temporal execution of the latter that is called 
praemotio physica. Hence we are justified in speaking, 
not only of a temporal praemotio, but of an eternal prae- 
determinatio, in fact the terms are often used synony- 
mously.® ; | 

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal 
predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion 
of the free will to determine itself. Since God has 
from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, 
which possess the power of physical predetermination 
without regard to the free consent of His creatures, phys- 


6 Cfr. De Lemos, Acta Congr. de 
Auxr., p. 1065: “Illa praepositio 


Deo debet determinari, quia scil. 
indifferens sit eaque indifferentia non 


‘prae’ nihil aliud denotat aut deno- 
tare potest quam Deum esse priorem 
et primam causam, prius natura et 
causalitate moventem, applicaniem, 
inclinantem et determinantem volun- 
tatem, quam ipsa voluntas se de- 
terminet.” 

7 Cfr. Gonet, Clypeus Theol. 
Thomist., disp. 11, art. 5: “ Haec 
divina motio in creatura recepta a 
Thomistis ‘ physica’ appellatur,... 
quia ex propria essentia et ab in- 
trinseco est efficax, independenter 
a quocumque creato consensu.”’ 

sCfr, Graveson, Epist. Theol. 
Polem.,.t. I, ep. 11: “ Voluntas 
creata priusquam se determinet, a 


solvatur quam per praeviam Dei 
motioneme’ |. Cfr. “Alvarez, De) Au- 
wiliis, disp. 28: “‘ Liberum arbi- 
trium, quia creatum est, licet de- 


terminet sibi actum, illum tamen 
determinat praedeterminatum a 
Deo.” 


9 Cfr. Reginald., De Novit. Anti- 
quit. Nominis Praedeterm. Phys., 1. 
II, c. 36: “ Quum Deus hanc mo- 
tionem det causis sciens et volens 
atque adeo cum [aeterna] cognitione 
et intentione certa cuiusdam deter- 
minati effectus, alias haec essent a 
casu respectu Dei: consequitur illam 
praemotionem physicam esse prae- 
determinationem.” 


— —" il ae 
si ae 
‘icciienint tei toe 


THOMISM 235 
ical predetermination constitutes an infallible medium 
by which He can foreknow their future free actions, 
_and hence there is no need of a scientia media. If God 
knows His own will, He must also know the free de- 
terminations included therein. To deny this would be 
to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge. 

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thom- 
istic system. Its champions carry the argument into the 
theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is 
true in the natural must be equally true in the super- 
natural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation." 

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the 
order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural 
sphere the gratia efficax, which predetermines man to 
perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but 
at the same time with metaphysical necessity (necessitate 
consequentiae, not consequentis). It would be a contra- 
diction to say that efficacious grace given for the pur- 
pose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, 
1. e., may fail to elicit consent.1? The will freely assents 
to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved 
thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does 
not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is 
efficacious of itself and intrinsically (gratia efficar ab 
intrinseco sive per se). 

10 Cfr. Nazarius, Comment. in S. et Cordis, 1, 
Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 22, art. ais 


4: “ Sublaté a Deo physicae prae- 
motionis efficacitate nulla relinquitur 


VIII, diss. 2, specul. 
““Generalem praemotionem ideo 
» solum adstruimus, ut per eam ad 
gratiam per se efficacem uberius 


alia in Deo sufficiens causalitas re- 
spectu determinationis liberorum 
actuum et consequenter neque in 
Deo esse poterit talium praescientia 
futurorum.”’ See also Pohle-Preuss, 
God: His Knowability, Essence, and 
Aitributes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. 

11 Cfr. Contenson, Theol. Mentis 


fortiusque stabiliendam viam muni- 
amus ad eamque propugnandam 
serviat etiam philosophia.? 

12 Cfr. Alvarez, De Ausxiliis, disp. 
92, n. 6: “ Repugnant ad invicem 
auxilium efficax ad consentiendum 
et actualis dissensus,” 

13 Cfr, Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 122 


? 


236 ACTUAL GRACE 

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as 
a praedeterminatio ad unum.™ 

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very 
nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the 
will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient 
grace (gratia mere sufficiens), which confers only the 
power to act (posse operari), not the act itself (actu 
operari). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, in- 
cludes the free consent of the will, while merely sufh- 
cient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would 
cease to be merely sufficient and would become effica- 
cious. 

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hy- 
pothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient ? 
The Thomists answer this question in different ways. 
Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power 
to perform a good deed, but that something more is re- 
quired for the deed itself.° De Lemos ascribes the inef- 
ficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.” 


n. 16: “Eficacia auxilii praeveni-  thomistice sufficiens ita ex natura 


entis gratiae et connexio eius in- 
fallibilis cum libera cooperatione ar- 
bitrii tota fundatur et deswmitur, 
tamquam ex prima radice, ex omni- 
potentia Dei atque ex absoluto et 
efficaci decreto voluntatis eius volen- 
tis, ut homo quem movet conver- 
tatur et pie operetur, nec huiusmodi 
eficacia ullo modo dependet etiam, 
tamquam «a conditione sine qua non, 
ex futura  cooperatione  arbitrit 
creati.” 

14 Cfr. Alvarez, op. cit., disp. 19, 
n. 7: “Praedictum auxilium ac- 
tuale determinat liberum arbitrium 
ad unam numero actionem, non 
subditur libero arbitrio quantum ad 
usum,” 

15 Cfr. Graveson, Epist. 
Polen baie hp) ) PeDee ic £7 


Theol. 
“ Gratia 


sua essentialiter distinguitur a gratia 
thomistice efficaci, ut numquam et in 
nullo casu gratia thomistice suffi- 
ciens evadere possit gratia efficax 
thomistice nec umquam  ponatur 
actus secundus, nist accesserit gra- 
tia efficax thomistice.” 

16 Prael. Theol., disp. 5, ¢. 6: 
“In gratia sufficiente totum id con- 
tinetur quod ad potentiam bene 


operandi exigitur, non autem totum 


id quod ulterius requiritur ad 
actum; certum est enim in omni 
causa agente aliquid plus ad actum 
quam ad potentiam requiri.” 

17 Panoplia, t. IV, p. 2, tr. 3, & 2: 
© Auxilium sufficiens ita sufficientiam 
tribuit ad operandum, si homo velit, 
quod defectus operationis nullo 
modo  provenit ex insufficientia 


THOMISM 237 


If the will did not resist, God would promptly add | 
efficacious grace.18 


CriticAL EsTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC 
THEORY.—The Thomistic system undoubtedly has 
its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts 
divine grace as the prime factor in the business of 
salvation, and magnificently works out the con- 
cept of God as causa prima and motor primus 
both in the natural and the supernatural order. 

But Thomism also has its weak points. 

A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious 
grace is open to two serious theological difficulties. 

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial dis- 
tinction between efficacious and merely sufficient 
grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace. 

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace 
is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. 

Though in theory the Thomists defend the 
sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will 
as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their 
attempts at squaring these dogmas with the 
fundamental principles of their system. 

a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thom- 
ists, is not truly sufficient to enable a man to per- 
form a salutary act, because ex vi notionis it con- 
fers merely the power to act, postulating for 


aliqua ipsius auxilit, sed tantum zeichnung der thomistischen- Gna- 

ex defectu arbitrii, quod ei resistit denlehre’’ in the Innsbruck Zeit- 

et impedimentum ponit.”? Schrift fiir kath, Theologie, 1877, 
18 Cfr, Limbourg, S.-J., “ Selbst- 


238 ACTUAL GRACE 


the act itself a substantially new grace (gratia 
eficax). A grace which requires to be entita- 
tively supplemented by another, in order to enable 
a man to perform a salutary act, is clearly not 
sufficient for the performance of that act. ‘Tobe 
truly sufficient for something” and “to require to 
be complemented by something else” are mu- 
tually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient 
grace’ as conceived by Thomists is in reality in- 
sufficient. 


Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate 
this difficulty. Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists 
say that if any one who has received sufficient grace (in 
the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied the gratia 
eficax, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the 
will® But this explanation is incompatible with the 
Thomistic teaching that together with the gratia sufh- 
ciens there: co-exists in the soul of the sinner an irre- 
sistible and inevitable praemotio physica to the entity of 
sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound 
up.2° If this be true, how can the will of man be held 
responsible so long as God denies him the gratia ab 
intrinseco efficax? 

Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of 
three distinct attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may 
consent, it may resist, or it may remain neutral. It can- 
not consent except with the aid of a predetermining 


19 Billuart, De Deo, diss. 8, art. creata infallibiliter deficiet circa 
45583: quamcumque materiam virtutis, nist 
20 Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. efficaciter determinetur a _ divina 
Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 14, art. voluntate ad bene opéerandum.” 
13, concl 14: “‘ Nam _ voluntas 


THOMISM 239 


gratia efficax, to merit which is beyond its power. If it 
withstands, it eo ipso renders itself unworthy of the gratia 
eficax. If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in 
itself be a sinful act), and awaits efficacious grace, of 
what use is sufficient grace? 

To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. 
Now, where does the right use of liberty come in? If co- 
operation with sufficient grace moves God to bestow the 
gratia per se eficax, as the Thomists contend, then the 
right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the gratia 
sufficiens and the gratia efficax per se. But there is ab- 
solutely no place for it in the Thomistic system. The 
right use of liberty for the purpose of obtaining effica- 
cious grace is attributable either to grace or to unaided na- 
ture. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature 
would lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing 
to grace would be moving in a vicious circle, thus: “ Be- 
cause the will offers no resistance, it is efficaciously moved 
to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful resistance 
is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to per- 
form a salutary act.” 7} 

It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of 
this difficulty which will not at the same time upset the 
very foundation on which the Thomistic system rests, 
viz.: “ Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit effica- 
citer determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem poten- 
tiae ad actum],” that is to say, no secondary cause can 
act unless it be efficaciously determined by the First Cause 


by an application of the latter to the former as of potency 
to act. 


21 Other evasions are treated by sufficient grace, v., Ch. I, Sect. 2, 
Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 400 No. 6, supra. A 
sqq. On the true notion of merely 


240 ACTUAL GRACE 


b) The Thomistic gratia efficax, conceived as 
a praedeterminatio ad unum, inevitably destroys 
free-will. 


a) It is important to state the question clearly: Not 
physical premotion as such,” but the implied connotation 
of praevia determanatio ad umum, is incompatible with 
the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the will does 
not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a 
merely passive indifference, but in active indifference 
either to will or not to will, to will thus or otherwise. 
Consequently every physical predetermination, in so far 
as it is a determinatio ad unum, must necessarily be de- | 
structive of free-will. Self-determination and physical 
predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually ex- 
clusive. Now the Thomists hold that the gratia per se 
efficax operates in the manner of a supernatural praedeter- 
minatio ad unum. If this were true, the will under the 
influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free. 

To perceive the full force of this argument it is neces- 
sary to keep in mind the Thomistic definition of prae- 
motio physica as “actio Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, | 
priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuper- 
abili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus 
cum ila praemotione coniungere.’?? That is to say: 
As the non-performance of an act by the will is owing 
simply and solely to the absence of the respective prae- 
motio physica, so conversely, the performance of an act 
is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine 
premotion; the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent 

22 The Molinists also regard su- Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 145 
pernatural grace as a praemotio sq, Freiburg 1908. 


physica; cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 23 Gonet, Clypeus Theol. Thomist., 
dispi'9;) artis; SvBe 


THOMISM 241 


such a premotion, because this would require a new pre-’ 
motion, which again depends entirely on the divine pleas- | 
ure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predeter- 
mined by God, it could not in any sense of the term be 
called truly free. 


8B) The Thomists meet this argument with mere eva- 
sions. They make a distinction between necessitas con- 
sequentis (antecedens), which really necessitates, and 
necessitas consequentiae (subsequens), which does not. 
A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical 
premotion, but it is not on that account in itself 
necessary. But, we answer, a determinatio ad unum, 
which precedes a free act and is independent of the will, is 
more than a necessitas consequentiae — it is a necessitas 
consequentis destructive of free-will. The Thomists 
reply: Considered as a created entity, physical premo- 
tion may indeed be incompatible with free-will; not 
so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is 
able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its 
freedom." The obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic con- 
tradiction cannot be solved by an appeal to the divine 
omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do what 
is intrinsically impossible.2* He can no more change a 
determinatio ad unum into a libertas ad utrumque than 
He can create a square circle, because the two notions 
involve an intrinsic contradiction. Furthermore, if the 
Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to perform 


24 Cfr, Alvarez, De Auviliis, disp. dum actum in particulari, non solum 
22, n. 39: “‘“Solus Deus propter ‘secundum substantiam, sed etiam 
suam infinitatem et omntipotentiam, secundum modum libertatis, quod 
quia. est auctor voluntatis creatae, tamen non potest alia causa creata.’’ 
potest illam immutare conformiter 25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
ad suam naturam et movere effica- Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 


citer atque applicare ad producen-  butes, pp. 282 sqq. 


242 ACTUAL sGRACE 


some definite act, would He not choose precisely that 
praemotio physica which, the Thomists claim, also pro- 
duces free acts? Not so, replies Alvarez; “ for the will 
remains free so long as the intellect represents to it an 
object as indifferent.” °° That is to say: Liberty remains 
as long as its root, 7. e. an indifferent judgment, is pres- 
ent. But this new rejoinder, far from solving the rid- 
dle, simply begs the question. Liberty of choice resides 
formaliter in the will, not in the intellect, and conse- 
quently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless it 
possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not 
to act. This imdifferentia activa ad utrumlibet, as it is 
technically termed, is absolutely incompatible with the 
Thomistic praemotio ad unum. What would it avail the 
will to enjoy the indifferentia iudicii if it had to sub- 
mit to compulsion from some other quarter? 

y) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort 
to the famous distinction between the sensus compositus 
and the sensus divisus. The Molinists argue: “ Liberum 
arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia. non potest 
dissentire; ergo non est liberum.’ The Thomists re- 
ply: “ Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu di- 
viso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, 
concedo.” ‘They explain this distinction by certain well- 
known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart 
says: “Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in 
sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; ... 
im sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet po- 
tentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum 
sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat po- 
tentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem 

26 Alvarez, De Auziliis, disp. 22, tus tli repraesentat obiectum cum 


n. 19: “ Nam tamdiu manet liber-  indifferentia.’’ 
tas in voluntate, quamdiu intellec- 


THOMISM 243 


potentiae.” *" As one who sits cannot at the same time — 
stand (sensus compositus), although he is free to rise 
(sensus divisus), so the consent of the will effected by 
efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (sensus com- 
positus), though the will retains the power to dissent in- 
stead of consenting (sensus divisus), and this is sufficient 
to safeguard its freedom. 

Is the distinction between sensus compositus and 
sensus divisus correctly applied here? Can the will, 
under the predetermining influence of the gratia efticax, 
change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily 
as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby 
demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? 
Alvarez ** describes the Thomistic potentia dissentiendi as 
a faculty which can never under any circumstances be- 
come active. But such a potentia is really no potentia at 
all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand ; his ‘nat- 
ural potentia standi is neutralized by external restraint. 
Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic 
gratia efficax, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, 
and the alleged potentia resistendi, by which the Thom- 
ists claim to save free-will, is a chimera. 

6) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that 
the Molinists triumphantly bring in the declaration of the 
Council of Trent that “man... while he receives that 
inspiration [7. e. efficacious grace], ... is also able 
to reject it’ And again: “If any one saith that man’s 
free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to 
God exciting and calling, does in no wise codperate to- 
wards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the 

27 De Deo, diss, 8, art. 4, § 2. tentia ad dissentiendum, quamvis 

28De Auvxiliis, disp. 92, n, 11: nulla sit potentia ad coniungendum 


“Etiam posito auxilio efficaci in  actualem dissensum cum  auxilio 
voluntate componitur cum illo po- efficaci [not: cum actuali consensu].’’ 


244 ACTUAL GRACE 

grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent 
if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does 
nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be an- 
athema.” 2° To adjust their system to this important 
dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed that the 
Tridentine Council had in mind merely the gratia sufi- 
ciens, to which the will can refuse its consent. But this 
interpretation is untenable. The Council plainly refers 
to that grace with which the will cooperates by giv- 
ing its consent (cooperatur assentiendo) and which it can 
render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other 
words, with the grace which disposes and prepares a sin- 
ner for justification, and under the influence of which, 
according to Luther and Calvin, the will remains inani- 
mate and merely passive. This can only be the gratia 
eficax. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contra- 
dict the obvious sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that 
the Council intentionally chose the term dissentire (sensus 
divisus) rather than resistere (sensus compositus), in 
order to indicate that under the predetermining influence 
of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent 
(posse dissentire) but not to offer resistance (posse re- 
sistere).®° This interpretation is no longer tenable 
since the Vatican Council has defined that ‘“‘ Faith, even 


29 Sess. VI, cap. 5: “ Homo .. « 
inspirationem illam [gratiam effica- 
cem] recipiens ... illam et abiicere 
potest.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
rom) Sega, vids cael. (Tas et 
quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbt- 
trium a Deo motum et excitatum 
nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo ex- 
citanti atque vocanti, quo ad obti- 
nendam iustificationis gratiam se dis- 
ponat ac praeparet, neque posse dis- 
sentire, si velit, sed velut imanime 
quoddam mhil omnino agere mere- 


que passive se habere, anathema sit.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 814.) 

30 Thus’ Alvarez, De Auvilis, 
disp. 93, art. 1: “Nunc autem 
dicimus Concilium Tridentinum... 
numquam usum fuisse verbo illo 
“resistere, sed verbo ‘ dissentire’ 
et ‘abticere, ut insinuaret non esse 
idem formaliter resistere seu posse 
resistere auxilio efficaci et posse dis- 
sentire seu abticere gratiam voca- 
tionis. ... Unde licet arbitrium 
motum auxilio efficact ad consen- 


THOMISM 245 


when it does not work by charity, is in itself a gift 
of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to 
salvation, by which man yields voluntary obedience to 
God Himself, by assenting to and cooperating with His 
grace, which he is able to resist.” *4 If efficacious grace 
can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that “ ir- 
resistible ” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.2? 


B. The Thomistic system is open to two seri- 
ous objections also from the philosophical point 
of view. One of these concerns the medium by 
which God foreknows the future free acts of His 
rational creatures; the other, His relation to sin. 

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we 
do not, of course, underestimate the immense 
difficulties involved in the problem of God’s fore- 
knowledge of the free acts of the future. | 

The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they 
are sO numerous and weighty that in our treatise on 
God ** we made no attempt to demonstrate the scientia 


media by stringent arguments, but merely accepted it as 
a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of 


tiendum possit dissentire, si velit, 
non tamen potest Deo resistere vel 
auxilio eius efficact, secundum quod 
est instrumentum  voluntatis  di- 
vinae.”’ 

31 Sess, III, cap. 3: “ Quare 
fides ipsa in se, etiamsi per carita- 
tem non operetur, donum Dei est 
et actus eius est opus ad salutem 
pertinens, quo homo liberam prae- 
stet tpst Deo obedientiam, gratiae 
eius cui resistere possit consentiendo 
et cooperando.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 1791.) : 

32 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. 


III, pp. 74 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. 
Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., Wok, 
3rd ed., pp. 140 sqq., Freiburg 1908; 
Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 405 
sqq., Freiburg 1901. On the teach- 
ing of St. Augustine see Palmieri, 
De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 50; 
on that of St. Thomas, L. de San, 
S. J., De Deo Uno, t. I: De Mente 
SS. Thomae circa Praedetermina- 
tiones Physicas, Louvain 1894. 

83 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
butes, pp. 383 sqq., 400 sqq. 


246 ACTUAL GRACE 
scientific basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and 
free-will in both the natural and the supernatural order. 


b) A more serious objection than the one 
just adverted to is that the Thomistic hypothe- 
sis involves the blasphemous inference that God 
predetermines men to sin. 


a) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic prin- 
ciples God would have to be acknowledged as the cause 
of sin. As the predetermination of the will to justifica- 
tion can take no other form than the gratia per se efficax, 
so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the 
predetermining influence of the motor primus. With- 
out this assumption it would be impossible in the Thom- 
istic system to find in the absolute will of God an infalli- 
ble medium by which He can foreknow future sins. 
Bafiez says on this point: ‘God knows sin with an in- 
tuitive knowledge, because His will is the cause of the 
sinful act, as act, at the same time permitting free-will 
to concur in that act by failing to observe the law.” 
Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself 
is the immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable 
from their premises. And this for two reasons. First, 
because the alleged praemotio ad malum is as irresistible 
as the praemotio ad bonum; and secondly, because the 
material element of sin must be inseparable from its for- 


34“ Quidquid entitatis reperitur in 385 Cfr. Bafiez, Comment. in S. 


quocumque actu peccati, etiamsi alias 
sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in 
Deum tamquam in primam causam 
praemoventem et praedeterminantem 
actuali motione voluntatem creatam 
ad talem actum, inquantum actus est, 
secundum quod est ens.’ Alvarez, 
De Auxil., disp. 24, n. 15. 


Theol. S. Thom., 1 p., qu. 23, art. 
3, dub. 2, conclus. 2: “ Deus co- 
gnoscit cognitione intuitiva peccatum. 
quatenus Det voluntas est causa en- 
titatis actus peccati et simul per- 
mittens, quod ad eundem actum 
concurrat liberum arbitrium defi- 
ciendo a regula.” 


THOMISM 247 


mal element; otherwise God would foreknow sin merely 
matertaliter as an act but not formaliter as a sin. The 
teaching of the Church on this point was clearly defined 
by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is 
not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the 
works that are evil God worketh as well as those that 
are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Him- 
self, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less 
His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him 
be anathema.” °° 
If the rational creature were compelled to perform 
a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And 
if it were true that the malice of an act practically can- 
not be separated from its physical entity, then in the Tho- 
mistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the 
entitas but likewise of the malitia peccati. The devil 
tempts us only by moral means, 7. e. by suggestion; are 
we to assume that God tempts us physically by induc- 
ing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the prae- 
motio ad bonum, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? 
This consideration may be supplemented by another. 
So-called “sins of malice” are comparatively rare. 
Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure 
or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral 
theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical . entity. 
How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, 
for instance, separate the malice from the entity of their 
sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their passion 
without offending God! 
B) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist 
theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a 
lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his dis- 


86 Sess, VI, can. 6. _Cfr. Pohle- sence, and Attributes, pp. 253 saq., 
Preuss, God: His Knowability, Es- 442 sqq. 


248 ACTUAL GRACE 


abled limb ; however, the cause of limping is not the soul 
but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes 
of such reasoning as follows: “ The will of Adam be- 
fore the fall was not a crooked shinbone, but it was abso- 
lutely straight, and became crooked through physical pre- 
motion.” 37 

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist 
school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin 
somehow to God. “It is impossible for a man to sin 
unless God lends His cooperation. Do not, therefore, 
the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those 
who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a 
very large distinction between the concursus simultaneus 
of the Molinists and the praemotio physica of the Thom- 
ists. The praemotio physica predetermines the sinful 
act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the 
will is able to offer resistance. The concursus simulta- 
neus, on the other hand, begins as a mere concursus 
oblatus, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were 
the free consent of the will before it cooperates with the 
sinner as concursus collatus in the performance of the sin- 
ful act.28 For this reason the distinction between actus 
and malitia has a well-defined place in the Molinistic 
system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thom- 
iste:?* 


2. AUGUSTINIANISM.—This system, so called 
because its defenders pretend to base it on the 


37 “ Voluntas Adami ante pecca- 
tum non erat tibia curva, sed omnino 
recta, facta autem est curva ex pro- 
motione physica.’ Praelect. Dog- 
mat., Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 137. 

88 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
unal, pp. 72 sqq 


39 Cfr. on this subject Palmieri, 
De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 41; 
T. Papagni, O. P., La Mente di S. 
Tommaso intorno alla Mozione Di- 
vina nelle Creature, p, 44, Benevento 
I9OI. 


AUGUSTINIANISM 249 


authority of St. Augustine, has some points of 
similarity with Thomism but differs from the 
latter in more than one respect, especially in this 
that the Augustinians,*® though they speak with 
great deference of the gratia per se efficax, hold 
that the will is not physically but only morally 
predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustin- 
ianism may fitly be described as the system of the 
praedeterminatio moralis. Its most eminent de- 
fender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), 
who in a voluminous work De Theologicis Dis- 
ciplinis ** so vigorously championed the Augustin- 
ian theory that Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, 
of Vienne,*” and other contemporary theologians 
combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. 
Pope Benedict XIV instituted an official investi- 
gation, which resulted in a decree permitting 
Augustinianism to be freely held and taught. 


a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of causa 
prima and motor primus, Augustinianism is based on the 
notion of delectatio coelestis or caritas. Berti holds 
three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual 
grace consists essentially in the infusion of celes- 
tial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (i. e. 
grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its 
relative intensity in every instance constitutes the law 
and standard of the will’s disposition to do good. 


40 The principal representatives of 42Cfr. his work Le Bajanisme 
Augustinianism are Berti, Bellelli, et le Jansénisme Resuscités dans les 
and Bertieri. Livres de Bellelli et Berti, s. 1., 


_ 41 Published at Rome in 1739 sqq. 1745. 


250 ACTUAL GRACE 


(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concu- 
piscence (delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia) is doing its 
work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly con- 
tend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation 
(i. e. grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, con- 
cupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salu- 
tary act to which it is invited by the former. It is 
only when the delectatio coelestis overcomes concupis- 
cence (delectatio coelestis victrix) that free-will can per- 
form the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth prin- 
ciple, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which 
brings out the essential difference between Augustinian- 
ism and Jansenism, viz.: the delectatio coelestis never 
overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between 
good and evil.** 

b) The relation between merely sufficient and effica- 
cious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be 
described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to 
the will the posse but not the velle, or at best only such 
a weak velle that it requires the delectatio victrix (gratia 
efficax) to become effective. Efficacious grace (delectatio 
coelestis victrix), on the other hand, impels the will ac- 
tually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between 
the two an essential and specific difference, and the 
efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of 
salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the 
delectatio coelestis, which must consequently be conceived 
as gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se.™* 

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the gratia efficax ab 

43 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Di- est Thomistarum et Augustinensium 
vind, pp. 419 sqq. omnium afirmantium, gratiam effi- 


44 Cfr, Berti, De Theol. Disci- cacem esse se ipsa, non talem reddi 
_ plinis, XIV, 9, n. 6: “ Sententia aut cooperatione liberi arbitrit aut 


AUGUSTINIANISM 251 
mtrinseco, according to the Augustinian theory, is not 
due to the subordination of the causa secunda to the 
causa prima, as the Thomists contend, but to a consti- 
tutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this 
that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the 
delectatio coelestis victrix (gratia efficax, adiutorium 
quo). The case was different before the Fall, when 
the gratia versatilis (gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine 
quo non) sufficed for the performance of salutary 
acts.> 

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jan- 
senists, that the delectatio coelestis (1. e. efficacious 
grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts 
merely as a praemotio moralis, and that while the will 
obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (infallibiliter) it 
does not do so necessarily (non necessario). With equal 
certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped 
solely with sufficient grace, succumbs to concupiscence. 
The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be 
found in the indifferentia iudicii.° By way of exempli- 
fication the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man 
who, though physically free and able to do so, would 
never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or 
gouge out his own eyes. 
ex circumstantiis congruis, atque 
certissime et infallibiliter cum ef- 
fectu coniunctam esse.’ 


45 Cfr. Berti, op. cit., XIV, 11: 
“In aequali gradu concupiscentiae 


Dei praemotione est liberi ‘arbitrii 
sani et robusti, non autem infirmi.”? 

46 Cfr. Berti, De Theol, | Disci. 
blinis, XIV, 8, n.-18: “ Quamvis 
sit haec efficar gratia antecedens et 


et gratiae gratia concupiscentiae, non 
concupiscentia  gratiae succumbet, 
quia homo etiam cum aequali vir. 
tute maiorem habet ad malum quam 
ad bonum inclinationem. .. . Agere 
et non agere in aequilibrio virium et 
determinare seipsum absque efficact 


Deus sine nobis faciat ut velimus, 
nihilo tamen minus per illam non 
proponitur nobis bonum sub ratione 
omnis boni, quemadmodum propont- 
tur beatis per lumen gloriae, ideoque 
remanet indifferentia iudicii et vera 
libertas,”” 


252 ACTUAL /GRAGE 


CriticAL EsTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.— 
On account of its uncritical methods Augustin- 
ianism has found but few defenders and deserves 
notice only in so far as it claims to base its teach- 
ing on St. Augustine. 


Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have 
been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.** 
If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession 
of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim 
to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. 
Yet how widely does not the “ Augustinus Iprensis,” as 
he has been called, differ from the “ Augustinus Hippon- 
ensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the 
terms which it employs. Space permits us to call atten- 
tion to one or two points only. 


a) Inthe first place Augustinianism labors un- 
der an absolutely false conception of sufficient 
erace. 


How can that grace be sufficient for justification which 
is first described in glowing colors as parva et invalida and 
then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except 
when reinforced by a gratia magna in the shape of delec- 
tatio victrir? What kind of “grace” can that be which 
in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under 
the prevailing influence of conctupiscence, infallibly does 
the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally im- 
pelled? It is quite true that the distinction between 
gratia parva and gratia magna ** is found in St. Augus- 

47 Calvinism, Bajanism, Jansen- 48 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, c. 


ism—Thomism, Augustinianism, Mo- 17. 
linism, and Congruism. 


AUGUSTINIANISM 253 


tine. However, he understands by gratia parva not suf- 
ficient grace, but the grace of prayer (gratia remote suf- 
ficiens), and by gratia magna, not efficacious grace as 
such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (gratia 
proxime sufficiens) .*° 


b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its 


theory of a praemotio moralis with the dogma of 
free-will. 


Under the Augustinian system the influence of effica- 
cious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either 
it is so strong that the will is physically unable to with- 
hold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the 
consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral 
certainty. In the former alternative we have a prevenient 
necessity which determines the will ad unum and conse- 
quently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be 
no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of ra- 
tional creatures on the part of God, because the Augus- 
tinians reject the scientia media of the Molinists and ex- 
pressly admit that the same grace which proves effective 
in one man remains ineffective in another because of the 
condition of his heart.® 


c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of 
the Augustinian system are false and have no 
warrant in the writings of St. Augustine. 


It is not true that pleasure (delectatio) is the font and 
well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds 
may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.°! With 

49 Cfr, Palmieri, De Gratia Divina differentia iudicii to preserve free- 


Aciuali, pp. 433 sqq. | will, v. supra, p. 242, 
50 On the insufficiency of the in- 51 Conc. Trid., Sess. Wis Caps. 6: 


254 ACTUAL GRACE 
many men the fear of God or a sense of duty is as strong 
an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of 
treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard 
“ celestial delectation ” as the essential mark of efficacious 
grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.” . 
The second and third principles of the Augustinian sys- 
tem are likewise false. If delectation is only one mo- 
tive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the stan- 
dard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the 
will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the rela- 
tively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any 
necessitation that does not depend on the free will ex- 
cludes the Libertas a coactione, but not that libertas a ne- 
cessitate which constitutes the notion of liberty. There 
can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to 
resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth 
principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to 


uphold free-will, is also false.>* 


READINGS: — The literature on the different systems of grace 
is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works. 

On the Thomist side: *Bafiez, O. P., Comment. in S. Theol. 
S. Thom., Salamanca 1584 saq.-—tAlvarez, Ou: P:, De Auxiliis 
Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus, Rome 1610.— IpEM, Respon- 
sionum Libri Quatuor, Louvain 1622.— Ledesma, O. P., De Di- 
vinae Gratiae Auxiliis, Salamanca 1611.—*Gonet, O. P., Clypeus 
Theologiae Thomisticae, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.— Contenson, 
O. P., Theologia Mentis et Cordis, Lyons 1673— De Lemos, 
O. P., Panoplia Divinae Gratiae, 4 vols. Liége 1676.— Goudin, 
O. P., De Scientia et Voluntate ‘Dei, new ed., Louvain 1874.— 
*Gotti, O. P., Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem 


facias bene, amas Deum et times 


scans ~ 


52 ** Proponitur praemium ut 
pecces, 1. e@. quod te delectat,’ he 
says; “... Terreris minis, facis 
propter quod times. .«- Si cupiditas 
non valuit, forte timor valebit ut 
pecces.... Itaque ad omne recte 
factum amor et timor ducit. Ut 


Deum: ut autem facias male, amas 
mundum et times mundum.” In 
Ps2)79, es -13% 

53 Cfr, Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 
pp. 422 sqq.; Palmieri, De Gratia 
Divina Actual, thes. 54. 


OE ir epee I PB AS 


PREC RIC D Bie* 


See haa aes 


MOLINISM 255 


Divi Thomae, Venice 1750.— Gazzaniga, O. P., Theologia Dog- 
matica in Systema Redacta, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.—*Billuart, De 
Gratia, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).—Ipem, Le 
Thomisme Triomphant, Paris 1725.—*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., Die 
Lehre des hl. Thomas iiber die Willensfrethett, Prague 1890.— 
Ipem, in Commer’s Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und spekulative 
Theologie, 18904 sqq.—*Dummermuth, O. P., S. Thomas et Doc- 
trina Praemotionis Physicae, Paris 1886—I. A. Manser, Possi- 
bilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae, Fribourg (Switzer- 
land) 1895.— Joh. Ude, Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus 
V oluntatis Humanae, Graz 1905.— Del Prado, De Gratia et Libero 
Arbitrio, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.— P. Garrigou-La- 
grange, S. Thomas et le Néomolinisme, Paris 1917. 

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, Vindiciae Augu- 
stinianae, Padua 1677.—*Berti, De Theologicis Disciplinis, 8 vols., 
Rome 1739 sqq.— Bellelli, Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis 
Humanae Naturae, 2 vols. Rome 1773.—L. de Thomassin, 
Mémoires sur la Grace, etc., Louvain 1668. 

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq. 


ARTI ChE? 


MOLINISM AND CONGRUISM 


The point in which these two systems meet, 
and in regard to which they differ from Thomism 
and Augustinianism, is the definition of effica- 


cious grace as efficax ab extrinseco sive per ac- 
cidens. 


This conception was violently attacked by the Span- 
ish Dominican Bafiez and other divines. About 1594, 
the controversy between the followers of Bafiez and the 
Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII ap- 
pointed a special commission to settle it. This was the 
famous Congregatio de Auxilus, consisting of picked 
theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit or- 


256 ACTUAL GRACE 


ders. It debated the matter for nine full years without 
arriving at a decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the sug- 
gestion of St. Francis de Sales, declared both systems to 
be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade the con- 
tending parties to denounce each other as heretical.’ 

While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the de- 
fense of grace, Molinism made it its chief business to 
champion the dogma of free-will. 


1. Mottntsm.—Molinism takes its name from 
the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who published a famous 
treatise under the title Concordia Liber Arbitru 
cum Gratiae Donis at Lisbon, in 1588. His 
teaching may be outlined as follows: 


a) In actu primo there is no intrinsic and ontological 
but merely an extrinsic and accidental distinction between 
efficacious and sufficient grace, based upon their respective 
effects. Sufficient grace becomes efficacious by the con- 
sent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains ineffica- 
cious (ineficax) and merely sufficient (gratia mere siuf- 
ficiens). Consequently, one and the same grace may be 
efficacious in one case and inefficacious in another. It all 
depends on the will.’ 


lia praevenientis atque adiuvantis 
gratiae... pendere a libero con- 
sensu et cooperatione liberi arbitru 
nostri cum illis atque adeo in libera 


1On the Congregatio de Auxilis, 
so called because the principal 
question under discussion was the 
help (ausxilia) afforded by grace, see 


Astrain, S. J., in the Catholic En- 
cyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 238 Sq: and 
Schneemann, S. J., Die Entstehung 
und weitere Entwicklung der tho- 
mistisch-molinistischen Controverse, 
Freiburg 1879; also in a Latin 
translation, Freiburg 1881. ; 
2Cfr. Molina, Concordia Libert 
Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, qu. 14, 
art. 13, dip. 38: “ Asserimus auxi- 


potestate nostra esse, vel illa effica- 
cia reddere consentiendo et coope- 
rando cum illis ad actus, quibus ad 
iustificationem disponimur, vel in- 
eficacia illa reddere continendo con- 
sensum et cooperationem nostram 
aut etiam eliciendo contrarium con- 
sensum.” Ibid., disp. 12: “ Quare 
fieri potest, ut duorum qui aequali 
auxilio interius a Deo vocantur, unus 


MOLINISM 257 

b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and 
superior dignity of grace in the work of salvation. The 
will, considered as a mere faculty, and in actu primo, is 
raised to the supernatural order by prevenient grace 
(gratia praeveniens), which imparts to it all the moral 
and physical power necessary to perform free salutary 
acts. Neither can the actus secundus be regarded as a 
product of the unaided will; it is the result of grace co- 
operating with free-will.* Consequently, the will by giv- 
ing its consent does not increase the power of grace, but 
it is grace which makes possible, prepares, and aids the 
will in performing free acts. To say that the influence of 
grace goes farther than this would be to assert that it acts 
independently of the will, and would thereby deny the 
freedom of the latter.* 

c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works 
its effects is to be explained not by God’s absolute will, 
but by His infallible foreknowledge through the scientia 
media,— a Molinistic postulate which was first defined 
and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S.J., 
the teacher of Suarez.° God foreknows not only the 
absolutely free acts (futura) of His rational creatures 


pro libertate sui arbitrii convertatur arbitrium enim et influxus noster 


et alter infidelitate permaneat.”’ 

3“ Auxilium gratiae praevenien- 
tis,’ says Molina, “ est influxus Dei 
in liberum arbitrium, quo illud 
movet et excitat potensque reddit, ut 
eo pacto motum tamquam habens 
tam in se ipso principium efficiens 
actuum supernaturalium simul influ- 
endo ulterius eos producat.”’ Molina, 
op. cit., qu. 14, art. 13, disp. 41. 

4 Cfr. Molina, op. cit., qu. 23, art. 
4, disp. 1: ‘“‘ Quando audis consen- 
sum nostrum efficacia reddere auxi- 
lia gratiae, non ita id intelligas, 
quasi arbitrium nostrum vim aliquam 
seu efficacitatem tribuat auxiliis ipsis; 


nullam vim conferunt gratiae auxi- 
luis, sed potius auxilia vim et pro- 
pensionem arbitrio tribuunt ad con- 
sensum eliciendum.” Ibid., Appen- 
dix ad obi. 3 (ed. Paris., 1876, p. 
595): “Solum significare volumus, 
auxilium illud liberum nobis relin- 
quere consensum nostrum ad con- 
versionem, nec tale esse, ut nullam 
necessitatem, etiam consequentiae, ar- 
bitrio ad talem consensum aut con- 
versionem ponat,” 

5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
Knowability, Essence, 
butes, pp. 383 saq. 


God: His 
and Attria 


258 ACTUAL GRACE 

by the scientia visionis, but likewise their hypothetically 
free acts (futuribilia) by means of the scientia media, 
and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what 
attitude the free-will of man would assume in each case 
if grace were given him. Consequently, when God, in 
the light of this eternal foreknowledge, actually be- 
stows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious or 
inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether 
the will will give or withhold its consent. Thus can the 
infallibility of efficacious grace be reconciled with the 
dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other dog- 
mas as final perseverance and the predestination of the 
elect, because God by virtue of the scientia media has it 
absolutely in His power to give or withhold His graces 
in each individual case.® 


CriticAL Estrmate oF Morinism.—Even the 
most determined opponents of Molinism admit 
that this system possesses three important ad- 
vantages. 

a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the 


ee al 


6 Cfr. Molina, op. cit., qu. 19, art. 
6, disp. 2: “‘ Hac ratione Deus O. 
M. vult omnia bona, quae per ar- 
bitrium nostrum sunt futura, non 
solum voluntate conditionali, si nos 
quoque ea velimus, sed etiam volun- 
tate absoluta, quatenus ipsi praevi- 
denti ea futura placent eademque di- 
vina eius ac singularis bonitas per 
arbitrium nostrum intendit ac vult. 
Quod autem haec etiam absoluta 
voluntas semper impleatur, ex eo est 
manifestum, quia nititur certitudine 
praescientiae divinae, quod ita res 
futura sit per nostrum arbitrium.” 
—oalbed,,: id, )23). art. 4, disp.” .3: 
“ Quoniam quod Deus elegerit eum 


rerum ordinem, circumstantiarum et 
auxiliorum, sive maiorum sive mino- 
rum, in quo praevidebat eos pro sua 
libertate salvandos, qui electione eius 
ordinis eo ipso praedestinati sunt 
vitamque aeternam pro sua libertate 
consequuntur, potius quam alium ex 


_infinitis, in quo res aliter pro eadem 


ipsorum libertate habuisset, non futt 
ex nobis aut pro meritorum et co- 
operationis nostrae qualitate, sed ex 
sola misericordia Dei.” Cfr. G. 
Schneemann, Historia Controversia- 
rum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique 
Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progres- 
sus, Freiburg 1881, pp. 38 sqq. 


MOLINISM 4280 


sufficiency of “merely sufficient grace,’ which 
in its physical nature does not differ essentially 
from efficacious grace. 

Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by deny- 
ing that efficacious grace either physically or mor- 
ally predetermines the will to one course of action. 

Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satis- 
factory manner why efficacious grace is infallibly 
eficacious. God in virtue of the scientia media 
knows with metaphysical certainty from all 
eternity which graces in each individual case 
will prove efficacious through the free consent of 
the will and which will remain inefficacious, and 
is thereby enabled to bestow or withhold grace 
according to His absolute decrees. | 

b) The question may justly be raised, how- 
ever, whether, in endeavoring to safeguard free- 
will, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which 
is after all the primary and decisive factor in 
the work of salvation. 


There is something incongruous in the notion that 
the efficacy or inefficacy of divine grace should depend on 
the arbitrary pleasure of a created will. If sufficient 
grace does not become efficacious except by the consent of 
the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be an 
effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the coun- 
cils of the Church do not say: “ Deus facit, si volumus,” 
but they declare: “Deus facit, wut faciamus,” 
“Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et perficere,” and so 
forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need not 


260 ACTUAL GRACE 


concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, 
humors, etc., but it takes hold of the sinner and actually 
converts him, without regard to anything except the de- 
cree of the Divine Will. On account of this and similar 
difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and 
protector of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism * 
in favor of Congruism.*® 


c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine 
to embrace Congruism probably led the Jesuit 
General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order 
all teachers of theology in the Society to lay 
greater emphasis on the Congruistic element in 


7Cfr. his treatise De Gratia et 
Libero Arbitrio, I, 12 (ed. Févre, 
toms Ny Vp eB27en obaskis.\ (1873)! 
“Pyima opinio eorum est, qui gra- 
tiam efficacem constituunt in assensu 
et cooperatione humana, ita ut ab 
eventu dicatur gratia efficax, quia vi- 
delicet sortitur effectum et ideo sorti- 
tur effectum, quia voluntas humana 
cooperatur. Itaque existimant hi au- 
tores, in potestate hominis esse ut 
gratiam faciat esse efficacem, quae 
alioquin ex se non esset nisi suffi- 
ciens.’ Bellarmine treats this opin- 
jon as the extreme counterpart of 
Thomism (which he also combats) 
and disposes of it thus: “ Haec 
opinio aliena est omnino a sententia 
b. Augustini et, quantum ego exi- 
stimo, a sententia etiam Scripturarum 
divinarum.” (1. c.) Among the 
Scriptural texts which he quotes in 
support of this view are John VI, 45, 
rT Gon V, 7, Romy, me 


8 The learned Cardinal de- 
scribes the difference between 
Congruism and extreme Molin- 


ism (which latter, it may be re- 
marked, was not defended by Mo- 


illa discrepare. 


lina himself) as follows: “ Neque 
enim intelligi potest, quo pacto gratia 
efficax consistat in illa interna sua- 
sione, quae per liberum arbitrium 
respui potest, et tamen infallibilem 
effectum habeat, nisi addamus, Deum 
tis quos efficaciter et infallibiliter 
irahere decrevit, eam suasionem ad- 
hibere quam videt congruere ingenio 
eorum et quam certo novit ab eis non 
contemnendam.” (Op. cit., p. 531.) 
The objection that this explanation 
eventually resolves itself into the 
Molinistic theory which he had cen- 
sured, Bellarmine meets as follows: 
“ Respondeo sententiam nostram, 
quam S. Augustini esse demonstra- 
vimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa 
opinione convenire, sed in multis ab 
Convenit enim in eo 
quod utraque. sententia gratiam suf- 
ficentem et efficacem ponit in auxilio 
excitante potissimum, non in adiu- 
vante. Sed discrepant inter se, quod 
prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae 
pendere a voluntate humana, nostra 
vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei.” 
Cie }icapsii3s) 


MOLINISM 261 


the notion of efficacious grace. This measure 
was quite in harmony with the principles de- 
fended by the Jesuit members of the Congregatio 
de Auxiltis before Clement VIII and Paul V. 
Aquaviva’s order is of sufficient importance to 
deserve a place in the text of this volume: “Nostrt 
in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam 
quae effectum re ipsa habet atque efficax dicitur, 
et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non tantum 
discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu libert 
arbitru etiam cooperantem gratiam habentts 
effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in tpso 
actu primo, quod posita scientia conditionalium 
[scientia media] ex efficact Det proposito atque 
intentione efficiendt certissime in nobis boni, de 
industria tpse ea media seligit atque eo modo et 
tempore confert, quo videt effectum, infallibiliter 
habitura, alus usurus, st haec inethcacia praevidis- 
set. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione bene- 
fic. plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in. sufficienti 
gratia est, in actu primo continert: atque hac ra- 
tione efiicere Deum, ut re ipsa faciamus, non tan- 
tum quia dat gratiam qua facere possimus. Quod 
wdem dicendum est de perseverantia, quae procul 
dubio donum est.” This modified, or perhaps we 
had better say, more sharply determined form 
of Molinism is called Congruism.°® 

2. CONGRUISM.—The system thus recom- 


9 Further details in Schneemann, Hist. Controv., pp. 302 sqq. 


262 ACTUAL GRACE 


mended by Aquaviva in its fundamental principles 
really originated with Molina himself. It was 
developed by the great Jesuit theologians Suarez, 
Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the official 
system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio 
Vitelleschi (d. 1645) and Piccolomini (d. 1651). 


a) The distinction between gratia congrua and gratia 
incongrua is founded on the writings of St. Augustine, 
who speaks of the elect as “ congruenter vocati.” *° ‘The 
Congruists maintain against the extreme Molinists that 
the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free de- 
termination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact 
that grace is bestowed under circumstances favorable 
to its operation, 7. e. “ congruous ” in that sense. When 
the circumstances are comparatively adverse (tcon- 
grua), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father 
who knows how to govern his children without phys- 
ical force will speak the right word to each at the proper 
time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if it is to prove 
efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case, 
thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the 
reckless youth on the city streets needs more powerful 
graces than the pious nun in her secluded convent cell, 
because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his 


10 Cfr. Ad Simplician., I, qu. 2, n. 
13: “Si vellet [Deus] etiam ip- 
sorum misereri, posset ita vocare, 
quomodo illis aptum esset, ut et mo- 
verentur et intelligerent et sequeren- 
tur. Verum est ergo: Multi vocati, 
pauci electi. Illi enim electi, qui 
congruenter vocati; wl autem qui 
mon congruebant neque contempera- 
bantur vocationi, non electi, quia 
non secuti, quamvis vocati, Item 
verum est: Neque volentis neque 


currentis, sed miserentis est Det, quta 
etiamsi multos vocet, eorum tamen 
miseretur, quos ita vocat, quomodo 
tis vocart aptum est ut sequantur. 
Falsum est autem, si quis dicit: 
Igitur non miserentis Det, sed volen- 
tis atque currentis est hominis, quia 
nullius Deus frustra miseretur, 
Cuius autem miseretur, sic eum vo- 
cat quomodo scit ei congruere, ut 
vocantem non respuat.” 


CONGRUISM 263 


environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since 
grace is conferred with a wise regard to tempera- 
ment, character, inclinations, prejudices, time and place, 
there exists between it and free-will a sort of intrinsic 
affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible 
means of executing His decrees."* 

b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, consid- 
ered in actu primo, is undoubtedly a special gift of God, 
and hence the gratia congrua possesses a higher value 
than the gratia incongrua sive ineficax. An entitatively 
weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under compara- 
tively favorable conditions, is more precious than a 
stronger impulse which fails in its purpose by reason 
of unfavorable circumstances created by inclination, train- 
ing, or environment. Little David accomplished more 
with a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been 
heavily armed.” 

c) Congruism assigns a far more important réle to: 
grace than extreme Molinism. It makes the will depend 
on efficacious grace, not the efficacy of grace upon the 
will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the exam- 


aliCfr.jouarez, De Aurx., V, 25: 
“Vocatio efficax illa est, quae... 
includit congruitatem quandam re- 
spectu personae, cui datur, ut sit ili 
proportionata et accommodata, sicut 
oportet, ut in tali persona, in tali 
tempore et occasione infallibiliter ef- 
fectum habeat, et per hoc habet illa 
vocatio quod congrua et efficax sit.’ 

121 Kings XVII, 38 sqq.— 
Cfr.. Lessius, De  Praedest. et 
Reprob., sect. 5, n. 106: ‘“‘ Ex qui- 
bus patet, gratiam efficacem, si 
physice spectetur, non semper esse 
maius -beneficium, quum  saepenu- 
mero eda, quae effectu caret, secun- 
dum suam entitatem longe sit prae- 
stantior. Sit tamen spectetur mo- 


raliter, nimirum ut subest praescien- 
tiae infallibit effectus, sic semper 
maius est beneficium, etiam ut prae- 
cisa ab actuali effectu et gratia co- 
operante seu ut prior actuali suo 
influxu in opus, quum Deus, qui non 
caeco modo operatur, ex mero suo 
beneplacito et inscrutabili iudicio 
seligat pro quibusdam gratias illas 
quas effectum habituras videt, non 
solum ut gratiae quaedam sunt, sed 
etiam formaliter, ut effectum habi- 
turae sunt. ... Ex quibus constat, 
quo sensu distinctio gratiae congruae 
et non congruae admittenda sit, 
quam numquam reieci, sed totis ant- 
mis et sensu et praxi semper sum 
amplexus.” 


264 ACTUAL GRACE 


ple of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribu- 
tion of internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves 
another untouched.** 


CRITICAL EsTIMATE OF CoNGRUISM.—Among 
the different systems devised for the purpose of 
harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, 
Congruism probably comes nearest the truth. It 
strikes a golden mean between the two extremes 
of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one 
hand, and Calvinism and Jansenism on the other, 
and its principal theses can be supported by clear 
and unmistakable passages from the writings of 
St. Augustine. 

a) Other points in its favor are the following: 
_ “Sufficient grace,” in the Congruist hypothesis, is 
truly sufficient so far as God is concerned, be- 
cause its inefficaciousness is attributable solely 
to the human will. That free-will is prop- 
erly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious 
grace (gratia congrua) is admitted even by 
theologians of the opposing schools. True, Con- 
gruism does not regard the will as an abstract 
notion, but as a factor closely interwoven with the 
concrete circumstances of daily life. As favor- 
able circumstances (education, association, tem- 
perament) merely influence the will but do not 
compel it, so supernatural grace (gratia con- 
grua s. efficax) may soften the will and occasion- 


18 De Grat. et Lib. Arbiir., ed. Févre, t. V, p. 533. 


CONGRUISM 265 


ally even break down its resistance, but (rare 
cases excepted) ** will never compel it to do 
good. Congruism marks a distinct advance over 
extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the 
difference between gratia efficax (congrua) and 
gratia nefficax not entirely on the will of man, 
but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able 
to explain such formulas as “Deus facit, ut facia- 
mus,” “Deus est, qui discermit,”’ etc., in a manner 
see: compatible ae the eae teaching of 
the Church.*? 

The modus operandi of the gratia congrua (effi- 
cacious grace) is explained by Congruism, in 
common with Molinism, as follows: There is a 
threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (efficacia 
virtutis), the efficacy of union (efficacia con- 
nexioms), and the efficacy of infallible success 
(eficacia infallibtlhtatis). Grace (both effica- 
cious and sufficient) does not derive its efficacia 
virtutis from the free-will of man, nor from the 
knowledge of God (scientia media), but from 
itself. The efficacia connexionis (of union be- 
tween act and grace) on the other hand, depends 
entirely on the free-will, since, according to the 
Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, 
efficacious grace does not operate irresistibly but 
can be “cast off.” The efficacia infallibilitatis 


14V. supra, p. 16. tion see Palmieri, De Gratia Divina 
15 For the proofs of this asser- Actuali, thes. 50. 


266 ACTUAL GRACE 


springs from God’s certain foreknowledge 
(scientia media), which cannot be deceived.” 


b) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend 
that Congruism solves all difficulties. The mystery sur- 
rounding both the unequal distribution of efficacious grace 
and the scientia media still remains. Moreover, the 
theory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circum- 
stances of His creatures, can hardly be reconciled with 
His dignity and omnipotence. It would no doubt be far 
worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will of 
man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He 
wishes it to perform. Whoever has studied the lives of 
saints and eminent converts knows that the sudden and 
seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which many of 
them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles 
in the strict sense, though on the other hand it seems cer- 
tain that grace worked in them with little or no regard to 
the “congruity” of circumstances. Again, it is one of 
the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to 
be balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape 
them by changing a man’s temperament, dulling con- 
cupiscence, weakening the power of temptation, and so 
forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but 
controls and fashions the circumstances of the re- 
cipient. 

After all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and 
free-will still remains an unsolved mystery.*? 


mat. Theologie, Vol. VIII, § 447. 
On the various interpretations of 


16 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civitate 
Dei, V, 9, 4: “ Quod [voluntates] 


facturae sunt, ipsae omnino facturae, 
quia facturas ille praescivit, CuUS 
praescientia falli non potest.” 

17 On Congruism cfr. Chr. Pesch, 
Prael. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 
167 sqq.; Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 


the praedefinitio actuum salutarium, 
within as well as without the Jesuit 
Order, see Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. 
III, pp. 93 sqq., Paris 1896, and es- 
pecially Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 
pp. 458 sqq. 


SYNCRETISM 267 


3. SYNCRETISM.—Seeing that each of the dif- 
ferent systems which we so far reviewed contains 
grains of truth, some theologians ** have adopted 
the good points of all four and combined them 
into a fifth, called Syncretism. 


These authors begin by assuming the existence of two 
quite distinct sorts of efficacious grace, the (Thomistic- 
Augustinian) gratia efficar ab intrinseco, and the (Molin- 
istic-Congruistic) gratia efficax ab extrinseco. The for- 
mer, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of 
more difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temp- 
tations, observing onerous precepts, exercising patience 
in severe tribulation, etc.; while the latter enables man 
to accomplish less difficult acts, such as short prayers, 
slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between 
the two is prayer, which has been instituted for the pur- 
pose of enabling man to obtain that gratia efficax ab in- 
trinseco which is necessary for the performance of the 
more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture 
teaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding 
upon all men, and that it accomplishes its purpose infalli- 
bly7? 


CriTicAL EstimMaTE oF Syncretism.—The 
outstanding characteristic of Syncretism is its 
insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to 
say the most important, factor in the work of 
salvation. 

a) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubt- 


18 Chief among them Ysambert, 19 For a more detailed account 
Tournely, St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori, see Tournely, De Gratia Christi, qu, 
Albert Knoll, and more recently 7, art. 4, concl. 5; Katschthaler, De 
Cardinal Katschthaler, Gratia, pp. 173 sqq., Ratisbon 1880. 


' 268 ACTUAL iGRAGE 


edly right. Sacred Scripture and Tradition both 
strongly emphasize the importance and necessity 
of prayer, so much so that one naturally expects 
to find prayer playing an essential and indispen- 
sable role in every complete and orthodox 
system of grace. ‘The present economy of grace 
is essentially and intrinsically an economy of 
prayer,’ is a theological axiom which cannot 
be too strongly insisted upon. To have brought 
out this great truth forcibly and luminously i is the 
merit of Syncretism. 


b) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the 
Syncretistic theory has solved the problem of the relation 
between free-will and grace. On the contrary, by adopt- 
ing two such heterogeneous concepts as gratia efficax 
ab intrinseco and gratia efficax ab extrinseco it has actually 
increased the difficulties found in the other systems. 
For now we are put before the dilemma:—the Tho- 
mistic gratia efficax either supposes free-will or it does 
not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this grace 
to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does 
not, then the gratia efficax can be of novassistance in the 
performance of more difficult works, because these too, 
to be meritorious, require the cooperation of free-will. 

The Syncretists try.to evade this dilemma by contend- 
ing that prayer, as the connecting link, communicates its 
own liberty and meritoriousness to the salutary acts per- 
formed through its agency, in other words, that these 
acts are the effect of prayer (effectus orationis). But 
aside from the fact that prayer itself is quite often a 
difficult act, the more arduous works of salvation would 


SYNCRETISM 269 


in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their meri- 
toriousness and degraded to the level of a volun- 
tartum in causa, which is an untenable assumption.?° 
Finally, there is something illogical and unsatisfactory 
in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two such incom- 
patible notions as the Thomistic cognitio Dei in decretis 
praedeterminantibus and the Molinistic scientia media. 

Thus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas 
of grace and free-will fail to solve the mystery, and we 
are compelled to exclaim with St. Paul: “O the depth 
of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of 
God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and 
how unsearchable His ways!” 24 


READINGS: — Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance 
are: *Molina, S. J., Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Dons, 
Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876) .— Platel, S. J., Auctoritas contra 
Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media, Douai 1669. 
— Henao, S. J., Scientia Media Historice Propugnata, Lyons > 
1655.— Inem, Scientia Media Theologice Defensa, Lyons 1674-6. 
— De Aranda, S. J., De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante 
seu Schola Scientiae Mediae, Saragossa 1693.—*Suarez, S. J., De 
Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei, new ed., Paris 1856.— Inem, De 
Ausxilio Efficaci, Paris ed., 1856, t. XIL— IpEM, De Vera Intelli- 
gentia Auxilii Efficacis (Op. Posthum., t. X, Appendix ).—*Les- 
sius, S. J., De Gratia Efficact (Opusc., t. II, Paris 1878).— Sar- 
dagna, S. J., Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica, Ratisbon 1771,— 
Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), De Gratia, new ed., Paris 1853.— 
Murray, De Gratia, Dublin 1877.— B. Jungmann, S. J., De Gratia, 
6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.—Th. de Régnon, S. J., Batiez et Molina, 
flistoire, Doctrines, Critique, Métaphysique, Paris 1883.— Card. 
Mazzella, S. J., De Gratia Christi, 3rd ed., Rome 1882,— Palmieri, 
S. J. De Gratia Divina Actuali, thes. 49-58, Gulpen 1885.—*V. 
Frins, S. J., S. Thomae Doctrina de Cooperatione Dei cum Omni 


20 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, V, 20, Dogmat. Specialis, ed. by Gottfried 
3 a Graun, O. M. Cap., tom. II, pp. 
21 Rom. XI, 33. On Syncretism 193 sqq., Innsbruck 1894. 

efr, Alb. a Bulsano, Inst. Theol. 


2 


270 ACTUAL GRACE 


Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu S. Thomas Praedetermina- 
tionis Physicae Adversarius, Paris 1890.—*Schiffini, S. J., De 
Gratia Divina, disp. 5, Freiburg 1901.— Card: "Billot, 1S: J. De 
Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis Arbitrio, 1, Rome 1908.— Lim- 
bourg, S. J. “ Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen Gnadenlehre,” in 
_the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. Theologie, 1877.— B. J. Otten, 
S. J., A Manual of the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 
1918, pp. 493 Saq. 

Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism 
and Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphon- 
sus de’ Liguori, *Tournely, De Gratia, Venice 1755.— Card. Jos. 
Pecci, Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l Influsso di Dio sulle Aziom 
delle Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media, Rome 1885.— A. 
Adeodatus, J. Pecci’s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas tiber den 
Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert, Mainz 1888.— C. Krogh-Tonning, 
De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina, 
Christiania 1898—J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., De. Divina Gratia, 
Rome 1904. 

The history of the great controversy between Thomism and 
Molinism can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., Historia Congrega- 
tionum de Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 
1709.— Livinus de Meyer, S. J., Historia Controversiarum de 
Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis, Antwerp 1705.—*Schneemann, Sida 
Entstehung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse, Freiburg 
1879.—*Ipem, Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen 
Controverse, Freiburg 1880.—*IDEM, Controversiarum de Divinae 
Gratiae Liberique Arbitru Concordia Initia et Progressus, Frei- 
burg 1881. 


PART II 
SANCTIFYING GRACE 


The grace of justification, commonly called 
sanctifying grace, is related to actual grace as an 
end to its means. Actual grace introduces the 
state of sanctifying grace or preserves and aug- 
ments it where it already exists. 

This fact makes it advisable to consider the 
genesis of sanctifying grace before studying its 
nature and effects. | 

We shall therefore treat in three chapters: 
(1) of the Process of Justification (iustificatio in 
fiert); (2) of the State of Justification (iustifica- 
tio in esse), and (3) of the Fruits of Justification 
(1ustificatio in fdcto esse), or the Merit of Good 
Works. 


‘ga 


CHAPTER. I 


THE GENESIS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE, OR THE 
PROCESS OF JUSTIFICATION 


The justification of an adult human being does 
not take place suddenly, but runs through certain 
well-defined stages, which in their totality are 
called the process of justification. : 

Being a “regeneration in God,” justification 
bears a striking resemblance to the development 
of the foetus in the maternal womb. Like phys- 
ical birth, spiritual regeneration is preceded by 
travailing, i. e. fear and painful contrition. 

The dogmatic teaching of the Catholic Church 
on justification is formally defined by the Triden- 
tine Council, whose decrees? contain a masterly 
analysis of this most interesting of psychological 
processes. The holy Synod puts faith at the be- 
ginning. “Faith,” it says, “is the beginning of © 
human salvation, the foundation and the root of 
all justification.” ? The nature of faith and the 
part it plays in justification were the chief points 


1 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 5: 2Sess. VI, cap. 8: “Fides est — 
“De Necessitate Praeparationis,’ humanae salutis initium, fundamen- — 
and cap. 6: “De Modo Praepara- tum et radix omnis iustificationis.” — 


tionis.” 
272 


JUSTIFICATION 273 


in dispute between the Church and the so-called 
Reformers. Luther and his followers denatured 
the traditional Catholic teaching by basing justi- 
fication solely on faith, which they falsely defined 
as mere confidence or trust in the mercy of God. 


SECTION 1 


THE NECESSITY OF FAITH FOR JUSTIFICATION 


1. Tue LUTHERAN HERESY VS. THE TEACHING 
OF THE CHURCH.—The Protestant Reformers, 
notably Luther and Calvin, did not deny that 
justification is wrought by faith, but they defined 
justifying faith in a manner altogether foreign to 
the mind of the Church. 


a) They distinguished three kinds of faith: (1) belief 
in the existence of God and the historical fact that 
Christ has come on earth, suffered, and ascended (fides 
historica) ; (2) the sort of trust which is required for 
exercising the gift of miracles (fides miraculorum) ; and 
(3) faith in the divine promises with regard to the re- 
mission of sin (fides promissionum). The last-men- 
tioned species of faith they subdivided into general and 
particular. Fides generalis is that by which we believe 
that the righteousness of Christ “ covers” (but does not 
wipe out) our sins. Fides specialis or fiduciary faith 
(fiducia) is that by which a man applies to himself the 
righteousness of the Redeemer, firmly trusting that his 
sins are for Christ’s sake not imputed to him. Thus the 
Reformers erroneously transferred the seat of justify- 
ing faith from the intellect to the will and completely 
subverted the Catholic notion of faith as an intellectual 
assent to revealed truth. 


b) To this fundamental error the Fathers of 
274 


JUSTIFICATION 275 


Trent opposed the orthodox doctrine that 
(adults) ‘‘are disposed unto justice when, excited 
and assisted by divine grace, receiving faith by 
hearing, they are freely moved towards God, be- 
lieving those things to be true which God has re- 
vealed and promised, .. .’’° and they solemnly 
anathematized those who assert “that justifying 
faith is nothing else but confidence in the divine 
mercy which remits sin for Christ’s sake, or that 
this confidence alone is that whereby we are justi- 
Hed: 

Hence it is de fide that the faith whereby man is 
justified, is not a confident persuasion of being 
esteemed righteous in the sight of God, but a 
dogmatic or theoretical belief in the truths of 
Divine Revelation. 

2, REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE 
oF FipuctAryY FairH.—Whenever Sacred Scrip- 
ture and Tradition speak of justifying faith, they 
mean a dogmatic belief in the truths of Revela- 
tion,—that faith which the Protestants call fides 
historica. 

a) Christ Himself solemnly commanded His 


3Sess. VI, cap. 6: “‘ Disponun- 
tur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum 


aliud esse quam fiduciam divinae 
misericordwe  peccata  remittentis 


excitati divinG gratia et adiuti fidem 
ex auditu concipientes libere moven- 


tur in Deum, credentes vera esse - 


quae divinitus revelata et promissa 
sunt.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798). 

PiSess iN Es ean fai) Se \ gets 
dixerit, fidem iustificantem nihil 


propter Christum, vel eam fiduciam 
solam esse, qua iustificamur, anathe- 
ma sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
822.) Cfr. Conc. Vatic.,. Sess. III, 
cap. 3, “De Fide” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 1789). 


276 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Apostles and their successors to preach the Gospel 
to all nations, and before baptizing them to con- 
vert them to a firm belief in certain specified 
truths which no man may reject except at the 
peril of his eternal salvation. 

a) Mark XVI, 15 sq.: “Go ye into the whole world, 
and preach the gospel® to every creature: He that be- 
lieveth [%. e. in the Gospel] and is baptized, shall be 
saved: but he that believeth not shall be condemned.” 
Agreeable to this injunction St. John declares it to be 
the object of his Gospel “that you may believe that® 
Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believ- 
ing, you may have life in his name.”* The Gospel is 
written “that we may believe.” What must we believe? 
That “ Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God.” This is a 
revealed truth by firmly believing which we shall be 
saved. When the treasurer of Queen Candace begged 
to be baptized, Philip the deacon said to him: “If thou 
believest with all thy heart, thou mayest.” The eunuch 
replied: “I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God,” 
whereupon Philip baptized him.® 


8) St. Paul in his Epistles to the Romans and 
the Galatians eloquently insists on the necessity of 
faith, not a mere fides fiducialis, but a believing ac- 
ceptance of Divine Revelation. Cfr. Rom. X, 9 
sq.: ‘For if thou confess with thy mouth the 
Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God hath 
raised him up from the dead, thou shalt be saved. 
For with the heart we believe unto justice, but 


Sknpvéare TO evayyérLoy. % Tohny kk ats 
6 iva miorevonte Ort. 8 Acts VIII, 37. 


JUSTIFICATION 277 


with the mouth confession is made unto salva- 
tion.” ° We must confess with the mouth and be- 
lieve with the heart. External profession and in- 
ternal faith go together and have for their com- 
mon object a certain truth open to our knowledge, 
uig.: the resurrection of Christ—a dogma in 
which the whole teaching of the atonement lies 
imbedded. 

The character of justifying faith is still more 
plainly evident from Heb. XI,6: “Without faith 
it is impossible to please God. For he that cometh 
to God [he that is to be justified], must believe 
that He is [the existence of God], and is a re- 
warder to them that seek Him.” *° The Apostle 
here clearly asserts both the necessity of justifying 
faith and the minimum of doctrine to be explicitly 
“believed,” vizg.: the existence of God and eternal 
retribution.** 


y) The Lutherans appeal chiefly to Matth. IX, 2, Luke 
Sevit to.) Rom. TV, 5;, and Heb. XU) Ty: (Butinot) a 
single one of these texts represents fiduciary faith as 
the instrumental cause of justification. The word ziotis 
occurs no less than eighty times in the Synoptic Gos- 
pels and in St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, but there are 


9 Rom. X, 9 sq.: “ Quia si con- impossibile est placere Deo; credere 


fitearis in ore tuo Dominum Iesum 
et in corde tuo credideris quod Deus 
illum suscitaverit a mortuis, saluus 
eris. Corde enim creditur ad iusti- 
tiam, ore autem confessio fit ad sa- 
lutem.” 


10 Heb, XI, 6: “ Sine fide autem 


enim oportet accedentem ad Deum 
[i. e. iustificandum] quia est [= exi- 
stentia Dei] et inquirentibus se 
remunerator sit.” x 

11 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 
PP. 39 Sq. 


278 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

only six passages in which it could possibly be construed 
as synonymous with fiducia, and in none of these is the 
interpretation entirely certain. Not once does the New 
Testament employ ions in the sense of “ fiduciary 
faith,” ¢. e. a confident persuasion of one’s own righteous- 
ness.*? 


b) Tradition is in such perfect agreement with 
Scripture on this point that the Reformers did not 
venture to deny that their doctrine ran counter to 
the time-honored teaching of the Church. The 
Fathers unanimously insist on the necessity of 
dogmatic faith as a requisite of justification. 


a) St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, who is regarded as “ the 
best theologian of his time” (468-533),"* in his golden 
booklet De Fide seu de Regula Verae Fidei ad Petrum, 
says: “I rejoice that you take care to preserve the 
true faith without which conversion is useless, nay, im- 
possible. Apostolic authority tells us that we cannot 
please God without faith. For faith is the foundation 
of all good [works]; it is the beginning of human sal- 
vation, and without it no one can obtain a place among 
the children of God, because without it no one can ob- 
tain the grace of justification in this world or possess 
eternal life in the next.” 14 St. Fulgentius was a faith- 


esse conversio. Apostolica quippe 
dicit auctoritas, quia sine fide im- 
possibile est placere Deo. Fides 


12 Murray, De Gratia, disp. 10, n. 
18. Cfr. Becanus, De Gratia Habi- 
tuali, c. I, qu. 7, art. 6 sq.; Bel- 


larmine, De Justificatione, I, 5 saqq. 

13 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Pa- 
trology, p. 616, Freiburg and St. 
Louis 1908. 

14 Prologus: ‘‘ Gaudeo quod pro 
fide vera sine ullo perfidiae vitio 
custodienda sollicitudinem geris, sine 
gua nulla potest prodesse, imo nec 


namque est bonorum omnium fun- 
damentum. Fides est humanae sa- 
lutis initium. Sine hac fide nemo 
ad filiorum Dei numerum potest per- 
venire, quia sine ipsa nec in hoc 
saeculo quisquam wustificationis gra- 
tiam consequitur nec in futuro 
possidebit vitam aeternam.” 


JUSTIFICATION 279 


ful disciple of St. Augustine, and the whole trend of 
his treatise shows that by vera fides he understands 
not the Lutheran fiducia propriae «ustificationis, but 
Catholic belief in revealed truth. 


8) This teaching is corroborated by the ancient 
practice of instructing the catechumens in the 
truths of revelation and requiring them to make a - 
public profession of faith before Baptism. It was 
because they believed and professed the true faith 
that the early Christians, who knew nothing of 
the Lutheran fides fiducialis, were called “faithful” 
(fideles, moro), to distinguish them from false 
believers or heretics (haeretici, aipytuot, from 
aipeiofar, to choose), who denied some portion or 
other of the orthodox creed. 

c) In analyzing the notions of fides and neces- 
sitas theologians distinguish between fides ex- 
plicita and fides implicita, and between necessitas 
medu and necessitas praecepti. 


Fides explicita is an express and fully developed be- 
lief in the truths of revelation ; fides implicita, a virtual be- 
lief in whatever may be contained in a dogma explicitly 
professed. I make an act of implicit faith when I say, 
for instance: “I believe whatever the Church teaches,” 
or: “I heartily accept whatever God has revealed.” 

The necessitas medii is based on the objective rela- 
tion of means to an end, and consequently binds all men, 

15 On the traditional concepts of  ldndischen Schriftausleger bis Luther 
“faith” and ‘‘justification’” as ber die Iustitia Dei und Iustificatio, 


held in the Church before Luther’s Mainz 1905. 
time, see Denifle, O. P., Die abend- 


280 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


, even the ignorant and those who are in error without 
their own fault. Such, for example, is the necessity of 
the eye for seeing, of wings for flying, of grace for per- 
forming salutary acts, of the lumen gloriae for the 
beatific vision. The necessitas praeceptit, on the other 
hand, is founded entirely on the will of God, who posi- 
tively commands or forbids under pain of grievous sin, 
but is willing to condone non-compliance with his pre- 
cepts when it is owing to guiltless ignorance. This ap- 
plies to all positive divine precepts, e.g. the law of fasting 
and abstinence. It is to be noted that the necessitas medu 
always involves the necessitas praecepti, because God 
must needs will and impose upon us by positive precept 
whatever is objectively necessary as a means of salva- 
tion. 


a) The first question that arises with regard to 
this twofold faith and necessity is: Are sinners 
preparing for justification, and the faithful in gen- 
eral, obliged by necessity of precept to believe ex- 
plicitly all revealed truths? The answer is, No; 
because this is practically impossible, and God 
does not demand the impossible. 


Generally speaking, it is sufficient to have an explicit 
knowledge of, and give one’s firm assent to, the more 
important dogmas and moral precepts —the twelve ar- 
ticles of the Apostles’ Creed, the Commandments of God 
and the Church, the Sacraments (as needed), and the Our 
Father. All other revealed truths need be held only fide 
implicita.* More is of course demanded of educated 


16 Cfr. Mark XVI, 15 sq.; Gal. I, 6 sqq.; Tit. III, 10 sq. 


. 


JUSTIFICATION 281 


persons and those who are in duty bound to instruct 
others, such as priests and teachers.17 


8) A more important and more difficult ques- 
tion is this: Are there any dogmas, and if so 
how many, which must be believed by all men fide 
explicita and necessitate medii? St. Paul says: 
“Without faith it is impossible to please God, for 
he that cometh to God, must believe that He is, 
and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” #8 


With but few exceptions,?® Catholic theologians main- 
tain that the Apostle in this passage means theological 
faith, based upon supernatural motives. This interpre- 
tation is borne out by the context, by such parallel texts 
as John IIT, 11 sqq., 32 sqq., 2 Tim. I, 12, 1 John V, 
9 sq., and by the decisions of several councils.2° There 
can be no reasonable doubt that all men, to be justified and 
saved, must have an explicit belief in at least two dogmas, 
viz.: the existence of God and eternal retribution. Pope 
Innocent XI condemned the Jansenist proposition that ex- 
plicit belief in divine retribution is not necessary for 
salvation.?+ 


17 Cfr, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 
2a 2ae, qu. 2, art. 7: “ Post tem- 
pus autem gratiae revelatae tam 
maiores quam minores tenentur 
[necessitate praecepti] habere fidem 
explicitam de mysteriis Christi, prae- 
cipue quantum ad ea, quae com- 
muniter in Ecclesia solemnizantur et 
bublice proponuntur, sicut sunt arti- 
culi Incarnationis, . , . Alias autem 
subtiles considerationes circa Incar- 
nationis ‘articulos tenentur aliqui 
magis vel minus explicite credere, 
secundum quod convenit statui et 
officio uniuscuiusque.” This point 


is well developed by Ballerini, Opus 
Theologicum Morale, ed. D. Pal- 
mieri, Vol. II, grd ed., pp. 9 saq., 
Prati 1898. 

18 Heb. XI, 6. 

19 Chiefly Andrew Vega, Ripalda, 
and some modern -writers, 

20 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 6; 
Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 3, V. 
supra, pp. 182 sqaq. 

21“ Nonnisi fides unius Ded ne- 
cessaria videtur necessitate medii, 
non autem explicita remuneratoris.” 
Prop. Damn. ab Innocenti XI., prop. 
22, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. HEyze 


282 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Are there any other dogmas which must be explicitly 
believed necessitate medii? The only dogmas which 
might come in question are: the Trinity, the Incarnation, 
the immortality of the soul, and the necessity of grace. 
The last-mentioned two may be omitted from the list, be- 
cause St. Paul does not mention them,”? and for the addi- 
tional reason that belief in immortality is included in the 
dogma of eternal retribution, while the necessity of grace 
is inseparably bound up with the dogma of Divine Provi- 
dence, which in its turn is but a particular aspect of 
eternal retribution.22 Hence the only two dogmas in re- 
gard to which the question at the beginning of this para- 
graph can reasonably be asked, are the Blessed Trinity 
and the Incarnation. 

Theologians are divided in the matter. Some main- 
tain that no human being can or could ever be saved 
without explicit belief in both the Trinity and the Incarna- 
tion. Others24 hold that this necessitas medu did not 
exist under the Old Covenant. A third school * avers 
that no such necessity can be proved either for the Old or 
the New Dispensation. 

The first of these three opinions is excessively rigorous 
and intrinsically improbable. The Jews had no clearly re- 
vealed knowledge of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and 
consequently were under no obligation to believe them. 
As the divinely constituted guardians of the Messianic 


prophecies, they were bound to believe in the Redeemer, 


22 Heb. XI, 6. 

23 Cfr, Wirceburg., De Gratia, n. 
120: “Quia tamen qui credit et 
sperat remuneratorem supernatu- 
ralem, satis hoc ipso etiam credit ani- 
mae perpetuitatem et necessitatem 
auxilii melioris ad salutem, fides 


horum explicita et per distinctos 


conceptus non semper in re et ac- 
tualiter necessaria existimatur.” 

24 Gregory of Valentia, Becanus, 
Thomas Sanchez, and many Thom- 
ists, 


number of other theologians. 


25 Suarez, De Lugo, and a large Ni 


JUSTIFICATION 283 


though only necessitate praeceptt. The gentiles were dis- 
pensed even from this. 

The second opinion, which limits the necessitas medit 
to the New Testament, lacks solid proof. The Scrip- 
ture texts cited in its support merely prove the effica- 
ciousness of belief in Christ,’ or the duty of embrac- 
ing that belief on the strength of the Apostolic preach- 
ing,*” or, finally, the impossibility of redemption except 
through the mediation of Jesus; ?&—all truths which in 
themselves have nothing to do with the question under 
discussion. 

The third and most probable opinion is that even un- 
der the New Covenant, explicit faith in Christ, and a 
fortiori in the Divine Trinity, cannot be regarded as an 
indispensable medium of justification and salvation, (1) 
because St. Paul does not mention these two dogmas in 
the decisive passage, Heb. XI, 6; and (2) because a 
supernatural act of justifying love and contrition may be | 
inspired by belief in the existence of God and divine 
retribution; and (3) because this latter belief implicitly, 
by way of desire (fides in voto), includes belief in Christ 
and the Trinity.2® Nevertheless it must be held that an 
adult who desires to be received into the Church and is 
baptized in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, is bound 
to believe in the Trinity and the Incarnation by more 
than a mere necessitas praecepti, namely, by what is tech- 
nically called necessitas medii per accidens, a necessity 
from which God dispenses only in exceptional cases, 


26 Cfr. Rom. III, 22, salvatt absque fide mediatoris, quia, 
27 Cfr. John III, 18. etsi non habuerunt fidem explicitam, 
28 Cfr, Acts IV, 12. habuerunt tamen fidem implicitam 


29 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., in divina providentia, credentes 
2a z2a€, qu. 2, art. 7, ad 3: “St Deum esse liberatorem hominum se- 
qui salvati fuerunt, quibus reve- cundum modos sibi placitos,”’ 
Jatio non fuit facta, non fuerunt 


284 


SANCTIFYING GRACE 


when it is either physically or morally impossible to 


elicit an act of explicit faith *° 


It is for this reason that 


the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office decided, 


February 28, 1703, that missionaries are bound to explain a 


to all adult converts who have the use of reason, even 
though they be near death, those mysteries of the faith 
which are necessary for salvation necessitate medi, espe- 
cially the Trinity and the Incarnation.** 


80 The practical bearing of this 


question on the heathens is treated 


supra, pp. 179 sad. 

31 Missionarium teneri adulto 
etiam moribundo, qui incapax omnino 
non sit, explicare fidei mysteria, 
quae sunt necessaria necessitate 
medii, ut sunt praecipue mysteria 
Trinitatis et Incarnationis.” Cfr, 


Prop. Damn. ab Innocentio XI. a. 
1679, prop. 64 (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
n. 1214). For a full explanation — 
of the topics treated in the present 
Section consult Suarez, De Fide, 


disp. 12, sect. 4; De Lugo, De Fide, ag 


disp. 12, sect. 4 sq.; W. Liese, Der 
heilsnotwendige Glaube, Freiburg 
1902, 


SECTION 2 


THE NECESSITY OF OTHER PREPARATORY ACTS 
BESIDES FAITH 


I, HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF 
THE CHurRcH.—Martin Luther, to quiet his con- 
science, evolved the notion that faith alone justi- 
fies and that the Catholic doctrine of the necessity 
of good works is pharisaical and derogatory to 
the merits of Jesus Christ. This teaching was 
incorporated into the symbolic books of the Lu- 
therans* and adopted by Calvin. It has been 
called one of the two basic errors of Pro- 
testantism. The Tridentine Council solemnly 
condemns it as follows: “If anyone saith that by 
faith alone the impious is justified, in such wise as 
to mean that nothing else is required to cooperate 
in order to obtain the grace of justification, and 
that it is not in any way necessary that he be pre- 
pared and disposed by the movement of his own 


a Ctr Sold. Deéclar., art. .-3: 
 Neque contritio neque dilectio 
neque ulia virtus, sed sola fides 
[= fiducia] est medium et instru- 


2 Instit., III, 11, § 19: ‘“* Dicimus 
hominem solaé fide iustificari.”? For 
a classic exposition of the Lutheran 


mentum, quo gratiam Dei, merita 
Christi et remissionem peccatorum 
apprehendere possumus.” 


and Calvinistic views of faith, see 
Mohler, Symbolik, § 16; English tr. 
by James Burton Robertson, 5th ed., 
London 1906, pp. 124 sqq. 


285 


286 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


will; let him be anathema.” * Other acts that — 
dispose or prepare the soul for justification, ac- — 
cording to the same Council, are: the fear of 
divine justice; hope in God’s mercy; charity, 
which is the font of all righteousness; detestation 
of sin, and penitence.* } 

2. REFUTATION OF THE SOLA FIDES THEORY.— — 
The Lutheran theory involves an open rupture 4 
with the traditional teaching of the Church and — 
is positively unscriptural. Luther himself felt : 
this, as appears from his interpolation of the word q 
“alone” in Rom. III, 28 and his rejection of the — 
entire canonical Epistle of St. James.° 4 

a) The teaching of the Bible in regard to the 4 
role played by good works in the process of justi- — 
fication may be summarized as follows: _ 

(1) A man may believe all that the Church — 
teaches and yet be lost for want of good works 
or because he has not the love of God; conse- — 
quently, faith alone does not justify or insure | 
eternal salvation. Our Divine Saviour Himself — 
declares: ‘‘Not every one that saith to me, Lord, | 
Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven, but — 
he that doeth the will of my Father who is in 


3Sess. VI, can. 9: “Si quis anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- 
dixerit, sola fide impium iustificari, wart, n. 819.) : 
- ita ut intelligat nihil aliud requirt 4 Sess. VI, cap. 6. The passage 
quod ad iustificationis gratiam con- is quoted infra, p. 296. q 
sequendam cooperetur et nulla ex 5 He contemptuously called it “ em — 
parte necesse esse, eum suae volun- stroherne Epistel,”’ a letter of straw. © 
tatis motu praeparari atque dispont, y 


JUSTIFICATION 287 


heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of 
Heaven. -*° St. James sayss..° Do. you mot -see 
that by works a man is justified, and not by faith 
Only?) Andyst-Pauly lt) should: have-all 
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have 
not charity, I am nothing.” § 

(2) Besides faith, justification requires certain 
other preparatory or dispositive acts. There is, 
for example, the fear of divine justice. Cfr. 
Ecclus. I, 28: ‘He that is without fear cannot 
be justified.” ° Also, hope in God’s mercy.  Cfr. 
Rom. VIII, 24: “For we are saved by hope.” *° 
eavcain, ~Charity. “Cir. Luke VII, 47:0 “Many 
sins are forgiven her because she hath loved 
much.” ** Furthermore, contrition or penitence. 
Cir. Luke XIII, 3: “Unless you shall do pen- 
ance, you shall all likewise perish.” *? Finally, 
good works in general. Cfr. St. James II, 17: 
“So faith also, if it have not works, is dead in 
itself.” ** ‘No one who ponders these and similar 


6 Matth. VII, 21: ‘Non omnis, (dydrnv) autem non habuero, nihil 


qui dicit mihi, Domine, Domine, in- 
trabit in regnum caelorum: sed qui 
facit voluntatem Patris mei, qui in 
caelis est, ipse intrabit in regnum 
caelorum.” 

7 Jas. II, 24: “ Videtis quoniam 
ex operibus tustificatur homo, et non 
ex fide tantum (é& Epywv Sixarovrat 
dvOpwros, Kal ovK ék mlarews 
povov).”. 

81 Cor. XIII, 2: “ Et si habuero 
omnem fidem (rdcoav rhv lori), 
ita ut montes transferam, caritatem 


sum,” 

9 Ecclus. I, 28: “ Qui sine timore 
est, non poterit imustificari.”’ 

10 Rom. VIII, 24: “Spe enim 
salut factt sumus,” 

11 Luke VII, 47: 
ei peccata mutta, 
dilexit multum.”’ 

12 Luke XIII, 3: “Nist poeni- 
tentiam habueritis, omnes similiter 
peribitis.’”’ 

18 Jac. IJ, 17: “ Fides, si non 
habet opera, mortua est in semet- 
ipso.” 


© Remittuntur 
quoniam § (rt) 


288 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


texts can maintain, as Calvin and Melanchthon 
did, that the good works mentioned merely ace a 
company justification, for they are unmistakably — 
described as causes which dispose and prepare the — 
sinner for it. q 

(3) Itis not faith alone that justifies, but faith | 
informed and actuated by charity. Cfr. Gal. V, 6: 
“For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth | 
anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that — 
worketh by charity.” * The Greek text shows a 
that the word operatur in the Vulgate must be 4 
taken passively, so that a more correct translation | 
would be: “. . . but faith effected or formed by : 
charity.” But even if évepyounémm were used as a de-_ 
ponent (évepyeiofu—agere, operart) the meaning — 
would be substantially the same, i. e. a dead faith, — 
without charity, avails nothing. Cfr. St. James 
II, 26: “For even as the body without the spirit 
is dead, so also faith without works is dead,” *=aam 


In Rom. III, 28: ‘ For we account a man to be jus-— 
tified by faith, without the works of the law,” *® Luther 
deliberately inserted the word “ alone.’ The context 
shows that this is a falsification. The Apostle contrasts | 
justifying faith, not with those preparatory acts of salva- 
tion which spring from it, but with the sterile “ works of 

14Gal. V, 6: “In Christo Iesu pus sine spiritu mortuum est, tta et 
neque  circumcisio aliquid valet fides sine operibus mortwa est.” . 
neque praeputium, sed fides quae per 16 Rom. III, 28: “ Arbitramur— 
caritatem operatur (mloris OV aryd- enim hominem iustificarit per fidem 


ans évepyouuern).”’ sine operibus legis.” 
15 Jac. Il, 26: “ Sicut enim cor- 


JUSTIFICATION 289 


the law” (7. e. the Old Testament), which, as such, 
possessed no more power to justify than the good works 
of the heathen. Keeping this contrast in mind, it 
would not be incorrect to say, and St. Paul might well 
have said, that “ supernatural faith alone (i. e. only) jus- 
tifies, while the works of the law do not.” But if faith 
be taken in contradistinction to the other acts operative in 
the process of justification, such as fear, hope, contrition, 
love,— and this is the sense in which Luther takes it,— 
then it is false and contrary to the mind of St. Paul to 
say: “Faith alone justifies, nothing else is required.” 
For in this sense faith is merely the beginning, the 
foundation, the root of justification and cannot justify the 
sinner until it has absorbed the other preparatory acts re- 
quired by Holy Scripture and transformed them into per- 
fect love. This fact was already pointed out by St. Au- 
gustine. ‘“ Unintelligent persons,” he says, “ with regard 
to the Apostle’s statement: ‘We conclude that a man is 
justified by faith without the works of the law,’ have 
thought him to mean that faith is sufficient for a man, 
even if he leads a bad life and has no good deeds to al- 
lege. It is impossible that such a character should be 
deemed ‘a vessel of election’ by the Apostle, who, after — 
declaring that ‘in Christ Jesus neither circumcision avail- 
eth anything nor uncircumcision,’ adds the important 
remark: ‘but faith that worketh by charity.’ It is such 
faith which separates the faithful children of God from 
unclean devils,— for even these ‘ believe and tremble,’ as 
the Apostle James says, but they do no good works. 
Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just 
man lives,—the faith which operates through love in 
such wise that God recompenses it according to its works 
with eternal life.” 17 


17 De Fide et Lib. Arbitrio, c. 7, n. 18. 


j 


290 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


There is another sense in which faith alone may be 
said to justify, viz.: if the term be taken to include all 
those things which God has ordained for our salvation, 
that is to say, the sum-total of “ revelation “or othe 
true religion”? as opposed to “ heresy.” The term ziotis 
(fides) is sometimes employed in this sense by the Fa-- 
thers, but never in Sacred Scripture.” 


b) There is a unanimous and unbroken tradi- 
tion in favor of the Catholic doctrine. St. Poly- 4 
carp writes in his Epistle to the Philippians: — 
“the faith (mons) given you, which is — 
the mother of us all when hope (és) fol- — 


lows and love (éy4™) goes before.” St. Au- : 


gustine teaches that while faith is per se separable - . 


from hope and love, it is ineffective without them. 4 
“Man begins with faith, but the demons, too, be- 
lieve and tremble; to faith, therefore, must be-3 


added hope, and to hope, love.” ** And again: 
“Without love, faith can indeed exist, but it avail-"@ 
St. Gregory the Great, para- _ 
phrasing St. James, says: “Perhaps some one will — 
say to himself: I have believed, I shall be saved. — 
He speaks truly if he sustains faith by works. 
For that is true faith which does not contradict by _ 
deeds what it asserts in words. | 


99 21 


eth nothing. 


18On the misinterpretation of 
other Scripture texts by the Reform- 
ers see Bellarmine, De Iustificatione, 
I, 19-24. 

19 Ep. ad Philipp., 3. 

20 Serm., XVI, c. 6: “A fide 
incipit homo, sed et daemones cre- 


92 22 


dunt et contremiscunt; adde ergo — 
fidei spem speique ipsi adde carita- — 
tem.” - a 
21 De Trinit., XXV, 18: “Sine 
caritate quippe fides potest quidem — 
esse, sed non et prodesse.” 

22 Hom. in. Evang. 29: “Pomme 


JUSTIFICATION 291 


c) This teaching is in perfect conformity with 
reason. 

a) No supernatural enlightenment is needed 
to perceive the intrinsic propriety of a moral prep- 
aration for justification. Not only must the sin- 
ner learn to know God as His supernatural end 
and the source of all righteousness, but he must 
also be persuaded that it is his duty, with the help 
of sufficient grace, to direct his will towards this 
final end. 


Every tendency or movement presupposes a terminus 
a quo, from which it starts, and a terminus ad quem, 
to which it tends. The movement of the will in the 
process of justification, besides faith, demands a volun- 
tary withdrawal from sin (contrition, good resolutions ) 
and an approach to righteousness (hope, love, desire) .”* 

This argument would have made no impression on 
Luther, since he bluntly denied free-will in the moral or- 
der and regarded human nature as so radically depraved 
by original sin as to be incapable of codperating with di- 
vine grace. In fact he compared man to a “log, stick 
or stone.” This view was shared by Amsdorf, Flacius, 


statu. peccati in statum iustitiae. 
... Unde oportet quod mens hu- 


tasse unusquisque apud semetipsum 
dicat: Ego iam credidi, salvus ero. 


Verum dicit, si fidem operibus tenet. 
Vera etenim fides est, quae in hoc 
quod verbis dicit moribus non con- 
tradicit.? As to the sense in which 
some of the Fathers speak of faith 
as the only thing that can save men, 
cfr. Bellarmine De Iustificat., I, 26. 

23 Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum- 
moa-Eheol., 1a 2ae, qu. 113, \art. 5: 
“ Tustificatio impu est quidam motus, 
quo humana mens movetur a Deo a 


mana, dum iustificatur, per motum 
liberi arbitrit recedat a peccato et ac- 
cedat ad wstitiam. Recessus autem 
et accessus in motu liberi arbitru 
accipitur secundum detestationem et 
desiderium. , . . Oportet igitur quod 
in iustificatione impit sit motus liberi 
arbitrii duplex: unus quo per desi- 
derium tendat in Dei iustitiam, et 
alius quo detestetur peccatum.” 


202 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


and others, whereas Osiander and Butzer admitted that 

“inherent righteousness ”’ is at least a partial factor in jus- 
tification. Melanchthon, in an endeavor to reconcile the 
contradictions of this discordant system, unwittingly gave 
rise to the so-called Synergist dispute. When Pfef- 
finger °4 undertook the defence of free-will, many Luth- 
eran theologians, especially of the University of Jena, 
boldly attacked the log-stick-and-stone theory * and 


tried to force their adversaries to admit that man is able 
to codperate with grace. The “ Half-Melanchthonians,’ — 


as they were called, succeeded in smuggling Synergism & 
into the “ Book of Torgau;”?* but before the “ For- 


mulary of Concord” was finally printed in the monastery al 


of Bergen, near Magdeburg. (A. D..1577),. the - stricta 
Lutherans had eliminated that article as heterodox and _ 
substituted for it the log-stick-and-stone theory as it — 
appears in the official symbols of the Lutheran Church. ~ 
In the Syncretist dispute, and through the efforts of ~ 


the Pietists, this harsh teaching was afterwards mod-° _ 
erated. But .what probably contributed most to the 


crumbling of the system was the rapid growth of So- 
cinianism and Rationalism among the Lutherans in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. To-day, with the — 
exception of a small band of “orthodox” Lutherans in _ 
Saxony and the United States, Protestants no longer hold — 
the log-stick-and-stone theory. The school of Luther pro- _ 
claimed it as the distinguishing tenet of Protestantism, as — 
“the criterion of a standing or falling church,” ?7— and 
by this criterion the Lutheran Church has indeed fallen. 
Common sense has led modern Protestants to admit that — 


24De Libertate Voluntatis Hu- 26“ Das Torgische Buch,’ A.D. | 4 


manae, Leipzig 1555. 1576, 
25. “ Klotz-, Stock- und Stein- 27° Articulus stantis et cadentis 
theorie.”’ ecclesiae.”’” Cfr. Newman, Lectures 


on Justification, p. 113. 


JUSTIFICATION 203 


contrition and penance are quite as necessary for justifi- 
cation as faith, an opinion which, in the words of Dor- 
ner,28 “ comes dangerously near the Catholic system.” In 
Scandinavia, according to Dr. Krogh-Tonning,”® the Luth- 
eran Church has experienced a “ quiet reformation” and 
now unconsciously defends the Catholic doctrine of jus- 
tification.*° 


B) As the sufficiency of the Bible without 
Tradition is the formal principle of “orthodox”’ 
Protestantism, so justification by faith alone may 
be said to be its material principle. The ab- 
surdity of the Lutheran position is evident from 
the fact that these two principles are mutually 
destructive. So far from teaching justification 
by faith alone, the Bible inculcates the exact con- 
trary, while its sufficiency as the source of faith 
could be proved from its own pages, if at all, only 
by a vicious circle.** Thus the whole Protestant 
system is based on contradiction. 


The sola fides theory is open to serious objection also 
from the ethical point of view. It cannot be put into 
practice without grave danger. “Sin lustily,” writes 
Luther, “but be yet more lusty in faith.’*? The first 


28 Geschichte der protestantischen 
Theologie, p. 583, Miinchen 1867. 
»29 Die Gnadenlehre und die stille 
Reformation, Christiania 1894. Not 
long after writing this book Dr. 
Krogh-Tonning became a Catholic. 

30 How Luther came to adopt the 
sola fides theory is exhaustively 
explained by H. Grisar, S. J., 
Luther, Vol. I, Freiburg 1911; Eng- 
lish tr., Vols, I and Il, London 1913. 


Cfr, also F. Hettinger, Die Krisis 
des Christentums, pp. 72 saq., Frei- 
burg 1881. - 

31 Cfr. Pohle, art. on ‘“* Tradi- 
tion’? in Herder’s Kirchenlexikon, 
2nd ed., Vol. XI, 1933 sqq., Frei- 
burg 1899. F 

32 “ Pecca fortiter, crede fortius.” 
Cfr, Mohler, Symbolism (English 
tis. Pitgo)s 


204 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


part at least of this injunction was promptly obeyed by 
his followers, and the rapid deterioration of morals which 
followed was but a natural sequel of the sola fides theory. 
If faith alone were sufficient for justification, it would 
make no difference what kind of life a man led, for 
unbelief, 7. ¢. the loss of fiduciary faith, would be the 
only sin. No wonder this ethical antinomism of the 
Lutheran system, so radically opposed to the teaching of 
St. James, was rejected by Hugo Grotius, George Buller, 
and other honest Protestants. 

Another weighty objection against the Lutheran theory 
of justification is that it disregards the law of causation. 
According to Luther a man is justified by the firm be- 
lief and trust that his sins are forgiven. This “ belief ” 
is either true or false. If it is false, I can have no 
certainty with regard to my salvation, but am deceiving ; 
myself. If true, it presupposes that which it is to ef- 
fect, in other words, it puts the cause before the effect. 
An orthodox Lutheran theologian of the old school would 
probably retort: My sins are actually forgiven by virtue of 
the atonement, because all men without exception are re- 
deemed through the merits of Jesus Christ. If this be, 
true, then why not be consistent and say: All men are 
justified because all are redeemed, consequently there is 
no need of faith and sacraments, and keeping the 
commandments is a matter of indifference! It is at this 
point that the incompatibility of Luther’s teaching with 
the Bible and sound ethics becomes most glaringly ap- 
parent. True, Luther himself at times emphasized the ne- 
cessity of good works; but this merely proves that he had 
lucid intervals when his honest nature rebelled against the _ 
inconsistency of his teaching.** | 


iN 


33 Cfr. Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- §455, Mainz 1899. The ** ortho- 
matische Theologie, Vol. VIII, dox” Lutheran teaching is strongly 


JUSTIFICATION 295 


3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. 
—The Council of Trent assigned to faith its 
proper place in the process of justification,®* and 
gave a luminous and profound analysis of the 
process itself.’? Scholastic theology, in elaborat- 
ing the teaching of Scripture and Tradition, drew 
a distinction between fides formata, which truly 
justifies, and fides informis, which falls short of 
justification. 


a) As regards the intrinsic relation of (dogmatic) 
faith to other preparatory acts in the process of jus- 
tification, the Tridentine Council declares: ‘‘ Faith is the 
beginning of human salvation, the foundation and the 
root of all justification.” °° Supernatural faith, therefore, 
is the beginning of salvation, and not, as Harnack makes 
Luther say, “at once the beginning, the middle, and the. 
end,” because no man can be converted unless he has 
believingly embraced God as his final goal. This faith is 
preceded by certain preliminary conditions, of which the 
first is an illumination of the intellect and a strengthening 
of the will, which results in the affectus credulitatis 
(imtia fidet). For justifying faith does not flash forth 
suddenly, like a deus ex machina, but requires time for its 
development, as the history of many conversions proves.*? 

Faith is called the ‘“ foundation” of justification be- 
cause it not only marks its beginning, but constitutes the 
basis upon which all subsequent stages of the process rest. 
stated by the famous convert Dr. 85 Sess. VI, cap. 6. 

Edw. Preuss in his work, still re- 86 Sess. VI, cap. 8: “ Fides est 
garded as a classic by “orthodox”  humanae salutis initium, fundamen- 
Lutherans, Die Rechtfertigung des tum et radix omnis iustificationis.” 


Siinders vor Gott, Berlin 1868. (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 801.) 
84 Sess. VI, cap. 8. - 37 V. supra, pp. 100 sq. 


2096 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

To exclude the mistaken notion that the process of 
justification is a series of mechanical and disconnected 
acts, the Council calls faith the “root” of justification, 
from which the other preparatory acts spring organically, 
as the trunk of a tree from its root. 

The psychological description of the whole process 
given by the Tridentine Fathers, which even Harnack ad- 
mits to be “a masterly piece of work,” runs as follows: 
“ Now they [adults] are disposed unto justice when, ex- 
cited and assisted by divine grace, conceiving faith by _ 
hearing, they are freely moved towards God, believing _ 
those things to be true which God has revealed and — 
promised,— and this especially, that God justifies the im- Bo 
pious by His grace through the redemption that is in 
Jesus Christ; and when, understanding themselves to be 
sinners, they, by turning themselves from the fear of # 
divine justice, whereby they are profitably agitated, to 
consider the mercy of God, are raised unto hope, con-- - 
fiding that God will be propitious to them for Christ's @& 
sake; and they begin to love Him as the fountain of all _ 
justice, and are therefore moved against sins by a cer-am 
tain hatred and detestation, to wit: by that penitence — 
which must be performed before Baptism; lastly, when _ 
they purpose to receive Baptism, to begin a new life, and 7 


to keep the commandments of God. . . 


38 Sess. VI, cap. 6: “ Disponun- 
tur autem ad ipsam iustitiam, dum 
excitati divind gratia et adiuti, idem 
ex auditu concipientes, libere moven- 
tur in Deum, credentes vera esse, 
quae divinitus revelata et promissa 
sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo 
justificari impium per gratiam eius, 
per vredemptionem, quae est in 


Christo Iesu, et dum peccatores sé | 


esse intelligentes, a divinae iustitiae 
timore, quo utiliter concutiuntur, ad 


2788 The fourm 


considerandam Dei misericordiam se 


convertendo, in spem eriguntur fiden- 
tes, Deum sibi propter Christum 
propitium fore, illumque tamquam 
omnis iustitiae fontem diligere inct- 
piunt: ac propterea moventur ad-— 


versus peccata per odium aliquod et 


detestationem, hoc est, per eam poent- 


tentiam, quam ante baptismum agi 


oportet: denique dum proponunt sus- 


cipere baptismum, inchoare novam — 


vitam et servare divina mandata.” 


JUSTIFICATION 207 
ordinary stages in the process of justification, therefore, 
are: (1) From faith to fear of divine justice; (2) from 
fear to hope; (3) from hope to initial love;*® (4) from 
initial love to contrition and a firm purpose of 
amendment.*” If contrition is dictated and transfused 
by perfect love,** and the sinner has an explicit or at least 
implicit desire for the Sacrament,*? justification takes 
place at once. If, on the other hand, the sinner’s sorrow 
is imperfect (attritio), he attains justification only by 
actual reception of the Sacrament (Baptism or Pen- 
ance) .*3 

b) Does conversion always follow this conciliary 
schema? No. The Council did not mean to define that 
these acts must follow one another in strict sequence or 
that they are one and all absolutely indispensable for jus- 
tification. It is certain, however, that the process invar- 
jably begins with faith and ends with contrition accom- 
panied by a firm purpose of amendment. In exceptional 
cases (@. g. the Prodigal Son, Mary Magdalen) per- 
fect charity seems immediately to follow faith, and 
may then be said virtually to include the intermediate 
stages of fear, hope, and contrition. Yet this is not the 
usual way. Ordinarily faith elicits fear, which in turn 
produces two kinds of hope — hope of forgiveness (spes 
veniae) and hope in God (spes theologica), which marks 
the beginning of charity (amor concupiscentiae). Con- 
trition is always a conditio sine qua non, because there 
can be no forgiveness of sin without sorrow for it.44 It 
44 Cfr, Ez, XVIII, 30; Joel IL, 12; 


Luke XHI,° 33-Acts. TI,, 38. Cir. 
Conc. Trid., Sess. XIV, cap. 4: 


39“ Diligere incipiunt.” ibid.) 
_ 40 Contritio cum proposito novae 
vitae, 


41 Contritio caritate perfecta. 

42 Votum sacramenti, sacramentum 
in voto. 

43 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 
4 and 14, 


“ Gontritio, quae primum locum inter 
dictos poenitentis actus habet, animi 
dolor ac detestatio est de peccato 
commisso cum proposito non pec- 
candi de cetero, Fuit autem quovis 


298 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


is for this reason that, according to St. Thomas, explicit 4 


contrition for mortal sins is necessary for justification 


even when there is perfect charity, and the sufficiency of 
the so-called poenitentia virtualis is limited to venial of- 
fenses and such grievous sins as cannot be remembered.*® 
Fear, while not absolutely indispensable, is seldom absent. 
Holy Scripture tells us that “the fear of God is the be- 
ginning of wisdom,” and it is natural for the sinner seek- 
ing forgiveness to detest his sins out of fear of divine © 
justice before he attains to the motive of perfect char- 4 
MY 
c) Certain utterances of Scripture and the Fathers with 


regard to the possibility of a “dead” faith have led. # 


theologians to distinguish between fides informis and fides 
formata. Fides informis is a dead faith, devoid of char- — 
ity, and without justifying power. The only faith that 
can justify a man is that which is animated by charity and 
productive of good works.** This is the fides formata of — 
the Schoolmen, which includes all the preparatory acts 
enumerated by the Tridentine Council, from fear to per- : 
fect charity. These acts, however, though united in the — 
fides formata, retain their respective independence, and — 
can disappear singly, one after another, as they came. — 
Zwingli’s assertion that faith, hope, and charity are iden- | 
tical, or at least inseparable, has been expressly con- © 


tempore ad impetrandam veniam pec- 
catorum hic contritionis motus ne- 
cessarius.” 

45 Cfr. Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 87, 
art. 1: “ Exigitur autem ad remis- 
sionem peccati mortalis perfectior 
poenitentia, ut scil. homo actualiter 
peccatum mortale commissum dete- 
stetur, quantum in ipso est, ut scil, 
diligentiam adhibeat ad memorandum 
singula peccata mortalia, ut singula 
detestetur. Sed hoc non requiritur 


ad -remissionem venialium peccato- — 
rum. ... Unde sequitur quod requi- — 
ratur quaedam virtualis displicentia, — 


.. quod tamen non sufficit ad re- — 


missionem peccati mortalis, nisi — 

quantum ad peccata oblita post dili- — 

gentem inquisitionem.” 
46 Cfr, Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. 

TII, pp. 204 sqq., Paris 1896. 
47 Fides mortua in contradistinc- — 

tion to fides viva. 
48 Gal. V, 6. 


JUSTIFICATION 299 


demned by the Tridentine Council : “ If any one saith that, 
grace being lost through sin, faith also is always lost with 
it; or that the faith which remains, though it be no live 
faith, is not a true faith; or that he who has faith without 
charity is not a Christian; let him be anathema.” 4° 


READINGS : — Besides the respective chapters in the various 
text-books, the student may consult: * A, Vega, De Iustificatione 
Doctrina Universa Libris XV Absolute Tradita, Venice 1548 
(reprinted at Cologne, 1572),—* Bellarmine, De Iustificatione 
Impu, 1. V (ed. Feévre, Vol. VI, PP. 149 sqq. Paris 1873).— 
*Suarez, De Gratia, 1. VI sqq.— Becanus, Theol. Scholast., “ De 
Gratia Habituali,’? Rouen 1658.—L. Nussbaum, Die Lehre der 
kath. Kirche tiber die Rechtfertigung, Minchen 1837.—C. von 
Schatzler, Neue Untersuchungen iiber das Dogma von der Gnade 
und das Wesen des christl. Glaubens, Mainz 1867.— Oswald, Die 
Lehre von der Heiligung, § 5, 3rd ed., Paderborn 1885.— B. Bart- 
mann, St. Paulus und St. Jakobus und die Rechtfertigung, Frei- 
burg 1897— L. Galey, La Foi et les Oeuvres, Montauban 1902.— 
W. Liese, Der heilsnotwendige Glaube, sein Begriff und Inhalt, 
Freiburg 1902.—Card. Newman, Lectures on the Doctrine of Jus- 
tification, 8th impression, London 1900.— Hugh Pope, O. P., art. 
“Faith” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V.— J. Mausbach, 
Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists (tr. by A. M. Bu- 
chanan), pp. 150 sqq., New York 1914.— L. Labauche, S. S., God 
and Man, pp. 203 sqq., N. Y. Ig16, : 

On the teaching of the Reformers cfr. * Mohler, Symbolik, 
§ 18 sqq., 11th ed. Mainz 1890 (English tr. by James Burton 
Robertson, pp. 82 sqq., 5th ed., London 1906); Ad. Harnack, 
_ Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte, Vol. III, 4th ed., Freiburg 1910; 
Denifle-Weiss, O. P., Luther und Luthertum in der ersten Ent- 
wicklung, Vol. II, Mainz 1909; H. Grisar, S. J., Luther, Vol. I, 
Freiburg 1911 (English tr., Vols. I and II, London 1913). 


49 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 28: non esse Christianum, anathema sit,” 
“Si quis dixerit, amissé per pec- (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 838.) The 
catum gratia simul et fidem semper Scriptural argument for this thesis 
amitti aut fidem, quae remanet, non is developed by Bellarmine, De 
esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva, Iustificatione, I, 15, 
aut eum qui fidem sine caritate habet, 


CHAPTER. II 
THE STATE OF JUSTIFICATION 


Though the term “ justification” may be extended to 
the preparatory acts that lead up to the state of justice, 4 
strictly speaking it signifies only that decisive moment in 
which the sinner is cleansed from mortal sin by an infu- 
sion of sanctifying grace. Hence a careful distinction _ 
must be made between justification as an act (actus iustifi- 
cationis) and justification as an habitual state (habitus — 
iustificationis s. status gratiae sanctificantis). The tran- 


sient act introduces a permanent state, just as the Sacra- 


ment of Holy Orders constitutes a man in the sacerdotal 
state or priesthood. = 

Both as an act and as a state justification possesses — 
three distinct properties; it is uncertain, unequal, and — 
capable of being lost. 


This gives us the basis for a division of the — 
present Chapter into three Sections: (1) On ~ 
the Nature of Justification, (2) On Justifying, 7. e. 
Sanctifying Grace, and (3) On the Properties of 
that Grace. ; 


300 


SECTION? 


THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION 


Justification in the active sense (iustificatio, 
dixatwors) is defined by the Tridentine Council as 
“a translation from that state wherein man is born 
a child of the first Adam, to the state of grace and 
of the adoption of the sons of God through the sec- 
ond Adam, Jesus Christ, our Saviour.” ? 


Justification, therefore, has both a negative and a 
positive element. The positive element is interior sanc- 
tification through the merits of Jesus Christ. The nega- 
tive element consists in the forgiveness of sin. Though 
these elements are objectively inseparable, the forgive- 
ness of sin being practically an effect of interior sanctifica- 
tion, yet we must treat them separately in order to be 
able to refute more effectively the Lutheran heresy that 
sin is not wiped out but merely “ covered,” and that justi- 
fication consists in an external “ imputation ” of the right- 
eousness of Christ. 

1 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 4: et adoptionis filiorum Dei per secun- 
“ Iustificatio impii [est] translatio dum Adam Iesum Christum Salva- 


ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur torem nostrum.”’ (Denzinger-Bann- 
filius primi Adae, in statum gratiae wart, n. 796.) 


~ 301 


302 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


ARTICLE Rod 


THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION | 


I. THE HERESY OF THE PROTESTANT REFORM- 
ERS AND THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—LUt- 
ther held that human nature was radically de- 
praved by original sin ? and that justification con- 
sists in this, that sin (original and mortal) is no 
longer “imputed” to the sinner; that is to say, 
it is not blotted out but merely “covered” by the - 
merits of Christ. 4 


a) Forgiveness of sins, therefore, according to Luther, 
consists simply in their being no longer imputed.* This _ 
heresy was incorporated in the Formula of Concord and i* 
other symbolical books of the Lutheran Church, and sub- 
sequently adopted by Calvin.® . 


b) The Catholic Church has always maintained — | 
that justification is a renewal of the soul by which 


2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, pp. 221 sq. 

8 Cfr. the second on “the list of 
Lutheran propositions condemned by 
Leo.uX, : A.D. 15207. In puero 
post baptismum negare remanens 
peccatum est Paulum et Christum 
simul conculcare.”’ (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 742.) 

4:Porn.. Cones, . peo 2y~ Coes 
“ Quando autem docemus, quod per 
operationem Spiritus Sancti regene- 
ramur et iustificamur, non ita acci- 
piendum est quod iustificatis et rena- 
tis nulla prorsus iniustitia substan- 
tiae ipsorum et conversation adhae- 


reat, sed quod Christus perfectissima — 


obedientiad sud omnia ipsorum pec- — 


cata tegat, quae quidem in 
natura infixa haerent. 


ipsa 
Nihilominus 


tamen per fidem propter obedientiam 
Christi boni et insti pronuntiantur 
et reputantur, etiamsi ratione cor- — 
ruptae naturae suae sint maneantque y 


peccatores, dum mortale hoc or’ 
circumferunt.” 

5 Antid. Conc. Trid., ad Sess. V: 
“Manet vere peccatum in nobis 
neque per baptismum statim uno die — 
extinguitur.” Cfr. Mohler, Symbo- — 
lik, §14 (Robertson’s translation, — 
sth ed., pp. 110 sqq.). 


JUSTIFICATION 303 


a man’s sins are blotted out and he becomes truly 
just. This applies first of all to original sin. 
“If,” says the Council of Trent, “anyone denies 
that by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which 
is conferred in Baptism, the guilt of original sin 
is remitted, or even asserts that the whole of that 
which has the true and proper nature of sin is not 
taken away, but says that it is only raised or not 
imputed, let him be anathema.” *® What it here 
defines in regard to original sin, the Council else- 
where reaffirms in respect of mortal sin.’ 


2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY.— 
The theory thus solemnly condemned by the Tri- 
dentine Fathers is unscriptural and opposed to 
Catholic Tradition. | 

a) The teaching of the Bible on this point may 
be reduced to four distinct heads. 


_. (1) The remission of sin granted in the process of 

justification is a real annihilation of guilt; that is to 
say, the sins remitted cease to exist in the moral (though 
not, of course, in the historical) order. Cfr. Ps. L, 3: 
“ Have mercy on me, O God, according to thy great 
mercy; and according to the multitude of thy tender 
mercies blot out my iniquity.”* Is. XLIII, 25: “I am 


tantum. radi aut non imputari, ana- 
thema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, 


6 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 5: 
“Si quis per Iesu Christi D. N. 


gratiam, quae in baptismate confer- 
tur, reatum originalis peccati remitti 
negat aut etiam asserit, non tolli 
totum id quod veram et propriam 
peccati rationem habet, sed illud dicit 


n. 792.) 

7 Sess. VI, cap.. 14; Sess. XIV, 
cap. 2. See Pohle-Preuss, The Sac- 
raments, Vol. II, Penance. 

8“ Dele iniquitatem meam,” 


304 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

he that blot out thy iniquities.’® After God has blotted 
out a sin, it no longer exists. Cfr. Is. XLIV, 22: “1 
have blotted out thy iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins 
as a mist.”2° Acts III, 19: “Be penitent, therefore, 
and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.” * 
Elsewhere God is said to “take away” sin. Cir. 2 
Kings XII, 13: “The Lord also hath taken away thy 
sin.” 2 1 Paral. XXI, 8: “I beseech thee, take away 
the iniquity of thy servant.’** When He takes away 
sin, it is really and truly blotted out. Cfr. Mich. VII, 
18 sq.: “ Who is a God like to thee, who takest away in- 
iquity? .. . He will put away our iniquities, and he will | 
cast all our sins into the bottom of the sea.’** Ps. X,_ 
15: “ His sin shall be sought, and shall not be found.” * 
Ps Cli, 12s As farvas the east is irom the west, so 
far hath he removed our iniquities from us.” ** Conse-— 
quently, when our Divine Saviour said of Mary Mag- — 
dalen: “ Many sins are forgiven her,” *’ He meant that 
her sins were completely blotted out and taken away. — 

(2) Justification washes the soul from iniquity and © 

purifies the heart. Cfr. Ps. L, 4: “ Wash me yet more . 
from my iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin;s See 
16: “ Wash yourselves, be clean.” 1° After one’s sins are 


9Is, XLIII, 25: “ Ego sum ipse, quitates nostras et proticiet im pro- 


qui deleo iniquitates tuas.” 

10Is, XLIV, 22: “Delevi ut 
nubem iniquitates tuas et quasi 
nebulam peccata tua.” 

41 Acts III, 19: “ Poenitemini 
igitur et convertimini, ut deleantur 
peccata vestra.” 

122 Kings XII, 13: “ Dominus 
quoque transtulit peccatum tuum.” 

181 Paral. XXI, 8: ““ Obsecro, 
aufer iniquitatem servi tui.” 

14 Mich. VII, 18 sq.: “ Quis, 
Deus, similis tui, qui aufers ini- 
quitatem? ... Deponet [Deus] int- 


fundum maris omnia peccata no- 
stra.” 
1) Sah 1 Sis 
tum illius, et non invenietur.” 
- 16 Ps, CII, 12: “ Quantum distat 
ortus ab occidente, longe fecit a 
nobis iniquitates nostras.” 
“7 Ruke Webl 47: 
ei peccata multa.” 
18 Ps, L, 4: “ Amplius lava me 
ab iniquitate mea et a. peccato — 
meo munda me.” — 
181s... .06's 
estote.” 


“ LTavamini, mundi — 


“ Quaeretur pecca- 


“ Remittuntur 


JUSTIFICATION 305 


washed away, the heart is clean and pure. Cfr. Ez. 
XXXVI, 25 sq.: “ And I will pour upon you clean water, 
and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness, .. . 
and I will give you a new heart.”?° 1 Cor, VI, 11: 
“And such [fornicators, etc.] some of you were; but 
you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are 
justified.” ° Spotless purity takes the place of the im- 
purity that previously defiled the soul of the sinner. 
Cfr. Ps. L, 9: “ Thou shalt sprinkle me with hyssop, and 
I shall be cleansed: thou shalt wash me, and I shall be 
nade whiter than snow.’ 2? Is. I, 18: “If your sins be 
as scarlet, they shall be made as white as snow: and if 
they be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool.” 23 
No trace of sin remains in the soul after it has 
been washed in the Precious Blood of Christ. Apoc. I, 
5°... Jesus Christ, . ... hath loved us, and washed 
us from our sins in his own blood.” 24 1 Johncl, ye 
ia. the blood of Jesus ‘Christ . .. cleanséth us from 
allasiny )2° 

(3) Justification is an awakening of the sinner from 
death to life, a transition from darkness to light: Cir 
I John III, 14: “ We know that we have passed from 
death to life, because we love the brethren ; he that loveth 
not, abideth in death.” Col. II, 13: “ And you, when 

20 Ez. XXXVI, 25 sq.: “Effun-  vestra ut coccinum, quasi nix deal- 


dam super vos aquam mundam et babuntur, et si fuerint rubra quasi 
mundabiminit ab omnibus inquina- vermiculus, velut lana alba erunt.” 


mentis vestris.... Et dabo vobis 24Apoc. I, 5: “. .. dilexit ‘nos 
cor novum.” et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in san- 
2iz2- ‘Cor, VI, 31: “Et haec guine suo.’ ~ 
quidam [fornicarii etc.] fuistis, sed 251 John I, 7: “Sanguis Iesu 
abluti estis, sed sanctificati estis, sed Christi... emundat nos ab omni 
iustificati estis.” peccato.” 
22 Ps. L, 9: “ Asperges me hys- 261 John III, 14: “ Translati 
sopo et mundabor, lavabis me et su-  sumus de morte ad vitam, quoniam 
per nivem dealbabor.” diligimus fratres: qui non diligit, 


23qs, I, 18: “Si fuevint peccata  manet in morte,” 


306 SANCTIFYING GRACE 
you were dead in your sins, . . . he hath quickened to- 
gether with him, forgiving you all offences.” *7 Eph. V, — . 
8: “ For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in 
the Lords ay 4 | 
(4) Baptism, in particular, completely removes all — 
guilt. Cfr. Acts XXII, 16: “Rise up, and be baptized, 
and wash away thy sins.’ ?° Hence, though concupis- a 
cence remains, the soul has no longer in it anything 
damnable, 7. e. any trace of original or mortal sin. Cfr. — 
Rom. VIII, 1: “ There is now therefore no condemna- y 
tion to them that are in Christ Jesus.” °° 


It requires no special acuteness to perceive that 
this Biblical teaching is irreconcilably opposed to — 
the Protestant theory of non-imputation. If, as a 
the Lutherans allege, God merely declared the be- 


liever just, justification would not blot out or = 


take away sin, nor could it be truthfully said — 
that light and life take the place of death and 4 
darkness; something deserving of condemnation — 
would still remain in those that are in Christ 
Jesus.** 


There are a few Scriptural texts that seem to favor — 
the Lutheran view, but they must be interpreted in con- — 
formity with the general teaching of the Bible as out- 
~ g0Rom. VIII, 1: “Nihil ergo 


nunc damnationis est tis, qui sunt 
in Christo Iesu.” Cfr, on this point — 


27 Col. II, 13: “ Et vos, quum 
mortui essetis in delictis, .. ..con- 
vivificavit cum illo donans vobis 


omnia delicta.” 

28Eph. V, 8: “ Eratis enim ali- 
quando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in 
Domino,” 

29 Acts XXII, 16: “Exsurge et 
baptizare et ablue peccata tua.” 


the dogmatic treatise on the Sacra- — 
ment of Baptism. 

31 Cfr. Becanus, Theol. Scholast., — 
P. TI, te §, Cap. Ty que: Zs i 


JUSTEBICA TION 307 
lined above. Among these texts is Ps. XXXI, 1 sq.: 
“Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and 
whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom 
the Lord hath not imputed sin, and in whose spirit there 
is no guile.” ** The parallelism apparent in this verse 
allows us to conclude that “covered” is used in the 
sense of “remitted” and that “he to whom the Lord 
hath not imputed sin” is identical with the man “in 
whose spirit there is no guile.” The text manifestly 
refers to a real forgiveness of sins, for any sin that God 
“covers” and ceases to “ impute,’ must be blotted out 
and swept away, because “all things are naked and open 
to the eyes” of the omniscient Creator.** 

Another favorite text of the Lutheran theologians is 
Rom. VII, 17: “ Now then it is no more I that do it, but 
sin that dwelleth in me.”’** This passage clearly re- 
fers to concupiscence, which remains in the sinner after 
justification, but, according to Rom. VIII, 1 and James 
I, 14 sq., is not truly and properly sin but merely called 
“sin” *> by metonymy, “ because,’ in the words of the 
Tridentine Council, “ it is of sin and inclines to sin.” 34 


S2.Psiy AMX, ©. Sq.:. “ Beati 
quorum remissae sunt iniquitates et 
quorum tecta sunt peccata; beatus 
vir cut non imputavit Dominus pec- 
catum nec est in spiritu eius dolus.’’ 

33 Heb. IV, 13. Cfr. St. Augus- 
tine,. Enarr, im Ps., II, 31, n.° 12: 
“ Deus tegat vulnera, noli tu. Nam 
si tu tegere volueris erubescens, 
medicus non curabit. Medicus tegat 
et curet; emplastro enim tegit. Sub 
tegmine medici curatur vulnus, sub 
tegmine vulnerati celatur vulnus.’’ 

84 Rom. VII, 17: “ Nunc autem 
tam non ego operor illud, sed quod 
habitat in me peccatum.” 

35 Peccatum, duapria. 

Binoesss5 “Vjin Cat. Bs. 6°.) eg 


peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat.” 
Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author 
of Nature and the Supernatural, 
Pp. 242 sqq., 261 sqq. On Jas, I, 
14 sq.. St. Augustine observes: 
“Profecto in his verbis partus a 
pariente discernitur, Pariens enim 
est concupiscentia, partus peccatum. 
Sed concupiscentia non parit nisi 
conceperit, nec concipit nisi illexerit, 
h. e. ad malum. perpetrandum ob- 
tinuerit volentis assensum. Quod 
ergo adversus eam dimicamur, hoc 
agitur, ne concipiat pariatque pecca- 
tum.’ (Contra Iulian., VI, 15, 47.) 
For a more exhaustive discussion of 
this subject see Bellarmine, De 
Justf., LI, ‘gs 


308 - SANCTIFYING GRACE 


b) The Fathers of the Church, both Greek and — 
Latin, unanimously teach that justification effects 
the forgiveness of sins. | 


St. Justin Martyr says: “ By doing penance, all who 
desire it can obtain mercy from God, and Scripture calls 
them blessed in saying: ‘ Blessed is he to whom God hath 
not imputed sin,’ which means that he receives forgive- 
ness of his sins from God, not as you, deceiving your- 


selves, and others like you aver, that God does not im- J 


pute [their]: sin to them, though they are [still] sinners.” *” 
Clement of Alexandria likens Baptism to “a bath in — 
which sins are washed off.” °8 St. Gregory Nazianzen 
says: “It is called Baptism [Bamropds, from Bdrrew, to 
immerse] because the sin is buried in water, ... and 
a bath (Aourpdv), because it washes off.” * St. Augustine — 


indignantly opposes the erroneous opinion of the Pe- 
lagians that Baptism does not take away sins but merely © 4 


“trims them off.” “Who but an unbeliever,” he ex- 


claims, “can affirm this against the Pelagians? We say, © r 


therefore, that Baptism gives remission of all sins and 
takes away crimes, not merely trims them off (radere) 
in such wise that the roots of all sins may be preserved 
in an evil flesh, as of hair trimmed on the head, when 
the sins cut down may grow again.’*° Pope St. 
Gregory the Great seems almost to have foreseen the 
heresy of the Protestant Reformers, for he says: “ But 
if there are any who say that in Baptism sins are for- 


87 Dial. c. Tryph., n. 141. indulgentiam peccatorum et auferre — 
38 Strom., 1. II. crimina, non radere; nec ut omnium 
89 Or., 40. peccatorum radices in mala carne 
40 Contra Duas Epistolas Pela- teneantur, quasi rasorum in capite 


gian., I, 13, 26: “ Quis hoc adver-  capillorum, unde crescunt iterum — 


sus Pelagianos nisi infidelis afirmet? resecanda peccata,” 
Dicimus ergo baptisma dare omnium 


JUSTIFICATION 309 


given as to outward appearance only, what can be more 
un-Catholic than such preaching? . . . He who says that 
sins are not completely forgiven in Baptism might as 
well say that the Egyptians did not perish in the Red 
Sea. But if he admits that the Egyptians actually died 
[in the Red Sea], let him also admit that of necessity 
sins completely die in Baptism.” # 

c) The theological argument may be briefly formu- 
lated as follows: We can imagine but two reasons why 
God should not truly forgive us our sins in the process 
of justification: inability and unwillingness. To say that 
He is unable to forgive us our sins would be to assert 
that the remission of sin involves a metaphysical im- 
possibility. This no Protestant will admit, because all 
believe that “nothing defiled shall enter into heaven.” *? 
To assert that God is unwilling to forgive our sins would 
be to contradict the plain teaching of Scripture, as set 
forth above. Consequently there is no reason whatever 
for assuming that God does not truly forgive us our sins 
in the process of justification. Furthermore, it would 
be incompatible with His veracity and holiness to assume 
that He merely declares the sinner to be “ free from sin,” 
without actually cleansing his soul. It would be a con- 
tradiction to assert that a man whom the truthful and all- 
holy God has declared free from sin, remains steeped in 
iniquity. Cir. Prov. XVII, 15: “ He that justifieth the 

41Ep., 1, 11, ep. 48: “Si qui tismate funditus mori.’ Other con- 
vero sunt qui dicunt, peccata in  firmatory texts apud Alb. a Bul- 


baptismate superficie tenus dimitti, sano, Instit. Theol. Dogmat. Spe- 
quid est hac praedicatione infi- cialis, ed. P. Gottfr. a Graun, O. 


delius? ... Qui dicit peccata in Cap., Vol. II, pp. 226 sq., Inns- 
baptismate funditus non  dimitti, bruck 18094. 

dicat in mari rubro Aegyptios non 42 Apoc.. XXI, 27: “Non. in- 
veraciter mortuos. Si autem fate- trabit in coelum aliquod coinqui- 


tur, Aegyptios veraciter mortuos, fa- natum,” 
teatur necesse est, peccata in bap- 


310 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


wicked [i. e. absolves him from his sins], and he that con- _ 
demneth the just, both are abominable before God.” 


According to Revelation the justification of the sinner a 


is not a mere change, with a privation for its terminus a 
quo ** and an indifferent form for its terminus ad quem, 
but involves a movement from extreme to extreme, and 
hence the genesis of the one extreme must coincide with | 
the destruction of the other. Sin, being in contrary oppo- 
sition to righteousness, must depart when righteousness 
enters the soul,*4 


AR LICE 


THE POSITIVE ELEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION 


1. HERETICAL. ERRORS: AND THE .CHURCH:— 


Calvin held that justification consists essentially | 


and exclusively in the remission of sins.’ The 


other “Reformers” maintained that there must 
also be a positive element in the process, but — 
differed in determining its nature. 


a) The ambiguous language employed by Luther and 
Melanchthon gave rise to many different opinions, 
which agreed only in one point, that is, in holding, 
contrary to Catholic teaching, that the positive ele- 
ment of justification is not inward sanctification or in- | 
herent righteousness (7. e. sanctifying grace). Prob- | 
ably the view most common among the supporters of 
the Augsburg Confession was that the sinner, by a 
“fiduciary apprehension ” of God’s mercy, as proclaimed — 

48 Privatio, orépnots. 1Cfr. Bellarmine, De Iustifica- 4 

44 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Veritate, tione, II, 1 and 6, 


qu. 28, art. 1 sqq.; Ipem, Summa 
Theol., 1a seae;, qu. 113, art. “2. 


JUSTIFICATION 311 


in the Gospel, “apprehends” the extrinsic justice of 
Christ, and with it covers his sins, which are there- 
upon no longer “imputed” to him. In other words, 
he is outwardly accounted and declared righteous in 
the sight of God, though inwardly he remains a sinner. 
With the exception of “ sola fides” there was probably no 
shibboleth in the sixteenth century so _ persistently 
dinned into the ears of Catholics and Protestants alike 
as “iustitia Christi extra nos?’ It is found in the 
Apologia written in defence of the Augsburg Confession ?- 
and recurs in the Formula of Concord.’ According to 
the “orthodox” Lutheran view, therefore, justification 
on its positive side is a purely forensic and outward 
imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which the 
sinner seizes with the arm of faith and puts on like a cloak 
to hide the wounds of his soul.* 


b) Against this dismal heresy the Tridentine 
Council solemnly declared that “Justification 
. . . 1s not remission of sins merely, but also the 
sanctification and renewal of the inward man 
through the voluntary reception of the grace and 
of the gifts,’® and anathematized all those 


2Apol. Confess. August., c. 3, 4 The Lutheran doctrine is fully 
art. 6: “ Iustificare vero hoc loco and lucidly set forth by Dr. Edward 
(Rom. VIII, 1) forensi consuetu- Preuss in his work, Die Rechtferti- 


dine significat reum absolvere et 
pronuntiare iustum, sed propter 
alienam iustitiam, videl. Christi, quae 
aliena iustitia nobis communicatur 
per fidem,’”’ 

8 Solida Declar., III, “De Fide 
Tustif.,” § 11: “Vocabulum iusti- 


gung des Siinders vor Gott (Berlin 
1868), which he retracted at his 
conversion, in 1872, Cfr. also New- 
man’s Lectures on Justification, Lec- 
ture I (8th impression, London 
1900). 

5 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Iustificatio 


ficationis in hoc negotio significat 
iustum ‘pronuntiare, a peccatis et 
aeternis peccatorum supplictis absol- 
vere propter iustitiam Christi, quae 
a Deo fidei imputatur.” 


non est sola peccatorum remissio, 
sed et sanctificatio et renovatio in- 
terioris hominis per voluntariam sus- 
ceptionem gratiae et donorum,..” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799.) 


312 _ SANCTIFYING GRACE 


who say that “men are justified either by © 
the sole imputation of the justice of Christ or by 
the sole remission of sins, to the exclusion. of the 
grace and the charity which is poured forth in 
their hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in 
them, or even that the grace whereby we are 
justified is only the favor of God.” ® 


In thus defining the doctrine of the Church, the Coun- 
cil did not, however, mean to deny that the sinner is 7 
in a true sense “ justified by the justice of Christ,’—in _ 
so far namely, as our Lord has merited for us the — 
grace of justification. He merely wished to emphasize the _ 
fact that a sinner is not formaliter justified by the imputa- 
tion of Christ’s justice. For the sake of greater clearness _ 


the various “causes” of justification are enumerated 


as follows: “Of this justification the causes are these: _ 
the final cause indeed is the glory of God and of Jesus 
Christ, and life everlasting; while the efficient cause is — 
a merciful God, who washes and sanctifies gratuitously; 
. . . but the meritorious cause is His most beloved only- | 
begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, who ... merited © 
justification for us by His most holy Passion on the ~ 
wood of the Cross; ... the instrumental cause is the © 
Sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, — 
without which no man was ever justified; lastly, the | 
sole formal cause is the justice of God, not that where- — 
by He Himself is just, but that whereby He maketh us | 
just, that, to wit, with which we being endowed are re-_ 

6@Sess. VI, can. rr: “Si quis per Spiritum Sanctum diffundatur 
dixerit, homines iustificari vel solé  atque illis inhaereat, aut etiam gra- 
imputatione iustitiae Christi vel sold tiam qua iustificamur esse tantum — 


peccatorum remissione, exclusé gratia favorem Dei, anathema sit.” (Den- 
et caritate, quae in cordibus eorum  zinger-Bannwart, n. 821.) 


pUS TIFICATION 313 
newed in the spirit of our mind, and are not only 
reputed, but are truly called, and are, just.” 7 

So important did the distinction between the causa 
meritoria and the causa formalis of justification appear 
to the Fathers of Trent, that they made it the subject 
of a separate canon, to wit: “If anyone saith that men 
are just without the justice of Christ, whereby He 
merited for us to be justified; or that it is by that jus- 
tice itself that they are formally just; let him be anath- 
ema.” ° Justification in the Catholic sense, therefore, is 
not a mere outward imputation of the justice of Christ, 
but a true inward renewal and sanctification wrought by 
a grace intrinsically inhering in the soul. This grace 
theologians call the “ grace of justification.” 


2. REFUTATION OF THE LUTHERAN THEORY OF 
IMPUTATION.—Nothing is so foreign to both the 
spirit and the letter of Holy Scripture as the idea 
that justification merely covers a man’s sins with 
a cloak of justice and leaves him unsanctified 
within. 

Justification is described in the Bible not only 
as a remission of sins,° but likewise as the begin- 


7Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Huius iu- 
Stificationis causae sunt: formalis 
quidem gloria Dei et Christi ac vita 
aeterna; efficiens vero misericors 
Deus, qui gratuito abluit et sanctifi- 
cat; ... meritoria autem dilectissi- 
mus Unigenitus suus D. N. TIesus 
Christus, qui... sud sanctissima 
passione in ligno crucis nobis iusti- 
ficationem meruit; . .. instrumen- 
talis item sacramentum  baptismi, 
quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua 
nullt unquam contigit _tustificatio ; 
demum unica formalis causa est 


iustitia Dei, non qua ipse iustus est, 
sed qua@ nos iustos facit, qua videl. 
ab eo donati renovamur spiritu men- 
tks nostrae et non modo reputamur, 
sed vere iusti nominamur et su- 
mus.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 799). 

8 Sess. VI, can. 10: “Si quis 
dixerit, homines sine Christi iustitia, 
per quam nobis merutt iustificari aut 
ber eam ipsam formaliter iustos_ esse, 
anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 820.) 

9V. supra, Article 1, 


314 SANCTIFYING GRACE 
ning of a new life,!° a renewal of the spirit,* a 
new creation,’? a regeneration,*® a supernatural — 
likeness of God,'* etc. All these similes point to_ 
a permanent state of sanctity in the soul of the 
just. 


a) The Lutheran theory of imputation can be most of 
effectively refuted by an analysis of the Scriptural 
term “regeneration” (regeneratio, dvayévvyos, madvyye- 
“Unless a man be born again of water and 
the Holy Ghost,” says our Divine Lord, “he cannot _ 
enter into the kingdom of God.” * This spiritual rebirth. 7 
wipes out sin and inwardly sanctifies the soul. The re- | 
generate sinner receives a new and godlike nature. That 


vecia ) . 


this nature can be conceived in no other way than asa 


state of sanctity and justice appears clearly from Tit. III, — 


5 sqq.: “ Not by the works of justice which we have done, 


but according to His mercy, He saved us, by the laver of — 4 
regeneration and renovation of the Holy Ghost, whom he ~ t 
hath poured forth upon us abundantly, through Jesus 
Christ our Saviour: that, being justified by His grace, we — 
may be heirs, according to the hope of life everlasting.” *° 
Both text and context show that the Apostle is here speak- — 
ing of the justification of adult sinners in Baptism, which — 
he describes as a “ laver of regeneration and renovation” — 


10\Cfr.’ Eph; TI, 53Gok \1fia35 2 
John III, 14. ‘ 
14-Cfr, Eph. FV,.2374sq. 
42 Cfir2 Cor. .V,973Gak: VI; 8: 
Jas lous Ber ba. earule a 
48:Cfr:fohn 111,55; Tit TIES. 
14:‘Cfr; “Rom. VAIIl; 29; 2 Cor, 
TD eS a 52h Pet. jh. lake 
15:John ATT, 5; 
A6-Mit. o LLL; 8 saq?: os) Newose™: 
operibus iustitiae quae fecimus nos, 


sed secundum suam misericordiam 
salvos nos fecit (€swoev huas) 
per bkavacrum regenerationis et reno- 
vationis (dua AvTpov madvyyeve 
clas Kal dvakawwwocews) Spiritus — 
Sancti, quem effudit (é&éyeev) im 
nos abunde per Iesum Christum Sal- | 
vatorem nostrum, ut  ‘iustificatt — 
(SixawwOévres) gratia ipsius haeredes — 
simus secundum spem vitae aeter-— 
nae.” 


JUSTIFICATION 315 


resulting in an “ outpouring of the Holy Ghost.” These 
phrases plainly denote a positive quality of the soul as well 
as a permanent interior grace. Regeneration consists in 
the remission of sin through Baptism, and also, more 
particularly, in man being made like God, 7. e. becom- 
ing a child of God,’’ while “ renovation” means “ put- 
ting off the old man” ?® and “ putting on the new.” ? 
The “outpouring of the Holy Ghost” effected by Bap- 
tism is not, of course, an outpouring of the Hypostasis 
of the Third Person of the Trinity, but of created 
grace, which re-forms the sinner and makes him 
just.*° This justifying grace must not be conceived as 
an actual grace, much less as a series of actual graces, for 
it is not given us merely as an aid in the performance 
of some particular act, but as a new nature. Regenera- 
tion and renovation denote a state of being, as we can 
plainly see in the case of baptized infants. It is for this 
reason that the Apostle speaks of it as a lasting state ; — 
that which theologians call the status gratiae sanctifi- 
cantis,?4 

Closely akin to the notion of “regeneration” is that 
of “re-creation.” Justification renews the sinner inwardly 
and makes of him, so to speak, a new creature, which 
has sloughed off sin and become just and holy in the 
sight of God. Cfr. 2 Cor. V, 17: “If then any be in 
Christ a new creature, the old things are passed away, 
behold all things are made new.” 2? This is all the more 
true since re-creation effects an “incorporation of man 


17 Cfr. John I, 12 sq.; Rom, VIII, eration” in the Catholic Encyclope- 
16; Gal. III, 7; IV, 6sq.; 1 John dia, Vol. XII, and A. Rademacher, 


TEP Ty, Die iibernatirliche Lebensordnung 
18 Cir. Eph, ‘IV, 22 .sqa. nach der paulinischen und johannei- 
19 Cir. (Cols) TIE, 9 :éq. schen Theologie, pp. 41 sqq., Frei- 
20 Cfr. Acts II, 38; X, 45 sqq.; burg 1903. 

Om.) V5.8: 222 Cor. V, 17: “Si qua ergo 


21 Cfr. J. Pohle, article “Regen- in Christo nova creatura (kawn 


316 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


with Christ,” and is closely connected with “regenera- 
tion of God.” Cfr. James I, 18: “ For of his own will 
hath he begotten us by the word of truth, that we might 
be some beginning of his creature.’’?* A comparison 
with Gal. VI, 15 and Gal. V, 6 fully establishes it as a 
Biblical truth that in the process of justification the sin- 
ner, through faith informed by charity, is changed into a 
new creature. “ For in Christ Jesus,’ says St. Paul, — 
“neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircum- a 
cision, but a new creature.’24 And again: “In Christ — 
Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncir- 
cumcision, but faith that worketh by charity.” ?° In both 4 
these texts the Jewish rite of circumcision is rejected a 
as useless and contrasted with justification, which by 
means of the fides formata gives birth to a “new crea- — 
ture.” This is incompatible with the Protestant notion — 
that a man is justified by being declared righteous in the , 
sight of God, though he remains inwardly unchanged.** — 


8B) The Lutherans vainly appeal to the fact that — 
Holy Scripture employs the word “justify” ** for — 
the purpose of declaring a man to be just in a — 
purely forensic sense, as in Is. V, 23: “Who jus- i 
tify the wicked for gifts.” This proves nothing — 


““Nam in Christo — 


xrlow); vetera transierunt; ecce 26: Gals, 6% 

facta sunt omnia nova.’ Cfr. Eph. JTesw neque circumcisio aliquid valet — 

LE ero neque praeputium, sed fides quae 
23 Jac. I, 18: “ Voluntarie enim per caritatem M dalhitewo (rloris 50 


genuit (amextnoev) nos verbo veri- 
tatis, ut simus initium aliquod crea- 
turae eius.”’ 

24Gal. VI, 15: “In Christo enim 
Tesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet 
neque praeputium, sed nova crea- 
iura (kawwh xriots).” 


aydrns évepyoupevn).” i 
26 On the argument from Rom 
V, 15 sqq. cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God — 
the Author of Nature and the Sun i 
pernatural, pp. 247 sqq. ” 
27 Iustificare, diKarovy. 


JUSTIFICATION 317 


tirely on texts that exclude the judicial meaning 
of the term and plainly refer to inward sanctifica- 
tion.”® 


The word “ justification” also occurs in two other 
meanings in the Bible. Ps. CXVIII, 8 and 26 it stands 
in the plural for the “law”: “I will keep thy justifica- 
tions;” °° and “Teach me thy justifications.” ®° Apoc. 
XXII, 11 and in a few other passages it signifies 
“growth” in interior holiness, which theologians call 
tustificatio secunda.** 

The Lutherans are equally unfortunate in maintain- 
ing that St. Paul countenances their theory when he 
speaks) Of)” putting. on* Christ.) Cir. Gal) TL): 27: 
“ For as many of you as have been baptized in Christ, 
have put on Christ.”*? The Apostle in employing this 
simile does not mean to say that justification consists in 
putting on an outward cloak of grace to cover sins which 
inwardly endure, but precisely the contrary, vig.: that 
the sinner by being justified is inwardly cleansed from 
sin and becomes a new creature and a child of God. This 
interpretation is supported by various parallel texts % 
and by the staple of St. Paul’s teaching. 

Another passage which the Lutherans cite in their 
favor is 1 Cor. I, 30: “. . . who [Christ Jesus] of God 
is made unto us wisdom, and justice, and sanctifica- 
tion, and redemption.” ** Christ is made unto us jus- 


28. EB. -g., Rom. V3. 15 -sqq... and 
Gal. III, 8 sqq. 

29) Ps. CX VIL, 82 
tiones tuas custodiam.” 

30) PSK iC XVILI (26 '9))2)6 
me iustificationes tuas,’? 

31 Apoc. XXII, 11: “ Qui tustus 
est, tustificetur adhuc, et sanctus 
sanctificetur adhuc.” On the dif- 


 [ustifica- 


aeaoce 


/ 


ferent meanings of the term justi- 
fication in Scripture see Bellarmine, 
De \fastificg TS ay eFi Aes 

32 Gal. Ti, 275 
enim in Christo 
Christum induistis.’ 

83 Cfr. Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 
8 sqq. 

84.1 Cor, I; 30: 


* Quicunque 
baptizati estis, 


“Qui factus est 


318 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


tice and sanctification, in what sense? Manifestly in 
the same sense in which He is made unto us wisdom 
of God, that is to say, in so far as He imparts to us 
wisdom, which thereupon becomes our own, but not in 
the sense that the wisdom of Christ is outwardly im- 
puted to us. Note that St. Paul in this and many other 
passages of his Epistles merely wishes to emphasize the 
gratuity of the Redemption and of grace to the exclusion 
of all natural merit on the part of man.* 


b) As regards the teaching of the Fathers, the 
“Reformers” themselves admitted that it was 
against them.*° 

We read in the Epistle of Barnabas, which was 
probably composed about A.D. 100:*" “Since 
then He made us new by the remission of sins, he 
made us another type, that we should have the 
soul of children, as though He were creating us 
afresh.” . 

The reason why St. Paul calls Baptism the 
“laver of regeneration” rather than the laver of 
forgiveness, is explained by St. John Chrysos- _ 
tom *8 as follows: “Because it [Baptism] not — 
only remits our sins and wipes out our misdeeds, 
but accomplishes all this in such a way as if we ~ 


nobis sapientia a Deo et iustitia ad sanctificationem refert, qua in 


(Stxaoctvn) et sanctificatio (arye 
aguds) et redemptio.” 
35 Other objections are refuted by 
Bellarmine, De Iustif., II, 9 saa. 
36 Cfr. Calvin, Instit., III, 11, § 
15: “Ac nec Augustini quidem 
sententia recipienda est, qui gratiam 


vitae novitatem per Spiritum Sane- 
tum regeneramur.” a 
37 On the Epistle of Barnabas _ 
see Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, — 
p. 24. The passage quoted will be | 
found Ep. Barn., VI, 11. 4 
38 Hom. ad Illumin., I, n. 3. 


JUSTIFICATION 310 


were born anew; °° for it entirely re-creates and 
re-forms us.” *° 

St. Ambrose regards innocence as the positive 
element of justification: “After this [2. e. Bap- 
tism] you received a white robe, to indicate that 
you stripped off the vesture of sin and put on the 
chaste garments of innocence.” *? 


Harnack claims that St. Augustine first stemmed the 
current dogmatic tradition and reshaped it by going back 
to St. Paul. Bellarmine *? refuted this audacious assertion 
long before it was rehashed by the German rationalist. 
The Council of Trent was so thoroughly imbued with 
the teaching of Augustine that its decrees and canons 
on justification read as though they were lifted bodily 
from his writings. The great “Doctor of Grace” 
flatly contradicts the Protestant theory of imputa- 
tion in stich utterances as these: “He [St. Paul] 
does not say, ‘the righteousness of man,’ ... but ‘ the 
righteousness of God,— meaning not that whereby He 
is Himself righteous, but that with which He endows 
man when, He justifies the ungodly. . . . The righteous- 
ness of God is by faith of Jesus Christ, that is, by the 
faith wherewith one believes in Christ. For here is 
not meant the faith with which Christ Himself believes, 
just as there was not meant the righteousness whereby 
God is Himself righteous. Both no doubt are ours; 
but yet they are called [in one case] God’s, and [in the 
other] Christ’s, because it is by their bounty that these 

39 ws av el dvwhev éyerviOnuev. post baptismum], ut sint indicium 

40 Kat yap dvwhev Huds Snut- quod exueris involucrum peccati, in- 
oupyel Kal KaTaoKevdter. dueris innocentiae casta velamina.” 


41De Myst., c 7:3 “ Accepisti 42 De Iustific., II, 8. 
post haec vestimenta candida [scil. 


320 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


gifts are bestowed upon man.” ** Again: “ When 
righteousness is given to us, it is not called our own 
righteousness, but God’s, because it becomes ours only 
so that we have it from God.” ** Again: “The grace 
of God is called the righteousness of God through our 
Lord Jesus Christ, not that by which the Lord is just, 
but that by which He justifies those whom from un- 
righteous He makes righteous.” ** Again: “The love 
of God! is said to be shed abroad in our hearts, not be- 
cause He loves us, but because He makes us lovers of 
Himself; just as the righteousness of God is used in the 
sense of our being made righteous by His gift.’*° Ac- 
cording to St. Augustine, therefore, justification culmi- 
nates in a true sanctification of the soul. “‘ When he [St. 
Paul] says: ‘We are transformed into the same image,’ 
he assuredly means to speak of the image of God; and 
by calling it ‘the same,’ he means that very image which 
we see in the glass, . . . and that we pass from a form 
that is obscure to a form that is bright, . .. and this 
[human] nature, being the most excellent among things — 
created, is changed from a form that is defaced into 
a form that is beautiful, when it is justified by its 
Creator from ungodliness.” 47 


43 De Spiritu et Litera, c. 9, i. 
1s: “Non dicit iustitia hominis, 
sed iustitia Dei, non qua Deus 
justus est; sed qua induit hominem, 
quum iustificat impium. . . Iustitia 
autem Dei per fidem eee Christi, 
hoc est, per fidem qua creditur im 
Christum. Sicut autem ista fides 
Christi dicta est, non qua credtt 
Christus, sic et illa iustitia Det, non 
qué iustus est Deus. Utrumque 
enim nostrum est; sed ideo Det et 
Christi dicuntur, quod eius nobis 
largitate donatur.” 


44 De Gratia Christi, c. 13: “ St 


data est nobis iustitia, non dicitur 
justitia nostra, sed Dei, quia sic fit 
nostra, ut sit nobis ex Deo.” 

45 Serm., 131: “‘ Dei gratia per 
Dominum nostrum Iesum Christum 
iustitia Dei dicitur, non quad iustus 
est Dominus, sed qua iustificat eos, 
quos ex imptis iustos facit.” f 

46 De Spir. et Lit., c. 32, n. 5627 
“Caritas Dei dicta est diffundi in — 
cordibus nostris, non qua ipse nos — 
diligit, sed qué nos facit dilectores — 
suos, sicut iustitia Dei, qua nos insti i 
eius munere efficimur.” 

47 De Trinit., XV, 8, 14: 


= 


ae Quod 2 


JUSTIFICATION 321 

The Augustinian passages which we have quoted (and 
they are not by any means all that could be quoted) 
enumerate the distinguishing marks of sanctifying grace 
in so far as it is the formal cause of justification.** 


c) The argument from Revelation can be rein- 
forced by certain philosophical considerations 
which show the absurdity of the imputation 
theory from the standpoint of common sense. 


A man outwardly justified but inwardly a sinner 
would be a moral monster, and Almighty God would 
be guilty of an intrinsic contradiction were He to re- 
gard and treat such a one as just. This contradiction is 
not removed but rather intensified by the Lutheran ap- 
peal to the extraneous justice of Christ.‘ 

The incongruity of the Lutheran doctrine of justifica- 
tion becomes fully apparent from the consequences. 
which it involves, to wit: (1) all Christians without 
distinction would possess exactly the same degree of 
sanctity and justice; (2) justification once obtained by 
fiduciary faith could not be lost except by the sin of 
unbelief; and (3) children would not be justified by 
Baptism because they are not sufficiently advanced in 
the use of reason to enable them to “apprehend” the 
external righteousness of Christ. The first of these in- 
vero att: (2 Cor. III, 18): ‘In 
eandem imaginem transformamur,’ 
utique imaginem Dei vult intellegi, 


eandem dicens istam ipsam, scil., 
quam speculamur ... atque transi- 


48 Other Patristic texts can be 
seen in Ripalda, De Ente Supernat., 
disp. 132, sect. .7; Petavius, De 
Trinit., VIII, 4-7; Bellarmine, De 
Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio, I, 4. 


mus de forma obscura in formam 
lucidam. ... Quae = natura [hu- 
mana] in rebus creatis excellentis- 
sima, quum a suo Creatore ab impi- 
etate iustificatur, a deformi forma 
formosam transfertur in formam.” 


49 For a more detailed treatment 
of this point we must refer the 
reader to Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dog- 
mat, Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 537 
sqq. 


322 ~~ +SANCTIFYING GRACE 


ferences runs counter to common sense and experience. 
The second, which Luther clothed in the shameful exhor- 
tation, “ Pecca fortiter et crede fortius et mhil nocebunt 


centum homicidia et mille stupra,” °° is repugnant to the | ; 


teaching of Scripture and destructive of morality.** The 
third consistently led to the rejection of infant baptism 
by the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, and other Protestant 
Sects, 


3. SANCTIFYING GRACE THE SOLE ForMAL — 
Cause oF JustiFIcATion.—In declaring that “in- — 
herent grace” is the “sole formal cause of justifi- — 
cation,’ the Council of Trent °’ defined it as an q 
article of faith that sanctifying grace of itself is — 
able to produce all the formal effects of justifica- _ 
tion, e. g. forgiveness of sins, the sanctification of 3 
the sinner, his adoption by God, etc.,’’ and con- — 
sequently requires no supplementary or contribu- — 
tory causes. In other words, justification is _ 
wholly and fully accomplished by the infusion of — 


sanctifying grace. 


a) It appears from the discussions preceding its sixth — 
session that the Tridentine Council not only meant — 
to condemn the heretical contention of Butzer that “in-_ 
herent grace’? must be supplemented by the “ imputed — 
justice of Christ ” as the really essential factor of justifi- 
cation,®+ but also wished to reject the view of divers con-_ 
temporary Catholic theologians ** that “ intrinsic right-_ 


50 Quoted by De Wette, II, 37. 54 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Iustific., 
51V. infra, Section 3. i iy ya | 
52 Sess. IV, cap. 7. 55 Seripando, Albertus Pighius, | 


583 V, infra, Sect. 2, Art. 2. Gropper, and others. 


#4 


JUSTIFICATION a3 
eousness”’ is inadequate to effect justification without a 
special favor Dei externus.®® In this the Fathers of the 
Council were on Scriptural ground. The principal effects 
of justification,— forgiveness of sins and internal sancti- 
fication,— are both produced by sanctifying grace. Sa- 
cred Scripture is perfectly clear on this point. It repre- 
sents sin as opposed to grace in the same way in which 
darkness is opposed to light,*" life to death,°* the new man 
to the old.5®° The one necessarily excludes the other. 
Sanctifying grace and sin cannot co-exist in the same 
subject. 

Internal sanctification may be defined as a permanent, 
vital union with God, by which the soul becomes right- 
eous and holy in His sight and obtains a claim to Heaven. 
That this is also a function of sanctifying grace appears 
from those Scriptural texts which treat of the positive 
element of justification.°° With this doctrine Tradition 
is in perfect accord, and consequently the Fathers of 
Trent were right in teaching as they did, in fact they 
could not have taught otherwise.*? 


b) While all Catholic theologians admit the in- 
compatibility of grace and sin in the same subject, 
they differ as to the kind and degree of opposi- 
tion existing between the two. Some hold that 
‘this opposition is purely moral, others that it is 
physical, again others that it is metaphysical. 


56 On the discussion referred to 59 Eph. IV, 22 sqq.; Col. III, 9. 


in the text see Pallavicini, Hist. 60 V. supra, No. 2. 

Conc, Trad. Nie hit) 12s Aug, 61 On the history of the Triden- 
Theiner, Acta Genuina Concil. tine decree regarding justification 
Trid., tom. I, pp. 222 sqq., Leipzig cfr. J. Hefner, Die Entstehungs- 
1874. geschichte des Trienter Rechtferti- 


Sip phi So i2n, Cory bw 14, 
58'Col, 3) 13; 2 John ‘EI, 14. 


gungsdekretes, Paderborn 1909. 


324 - SANCTIFYING GRACE 


a) Nominalists ® and Scotists® before the Triden- 
tine decision maintained that the distinction between 
sanctifying grace and (original or mortal) sin is based on 
a free decree of the Almighty, and therefore purely 
moral. God, they held, by a favor externus superad- 
ditus, externally supplies what sanctifying grace inter- 
nally lacks, just as a government’s stamp raises the value 
of a coin beyond the intrinsic worth of the bullion. 
Followed to its legitimate conclusions, this shallow 
theory means that sanctifying grace is of itself insuf- 
ficient to wipe out sin, and that, but for the super- 
added divine favor, grace and sin might co-exist in the 
soul. This is tantamount to saying that justification 
requires a twofold formal cause, vig.: sanctifying grace | 
and a favor Dei superadditus,— which runs counter to 
the teaching of Trent. Henno tries to escape this objec- 
tion by explaining that the favor Dei acceptans appertains 
not to the formal but merely to the efficient cause of 
justification. But this contention is manifestly untenable. 
Sanctifying grace is either able to wipe out sin, or 
it is unable: if it is unable to produce this effect, the 
favor Dei acceptans must be part of the causa formals 
of justification, and then, in Henno’s hypothesis, we 
should have a duplex causa formalis, which contradicts 
the Tridentine decree. If, on the other hand, sanctify- 
ing grace is able to wipe out sin without any favor su- 
 peradditus, then the Scotistic theory has no raison d’étre. 

8) From what we have said it follows that there 
must be at least a physical contrariety between grace and 
sin. The difference between physical and metaphysical 
opposition may be illustrated by the example of fire 
and water. These two elements are incompatible by a 


62 Ockam, Gabriel Biel, e¢ al. 63 Henno, Mastrius, ef. al. 


JUSTIFICATION 325 


law of nature. But as there is no metaphysical contra- 
diction between them, Almighty God could conceivably 
bring them together. It is this physical kind of opposi- 
tion that Suarez and a few of his followers assume to 
exist between grace and sin. Absolutely speaking, they 
say, there is no intrinsic contradiction in the assump- 
tion that God could preserve the physical entity of sanc- 
tifying grace in a soul guilty of mortal sin.** In so far as 
this school admits the existence of an internal opposition, 
which actually prevents original or mortal sin from ever 
co-existing in the soul with justifying grace, its teach- 
ing may be said to be acceptable to all Catholic theologians. 
The Scotistic view, on account of its incompatibility 
with the teaching of the Tridentine Council, is no longer 
held. 

It may be questioned, however, whether Suarez goes 
far enough in this matter, and whether the opposition 
between grace and sin could really be overcome by a 
miracle. The simultaneous co-existence of grace and sin 
seems to involve an absolute, 7. e. metaphysical, contra- 
diction. 

y) This is what the Thomists maintain with the ma- 
jority of Jesuit theologians.** As some subtle objections 
have been raised against this view, it cannot be accepted 
as theologically certain; but it undoubtedly corresponds 
better than its opposite to the spirit and letter of Scrip- 
ture. The Bible, as we have already pointed out, 
likens the opposition existing between grace and sin to 
that between life and death,®* justice and injustice, 


64 Suarez, De Gratia, 1. VII, c. tiam im e0, qui peccavit, non re- 
20, n 7: “... non obstante ill@ mittendo illi peccatum.’ 
oppositione et repugnantia connatu- 65 Vasquez, Sardagna, Antoine, 
vali potest Deus de su@ absoluté po- Mazzella, Tepe, et al. 


tentiG eam vincere et conservare gra- 66 Col. II, 13; 1 John III, 14. 


326 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

Christ and Belial, God and an idol.®’ But these are 
contradictories, ergo.°§ The same conclusion can be 
reached by arguing from the character of sanctifying 
grace as a participatio divinae naturae.®® If grace is a 
participation in the divine nature, it must be opposed to 
sin in the same way in which God Himself is opposed to 
it. Now God as the All-Holy One is metaphysically op- 
posed to sin; consequently, the same kind of opposition 
must exist between sanctifying grace and sin. 

It is alleged against this teaching that between habitual 
grace and habitual sin there is merely a disparate oppo- 
sition, 1. e. that of a physical to a moral form, the con- 
cepts of which are not mutually exclusive. But sancti- 
fying grace is more than a physical ornament of the 
soul; it is an ethical form which has for its essential 
function to render the soul holy and righteous in the | 
sight of God."° 


READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 113, and 
the commentators, especially Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 7, art. 1 
sqq.; *Bellarmine, De Justificatione, 1. Il (Opera Ommia, ed. 
Févre, Vol. VI, pp. 208 sqq., Paris 1873). 

Besides the current text-books cfr. *Jos. Wieser, S. Pauli 
Apostoli Doctrina de Iustificatione, Trent 1874; H. Th. Simar, 
Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, and ed., § 33 sqq. Freiburg 1883. 

On the Protestant notion of justification cfr. Mohler, Sym- 


67 2 Cor. VI, 14 sqq. 

68 Cfr. 1 John III, 9: “ Omnis, 
qui natus est ex Deo, peccatum non 
facit, quoniam semen ipsius (orép- 
ie avrou) 1% eo manet et non 
potest peccare (ob Stvarar amapTa- 
yew), quoniam ex Deo natus est.” 

69 V, infra, Sect. 2, Art. 1. 

70 For the solution of other dif- 
ficulties consult Tepe, Inst. Theol., 
Vol sovill spp. 
whole subject of this subdivision cfr. 
Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 7, art. 2 


152 sqq. On the 


sq. On certain incidental questions, 
é. g. whether justification takes 
place in instanti, whether the infu- 
sion of sanctifying grace in ordine 
naturae precedes or follows the for- 
giveness of sins, whether justifica- 
tion is the greatest of God’s works, 
whether it is to be regarded as a 
miracle, etc., see St. Thomas, Sum- 
ma Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 113, art. 7-103 
cfr. also Scheeben, Die Mysterien 
des Christentums, 3rd ed., pp. 543 
sqq., Freiburg 1912. 


JUSTIFICATION 327 


bolik, $10 sqq., Mainz 1800 (Robertson’s translation, pp. 82 
sqq., 5th ed., London 1906) ; Realenzyklopadie fiir prot. Theologie, 
Vol. XVI, 3rd ed., pp. 482 sqq., Leipzig 1905 (summarized in Eng- 
lish in the New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowl- 
edge, Vol. VI, pp. 275 sqq., New York 1910); Card. Newman, 
Lectures on the Doctrine of Justification, 8th impression, London 
1900; J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, 
New York 1914, pp. 150 sqq.— B. J. Otten, S. J., A Manual of the 
History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 246 sqq., 464 sq., 
470 sqq. 


SiG TION 2 


JUSTIFYING OR SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Sanctifying grace is defined by Deharbe as “ an 
unmerited, supernatural gift, imparted to the soul 
by the Holy Ghost, by which we are made just, 
children of God, and heirs of Heaven.” As it — 
makes sinners just, sanctifying grace is also called 
justifying, though this appellation can not be 
applied to the sanctification of our first parents 
in Paradise or to that of the angels and the sinless 
soul of Christ. Justification, as we have shown, 
consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace, and 
hence it is important that we obtain a correct idea 
of the latter. We will therefore consider (1) 
The Nature of Sanctifying Grace, (2) Its Effects 
in the Soul, and (3) Its Supernatural Concom1- 
TATLES. | ayia | 


ARTICLE) 1 


THE NATURE OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 


1. SANCTIFYING GRACE A “PERMANENT QUAL- _ 
ITY” OF THE SoUL.—Having no intuitive knowl- — 


edge of sanctifying grace, we are obliged, inorder — 
328 7 


ITS NATURE 320 


to obtain an idea of its true nature, to study its 
effects, as made known to us by Revelation. 
Sacred Scripture and the teaching of the Church 
do, however, enable us to form certain well-de- 
fined conclusions, of which the most important is 
that sanctifying grace must be conceived as a per- 
manent quality (qualitas permanens) of the soul. 
If it is a permanent quality, sanctifying grace 
cannot be identical with actual grace or with “un- 
created grace,” 7. e. the Person of the Holy Ghost. 


a) In conformity with such Biblical expressions as 
“the new life,” “renovation of the spirit,” “ regenera- 
tion,” “divine sonship,” etc., the Council of Trent de- 
fines justifying grace as a supernatural something “ in- 
fused” into and “inherent” in the soul. Both ideas de- 
note a permanent state, not a mere transient act or the 
result of such acts. “ The charity of God is poured forth 
by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of those that are justified, 
and is inherent therein.” + “ That justice which is called 
ours, because we are justified from its being inherent in 
us, that same is (the justice of God) because it is infused 
into us by God, through the merit of Christ.”2 “If any 
one saith that men are justified . . . to the exclusion of 
the grace and the charity which is poured forth in their 
hearts by the Holy Ghost and is inherent in them, . 
let him be anathema.”’* Hence Justification is defined by 


1Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 7: 
“Per spiritum sanctum caritas Dei 
diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui 
iustificantur, atque ipsis inhaeret.” 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 800.) 

2 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “ Quae enim 
tustitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam 


nobis inhaerentem iustificamur, illa 
eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis in- 
funditur per Christi meritum.”? 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 809.) 

8 Sess, Vij. cahsintr dt 1199) leaps 
dixerit, homines iustificari ... ex- 
clusG gratia et caritate, quae in cordi- 


330 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


the Fathers of Trent as “a translation . . . to the state 
of grace and adoption of the sons of God.” # 

Before the Tridentine Council a number of theo- 
logians held that sanctifying grace consists in some par- 
ticular actual grace or in a consecutive series of actual 
graces. This view is incompatible with the definition just 
quoted; in fact Suarez, Bellarmine, Ripalda, and others 
regard it as positively heretical or at least intolerably 
rash. During the preliminary debates at Trent some of 
the Fathers asked for an express declaration of the Coun- 
cil to the effect that justification is wrought by the instru- 
mentality of an infused habit; but their request was set 
aside on the ground that the nature of justifying grace as 
a stable habit is sufficiently indicated by the word “im- 
haeret.” ® 

That sanctifying grace is a permanent state of the soul 
may also be inferred from the Catholic teaching that the 
grace which Baptism imparts to children does not differ 
essentially from that which it imparts to adults. True, 
this teaching was not always regarded as certain;® but 


bus eorum per Spiritum sanctum 
diffundatur atque in illis inhaereat, 
... anathema sit.” (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 821.) ; 

4 Sess. VI, cap. 4: “ [Iustificatio 
est] translatio ... in statum gratiae 
et adoptionis filiorum Dei.” (Den- 
zinger-Bannwart, n. 796.) 

5 Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Cone. 
Trid., VIII, 14, 3: “ Postubantt- 
bus quibusdam, ut expressius decla- 
raretur fiert iustitiam per habitum 
infusum, delecti Patres ad id re- 
sponderunt, id satis explicart per 
vocem ‘inhaeret, quae stabilitatem 
significat et habitibus congruit, non 
actibus.’ It was on the same 
ground that Pius V censured the 
forty-second proposition of Baius, 


vig.: “Lustitia quad tiustificatur per 
fidem impius, consistit formaliter in 
obedientia mandatorum, quae est 
operum iustitia; non autem in gratia 
aliqua animae infusa, qua adoptatur 
homo in filium Dei, et secundum 
interiorem hominem renovatur ac 
divinae naturae consors efficitur.’’ 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 1042.) 

6 Cfr. the Cap. Maiores of Pope 
Innocent III (Decret., 1. 3, tit. 
42, De Bapt.): ‘“ Aliis asserentibus, 
per virtutem baptismi parvulis qui- 
dem culpam remitti, sed gratiam non 
conferri; nonnullis dicentibus, di- 
mitti peccatum et virtutes infundt 
quantum ad habitum, non quoad 
usum.” 


ee 


ITS NATURE 331 


at the Ecumenical Council of Vienne, A.D. 1311, Pope 
Clement V declared it to be ‘the more probable opin- 
ion,’ * and it was rendered absolutely certain by the Tri- 
dentine decision that infant Baptism results not only in 
the remission of sins, but likewise in an infusion of sanc- 
tifying grace. This being so, there can be no essential 
difference between the justification of children and that 
of adults. Now it cannot be actual grace which renders 
children righteous in the sight of God, for they are unable 
to avail themselves of actual grace on account of the 
undeveloped state of their intellect. The grace that Bap- 
tism imparts to them is consequently a gratia inhaerens 
et informans, that is, a permanent state of grace; and it 
must be the same in adults.® 

Peter Lombard ® identified sanctifying grace with the 
gratia increata, i. e. the Person of the Holy Ghost. 
This notion was combatted by St. Thomas? and im- 
plicitly rejected by the Tridentine Council when it declared 
that sanctifying grace inheres in the soul and may be 
increased by good works.**_ To say that the Holy Ghost 
is poured forth in the hearts of men, or that He may be 


7De Summa Trinit. et Fide  modernorum theologorum magis con- 
Cath: “ Quanium ad  effectum sonam et conformem sacro appro- 
baptismi in parvulis reperiuntur  bante concilio duximus eligendam.” 


doctores quidam theologi opiniones 
contrarias habuisse, quibusdam ex 


8 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 
4; Sess. VII, can. 13. For a fuller 


ipsis dicentibus, per virtutem baptis- 
mt parvulis quidem culpam remittt, 
sed gratiam non conferri, aliis e 
contra asserentibus, quod et culpa 
eisdem in baptismo remittitur et 
virtutes ac informans gratia in- 
funduntur quoad habitum, etsi non 
pro illo tempore quoad usum. Nos 
attendentes  generalem  efficaciam 
mortis Christi, quae per baptisma 
applicatur pariter omnibus baptiza- 
tis, opinionem secundam tamquam 
probabiliorem et dictis sanctorum et 


treatment consult Suarez, De Gratia, 
VI, 3; Vasquez, Comment, in S. 
Lh.) F525) disp) 204, cap. 6, The 
false views of Hermes and Hirscher 
are refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie 
der Vorzeit, Vol. II, and ed., pp. 
254-343, Minster 1872, 

9 Libri Quatuor Sent., I, dist, £75 
§ 18, 

10 Summa Theol., 2a 2a¢, qu. 23, 
Bhta2. 

11 Cone. Trid., Sess. VI, can, 24. 


232 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

increased by good works, would evidently savor of Pan- 
theism. The Holy Ghost pours forth sanctifying grace 
and is consequently not the formal but the efficient cause 
of justification.” 

b) The gratia inhaerens permanens is not a mere rela- 
tion or denominatio extrinseca, but a positive entity pro- 
ductive of real effects,* and must consequently be con- 
ceived either as a substance or as an accident. We have 
shown that it is not identical with the uncreated substance 
of the Holy Ghost. Neither can it be a created substance. 
The idea of an intrinsically supernatural created substance 
involves a contradiction.1* Moreover, sanctifying grace 
in its nature and purpose is not an entity independently 
co-existing with the soul but something physically inherent 
init. Now, a thing which has its existence by inhering in 
some other thing is in philosophic parlance an “ accident.” 
St. Thomas expressly teaches that, “since it transcends 
human nature, grace cannot be a substance nor a substan- 
tial form, but is an accidental form of the soul itself.” 
Agreeable to this conception is the further Thomistic 
teaching that sanctifying grace is not directly created by 
God, but drawn (educta) from the potentia obedientialis 
of the soul.® Not even the Scotists, though they held 
grace to be created out of nothing" claimed that it was 
a new substance. 


12 Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 


Ppp. 263 sq. 
18 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 
hheoli' va Y2aes qui; 210, (art. nr; 


Summa contra Gentiles, III, 150. 

14 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernat- 
ural, p. 193. 

15 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. I10, 
art, 2, ad 2: “ Omnis substantia 
vel est ipsa natura rei, cuius est 
substantia, vel est pars naturae, 


secundum quem modum materia vel 
forma substantia dicitur. Et quia 
gratia est supra naturam humanam, 
non potest esse quod sit substantia 
aut forma substantialis, sed est 
forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id 
enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, 
accidentaliter fit in anima partici- 
pante divinam bonitatem.” 

16 Cfr. Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 
G;vart. 2: 

17 This theory was based on such 


ITS NATURE 333 


An accident that inheres in a substance permanently 
and physically is called a quality (qualitas, morys). 
Consequently, sanctifying grace must be defined as a 
supernatural quality of the soul. This is the express 
teaching of the Roman Catechism: “Grace... is a 
divine quality inherent in the soul, and, as it were, a 
certain splendor and light that effaces all the stains of 
our souls and renders the souls themselves brighter and 
more beautiful.” 18 


2. SANCTIFYING GRACE AN INFUSED Hasit.— 
Sanctifying grace may more specifically, though 
with a lesser degree of certainty, be described 
as a habit (habitus). Being entitatively super- 
natural, this habit must be infused or “drawn 
out” by the Holy Ghost. 


a) Aristotle * distinguishes four different sets of quali- 
ties: (1) habit and disposition ; (2) power and incapacity ; 
(3) passio (the power of causing sensations) and patibilis 
qualitas (result of the modification of sense) ; (4) figure 
and circumscribing form (of extended bodies). As 
sanctifying grace manifestly cannot come under one of 
the three last-mentioned heads, it must be either a habit or 
a disposition. Habit denotes a permanent and compara- 
tively stable quality, by which a substance, considered as to 
its nature or operation, is well or ill adapted to its natural 
end.” As a permanently inhering quality, sanctifying 


texts as Ps. L., 12: “Cor mundum  chriores et splendidiores reddit.’’ 


crea in me.” 

18 Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 2 de Bapt., 
qu. 49: “Est autem gratia . 
divina qualitas in anima inhaerens 
ac veluti splendor quidam et lux, 
quae animarum nostrarum maculas 
omnes delet ipsasque animas pul- 


On the supernatural character of 
sanctifying grace see Pohle-Preuss, 
God the Author of Nature and the 
Supernatural, pp, 191 sqq. 

19 Categ., 6. 

20°... qualitas difficile mobilis, 
secundum quam res bene vel male 


334 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


grace must be a habit. Hence its other name, “ habitual 
grace.’ The Scholastics draw a distinction between 
entitative and operative habits. An operative habit 
(habitus operativus) gives not only the power (potentia) 
to act, but also a certain facility, and may be either good, 
bad, or indifferent. An entitative habit (habitus entita- 
-tivus) is an inherent quality by which a substance is 
rendered permanently good or bad, e. g. beauty, ugliness, 
health, disease.’ 

Philosophy knows only operative habits. But sanctify- 
ing grace affects the very substance of the soul. Hence 
the supplementary theological category of entitative 
habits. ‘‘ Grace,’ says St. Thomas, “ belongs to the first 
species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a 
habit, because it is not immediately ordained to action, but 
to a kind of spiritual being, which it produces in the 
soul.” 24. There is another reason why grace cannot be 
called a habit in the philosophical sense of the term: — it 
supplies no acquired facility to act. This consideration led 
Suarez to abstain altogether from the use of the term 
“habit” in connection with grace,”? and induced Cardinal 
Bellarmine to describe sanctifying grace as a qualitas per 
modum habitus,2 by which phrase he wished to indicate 
that it imparts a supernatural perfection of being rather 


se habet in ordine ad swam naturam — ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam 


et ad operationem vel finem eius.” 
Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 
2ae, qu. 19, att '23).0S.,  Sehithni, 
Principia Philosophica ad Mentem 
Aquinatis, pp. 574 sqq., Turin 1886; 
A. Lehmen, Lehrbuch der Philoso- 
phie auf aristotélisch-thomistischer 
Grundlage, Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 398 
sqq., Freiburg 1904. 

21 De Veritate, qu. 27, art. 2, ad 
7: “Gratia est in prima 
qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit 
dict habitus, quia non immediate 


specie 


esse spiritale, quod in anima facit.” 

22 De Gratia, VI, 4, 1: “‘ Abstinu- 
imus ab hac voce, quia per habitum 
solet wmtelligi principium actus; 
quamvis, si vox illa latius sumatur, 
pro quacumque qualitate perficiente 
animam, quae non sit actus secun- 
dus, eadem certitudine, qua ostendi- 
mus dari gratiam permanentem, con- 
cluditur esse qualitatem habitualem.”’ 

23 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I, 
Be 


ifs NATURE 335 


than a facility to act. To obviate these and similar sub- 
tleties the Council of Trent defined sanctifying grace sim- 
ply as a permanent quality. 

Nevertheless scientific theology employs the term 
habitus because it has no other philosophical category 
ready to hand. This defect in the Aristotelian system 
is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that besides 
the supernatural, there are distinctly natural qual- 
ities which “belong to the first species,” though they 
impart no facility to act but merely a disposition to certain 
modes of being, e. g. beauty, health, etc. 

There is also a positive reason which justifies the defi- 
nition of sanctifying grace as a habit. It is that grace 
imparts to the soul, if not the facility, at least the power 
to perform supernaturally meritorious acts, so that it is 
really more than a habitus entitativus, namely, a habitus 
(at least remotely) operativus.?+ 

b) The Scholastic distinction between native and ac- 
quired habits does not apply in the supernatural domain, 
because the supernatural by its very definition can never 
be either a part or an acquisition of mere nature2° It 
follows from this that supernatural habits, both entitative 
and operative, can be imparted to the human soul in no 
other way than by infusion (or excitation) from above. 
Hence the name habitus infusus. When the Holy Ghost 
infuses sanctifying grace, the habitus entitativus imparts 
to the soul a supernatural principle of being, while the 
habitus operativus confers upon it a supernatural power, 
which by faithful codperation with (actual) grace may be 


24Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- 
naturali, disp. 30. Under these cir- 


sanctificantem esse habitum, licet 
esse temere dictum, non posset 


cumstances Suarez was justified in 
Saying, in regard to the degree of 
certitude to be attributed to this 
teaching: “Si quis negaret gratiam 


tamen ut haereticum damnari,’ 

25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernatu- 
ral, pp. 190 sqq. 


336 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

developed into a facility to perform salutary acts. Hence, 
if we adopt the division of habits into entitative and op- 
erative, sanctifying grace must be defined first as an en- 
titative habit (habitus entitatiwwus), because it forms the 
groundwork of permanent righteousness, sanctity, divine 
sonship, etc.; and, secondly, as an infused habit, because it 
is not born in the soul and cannot be acquired by practice. 
This view is in accord with Sacred Scripture, which de- 
scribes the grace of justification as a divine seed abiding 
in man,?* a treasure carried in earthen vessels,?’ a regen- 
eration by which the soul becomes the abode of God” 
and a temple of the Holy Ghost.” 


3. THE CoNTROVERSY REGARDING THE AL- 
LEGED IDENTITY OF SANCTIFYING GRACE AND 
CuHarity.—As justifying grace and theological 
love (charity) are both infused habits, the ques- 
tion arises as to their objective identity. The © 
answer will depend on the solution of the problem, 
just treated, whether sanctifying grace is pri- 
marily an entitative or an operative habit. Of 
theological love we know that it is essentially an 
operative habit, being one, and indeed the chief 


26 Cir, 1 ‘John, “11, 9: iy oTrépp.a 
avrov [scil. Qeot] év adr@ pévet.” 
27 Cire 2a? Cor, LV 7 Sy eo) the- 
saurum in vasis fictilibus.” 
28 Cir) Johny ex1V.,) 23): 
sionem apud eum faciemus.” 
29 Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 16.—On 
the subtle question whether  ha- 
bitual grace is to be regarded as 
a real or merely as a modal accident 


V, 3rd ed., pp. 181 sqq., Freiburg 
1908. An extreme and altogether 
unacceptable view is that of Billu- 
art (De Gratia, diss. 6, art. 2), who 
regards sanctifying grace as an ab- 
solute accident, 7. e. one which the 
omnipotence of God could miracu- 
lously sustain if the soul ceased to 
exist. Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VII, 
15; Schiffni, De Gratia Divina, p. 


* Man- 


of the soul, see Tepe, Inst. Theol., 
Vol. III, pp. 154 sqq., Paris 1896; 
Chr. Pesch, Prael. Dogmat., Vol. 


289; Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, 
pp. 164 sqq. 


ITS NATURE 337 


of the “three theological virtues.” What we 
have said in the preceding paragraph will enable 
the reader to perceive, at the outset, that there 
is a real distinction between grace and charity, 
and that consequently the two can not be identi- 
cal. | 

a) Nevertheless there is an imposing school of 
theologians who maintain the identity of grace 
with charity. They are Scotus *° and his follow- 
ers,°* Cardinal Bellarmine,®? Molina, Lessius, Sal- 
meron, Vasquez, Sardagna, Tournely, and others. 
Their principal argument is that Holy Scripture 
ascribes active justification indiscriminately to 
theological love and sanctifying grace, and that 
some of the Fathers follow this example. Here 
are a few of the Scriptural texts quoted in favor 
of this opinion. Luke VII, 47: “Many sins are 
forgiven her, because she hath loved much.” * 
I Pet. IV, 8: “Charity covereth a multitude of 
sins. °° “I John [V, 7: . “Every one that loveth 
is born of God.” *° St. Augustine seems to iden- 
tify the two habits in such passages as the follow- 
ing: “Inchoate love, therefore, is inchoate 


righteousness; . . . great love is great righteous- 
30 Comment. in Quatuor Libros ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit 
Sent., II, dist. 27. : (nydmrnoev) multum.” 
31 E. g., Mastrius, De Iustif., disp. 341 Pet. IV, 8: “ Caritas (dyd- 
7, qu. 6. : 7) operit multitudinem  pecca- 
32 De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, torum.” 
iLONS, 851 John IV, 7: “Omnis qui 
33 Luke VII, 47: “ Remittuntur  diligit (mas 6 dyamrwyv) ex Deo 


natus est.” 


i838 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


ness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.” °° 
According to the Tridentine Council, “the justifi- 
cation of the impious’ takes place when “‘the char- 
ity of God is poured forth . . . in the hearts of 
those that are justified, and is inherent therein.” #7 
It is argued that, if charity and grace produce 
the same effects, they must be identical as causes, 
and there can be at most a virtual distinction be- 
tween them. This argument is strengthened by 
the observation that sanctifying grace and theo- 
logical love constitute the supernatural life of the 
soul and the loss of either entails spiritual death. 


These arguments prove that grace and charity are in- 
separable, but nothing more. All the Scriptural and Pa- 
tristic passages cited can be explained without recourse to 
the hypothesis that they are identical. Charity is not su- 
perfluous alongside of sanctifying grace, because the pri- 
mary object-of grace is to impart supernatural being, 
whereas charity confers a special faculty which enables 
the intellect and the will to elicit supernatural salutary 
acts. 


b) The majority of Catholic theologians ** hold 
with St. Thomas °° and his school that grace and 
charity, while inseparable, are really distinct, 
sanctifying grace as a habitus entitativus impart- 


36 De Natura et Gratia, c. 70, n. 
84: “ Caritas ergo inchoata, in- 
choata tustitia est,.. 


fecta, perfecta iustitia est.’’ 
87 Conc. .Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 7: 


“. .. dum caritas Dei diffundiiur 


. Caritas ma- 
gna, magna iustitia est, caritas per- 


in cordibus.eorum qui iustificantur 
atque ipsis inhaeret.” 

38 Preéminently Suarez, Tanner, 
Ripalda. 

39 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. I10, 
art. 3.sq.; De Veritate, qu. 27, art. 2. 


ITS. NATURE ao 


ing to the soul a supernatural being, whereas 
charity, being purely a habitus operativus, confers 
a supernatural power. 


Let us put the matter somewhat differently. Grace 
inheres in the substance of the soul, while charity has its 
seat in one of its several faculties. Inhering in the very 
substance of the soul, grace, by a physical or moral power, 
produces the three theological virtues — faith, hope, and 
love. “As the soul’s powers, which are the wellsprings 
of its acts, flow from its essence,” says the Angelic Doc- 
tor, ‘so the theological virtues flow from grace into the 
faculties of the soul and move them to act.’ *® And 
St. Augustine: ‘ Grace precedes charity.” * 


This is a more plausible view than the one we 
have examined a little farther up, and it can claim 
the authority of Scripture, which, though it occa- 
sionally identifies the effects of grace and charity, 
always clearly distinguishes the underlying habits. 
Giana Cor NIL G3). he erace ot our ford 
Jesus Christ and the charity of God.” * 1 Tim. I 
14: “The grace of our Lord hath abounded ex- 
ceedingly with faith and love.” ** Furthermore, 
“regeneration” and “‘new-creation” in Biblical us- 
age affect not only the faculties of the soul, but its 


40 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 
110, art. 4, ad 1: “ Sicut ab essen- 
tia animae effluunt eius potentiae, 
quae sunt operum principia, ita etiam 
ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes 
[theologicae] in potentias animae, 
per quas [virtutes] potentiae moven- 
tur ad actus.” 

41 De Dono Perseverantiae, c. 16, 


n. 41: “‘Gratia praevenit carita- 
tem.”’ ; 

42 2 Cor. XIII, 13: “ Gratia Do: 
mint nostri Iesu Christi et caritas 
Dei.’ 

431 Tim. I, 14: “ Superabunda- 
vit autem gratia Domini nostri cum 
fide et dilectione.” 


340 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


substance. Finally, many councils consistently 
distinguish between gratia and caritas (dona, vir- 
tutes )—a distinction which has almost the force 
of a proof that grace and charity are not the same 
thing.** These councils cannot have had in mind 
a purely virtual distinction, because theological 
love presupposes sanctifying grace in exactly the 
same manner as a faculty presupposes a substance 
or nature in which it exists. The Roman Cate- 
chism expressly designates the theological virtues 
as “concomitants of grace.” * 


The question nevertheless remains an open one, as 
neither party can fully establish its claim, and the Church 
has never rendered an official decision either one way or 
the other, * 


4. SANCTIFYING GRACE A PARTICIPATION OF 
THE SOUL IN THE Divine Nature.—tThe highest 
and at the same time the most profound concep- 
tion of sanctifying grace is that it is a real, 
though of course only accidental and analogical, 
participation of the soul in the nature of God. 
That sanctifying grace makes us “partakers of 


44 Cfr. Conc. Viennense, A.D. Ente Supernaturali, disp. 132, n. 


1311: “. .. gratiam informantem 132, n. 53): “ Haec controversia 
et virtutes.” Conc. Trid., Sess. VI,  olim celebris fuit. Nunc facile diri- 
cap. 7: “. .. per voluntariam sus- mitur, quum iam constiterit nullius 
ceptionem gratiae et donorum.’ partis argumenta plane convincere.”’ 
Sess. VI, can. 11: “. .. exclusG@ On the theological aspects of Her- 
gratia et caritate.” bart’s philosophy, which denies the 


45 For a fuller treatment of this existence of qualities and faculties 
topic consult Billuart, De Gratia, in the soul, see Heinrich-Gutber- 
diss.64,art.-4. let, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 

46 Ripalda justly observes (De _ VIII, p. 560, Mainz 1897. 


Se ee a 


ITSyNATURE 341 


the divine nature” is of faith, but the manner in 
which it effects this participation admits of differ- 
ent explanations. 

a) The fact itself can be proved from Sacred 
Scripture, Cir. 2) Pets la: By whom | Christ] 
He [the Father] hath given us great and precious 
promises: that by these you may be made partak- 
ers of the divine nature.” *” To this text may be 
added all those which affirm the regeneration of 
the soul in God, because regeneration, being a new 
birth, must needs impart to the regenerate the na- 
ture of his spiritual progenitor. Cfr. John I, 
2: ) (Who are born; not jot bloody).),. bat ot 
God? )*3.\John) Ths) “Unless aman) bes bor 
again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot 
enter into the kingdom of heaven.” *” St. James 
I, 18: “For of his own will hath he begotten us 
by the word of truth.” °° 1 John ITI, 9: “Whoso- 
ever is born of God, committeth no sin.” °? 


The Fathers of the Church again and again extol the 
deification (deificatio, Oetwors) of man effected by sanctify- 
ing grace and compare the union of the soul with God 
to the commingling of water with wine, the penetration 


Gi ALOI DY, Ares, etc. 


AT 2)\Pet. I, 43. °..0\.. per. quem 
[i. e. Christum] maxima et pretiosa 
nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec 
eficiamini divinae consortes naturae 
(Oelas Kowvwvot picews).” 

48 John I, 13: “..... qui non ex 
sanguinibus,... sed ex Deo nati 
sunt.” 


Sr 


Athanasius *? begins his 
49 John III, 5: ‘“ Nist quis rena- 
tus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, 
non potest introire in regnum Det,’ 
50 Jac. I, 18: ‘ Voluntarie enim 
genuit nos verbo veritatis.” 
511 John III, 9: “ Omnis qui na- 
tus est ex Deo, peccatum non facit.”’ 
52 Or, contr. Arian., I, 39. 


342 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Christological teaching with the declaration: ‘“ He 
was not, therefore, first man and then God, but first God 
and then man, in order that He might rather deify us.” °° 
St. Augustine describes the process of deification as fol- 
lows: “ He justifies who is just of Himself, not from 
another; and He deifies who is God of Himself, not by 
participation in another. But He who justifies also 
deifies, because He makes [men] sons of God through 
justification. . . . We have been made sons of God and 
gods; but this is a grace of the adopting [God], not the 
nature of the progenitor. The Son of God alone is 
God; ... the others who are made gods are made gods 
by His grace; they are not born of His substance, so as 
to become that which He is, but in order that they may 
come to Him by favor and become co-heirs with 
Christ.” °* The idea underlying this passage has found 
its way into the liturgy of the Mass,°® and Ripalda is 
justified in declaring that it cannot be denied without 
rashness.*° 


b) In trying to explain in what manner grace 
enables us to partake of the divine nature, it 


53 tya maddov nuas Oeoroijon- 

54In Psalmos, 49, n. 2: “ Ille 
iustificat, qui per seipsum, non ex 
alio wustus est; et ille deificat qui 
per seipsum non alterius participa- 
tione Deus est. Qui autem wisti- 
ficat, ipse deificat, quia iustificando 
filios Det facit.... Fili Dei facts 
sumus et du facti sumus; sed hoc 
gratia est adoptantis, non natura 
generantis. Unicum enim Dei Filius 
Deus, ... ceteri qui dit fiunt, gratia 
ipsius fiunt, non de substantia ipsius 
nascuntur, ut hoc sint quod ille, sed 
ut per beneficium perveniant ad eum 
et sint cohaeredes Christi.’ Many 
other cognate Patristic texts in Ri- 


‘naturali, disp. 132, sect. 7: 


palda, De Ente Supernaturali, disp. 
132, sect. 7-9. 

55 See, e. g., the Offertory and 
Preface for the festival of the As- 
cension of our Lord and the Secreta 
for the fourth Sunday after Easter. 

56 Cfr. Ripalda, De Ente Super- 
Ber 
gratiam vero habitualem fieri ho- 
minem participem divinae naturae 
ideoque gratiam esse participationem 
deitatis, adeo frequens est et con- 
stans theologorum assertum, ut 
absque temeritate negari non possit.”” 
On the teaching of St. Thomas and 
the Thomists see Billuart, De Gratia, 
diss. 4, art. 3. 


Se i a a ee 


ITS NATURE 343 


is well to keep in view the absolutely supernatural 
character of sanctifying grace and the impossi- 
bility of any deification of the creature in the strict 
sense of the term. ‘The truth lies between these 
two extremes. 


A few medieval mystics®*’ and modern Quietists °® 
were guilty of exaggeration when they taught that 
grace transforms the human soul into the substance of 
the Godhead, thus completely merging the creature in its 
Creator. This contention ®® leads to Pantheism. How 
can the soul be merged in the Creator, since it con- 
tinues to be subject to concupiscence? ‘‘ We have 
therefore,” says St. Augustine, ‘even now begun to be 
like Him, as we have the first-fruits of the Spirit; but 
yet even now we are unlike Him, by reason of the old 
nature which leaves its remains in us. In as far, then, 
as we are like Him, in so far are we, by the regenerating 
Spirit, sons of God; but in as far as we are unlike Him, 
in so far are we the children of the flesh and of this 
world,’’ °° 

On the other hand it would be underestimating the 
power of grace to say that it effects a merely external 
and moral participation of the soul in the divine nature, 
similar to that by which those who embraced the faith of 


57 Cir. Prop. Ekkardi a. 1329 °&2sana.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 


damn. a Ioanne XXII, prop. 10, 
quoted in Denzinger-Bannwart’s En- 
chiridion, n. 510. 

58 Cir. Prop. Mich. de Molinos 
a 1687 damn. ab Innocentio XI, 
prop. 5, in Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
1225, 

59 The Fourth Council of the 
Lateran (A, D. 1218) calls it “ doc- 
trina non tam haeretica quam in- 


433-) 

60 St. Augustine, De Peccatorum 
Meritis et Remissione, II, 8, 10: 
“Nunc ergo et similes esse iam 
coepimus primitias spiritus habentes, 
et adhuc dissimiles sumus per re- 
liquias vetustatis. Proinde inquan- © 
tum similes, in tantum regenerante 
Spiritu filii Dei; inquantum autem 
dissimiles, in tantum filit carnis et 
saeculi,”’ 


344 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Abraham were called “ children of Abraham,” and those 
who commit heinous crimes are called “sons of the 
devil.” According to the Fathers *! and theologians, to 
“partake of the divine nature” means to become inter- 
nally and physically like God and to receive from Him 
truly divine gifts, 7. e. such as are proper to God alone and 
absolutely transcend the order of nature.*? Being self- 
existing, absolutely independent, and infinite, God cannot, 
of course, be regarded as the formal cause of created 
sanctity; yet the strictly supernatural gifts which He 
confers on His creatures, especially the beatific vision 
and sanctifying grace, can be conceived only per modum 
causae formalis (not informantis), because through them 
God gives Himself to the creature in such an intimate 
way that the creature is raised up to and transfigured by 
Him.®* Consequently, the so-called deificatio of the soul 
by grace is not a real deification, but an assimilation of 
the creature to God.** 


c) Which one of God’s numerous attributes 
forms the basis of the supernatural communica- 
tion made to the soul in the bestowal of grace, is 
a question on which theologians differ widely. 
The so-called incommunicable attributes, (self- 
existence, immensity, eternity, etc.), of course, 


61 Quoted by Ripalda, De Ente 
Supernaturali, disp. 132, sect. 9. 


63 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 


62 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 
Ta.2ae qu, 12, art. 1:' “Donum 
autem gratiae excedit omnem facul- 
tatem naturae creatae, quum nihil 
aliud sit quam quaedam participatio 
divinae naturae, quae excedit omnem 
aliam naturam.”’ 


butes, pp. 165 sqq.; Christology, pp. 
85 sqq. 

64 Cfr. St. John of Damascus, De 
Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12 “ [&vOpw- 
mov] Oeovmevoy Sé weToXH THS Oelas 
E\AduWews Kal ovK els THv Oelav 
peOrorduevoy ovcoliar.” 


ITS NATURE 345 


cannot be imparted to the creature except by way 
of a hypostatic union.*° 

Gonet °° misses the point at issue, therefore, when He 
declares the essential characteristic of deification to be the 
communication to the creature of the divine attributes 
of self-existence and infinity. Self-existence is absolutely 
incommunicable.** Somewhat more plausible, though 
hardly acceptable, is Ripalda’s opinion that deification 
formally consists in the participation of the creature in the 
holiness of the Creator, particularly in the supernatural 
vital communion of the soul with God in faith, hope, and 
charity, thus making sanctifying grace the radix totius 
honestatis moralis.6® While it is perfectly true that the 
supernatural life of the soul is a life in and through God, 
and that the very concept of sanctifying grace involves a 
peculiar and special relation of the soul to God, the Bibli- 
cal term xowwvia Oeias dicews points to a still deeper prin- 
ciple of the sanctifying vita deiformis. This principle, 
as some of the Fathers intimate, and St. Thomas ex- 
pressly teaches,® is the absolute intellectuality of God. 
Hence the object of sanctifying grace is to impart to the 
soul in a supernatural manner such a degree of intellec- 
tuality as is necessary to perceive the absolute Spirit — 
here on earth in the obscurity of faith, and in the life be- 
yond by the lumen’ gloriae.” This view is to a 


God: His 70 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VII, 
and Atiri- 1, 30: ‘Vera ergo excellentia gra- 


65 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
Knowability, Essence, 


butes, pp. 165 sqq. 

66 Clyp. Thomist., tom, VI, disp. 
2, S<T0! 

67 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VII, 1, 
27: “Eo ipso quod divinum esse 
participatur, non participatur ut 
imparticipatum est.’ 

68 De Ente Supernaturali, 
20, sect. 14. 

69S. Theol., 1a, qu. 93, art. 4. 


disp. 


tiae habitualis, propter quam dicitur 
esse singularis participatio divinae 
naturae, est... quia, quum natura 
divina sit quaedam  intellectualis 
natura altioris ordinis quam sit vel 
esse possit ulla substantia intellec- 
tualis creata, ille gradus intellectuali- 
tatis, qui est in divina natura, 
divino quodam et  supernaturali 
modo participatur pen habitualem 


346 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


certain extent confirmed by Sacred Scripture, which de- 
scribes the regeneration of the sinner as a birth of spirit 
from spirit. It is also held by some of the Fathers, 
who attribute to sanctifying grace both a deifying and 
a spiritualizing power. Thus St. Basil’ says: “The 
spirit-bearing souls, illuminated by the Holy Ghost, 
themselves become spiritual ** and radiate grace to others. 
Hence . . . to become like unto God,” is the highest of all 
goals: to become God.” * Finally, since the Holy Ghost, 
as the highest exponent of the spirituality of the divine 
nature, by His personal indwelling crowns and consum- 
mates both the regeneration of the soul and its assimila- 
tion to God, there is a strong theological probability in 
favor of Suarez’s view. Of course the process does not 
attain its climax until the creature is finally admitted to 
the beatific vision in Heaven. Cfr.1 John III,2: “We 
are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared 
what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, 
we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as 
Plenis. ite 


gratiam, quo quidem modo 
a nulla substantia creata per 
se ipsam vel. per potentiam sibi con- 
naturalem  participart potest. ... 
Divina entin essentia in ratione 
obiecti intelligibilis in se et per vi- 


71 John TIT)! 63: ctr. 2 Cor, LIT) 18; 
Eph.) V3\.28. 

72 De Spiritu Sancto, c. 9, n. 23. 

73 mvevmaTiKal. 

74% mpos Ocdv duolwors. 

75 Pedy yevécdar. 


sionem intuitivam ad ipsam Dei es- 761 John III, 2: “Nunc filu 
sentiam immediate terminatam adeo Dei sumus et nondum apparuit, quid 
est elevata et excellens ratione erimus; scimus quoniam, quum 


purissimae actualitatis et immatert- 
alitatis suae, ut a nulla substantia 
intellectualt  possit connaturaliter 
videri, nist a seipsa. Per gratiam 
vero et dona supernaturalia elevatur 
natura creata intellectualis ad par- 
ticipationem illius gradus intellectua- 
litatis divinae, in quo possit obiectum 
tllud intelligibile divinae essentiae 
in se intueri.” 


apparuerit, similes et erimus 6motot 


avira éodbucba), quoniam videbimus 


eum sicuti est.” On this passage see 
Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, 
Essence, and Attributes, pp. 96 sq. 
On the whole subject treated in this 
subdivision consult H'einrich-Gutber- 
let, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
VIII, pp. 588 sqq.; A. Rademacher, 


’ Die iibernatiirliche Lebensordnung 


ITS EFFECTS 347 


ARTICLE 2 


THE EFFECTS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 


We shall better understand the nature of sanctifying 
grace by studying what are known as its “ formal effects.” 
As the causa efficiens of a thing is commonly farther re- 
moved from our mental grasp than its effects, we are 
ordinarily more familiar with the latter than with the 
former. For this reason the glories of divine grace can be 
best explained to children and to the faithful in general by 
describing the effects it produces in the soul.t 


I. SANcTITY.—The first among the formal ef- 
fects of sanctifying grace (an effect connoted by 
iouvery. mame), .1s; sanctity. Ppny IVa. ian 
“Put on the new man, who according to God is 
created in justice and holiness of truth.’? The 
Tridentine Council explicitly mentions sanctity as 
an effect of sanctifying grace: “Justification 
. . . 1s not remission of sins merely, but also the 
sanctification and renewal of the inward man 
through the voluntary reception of the grace and 
of the gifts whereby man from unjust becomes 


nach der paulinischen und johan- 
neischen Theologie, pp. 88 sqq., 
Freiburg 1903; A. Prumbs, Die 
Stellung des Trienter Kongils zu 
der Frage nach dem Wesen der 
hetligmachenden Gnade, Paderborn 
IQIO. 

1 Fer a fuller treatment we must 
refer the reader to Scheeben, Die 
Herrlichkeiten der géttlichen Gnade, 
8th ed, Freiburg 1908; Englisk 


translation by a Benedictine monk 
of St. Meinrad’s Abbey, The 
Glories of Divine Grace, 3rd ed., 
New York s. a, 

2Eph. IV, 24: “ Induite novum 
hominem, qui secundum Deum 
creatus est in iustitia et sanctitate 
veritatis.” On this text see Pohle- 
Preuss, God the Author of Nature 
and the Supernatural, p, 197. 


348 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


993 


just. It follows that the two elements of active 
justification, vig.: remission of sin and sanctifica- 
tion, are also constitutive elements of habitual 
or sanctifying grace. For it is precisely by the 
infusion of sanctifying grace that sin is wiped out 
and sanctity established in its place.* 


a) By sanctifying grace the justified man becomes a 
living member (membrum vivum) of the mystical body 
of Christ. His sins, it is true, did not forfeit member- 
ship in the Church, so long as he preserved the faith, but 
by sinning he became a dead member who can regain life 
only by returning to the state of grace. Grace is the 
life of the soul, sin its death. Hence the evil of mortal 
sin can be most effectively illustrated by contrast with the 
glory of divine grace, and wice versa. Cir. Gal. II, 20: 
“And I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.’ ® 

b) He who hates mortal sin and faithfully obeys the 
will of God, enjoys peace of heart,® whereas the sinner is 
incessantly harassed by qualms of conscience. The faith- 
ful Christian rejoices in serving His Master and combats 
the flesh, the world, and the devil with a fortitude that not 
infrequently rises to heroic proportions, as the example 
of many holy men and women proves. 

c) Sanctifying grace entails a particular providence, in- 
asmuch as, by means of it, God grants man His special 


3 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “... non est 


sola peccatorum remissio, sed et 


-5 Gal. II, 20: ‘“‘ Vivo autem iam 
non ego, vivit vero in me Christus.” 


sanctificatio et renovatio interioris 
hominis per voluntariam susceptio- 
nem gratiae et donorum, unde homo 
ex imiusto fit iustus.” 

4V. supra, Sect. I, Art. 1 and 2, 


On the concept of sanctity see Pohle-. 


Preuss, God: His Knowability, Es- 
sence, and Attributes, pp. 251 sqq. 


On the life of the soul in and 
through grace cfr, Heinrich-Gutber- 
let, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
VIII, § 466. 

é-Gfir. 2 (Core Vill, wate Super 
iabundo gaudio in omni tribulatione 
nostra.” 


a a ee ” 


a 


LISehr PAC LS 349 


assistance towards preserving the state of grace, without, 
of course, interfering with free-will. Cfr. Is. XLIX, 16: 
“ Behold, I have graven thee in my hands.”’* Rom. VIII, 
28: “... to them that love God, all things work to- 
gether unto good.’® Mediately, God also proves his 
special love for the just man by shielding him from bodily 
and spiritual danger. 


2. SUPERNATURAL BEAUTY.—Though we can 
quote no formal ecclesiastical definition to prove 
that sanctifying grace beautifies the soul, the fact 
is sufficiently certain from Revelation. If, as 
is quite generally held by Catholic exegetes, the 
Spouse of the Canticle typifies the human soul 
endowed with sanctifying grace, all the passages 
describing the beauty of that Spouse must be ap- 
plicable to the souls of those whom Christ em- 
braces with His tender love. The Fathers of. 
the Church frequently extol the supernatural 
beauty of the soul in the state of grace. Ambrose 
calls it “a splendid painting made by God Him- 
self;” Chrysostom compares it to “a statue of 
gold;” Cyril, to “a divine seal;’’ Basil, to “a shin- 
ing light,” and so forth. St. Thomas says: 
“Divine grace beautifies [the soul] like light,” ® 
and the Roman Catechism declares: “Grace 

. is a certain splendor and light that effaces 
all the stains of our souls and renders the 


TIs, XLIX, 16: “Ecce in mani- Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum.” 
bus meis descripsi te.’ 9In Ps., 25: “ Gratia divina 
8Rom. VIII, 28: “ Diligentibus  pulchrificat sicut lux.” 


350 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


souls themselves brighter and more beauti- 
1b hig 


In defining beauty as “the representation of an 
idea in a sensual form,’ modern aesthetics has elim- 
inated the spiritual element and in consequence is unable 
to appreciate the spiritual beauty of God and of the 
soul. Being composed of body and soul, man is naturally 
most impressed by beauty when it appears in a material 
guise. But this does not prove that there is no 
spiritual beauty, or that true beauty abides solely in mat- 
ter. Some present-day writers strongly emphasize the 
need of realism as against an idealism which, they 
claim, is not truly human because it exalts the spiritual 
at the expense of the material. In its last conclusions this 
perverted realism harks back to the sophistry of Prota- 
goras who held that ‘“‘ man is the measure of all things.” 
Idealism, on the other hand, is based on the true 
Platonic doctrine that God is the measure of all things.” 
St. Augustine defines beauty as “ unity in variety,” which 
is a correct definition, because it is adaptable to both 
the spiritual and the material order.1* Applying this defi- 
nition we find that the soul is not only naturally beautiful 
by the substantial unity and simplicity which shines forth 
in the variety of its faculties and powers, but also super- 
naturally by virtue of sanctifying grace, which transfuses 
nature into a new unity with the supernatural,— at the 
same time producing a variety of theological and moral 
virtues and the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and thus 


10 Cat. Rom., P. II, Ch. II, qu.  Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, p. 268. 


49: “‘Est autem gratia... splen- Freiburg igor. 

dor quidam et lux, quae animarum 11” AvOpwios méeTpoy mwavTwr. 
maculas delet ipsasque ‘animas pul- 12 Geds MET pov WAYTOV. 

chriores et splendidiores reddit.” 13 On the notion of beauty see 


On the aptness of this simile see Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, 
; Essence, and Attributes, pp. 265 sqq. 


1S Wy 2 ag 1 oes 351 
creating a true work of art. Moreover, by enabling 
man to participate in the Divine Nature,!* grace pro- 
duces in the soul a physical reflection of the uncreated 
beauty of God, a likeness of the creature with its Creator, 
which far transcends the natural likeness imprinted by 
creation. True, only God and the Elect in Heaven per- 
ceive and enjoy this celestial beauty; but we terrestrial 
pilgrims can, as it were, sense it from afar and indulge 
the hope that we may one day be privileged to contemplate 
and enjoy the divine beauty that envelops the souls en- 
dowed with grace. 

The beauty produced by sanctifying grace must be con- 
ceived not merely as a reflection of the absolute nature of 
God, who is the pattern-exemplar of all beauty, but more 
specifically as an image of the Trinity impressed upon the 
soul, St. Paul teaches that the soul is transformed into 
an image of the Divine Logos, to whom, as the holy 
Fathers tell us, beauty is appropriated in an especial man- 
ner.’ Cfr. Rom. VIII, 29: “ Whom he foreknew, he 
also predestinated to be made conformable to the image 
of his Son.”*° Gal. IV, 19: “My little children, of 
whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in 
you.” “’ In virtue of the adoptive sonship effected by 
grace,'® the soul becomes a true “ temple of the Holy 
Ghost.” 1° 


3. T'HE FRIENDSHIP oF Gop.—Closely con- 
nected with the beauty which sanctifying grace 


14V, supra, Art. 1, No. 4. 

15 On the divine appropriations 
see Pohle-Preuss, The Divine Trin- 
ity, DP. 244 sqq. 

16Rom. VIII, 209: “. .. prae- 
destinavit conformes fieri imaginis 
Fil sui,” 

17 Gal. IV, 19: 


“ Filiok mei, 


quos iterum partwrio, donec forme- 
tur Christus in vobis,’ 

18 V. infra, No. 4. . 

19 V. infra, Art. 3, No. 4. On 
the whole subject cfr. Heinrich-Gut- 
berlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
VIII, § 465; H. Krug, De Pulchritu- 
dine Divina, pp. 53 sqq., 144 sqq., 
241 sqq., Freiburg 1902. 


302 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


confers, is the supernatural friendship it estab- 
lishes between God and the soul. True beauty 
elicits love and benevolence. By nature man is 
merely a servant of God; in fact, since the fall, he 
is Hisenemy. Sanctifying grace transforms this 
hostile relation into genuine friendship. By 
grace, says the Council of Trent, “man of unjust 
becomes just, and of an enemy a friend.” ”° And 
again: “Having been thus justified and made 
the friends and domestics of God.” ** God loves 
the just man as His intimate friend and enables 
and impels him, by means of habitual grace and 
habitual charity, to reciprocate that love with 
all his heart. Here we have the two. constituent 
elements of friendship. The Bible frequently 
speaks of friendship existing between God and the 
just.).Cir. Wisd WL. a14>) They, (the yusppibe= 
come the friends of God.” ?* John XV, 14 sq.: 
“T will not now call you servants, . . . but I have 
called you friends.” ** This friendship is some- 
times compared to a mystic marriage. Cfr. 
Matth. IX,15: “And Jesus said to them: Can 
the children of the bridegroom mourn, as long as 
the bridegroom is with them?’ ** Apoc. XIX, 7: 


20 Sess. VI, cap. 773.5%. 0. wnde 23 John XV, 14 Sq: “lam non 
homo ex iniusto fit iustus et ex  dicam vos servos,...vos autem 
inimico amicus.” dixt amicos.” 

21 ‘Sess. V1; ceap.i. 102) “* Ste) exgzo 24 Matth. IX, 15: “ Numquid 
iustificati et amici Dei ac domestici possunt filit sponsi lugere, quamdiu 
ZACH IES cum illis est sponsus?”’ 

22 Wisd. VII, 14: “ Participes 


facti sunt amicitiae Det.” 


OTS ERFECTS 353 


“The marriage of the Lamb is come, and his wife 
hath prepared herself.” * 


a) Friendship (¢iAéa), according to Aristotle,?° is “ the 
conscious love of benevolence of two persons for each 
other.”” Hence, to constitute friendship, there must be 
(1) two or more distinct persons; (2) pure love of be- 
nevolence (amor benevolentiae, not concupiscentiae), be- 
cause only unselfish love can truly unite hearts; (3) 
mutual consciousness of affection, because without a 
consciousness of the existing relation on both sides 
there would be merely one-sided benevolence, not friend- 
ship. It follows that true friendship is based on virtue 
and that a relation not based on virtue can be called 
friendship in a qualified or metaphorical sense only 
(amicitia utilis, delectabilis). 

From what we have said it is easy to deduce the essen- 
tial characteristics of true friendship. They are: (1) 
benevolence; (2) love consciously entertained by both 
parties ; (3) a mutual exchange of goods or community of 
life; (4) equality of rank or station. The first condition 
is based on the fact that a true friend will not seek his 
own interest, but that of his friend. It is to be noted, 
however, that one’s joy at the presence or prosperity of a 
friend must not be inspired by selfishness or sensual de- 
sire, for in that case there would be no true friendship.’ 
The second condition is based on the necessity of friend- 


25 Apoc. XIX, 7: ‘“ Venerunt 27 Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment. in 


nuptiae Agni et uxor eius praepara- 
Mi sSeouncite, ohne il an2gs.. Eph; 
Vis 23uSdd.s ce Comm wily ais Cant, Liv, 
1 sqq.; Ps. XLIV, 22 sqq. On the 
teaching of the Fathers see Corne- 
lius a Lapide, Comment. in 2 Cor., 
DG ee 
26 Eth. ad Nichom., VIII sq. 


Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 27, 
Gus..25. :artieer, srady (peas Amicitia 
vera desiderat videre amicum et 
colloquits mutuis gaudere facit, ad 
quem principaliter est amicitia; non 
autem ita, quod delectatio ex amici 
vistione et perfruitione, finis anricitiae 
ponatur,” 


354 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


ship being mutual love, for friendship is not a one-sided 
affection, nor does it spend itself in mutual admiration. 
The third condition is necessary for the reason that love, 
if it is to be more than “ Platonic,” must result in acts 
of benevolence and good will.2® Of the fourth condi- 
tion St. Jerome says: “Friendship finds men equal or 
makes them equal.” 7° 

b) All these conditions are found in the friendship 
with which Almighty God deigns to honor those who are 
in the state of sanctifying grace. 

(1) That God loves the just man with a love of 
pure benevolence and eagerly seeks his companionship, is 
proved by the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Holy 
Bucharist. ..Cir, Prov. VIII) 31: “ And my delight: [1s] 
to be with the children of men.” *° 

(2) The just man is enabled to return God’s love by 
the habit of theological charity, which is inseparably 
bound up with and spontaneously flows from sanctifying 
grace.*t God’s consciousness of this mutual love is, of 
course, based on certain knowledge, whereas man can 
have merely a probable conjecture.*? This, however, suf- 
fices to establish a true friendship, as the example of hu- 
man friends shows.** 


28 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theo- 80 Prov. VIII, 31: “ Deliciae 
logicd, 1a zae, qu. 28, art. 1: meae esse cum filis hominum.” 
“ Quum aliquis amat aliquem amore 31 V. supra, Art. 1, No. 3. 
amicitiae, vult et bonum, sicut et 82 V. infra, Sect. III, No. x. 
sibit vult bonum, unde apprehendit 33 Cir. St. Thomas, Comment. in 


eum ut alterum se, inquantum scil. Quatuor Libros Sent., III, dist. 37, 
et vult bonum, sicut et sibi vult qu. 2, art. 1, ad 10: “ Amicitia 
bonum. Et inde est, quod amicus  dicitur esse non latens, non quod 


dicitur esse alter ipse. Et Augu- per certitudinem amor amici co- 
stinus dicit in l. 4 Confess.: Bene  gnoscatur, sed quia per signa proba- 
quidam dixit de amico suo, ‘dimi-  bilia amor mutuus habentium -col- 
dium animae meae’.” ligitur. Et talis manifestatio potest 

29“ Amicitia pares aut invenit aut esse de caritate, inquantum per 
factt.”’” In Mich., 7. aliqua signa potest aliquis probabili- 


ter aestimare se habere caritatem.” 


PES EE GTS 355 


(3) There is also community of life and property be- 
tween God and man when the latter is in the state of sanc-. 
tifying grace; for not only is he indebted to God for his 
very nature and all natural favors which he enjoys, but 
likewise and especially for the supernatural blessings be- 
stowed upon him.** On his own part, it is true, he can- 
not give his Benefactor anything in return which that 
Benefactor does not already possess; but the just man is 
ever eager to further God’s external glorification, agree- 
able to the first petition of the Our Father: ‘‘ Hallowed 
by Thy name.’ *° God has furthermore given him a kind 
of substitute for operative charity in the love of his neigh- 
bor, which has precisely the same formal object as the 
fove ot Gods) Ciricl John Tl, 17.2) .% He that hathithe 
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, 
and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the 
charity of God abide in him?” * 

(4) There can be no real equality between God and the 
human soul, but God in His infinite goodness, elevat- 
ing the soul to a higher plane and allowing it to participate 
in His own nature,*” makes possible an amicitia excel- 
lentiae s. eminentiae, which is sufficient to constitute a 
true relation of friendship. Without this elevation of 
the soul by grace there could be no friendship between 
God and man.*§ 


34 Cfr. Ecclus. XXXIV, 14 saqq. ¢0, quomodo caritas Dei (h ayarn 


85 Cfr. St. Thomas, op. cit., III, 
ice v2e, Gu.) 1, abe. 3) ad) at Se 
esset possibile, quod ex nostris operi- 
bus aliquid Deo accresceret, habens 
caritatem mulio plura faceret prop- 
ter beatitudinem ei conservandam, 


quam propter eam sibi adipiscen- 
dam,”’. 
861 John III, 17: “Quit ha- 


buerit substantiam huius mundi et 
widerit fratrem suum necessitatem 
habere et clauserit viscera sua ab 


Tov Ocov) manet in ea?” 

a7 V. supra, Art. 1, No. 4. 

38 The singular opinion of Ri- 
palda (De Caritate, disp. 33), that 
such a relation would be possible 
even in the state of pure nature, 
is rejected by Suarez as incorrect 
(De Caritate, disp. 3, sect. 5, n. 4). 
On the whole question cfr. Schif- 
fini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 305 
sqq. 


356 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


4. ADOPTIVE SoNSHIP.—The formal effects of 
sanctifying grace culminate in the elevation of 
man to the rank of an adopted child of God (filius 
Dei adoptivus), with a claim to the paternal in- 
heritance, 7. e. the beatific visionin Heaven. This 
truth is so clearly stated in Scripture and Tra- 
dition that its denial would be heretical. The Tri- 
dentine Council summarily describes justification 
as “the state of grace and of the adoption of the 
sons of God.” °° The teaching of Holy Scripture 
can be gathered from such texts as the following. 
Rom. VIII, 15 sqq.: “. .. You have received 
the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: 
Abba (Father). For the spirit himself giveth 
testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of 
God. And if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, 
and joint heirs with Christ.” *#° 1 John III, 1 sq.: 
“Behold what manner of charity the Father hath 
bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and 
should be the sons of God. . . . Dearly beloved, 
we are ‘now! the ‘sons of God’ = “Gal, EV; "5s 
cea. that owe ‘might receive the® adoption of 
sons.” ** That the just become the adopted 


89 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 
4: “. ,. status gratiae et adop- 
tionis filiorum Det.” 

40'Rom. “VIII, 15. sqq:: “ Ac: 
cepistis .. . spiritum adoptionis fili- 
orum, in quo clamamus Abba, 
Pater; ipse enim Spiritus  testi- 
monium reddit spiritut nostro, quod 
sumus filii Dei; si autem flu, et 


- haeredes: haeredes quidem Dei, co- 


haeredes autem Christi.’’ 

441 John - IIT, *9\'sq.3) “ Videte; 
qualem caritatem dedit nobis Pater, 
ut filu Det nominemur et simus 
-.. Carissum, nunc filu Det su- 
mus.” 

42Gal. IV, 5: “... ut adoptio- 
nem filiorum reciperemus.” 


PRS Re PEC TS 357 


sons of God follows likewise as a corollary 
from the doctrine of regeneration so _ fre- 
quently taught by Scripture. This regeneration 
is not a procession of the soul from the divine 
essence, but a kind of accidental and analogical 
procreation substantially identical with adoption 
(filiatio adoptiva, viobesia), Cfr. John I, 12 sq.: 
“. . He gave them power to be made the sons 
en Godeme... whoare born. 1)! of Goda. 


a) St. Thomas defines adoption as “ the gratuitous ac- 
ceptance of a child of other parents to be the same as 
one’s own child and heir.” *4 Adoption implies (1) that 
the adopted child be a stranger to the adopting father; 
(2) that it have no legal claim to adoption; (3) that it 
give its consent to being adopted; (4) that it be received 
by the adopting father with parental love and affection. 
All these elements are present, in a far higher and more 
perfect form, in the adoption of a soul by God. 

(1) The rational creature, as such, is not a “son” but 
merely a “servant of God,’ * and, if he be in the state 
of mortal sin, His enemy. 

(2) That adoption is a gratuitous favor on the part of 
the Almighty, follows from the fact that the adopted 
creature is His enemy and that grace is a free super- 
natural gift, to which no creature has a natural claim. 
Adoption furthermore implies the right of inheritance.*® 


43 John I, 12 sq.: “... dedit eis  neae in filium et haeredem gratuita 
potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui... assumptio.” 
ex Deo nati sunt (€wKkev avrots 45 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7: ‘‘ Itaque tam 
éfougiay Tréxva Oeovd yevécOat, Tois non est servus, sed filius; quod si 

- €k Ocov éyeryHiOnoar).” filius, et haeres per Deum,” 

44 Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 23, art. 46 CfirssRom.) VILI, 17; Galv. 1V57: 


1: “ Adoptio est personae extra- 


358 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


The heritage of the children of God is a purely 
spiritual possession which can be enjoyed simultaneously 
by many, and consequently excels every natural heritage. 
Men, as a rule, do not distribute their property during 
life, while, after their death, it is usually divided up 
among several heirs.** 

(3) Whereas adoption among men owes its existence 
to the desire of offspring on the part of childless parents, 
the adoption of the soul by God springs from pure be- 
nevolence and unselfish love, and for this reason pre- 
supposes (in the case of adults) the free consent of 
the adopted. No one can become an adopted son of 
God against his will.*® 

(4) Whereas human adoption supposes substantial 
equality between father and child, and therefore at best 
amounts to no more than a legal acceptance, adoption by 
God elevates the soul to a higher level by allowing it to 
participate in the Divine Nature, and consequently is a 
true (even though merely an accidental and analogical) re- 
generation in God. 

b) From what we have said it follows—and this is a 
truth of considerable speculative importance—that there 
are essential points of difference as well as of resemblance 
between Jesus Christ, the true Son of God, and the justi- 
fied sinner adopted by the Heavenly Father. 

a) The difference between the “ natural Son of God” 
and an “adopted son” is exactly like that between God 
and creature. The Logos-Son, engendered by eternal 
generation from the divine substance, is the true nat- 
ural Son of the Father, the Second Person of the Di- 
vine Trinity, and Himself God.*® The just man, on the 


47 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., susceptionem gratiae et donorum.” 
Ba; ai. 43, atte) 1s ads. . 49 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
48 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, Trinity, pp. 49 sqq. 
cap. Raat TEpen voluntariam 


ITS EREECTS 359 


other hand, is a child of God merely by the posses- 
sion of sanctifying grace,°® which can be lost by mortal 
sin and consequently is founded upon a free relation that 
may be terminated by man as freely as it was entered 
into between himself and God. 

Intimately related to this distinction is another: — 
Christ is the Son of the Father alone, the just man is 
an adopted child of the whole Trinity. This fact does 
not, however, prevent us from “appropriating ’”’ adop- 
tive sonship to each of the three Divine Persons ac- 
cording to His peculiar hypostatic character: — the 
Father as its author, the Son as its pattern, and the Holy 
Ghost as its conveyor.®? Now, if Christ, as the true Son 
of God, is the efficient cause (causa efficiens) of that 
adoptive sonship of which, as God, He is also the pattern- 
exemplar (causa exemplaris), it follows that He cannot 
be an adopted son of God. “ Christus est incapax adop- 
tionis,” as Suarez puts it.6? To say that He is both the 
natural and an adopted Son of God would be heretical.®+ 
Consequently, sanctifying grace, in Him, did not exercise 
one of the functions it invariably exercises in the souls of 
men, 1. e. it did not make Him an adopted son of God. 

B) It is to be noted, however, that the unique posi- 
tion enjoyed by our Lord gives rise, not only to essential 
distinctions but also to an equal number of analogies be- 
tween the Only-begotten Son of God and His adopted 


60. Cfrs John IIT, 5\'sq.; ‘2 Cor. 
OTT 133 Tit) ITI, 's‘sqaq. 


51 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theo- 


pogied, ).34;5  qu.'| (23, art. 2, (ad. 2: 
“For He [God the Father] is 
Christ’s father by natural genera- 
tion; and this is proper to him: 
whereas He is our Father by a vol- 
untary operation, which is common 
to Him and to the Son and the Holy 


Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son 
of the whole Trinity, as we are.” 

52 Cfr, St.. Thomas, J. c., ad 2. 

53 Suarez, De Incarnatione, disp. 
49, (Sects 2, rs. 

54 This heresy is called Adop- 
tionism; for a refutation of it see 
Pohle-Preuss, Christology, pp. 196 
sqq. 


360 } SANCTIFYING GRACE 


sons. The first and most fundamental of these analogies 
is the attribution of the common appellation “son of 
God” both to Christ and to the just. Though Christ 
is the only true Son of God, the Heavenly Father 
has nevertheless charitably “bestowed upon us, that we 
should be called, and should be, the sons of God.” ®= Ac- 
cording to John I, 13, Christ “ gave power to be made the 
sons of God” to them “who are born... of God.” 
Hence divine sonship formally consists in an impression 
of the hypostatic likeness of the Only-begotten Son of 
God, by which the soul in a mysterious manner becomes 
an image of the Trinity, and especially of the Only-be- 
gotten Son of God, who is the archetype and pattern- 
exemplar of adoptive sonship. This hypostatic propriety 
and exemplariness was the reason why the Second Per- 
son of the Trinity became man.** That the soul of the 
justified is transformed into “an image of the Son of 
God” is expressly taught by the Greek Fathers. Thus 
St. Cyril of Alexandria says: “Christ is truly formed 
in us, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost impresses on us a 
certain divine likeness by means of sanctity and justice. 
. . . But if any one is formed in Christ, he is formed into 
a child of God.” *7 

These considerations also explain the points of resem- 
blance between the adoptive sonship of God and the Holy 
Eucharist. Being our Father by adoption, God is bound 
to provide us with food worthy of a divine progenitor. 
The food He gives us (the Holy Eucharist) corresponds 
to our dignity as His children, sustains us in this sublime 
relation, and at the same time constitutes the pledge of a 
glorious resurrection and an eternal beatitude. 

551 John III, r. 


56 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Soteriology, pp. 15 sqq. 
&7'Or. anIs.° TI, 4. 


See ee 


ITS EFFECTS 361 


c) Is the adoptive sonship of the children of God con- 
stituted entirely by sanctifying grace, or does it require 
for its full development the personal indwelling in the 
soul of the Holy Ghost?*®* This subtle question formed 
the subject of an interesting controversy between Joseph 
Scheeben and Theodore Granderath, S. J. Father 
Granderath claimed on the authority of the Tridentine 
Council that divine sonship is an inseparable function of 
sanctifying grace, and through that grace alone, without 
the inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, constitutes the unica causa 
formalis of justification.°® Against this theory Dr. 
Scheeben maintained with great acumen and, we think, 
successfully, that sanctifying grace of itself alone, with- 
out the aid of any other factor, not only completely justi- 
fies the sinner but raises him to the rank of an adopted 
son of God, though there is nothing to prevent us from 
holding that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost forms the 
climax of the process, and develops and perfects the 
already existing filiatio adoptiva. 

Petavius had contended * that the ae men of the Old 
Testament, though in the state of sanctifying grace, were 
not adopted children of God, because the filiatio adoptiva 
is an exclusive privilege of those living under the Chris- 
tian Dispensation. This theory became untenable when 
the Tridentine Council defined sanctity and adoptive son- 
ship as inseparable formal effects of sanctifying grace. 
There can no longer be any doubt, therefore, that the 
patriarchs, together with sanctifying grace also enjoyed 

58V. infra, Art. 3, No. 4, sqq., 610 sqq.; Granderath, ‘'Kon- 

59 V. supra, Sect. 1, Art. 2, No. 4. troverse tiber die Gotteskindschaft,” 

60 Cfr. J. Scheeben, “ Kontroverse in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift fur 
uber die Formalursache der Kind- kath. Theologie, 1881, pp. 283 sqq., 
schaft Gottes,” in the Katholik, of 1883, Pp. 491 sqq., 593 saqq., 1884, 


_ Mayence, 1883, I, pp. 142 sqq., II, pp. 545 sqq. 
PP. 561 sqq.; 1884, I, 18 sqq. II, 465 61 De Trinitate, VIII, 4 sqq. 


362 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


the privilege of adoptive sonship, though, as Suarez ob- 
serves,°” adoptive sonship under the Old Covenant de- 
pended both as to origin and value upon the adoptive son- 
ship of the New Testament, and therefore was inferior to 
it in both respects.** 


READINGS : — Scheeben, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 168 
sqq., Freiburg 1878.— J. Kirschkamp, Gnade und Glorie in ihrem 
mneren Zusammenhang, Wiirzburg 1878.— P. Hagg, Die Reich- 
tumer der gottlichen Gnade und die Schwere ihres V erlustes, 
Ratisbon 1889.— Card. Katschthaler, De Gratia Sanctificante, 3rd 
ed., Salzburg 1886.— P. Einig, De Gratia Divina, Part II, Treves 
1896.— Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. VIII, pp. 
575 sqq., Mainz 1897.— Scheeben, Die Herrlichkeiten der géttlichen 
Gnade, 8th ed., by A. M. Weiss, O. P., Freiburg 1908 (English 
translation, The Glories of Divine Grace, 3rd ed., New York 
s. a.).— Th. Bourges, O. P., L’Ordre Surnaturel et le Devoir 
Chrétien, Paris 1901.—* B. Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire ou la 
Filiation’ Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu Etudiée dans sa Réalité, 
ses Principes, son Perfectionnement et son Couronnement Final, 
2 vols., Paris 1897—*P. Villada, De Effectibus Formalibus 
Gratiae Habitualis, Valladolid 1899—-L. Hubert, De Gratia 
Sanctificante, Paris 1902. 


ARTICLE 3 


THE SUPERNATURAL CONCOMITANTS OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 


Besides producing the effects described in the 
preceding Article, sanctifying grace also confers 
certain supernatural privileges, which, though not 


62 Comment. in S. Theol., 3a, qu. consult A. Rademacher, Die iiber- 
23) Kart, natirliche Lebensordnung nach der 

63 Cfr. Gal. IV, 7. On the sub-  paulinischen und johanneischen 
ject of the adoptive sonship of Theologie, pp. 97 sqq., Freiburg 
the just the student may profitably 1903. 


Se eg a een a ee ee 


a 
rh a ee 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 363 


of the essence of grace, are, in the present econ- 
omy at least, inseparably connected with it and 
may therefore be regarded as its regular concomi- 
tants. 

The existence of these privileges is established 
by the fact that certain councils (e. g. those of 
Vienne and Trent), couple “grace and gifts” in 
their official definitions. The doctrine is clearly 
stated by the Roman Catechism as follows: ‘To 
this [sanctifying grace] is added a most noble ac- 
companiment of all virtues, which are divinely 
infused into the soul together with grace.” ° 

We will treat of the supernatural concomitants 
of sanctifying grace in four theses. 


Thesis I: The three divine virtues of faith, hope, 
and charity are infused into the soul simultaneously 
with sanctifying grace. 


Some theologians (notably Suarez, Ripalda, and De 
Lugo) declare this thesis to be de fide, while others 
(Dom. Soto, Melchior Cano, and Vasquez) hold it 
merely as certain. Under the circumstances it will be 
safest to take middle ground by characterizing it as fdei 
proxima. 


Proof. The Council of Trent teaches: “Man 
through Jesus Christ, in whom he is ingrafted, re- 
ceives, in the said justification, together with the 


-1V. supra, p. 340. ditur nobilissimus omnium  virtu- 
2Cat. Rom., P, II, c. 1, m 51: tum comitatus, quae in animam 
“Huic ([gratiae sanctificanti] ad- cum gratia divinitus infunduntur.” . 


364 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


remission of sins, all these [gifts] infused at once 
—faith, hope, and charity.” 3 | 

a) That theological charity, as a habit, is in- 
fused together with sanctifying grace can be con- 
vincingly demonstrated from Holy Scripture. 
Gir Won. eV Whe hb jee then charity aniGodnis 
poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who 
is given to us.”* In connection with charity, 
Holy Scripture frequently mentions faith. Cfr. 1 
Cor AT nek And atid Shodan in ice 
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have 
not charity, I am nothing.’ ® All three of the 
theological virtues are expressly enumerated in I 
Cor. XI, 13%) “And now. there remain ‘faith; 
hope, and charity, these three: but the greatest of 
these is charity.’ ® Unlike certain other texts, 
the one last quoted leaves no doubt that faith, 


8 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 7: 
“Unde in ipsa iustificatione cum 
vemissione peccatorum haec omnia 
simul infusa accipit homo per Te- 
sum Christum, cui inseritur, fidem, 
spem et caritatem.”  (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 800.) The question 
whether the three theological virtues 
are genuine habitus operativi, must 
be answered in the affirmative; but 
its denial incurs no censure so long 
as the distinction existing between 
these habitual virtues and actual 
grace is left intact. It is of faith 
that habitual charity is infused si- 
multaneously with habitual grace. 
Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 
tr: “ Si quis dixerit, homines iusti- 
ficari... exclusG gratia et caritate, 
quae in cordibus eorum per Spi- 


- Spiritum Sanctum, 


ritum Sanctum diffundatur atque 
illis inhaereat, anathema sit.” On 
the bearing of this definition see 
Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 
178 sq., Paris 1896; Schiffini, De 
Gratia Divina, pp. 315 sqq., Frei- 
burg 1901. 

4 Rom.'\\V3) ss Caritess. (Dest 
( dyarn rov Oceov) diffusa est 
(éxxéxutat) in cordibus nostris per 
qui datus est 
nobis.” 

51 Cor. XIII, 2: “ Et si habuero 
omnem ftidem, ita ut montes trans- 
feram, caritatem autem non habuero, 
nihil sum.” 

61 Cor, XIII, 13: “ Nunc autem 
manent fides, spes, caritas (mloris, 
édmis, ayanrn), tria haec; maior 
autem horum est caritas.’ 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 365 


hope, and charity are to be conceived as dona 
“inhaerentia, 1. e. habits or qualities inherent in the 
soul. This interpretation is approved by the Fa- 
thers and Scholastics. 


b) St. Thomas proves the necessity of the three theo- 
logical virtues for salvation as follows: “In order that 
we be properly moved towards our end [God], that end 
must be both known and desired. Desire of an end in- 
cludes two things: first, hope of attaining it, because no 
prudent man will aspire to that which he cannot attain; 
and secondly, love, because nothing is desired that is not 
loved. And hence there are three theological virtues,— 
faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we trust to 
obtain Him; and charity, by which we love Him.” ? 

When are the three theological virtues infused into the 
soul? This is an open question so far as faith and hope 
are concerned. Of charity we know that it is always in- 
fused with habitual grace. Suarez contends that, when 
the soul is properly disposed, faith and hope are infused 
before justification proper, that is to say, in the pro- 
cess leading up to it. St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, 
on the other hand, hold that faith and hope, like charity, 
are infused at the moment when justification actually 
takes place in the soul. This last-mentioned opinion is 
favored by the Tridentine Council.® 

Mortal sin first destroys sanctifying grace together with 
the habit of charity that is inseparable from it. Faith 


7 Quaestiones Disputatae de Vir- 
tutibus in Communi, art. 12: “Ad 
hoc autem, quod moveamur recite in 
finem [scil. Deum], oportet finem 
esse et cognitum et desideratum. 
Desiderium autem finis duo exigit, 
scil. fiduciam de fine obtinendo, quia 
nullus sapiens movetur ad id quod 


consequi non potest; et amorem finis, 
quia non desideratur nist amatum. 
Et ideo virtutes theologicae sunt 
tres, scil. fides qué Deum cognosci- 
mus, spes qua ipsum nos obtenturos 
esse speramus, et caritas qua eum 
diligimus.”” 
& Sess. | ViEj capsl igs 


366 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


and hope may continue to exist in the soul, and if hope, 


too, departs, faith may remain alone. But the loss of : 


faith invariably entails the destruction of hope and 
charity. 


Thesis II: Together with sanctifying grace there 
are also infused the supernatural moral virtues. 


This proposition may be characterized as sententia 
communior et probabilior. Though denied by some the- 
ologians, it can claim a high degree of probability.® 


Proof. The infused moral virtues (virtutes 
morales infusae) differ from the theological vir- 
tues in that they have for their immediate formal 
object, not God Himself, but the creature in its 
relation to the moral law. 


The moral virtues may be reduced to four, wiz.: pru- 
dence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are 
called the “cardinal” virtues; first, because they perfect 
the principal faculties of the soul; secondly, because all 
the other virtues may, be scientifically deduced from 
them.’® In the supernatural order the infusion of the 
cardinal virtues and of the other virtues subordinate to 
them has for its object the government of intellect and 
will in their relation towards created things and the 
guidance of these faculties to their supernatural end. 


a) The existence of supernaturally infused 


9 This thesis is not, however, so 10Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 
certain that it would be wrong to Theol, 1a’ 2ae; ‘qu. 57 sqq. ‘hat 
contradict it, as has actually been the cardinal virtues are four in 
done by Scotus, Durandus, and number, St. Thomas proves as fol- 
others. Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, VI, lows: ‘‘[Bonum_ rationis] potest 
O5ir2% dupliciter considerari: uno modo, 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 367 


moral virtues is intimated in Wis. VIII, 7: “And 
if a man love justice: her labors have great vir- 
tues; for she teacheth temperance, and prudence, 
and justice, and fortitude, which are such things 
as men can have nothing more profitable in life.’’ 1 
The teacher of the three cardinal virtues here 
mentioned is “Divine Wisdom,” 7. e. God Him- 
self, and we may assume that He inculcates them 
by the same method which He employs in infusing 
the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. 
Another relevant text is Ezechiel XI, 19 sq.: 
. . and I will take away the stony heart out of 
their flesh, and give them a heart of flesh, that 
they may walk in my commandments, and keep 
my judgments.” ’* Here Yahweh promises to 
give the just men of the New Covenant a “heart 
of flesh” as opposed to the “stony heart” of the 
Jews. The meaning evidently is that a disposition 
to do good will be a characteristic of the New Tes- 
tament Christians in contradistinction to the hard- 


6é 


prout habet vationem consiliabilis et 
eligibilis, secundum quam ratio circa 
illud operatur et sic est prudentia, 
quae est media inter intellectuales 
et morales; ... alio modo, secun- 
dum quod habet rationem boni appe- 
tibilis. Ad appetitum autem duo per- 
tinent, scil. actio et passio; passio 
autem est in irascibili et concupisct- 
bili. Circa actiones ergo est iustitia, 
circa. passiones irascibiles est forti- 
tudo, circa passiones concupiscibiles 
est temperantia. Et sic sunt qua- 
tuor virtutes cardinales.” (Com- 


ment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., III, 
dist. 33, qu. 2, art. 1, solut. 3.) 

11 Wis. VIII, 7: “Et si. iusti- 
tiam quis diligit, labores huius 
magnas habent virtutes; sobrietatem 
enim et prudentiam docet [Deus] 
et iustitiam et virtutem, quibus uti- 
linus nihil est in vita hominibus.” 

12 Ez. XI, 19 sq.: “‘ Et auferam 
cor lapideum de carne eorum et dabo 
eis cor carneum, ut in praeceptis 
meis ambulent et iudicia mea custo- 
diant.”’ 


368 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


hearted Old Testament Jews. He who has a 
“heart of flesh” will walk in God’s commandments 
and keep His judgments. Hence “heart” sig- 
nifies the sum-total of all those habits which impel 
and enable a man to lead a good life. Since it is 
God Himself who gives the “heart of flesh,” 7. e. 
the moral virtues, it follows that they are super- 
naturally infused. 

b) Some of the Fathers ascribe the moral vir- 
tues directly to divine infusion. 


Thus St. Augustine observes that the cardinal virtues 
“are given to us through the grace of God.” * And St. 
Gregory the Great says that the Holy Ghost does “ not 
desert the hearts of those who are perfect in faith, hope, 
and charity, and in those other goods without which no 
man can attain:to) the, heavenly) fatherland.7)" St: 
Thomas shows the theological reason for this by pointing 
to the parallel that exists between nature and the super- 
natural. “ Effects,” he says, “must always be propor- 
tionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, 
intellectual and moral, which we acquire by our acts, pro- 
ceed from certain natural principles preéxisting in 
us. .. . In lieu of these natural principles God confers 
on us the theological virtues, by which we are directed to 
a supernatural end. ... Hence there must correspond 
to these theological virtues, proportionally, other habits 
caused in us by God, and which bear the same relation to 


18 Cfr. Jer. XXXI, 33; Col. I, 10 “In fide enim, spe atque caritate, 


Sdistlonn Lyla, et in aliis bonis, sine quibus ad 
14JIn Ps., 83: “‘Istae virtutes  coelestem patriam non potest per- 

nune in convalle plorationis per  veniri,... perfectorum corda [Spi- 

gratiam Dei donantur nobis.” ritus Sanctus] non deserit.” 


16 Hom, ‘tn’ Beech, 1,5; Ns) It? 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 369 
the theological virtues that the moral and intellectual vir- 
tues bear to the natural principles of virtue.” *° 


Thesis III: The seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are 
also infused with sanctifying grace. 


This proposition may be qualified as “ probabilis.” 


Proof. The Church’s teaching with regard to the seven 
gifts of the Holy Ghost is based on Isaias XI, 2 sq.: 
“ And the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him: the spirit 
of wisdom, and of understanding, the spirit of counsel, and 
of fortitude, the spirit of knowledge, and of godliness. 
And he shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the 
Lord.” Four of these supernatural gifts (wisdom, un- 
derstanding, counsel, and knowledge) perfect the intellect 
in matters pertaining to salvation, while the remaining 
three (fortitude, godliness, and the fear of the Lord) 
direct the will to its supernatural end. Are these seven 
gifts, (or some of them), really distinct from the infused 
moral virtues? Are they habits or habitual dispositions, 
or merely transient impulses or inspirations? What are 
their mutual relations and how can they be divided off 
from one another? These and similar questions are in 
dispute among theologians. The prevailing opinion is 
that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused habitual dis- 


16 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 63, 
art. 3: “ Oportet effectus esse suis 
causis et principis proportionatos. 
Omnes autem virtutes tam intellec- 
tuales quam morales, quae ex nostris 
actibus acquiruntur, procedunt ex 
quibusdam naturalibus principtis in 
nobis praeexistentibus ... Loco 
quorum naturalium principiorum 
conferuntur nobis a Deo virtutes 
theologicae, quibus ordinamur ad 
finem supernaturalem. ... Unde 
oportet quod his etiam virtutibus 


theologicis proportionahiter respon- 
deant alu habitus divinitus causati 
in nobis, qui sic se habent ad virtutes 
theologicas sicut se habent virtutes 
morales et inteliectuales ad principia 
naturalia virtutum.’ For further 
information on this subject consult 
Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische The- 
ologie, Vol. VIII, § 471, Mainz 
18973; Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 
Pp. 319 saqq., Freiburg 1901; Van 
Noort, De Gratia Christi, pp. 161 
sqq., Amsterdam 1908, 


370 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


positions, realiter distinct from the theological and moral 
virtues, by which the soul is endowed with a supernatural 
capacity for receiving the inspirations of the Holy Ghost 
and a supernatural readiness to obey His impulses in all 
important matters pertaining to salvation.27 

That the gifts of the Holy Ghost are infused into the 
soul simultaneously with sanctifying grace, can be 
demonstrated as follows: Christ, as the mystical head, is 
the pattern of justification for the members of His spir- 
itual body, who are united to Him by sanctifying grace.18 
Now the Holy Ghost dwelled in Christ with all His gifts 
as permanent -habits.*° Consequently, these gifts are im- 
parted by infusion to those who receive the grace of jus- 
tification. This is manifestly the belief of the Church, 
for she prays in the “Veni Sancte Spiritus” 


“Shed upon thy faithful fold, 
By unbounded hope controlled, 
Thy seven gifts.” 2° 


Thesis IV: The process of justification reaches its 
climax in the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost 
in the soul of the just. 


This thesis embodies what is technically called a propo- 
sitio certa. 


17 Cfr. Gregory of Valentia, Com- Freiburg 1899; Van Noort, De 
ment. in S. Theol., 1a 2ae, disp. 5,  Gratia Christi, pp. 174 sqq. 


qu. 8, p..1: “ Dona Spiritus S..po- 18 Rom. VIII, 9 sqq. 

tentias animae perficiunt ad actiones 19, Ctr.) Ts.) ly 2 sqo.s LX ia. 
quasdam heroicas,... quad ratione -Luke IV, 18. 

pecuhiariter procedunt ex divino 20“ Da tuts fidelibus, in te con- 


quodam Spiritus S. instinctu, quo fitentibus, sacrum  septenariwm.” 
mens nostra plerumque mirabiliter (Missale Rom., Sequence for Whit 
solet agi et impelli ad quaedam opera Sunday.) For a more detailed 
praestantia et rara.... Atque ita treatment of the subject dealt with 
in usu donorum homo potius agitur, in Thesis III consult J. Kleutgen, 
in usu autem virtutum se habet Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd 
potius ut agens.” Cfr. Simar, Dog-  ed., pp. 365 sqq., Miinster 1872; C. 
matik, Vol, II, 4th ed., pp. 641 sqq., Weiss, S. Thomae Aquinatis de Sep- 


—— 


a 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 371 


Proof. There are two ways in which God 
may dwell in the soul, either by virtue of 
His created grace (inhabitatio per dona acci- 
dentalia, évoixnos kar’ évépyeav) or by virtue of His | 
uncreated substance (inhabitatio substantialis sive 
personalis, évotxnows Kar’ ovoiay), The personal in- 
dwelling of the Holy Ghost, therefore, may consist 
in a twofold grace: gratia creata and gratia in- 
creata, of which the former is the groundwork 
and necessary condition of the latter, while the 
latter may be described as the climax and consum- 
mation of the former.?* The indwelling of the 
Holy Ghost in the souls of the just is taught by 
Holy Scripture and attested by the Fathers. 

a) Holy Scripture draws a clear-cut distinction 
between the accidental and the substantial in- 
dwelling of the Holy Ghost. | 

a) Our Lord Himself, in addition to the’charis- 
mata, promised His Apostles the Holy Ghost 
imeerson, ~ John XPV; 16:8qis.. the Father 
. }. Shall give you another Paraclete, that he 


tem Donis Spiritus S. Doctrina, also consult Suarez, De Gratia, VI, 


Vienne 1895; J. Regler, Die sieben 
Gaben des HI. Geistes in ihrer 
Bedeutung fiir das christliche Leben, 
Ratisbon 1899; Schiffini, De Gratia 
Divina, pp. 337 sqq., Freiburg root. 
On the connection of the gifts of 
the Holy Ghost with the beatitudes 
(cir, Matth, V, 3 saq.) and the 
“twelve fruits of the Holy Ghost” 
ictrinnGaly Vi. 022. sq), see St. 
Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, 
qu. 69 and 7o. The student may 


10, and Vasquez, Comment. in S. 
Theol., III, disp. 44, cap. 2. 

21 Cfr. St. Bonaventure, Compen- 
dium Theol. Verit., I, 9: “‘ In tusti- 
ficatione duplex caritas nobis datur, 
scil. creata et increata: illa qua 
diligimus, et illa qué diligimur. . 
Ex his colligitur, quod licet Deus 
sit in omnibus per essentiam, prae- 
sentiam et potentiam, non tamen 
habetur ab omnibus per gratiam.” 


372 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


may abide with you for ever, . . . but you shall 
know him, because he shall abide with you, and 
shall be in you.’ ** This promise was made to 
ath the staithiulseiine Rom el gue i TN anit 
charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by 
the Holy Ghost, who is given to us.” ** Hence 
the Holy Ghost abides in the just and sets up His 
throne ‘un’ their’) soulesy Cin Rent) Vidi) or 
“And if the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from 
the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus 
Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mor- 
tal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in 
you.” ?* By His indwelling our souls become 
temples of God. 1 Cor. III, 16sq.: “Know you 
not that you are the temple of God, and that the 
Spirit of God dwelleth in you? . . . For the tem- 
ple of God is holy, which you are.” ?° 1 Cor. VI, 
19: “Or know you not that your members are 
the temple of the Holy Ghost, who is in you, whom 
you have from God; and you are not your 
own?” * 


22 John XIV, 16 sq.: “... alium a mortuis, vivificabit et mortalia 


Paraclitum, dabit vobis, ut maneat 
vobiscum in aeternum.... Vos au- 
tem cognoscetis eum, quia apud vos 
manebit et in vobis (év byiv) erit.” 

23\Romi Wess) |" Caritas’) Det 
diffusa est in cordibus nostris per 


Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est 
nobis.” 
24 Rom. VILE 11: “ Quodst 


Spiritus eius, qui suscitavit Iesum a 
mortuis, habitat in vobis (oixet év 
dui), qui suscitavit Iesum Chrisium 


corpora vestra propter imhabitantem 
Spiritum eius in vobis (dia Tov 
é€votkouvTos avTov mveluaTos ev 
tuiy).” 

25 “ Nescitis, quia templum Dei 
(vabs Qeov) estis et Spiritus Det 
habitat in vobis (oixei év Duty) ? 
~.- Lemplum enim Det sanctum 
est, quod estis vos.” 

261 Cor. 6, 19: '\ An nescttis, 
quoniam membra vestra templum 
sunt Spiritus S., qui in vobis est, 


NS aa ee ae 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 373 


B) Agreeable to this teaching of Scripture the 
Fathers, especially those of the East, assert the 
substantial indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the 
souls of the just. 


The fact that no one but God can dwell substantially 
and personally in a creature was cited by the Greek Fa- 
thers in their controversies with the Pneumatomachians 
to prove the divinity of the Holy Ghost. St. Athanasius 
writes to Serapion:27 “If we by receiving the Holy 
Ghost are allowed to participate in the Divine Nature, 
no one but a fool will assert that the Holy Ghost is not 
of divine but of human nature. For all those in whom He 
abides become deified 28 for no other reason. But if He 
constitutes them gods, there can be no doubt that His 
nature is divine.” St. Basil comments as follows on Ps. 
LXXXI, 6 (Ego dixi, dit estis): “ But the Spirit that 
causes the gods to be gods, must be divine, and from God, 

_ and God.” 2® St. Cyril of Alexandria *° glowingly 
describes the soul inhabited by the Holy Ghost as inlaid 
with gold, transfused by fire, filled with the sweet odor 
of balsam, and so forth. 

The Latin Fathers, with one exception, are less defi- 
nite on this point. St. Augustine says that the Holy 
Ghost “is given as a gift of God in such a way that He 
Himself also gives Himself as being God,” ** and that 
“the grace of God is a gift of God, but the greatest gift 
is the Holy Spirit Himself, who therefore is called a 
grace.” *? Again: “. .. the Holy Spirit is the gift of 


quem habetis a Deo et non estis 80 Dialog., VII, per totum. 
vestri?’”’? Cfr. Rom. VIII, 9; Gal. 31 De Trinitate, XV, n. 36: “Ita 
TV,;' 6; 2 Cor. VI, 16. enim datur sicut donum_ Det, ut 
27 Ep. ad Serap., I, n. 24. etiam seipsum det sicut Deus.” 
28 PeorrolovvTal. 32Serm., 144, ¢. 1: “ Gratia 


29 Contra Eunom., 1. Vs quippe Dei donum Dei est; donum 


374 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


God, the gift being Himself indeed equal to the giver, and 
therefore the Holy Ghost also is God, not eon to the 
Father and the Son.” * 


b) While theologians are unanimous in ac- 
cepting the doctrine of the personal indwelling of 
the Holy Ghost in the just as clearly contained in 
Sacred Scripture and Tradition, they differ in ex- 
plaining the manner in which He dwells in the 
soul. 


a) The great majority hold that the Holy Ghost can not 
dwell in the soul, as the human soul dwells in the body, 
per modum informationis, nor yet by a hypostatic union, 
as godhead and manhood dwell together in the Person of 
Christ ; and that consequently His indwelling is objectively 
an indwelling of the whole Trinity, which is appropriated 
to the Third Person merely because the Holy Ghost is 
“hypostatic holiness” or “personal love.’ This view 
is based on what is called “the fundamental law of the 
Trinity,” viz.: “In God all things are one except 
where there is opposition of relation.” ** Sacred Scrip- 
ture speaks of the personal indwelling of the Father 
and the Son as well as of the Holy Ghost. Cfr. John 
XIV, 23: “If any one love me, he will keep my word, 
and my Father will love him, and we will come to him 
and will make our abode with him.” ** St. Athanasius 
autem maximum ipse Spiritus Sane- tate, 1, VIII, cap. 4 sq.: Franzelin, 
tus est, et ideo gratia dicitur.” De Deo Trino, thes. 43; J. Kleut- 


83 Enchiridion, c. 37: “‘ Et utique gen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 
Spiritus Sanctus Dei donum est, 2nd ed., pp. 369 sqq. 


quod quidem et ipsum est aequale 84 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
donanti; et ideo Deus est etiam Trinity, pp. 230 sqq. 
Spiritus Sanctus, Patre Filioque non so John XEVi) 235 St (Giis ates 


minor.” Additional Patristic texts ligit me, sermonem meum servabit, et 
of like tenor in Petavius, De Trini- Pater meus diliget eum, et ad eum 


ITS CONCOMITANTS 375 


concludes from these words that “the energia of the 
Trinity is one. . . . Indeed when the Lord says: I and 
the Father will come, the Spirit also comes, to dwell in us 
in precisely the same manner in which the Son dwells in 
us.”2¢ And St. Augustine teaches: “Love, therefore, 
which is of God and is God, is properly the Holy Spirit, 
by whom the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts,— 
that love by which the whole Trinity dwells in us.” *7 
Accordingly, the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost 
consists in the state of grace as bearing a special relation to 
the Third Person of the Trinity; the “higher nature” 
which sanctifying grace imparts to the soul is not an 
absolute but a relative form (ocxéos), by which the 
soul is mysteriously united with the Three Divine Per- 
sons and, by appropriation, with the Holy Ghost, thereby 
becoming a throne and temple of God. It is in this sense 
that the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul is called 
the climax of justification.*® | | 

B) Other eminent theologians (Petavius, Passaglia, 
Schrader, Scheeben, Hurter, et al.) regard the explana- 
tion just given as unsatisfactory. They contend that the 
Fathers, especially those of the East, conceived the in- 
dwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just, not 
as an indwelling (évolkyow) of the Trinity, appropriated 
to the Holy Ghost, but as a union (éwos) of the Holy 
Ghost Himself with the soul.*® This union, they say, is 


veniemus et mansionem (uovnv) 
apud eum faciemus.” 

36 Ep. 1 ad Serap., n. 30: “Ex 
his una Trinitatis évépyera ostendi- 
tur... profecto quum Dominus 
ait: Veniemus ego et Pater, simul 
venit Spiritus, non alio modo quam 
ut Filius in nobis habitaturus.” 

37 De Trinit., XV, 18, 32: “ Di- 
lectio igitur, quae ex Deo est et 
Deus est, proprie Spiritus S. est, 


per quem diffunditur in cordibus 
nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos 
tota inhabitat Trinitas.” 

38 For a more detailed treatment 
see Franzelin, De Deo Trino, thes. 
43-48, Rome 1881, 

39 Cfr. Pseudo-Dionys, Areop., De 
Hier. Eccl., 1, §3 (Migne,-P. G., 
III, 376): ‘H 6€ Odwais éorw F 
mpos Qedv adouolwcis re Kar 
EVWCTLSs 


376 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


neither physical nor hypostatic, but an altogether unique 
and inexplicable relation by which the soul is morally, ac- 
cidentally, and actively united to the person of the Holy 
Ghost.*° 

y) Unfortunately this exalted and mystic theory can- 
not be squared with the theological principles underlying 
the Catholic teaching on the Trinity, especially that por- 
tion of it which concerns the appropriations and missions 
of the three Divine Persons.*! It is true that sanctifying 
grace culminates in a communication of the Divine 
Nature, and that this Getwors is effected by imprinting upon 
the soul an image of the divine processes of generation 
and spiration,— the first by adoptive filiation, the second 
by an indwelling of the Holy Ghost.4? In fact all the 
Trinitarian relations are reflected in the justification of the 
sinner. Thus regeneration corresponds to the generation 


of the Logos by the Father; adoptive sonship and the’ 


accompanying participation of the soul in the Divine Na- 
ture corresponds to our Lord’s natural sonship and his 
consubstantiality with the Father; the indwelling of the 
Holy Ghost and His union with the soul, on the other 
hand, corresponds to the divine process of Spiration, in- 
asmuch as it is preéminently a supernatural union of love 
and effects a sort of mutual inexistence or perichoresis 
of the soul in the Holy Ghost or the three Divine Per- 
sons respectively.** Since, however, this union of the 


40 Cfr. Petavius, De Trinit., VIII, 
7, 12: “Ostendimus enim non 
semel, coniunctionem illam Spiritus 
S. neque dvoikny neque sroorate 
Knv esse, h. e@ neque naturalem 
neque personalem, quasi una fiat ex 
ambobus natura vel persona. Non 
enim quia et illti per adoptionis gra- 
tiam filii Dei sunt, ait Augustinus 
(In Ps. 67), ideo quisquam illorum 
est unigenitus. Neque enim ex per- 


sonarum duarum copulatione unum 


aliquid per sese, sed xard ovpBe- 


Bnxés potest effici.’’ 

41 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
Trinity, pp. 244 sqq. 

42 Cfr. Scheeben, Die Mysterien 
des Christentums, 2nd ed., p. 165, 
Freiburg 1808. 

43 Cfr, John XIV, 23; XVII, 20 
sqq. 


el 


ITS CONCOMITANTS B77 


soul with the substance of the three Divine Persons in 
general, and the Holy Ghost in particular, is not a sub- 
stantial and physical but only an accidental and moral 
union, the regeneration of the sinner must be conceived 
as generation in a metaphorical sense only, divine son- 
ship as adoptive sonship, the deification of man as a 
weak imitation of the divine homoousia, and the indwell- 
ing of the Holy Spirit in the soul as a shadowy analogue 
of the Divine Perichoresis.“ 


READINGS: — Deharbe, Die vollkommene Liebe Goties nach dem 
hl. Thomas von Aquin, Ratisbon 1856— Marchant, Die theolo- 
gischen Tugenden, Ratisbon 1864.— Mazzella, De Virtutibus In- 
fusis, 4th ed., Rome 1894.—G. Lahousse, S. J., De Virtutibus 
Theologicis, Louvain 1890.—S. Schiffini, S. J., Tractatus de 
Virtutibus Infusis, Freiburg 1904.— J. Kirschkamp, Der Geist des 
Katholizismus in der Lehre vom Glauben und von der Liebe, 
Paderborn 1804. C. Weiss, S. Thomae Aquinatis de Septem 
Donis Spiritus Sancti Doctrina Proposita et Explicata, Vienna 
1895. 

On the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the souls of the just 
see A. Scholz, De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti, Wirzburg 1856. 
—* Franzelin, De Deo Trino, pp. 625 sqq., Rome 1881.— Ober- 
dorffer, De Inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti im Animabus Iustorum, 
Tournai 1890.—* B. Froget, O. P., De I’Inhabitation du S. Esprit 
dans les Ames Justes d’aprées la ents de S. Thomas @Aquin, 
Paris 1901.— De Bellevue, LOeuvre du S. Esprit ou la Sanec- 
tification des Ames, Paris 1901. 

On the historic development of the dogma see Schwane, 
Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vol. II, § 56-75, Freiburg 1895. 


44 Gutberlet takes middle ground macher, Die iibernatiirliche Lebens- 
between the two theories and tries to ordnung nach der paulinischen und 
reconcile them. Cfr. Heinrich-Gut- johanneischen Theologie, pp. 193 
berlet, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. — sqq., Freiburg 1903. 

VIII, §468. See also A, Rade- 


SECTION 3 


THE: PROPERTIES OF SANCTIFYING GRACE 


By a property (proprium, ‘8ov) we understand 
a quality which, though not part of the essence of 
a thing, necessarily flows from that essence by 
some sort of causation and is consequently found 
in all individuals of the same species.t A prop- 
erty, as such, is opposed to an accident (accidens, 
ovpBeByxos), which is neither part of, nor neces- 
sarily attached to, the essence, but may or may not 
be present in the individual. Thus the ability to 
laugh is a property of human nature, whereas the 
color of the skin is an accident. 

How do the properties of grace differ from its 
formal effects, and from its supernatural concomi- 
tants? The formal effects of grace, as we have 
seen, are the elements constituting its nature, the 
properties are determinations necessarily flowing 
from that nature, while the supernatural concomi- 
tants are free gifts superadded by God. 


According to the Protestant theory, justification is abso- 
lutely certain, equal in all men, and incapable of being lost. 
The Catholic Church, on the contrary, teaches that justi- 


1 Cir. RoR Clarke S. J, Logic, puts 4s 
378 


LS) PROP Th Rane S 379 


fication is (1) uncertain, (2) unequal, and (3) amissible. 
We will explain this teaching in three theses. 


Thesis I: No man knows with certainty of faith 
whether he is justified or not. | 


This proposition is de fide. 

Proof: The Tridentine Council rejected’ the 
“fiduciary faith” ? of Luther as “an empty hereti- 
cal confidence,” * and in three distinct canons de- 
nied the properties attributed to faith by the early 
Protestant dogmaticians.! 

a) Holy Scripure again and again warns us 
that we can never be sure of our salvation. St. 
Paul, though himself “a vessel of election,” freely 
admits: “I am not conscious to myself of any 
thing, yet I am not hereby justified; but he that 
judgeth me is the Lord,” ® and declares: “I chas- 
tise my body and bring it into subjection, lest per- 
haps, when I have preached to others, I myself 
should become a castaway.” °® He exhorts the 
faithful to work out their salvation “with fear and 
trembling.” * 


2° Fides fiducialis,” v. supra, pp. 


255 sdq- 
3 Sess. VI, cap. 9; Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 684, 


4 Sess. VI, can, 13-15; Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 823 sqq. 

51 Cor. IV, 4: “ Nihil enim mihi 
conscius sum, sed non in hoc iusti- 
ficatus: sum; qui autem iudicat me, 
Dominus est.’ 

61 Cor. IX, 27: ‘“‘ Castigo corpus 


meum et in servitutem redigo, ne 
forte, quum altis praedicaverim, ipse 
rveprobus (adéximos) efficiar.” 

7 Phil. II, 12: “Cum metu et 
tremore vestram salutem operamini.”’ 
Other Scriptural texts in Bellarmine, 
De Iustificatione, III, 4 sqq. For 
the solution of certain exegetical 
difficulties see the same author, op. 
cit., III, 9, and Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
Vol. III, pp. 210 sqq., Paris 1896. 


380 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


b) The Fathers also teach the uncertainty of 
justification in the individual, and attribute it to 
the fact that, while we know that God pardons 
penitent sinners, no man can be entirely certain 
that he has complied with all the conditions nec- 
essary for justification. 


“Our fate,’ says St. Chrysostom, “‘is uncertain for 
a number of reasons, one of which is that many of our 
own works are hidden from us.”® St. Jerome, comment- 
ing on Eccles. IX, 1 sq.,° observes: “In the future they 
will know all, and all- things are manifest to them, that 
is to say, the knowledge of this matter will precede them 
when they depart this life, because then the judgment will 
be pronounced, while now we are still battling, and it is 
now uncertain whether those who bear adversities, bear 
them for the love of God, like Job, or because they hate 
Him, as do many sinners.” *° Pope St. Gregory the Great 
said to a noble matron who asked him whether she could 
be sure of her salvation: ‘ You ask me something which 
is both useless and difficult [to answer] ; difficult, because 
I am unworthy to receive a revelation; useless, because it 
is better that you be uncertain with regard to your sins, 
lest in your last hour you should be unable to repent.” *4 

8 Hom. in I. Epist. ad Cor, 2. 


o'Hethesy | IX, ut) isq.2../ 1 Nesci 
homo, utrum amore an odio dignus, 


plurimi peccatores, nunc habetur 
incertum.” 


Tee pe WD aes 


“Rem et inuti- . 


etc.” 

10 Hieronymus in h. 1. (Migne, P. 
LA RXTMT, 1080) 2% In 2 futuro 
igitur scient omnia et in vultu eorum 
sunt omnia, 1. @. antecedet eos, quum 
de hac vita decesserint, notitia istius 
rei quia tune est iudicum et nune 
certamen. Et quicunque adversa 
sustinent, utrum per amorem Det 
sustineant, ut Iob, an per odium, ut 


lem et difficilem postulasti: difficilem 
quidem, quia ego indignus sum, cut 
revelatio fiert debeat; inutilem vero, 
quia secura de peccatis tuis fieri non 
debes, nist quum iam in die vitae tuae 
ultimo plangere eadem peccata mi- 
nime valebis.” The Patristic argu- 
ment is more fully developed by 
Bellarmine, De Iustif., III, 7. 


SS ee 


Se ne oe ee eae ee 


ITS PROPERTIES | 381 


c) We now proceed to the theological explana- 
tion of the dogma embodied in our thesis. 


a) The purpose of this dogma is not, as Harnack *? 
thinks, “‘ partly to assuage and partly to excite the restless- 
ness that still remains, by means of the sacraments, indul- 
gences, liturgical worship and ecclesiastical encouragement 
of mystical and monkish practices,” but to prevent undue 
security and careless assurance. What the Church con- 
demns, in accordance with Sacred Scripture and Tradi- 
tion, is the certitudo fidet, that vain confidence which leads 
men to feel certain that they are in the state of grace 
(inanis fiducia), not the certitudo spet, 1. e. humble 
trust in God’s abundant mercy. “As no pious person 
ought to doubt of the mercy of God, of the merit of Christ, 
and of the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments,” says the 
Tridentine Council, “ even so each one, when he regards 
himself and his own weakness and indisposition, may 
have fear and apprehension touching his own grace; see- 
ing that no one can know with a certainty of faith, which 
cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace 

Greode . 
One needs but to apply to theology the epistemological 
principles and criteria furnished by philosophy to perceive 
that the Catholic dogma is as reasonable as the Protestant 
theory is absurd. The Protestant syllogism: “I know 
with a certainty of faith that the penitent sinner who 
does his share, is justified through the grace of Christ; 


12 Dogmengeschichte, Vol. III, p. suamque propriam infirmitatem e¢ 


617. indispositionem respicit, de sua gratia 
13 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap.  formidare et timere potest, quum 
9: “ Sicut nemo pius de Dei mi-  nullus scire valeat certitudine fidei, 


sericordia, de Christi merito deque cui non potest subesse falsum, se 
sacramentorum  efficacia dubitare  gratiam Dei esse consecutum.,” 
debet, sic quilibet, dum seipsum (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 802.) 


382 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


now, I, who am a penitent sinner, know with a certainty 
of faith that I have done my share; therefore, I know 
with a certainty of faith that I am justified,” may be 
formally correct, but the minor premise embodies a ma- 
terial error, because no man knows with a certainty of 
faith that he has done his share, unless it be specially 
revealed to him by God. No matter how sure I may feel 
of my own goodness, I have no certainty of faith, such 
as that which Mary Magdalen had, or that which was 
vouchsafed to the penitent thief on the cross, that I am 
justified. It is one of the approved rules of syllogistic 
reasoning that “the conclusion must follow the weaker 
premiss.” ** Hence, in the above syllogism the certainty 
cannot be of faith, but human and moral only. We do 
not mean to deny that God may grant to this or that indi- 
vidual a certainty of faith with regard to his justification ; 
in fact theologians expressly teach that in such a rare and 
exceptional case the privileged person would be obliged to 
believe in his own justification, fide divina.® 

B) Can any one, without a special revelation, be theo- 
logically certain that he is justified? Theological cer- 


tainty (certitudo theologica) is the result of a syllogism — 


which embodies an article of faith in one of its premises 
and an obvious truth of reason in the other. Ambrosius 
Catharinus '° stands alone among Catholic theologians in 
holding that there are rare cases in which men do 
have a theological certainty as to their justification with- 
out a private revelation. All other writers deny the 


14“ Peirorem sequitur semper et infallibili certitudine dixerit, nist 


conclusio partem.” Cfr. Clarke, hoc speciali revelatione  didicerit, 

Logic, p. 322. anathema sit.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
15 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, wart, n, 826.) 

can. 16: “Si quis magnum illud 16 In his little treatise De Certi- 


usque in finem  perseverantiae  tudine Gratiae. 
donum se certo habiturum absoluta 


ae a. ee ee 


ITS PROPERTIES 383 


possibility: (1) because Scripture and Tradition do not 
countenance the proposition; (2) because there are no 
criteria available for such certainty outside of private 
revelation, and (3) because the Tridentine Council cen- 
sured the assertion “that they who are truly justified 
must needs, without any doubt whatever, settle within 
themselves that they are justified.” *” 

y) For precisely the same reasons no man can be 
metaphysically certain of his own justification. Hence 
there remains only moral certainty. Moral certainty 
admits of varying degrees. The highest degree of moral 
certainty concerning justification can be had in the case of 
baptized infants, though, of course, we can never be 
metaphysically certain even in regard to them, because 
there is always room for doubt as to the intention of the 
minister and the validity of the matter and form 
employed in the administration of the sacrament. In the 
case of adults, certainty regarding justification varies in 
proportion to the measure in which it can be ascertained 
whether one has complied with all the requirements de- 
manded by God. However, certainty may be so great as 
to exclude all reasonable doubt. St. Paul says: “Iam 
sure that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to sepa- 
rate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our 
Lord.” 18 And St. Augustine: “ What do we know? 
We know that we have passed from death to life. 
Whence do we know this?. Because we love our breth- 
ren. Let no oneask another. Let each question his own 
heart; if he there finds fraternal charity, let him be sure 
that he has passed from death to life.’ *® This teaching 


ce 
° 


17 Sess. VI, cap. 9: .. msti- sum enim (réreomat = persuasum 
ficatos absque ulla dubitatione apud habeo), quia neque mors neque vita 
semetipsos statwere, se esse tustifica- ... poterit nos separare a caritate 
FOSv Dei, quae est in Christo Iesu.” 

18 Rom. VIII, 38 sq: “‘ Cerius Lo Track int loa Lwsanrse ns 10S 


384. SANCTIFYING GRACE 


has led theologians to set up certain criteria by which the 
faithful may be relieved of unreasonable anxiety and 
obtain some sort of assurance as to the condition of 
their souls. Such criteria are: a taste for things spirit- 
ual; contempt of earthly pleasures ; zeal and perseverance 
in doing good; love of prayer and pious meditation; pa- 
tience in suffering and adversity; a fervent devotion to 
the Blessed Virgin Mary; frequent reception of the sac- 
raments, etc.?° 


Thesis II: Sanctifying grace admits of degrees and 
therefore can be increased by good works. 


Both propositions contained in this thesis are 
de fide. 

Proof. The Protestant contention that the 
erace of justification is shared in an equal meas- 
ure by all the justified, was a logical deduction 
from Luther’s false principle that men are justified 
by faith alone through the external justice of 
Christ. If this were true, good works would be 
superfluous, and all Christians would enjoy an 
equal measure of grace. Luther formally as- 
serted this in his sermon on the nativity of the 
Blessed Virgin: ‘All we who are Christians are 
equally great and holy with the Mother of God.” *? 
Thomas a Kempis, III, 54 sqq. On 


“Quid nos scimus? Quia transivi- 


mus de morte ad vitam. Unde the whole subject of this subdivision 
scimus? Quia  diligimus  fratres. the student may profitably consult 
Nemo interroget hominem, redeat the Summa _ Theologica of St. 
unusquisque ad cor suum; si ibi Thomas, 1a 2ae, qu. 112, art. 5; 
invenerit caritatem fraternam, secu- Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 9-11, and 


rus sit, quia transiit a morte ad 
vitam.” 
20 Cfr. the Imitation of Christ by 


Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 6, art. 4. 
21 Serm. de WNativitate Mariae: 
“Omnes Christiani aeque magni 


ae a tO a eee 


ITS PROPERTIES 385 


The Catholic Church rejects this teaching. She 
holds that justification is an intrinsic process by 
which the justice and holiness of Christ becomes 
our own through sanctifying grace, and that con- 
sequently sanctifying grace may be present in the 
soul in a greater or less degree, according to the 
liberality of God and the disposition of the indi- 
vidual Christian, and those who are in the state of 
grace may augment it by good works. The Coun- 
cil of Trent formally defines these truths when 
it says: “[We receive] justice within us, each 
one according to his own measure, which the Holy 
Ghost distributes to every one as He wills, and ac- 
cording to each one’s proper disposition and co- 
operation.” 2? And: “[The justified], faith co- 
operating with good works, increase in that 
justice which they have received through the 
grace of Christ, and are still further justi- 
fied...’ 2% The second and more important of 
these truths is re-iterated and emphasized in the 
canons of Session VI: “If anyone saith that the 
justice received is not preserved and also increased 
before God through good works, but that those 
works are merely the fruits and signs of justi- 


sumus sicut mater Dei, et aeque  tionem.” (Dénzinger-Bannwart, n. 


sancti sicut ipsa.” 


22 Sess. VI, cap. 7: “ Iustitiam 
in nobis recipientes, unusquisque 
suam secundum mensuram, quam 
Spiritus Sanctus partitur  singulis 


prout vult, et secundum propriam 
cuiusque dispositionem et coopera- 


799.) 

23 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “ Iustif- 
catt ... in ipsa iustitia per Christi 
gratiam accepta, cooperante fide 
bonis operibus crescunt atque magis 
qustificantur.” (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n, 803.) 


386 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


fication obtained, but not a cause of the increase 
thereof: let him be anathema.” * 

a) The Tridentine Fathers base their teaching 
on a number of Scriptural texts which either ex- 
pressly declare or presuppose that grace is capable 
of being increased in the soul after justification. 

Thus we read in Prov. IV, 18: “The path of 
the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and 
increaseth even) |) to. perfect day? iecins: 
XVID) 2220 “Let! nothing: hinder thee “trom 
praying always, and be not afraid to be justified 
even to death: for the reward of God continueth 
fon every) 2Pet. TL 18s 4) Grow anvorace 
and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour 
Jesus Christan 2rCor, sxe ros, 7 od as 
increase the growth of the fruits of your jus- 
tice 8 Eph IV 572.5, But toevery- one OF tists 
given grace, according to the measure of the giv- 
Ing vot Christ eoApoe. Xk XO VL asc) ethos 
that is just, let him be justified still; and he that 
is holy, let him be sanctified still. Behold, I come 


pediaris ovare semper et ne verearis 
usque ad mortem iustificari, quo- 


24 Sess. VI, can. 24: “*Si quis 
dixerit, iustitiam acceptam non con- 


servari atque etiam augeri coram 
Deo per bona opera, sed opera ipsa 
fructus solummodo et signa esse 
iustificationis adeptae, non autem 
ipsius augendae causam, anathema 
sit.’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 834.) 

25 Prov. IV, 18: “ Iustorum au- 
tem semita quasi lux splendens pro- 
cedit et crescit usque ad perfectam 
diem.” 


26 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “‘ Non im- 


niam merces Det manet in aeter- 
num.” 

272 Pet. III, 18: ‘“‘ Crescite vero 
in gratia et in cognitione Domini 
nostri et Salvatoris Iesu Christi.” 

28 2 Cor. IX, ro: “ [Deus] auge- 
bit incrementa frugum  iustitiae 
vestrae.” 

29 Eph. IV, 7: “‘ Unicuique au- 
tem nostrum data est gratia secun- 
dum mensuram donationis Christi.” 


a, hl a 


— 


ITS: PROPERTIES 387 


quickly, and my reward is with me, to render to 
every man according to his works.” * 

Such texts could easily be multiplied. 

b) Tradition found definite utterance as early 
as the fourth century. 


When Jovinian attempted to revive the Stoic theory 
of the absolute equality of all virtues and vices, he met 
with strenuous opposition on the part of St. Jerome, 
who wrote a special treatise Contra Iovinianum, in which 
he said: “Each of us receives grace according to the 
measure of the grace of Christ (Eph. IV, 7) ; not as if 
the measure of Christ were unequal, but so much of 
His grace is infused into us as we are capable of re- 
ceiving.” * St. Augustine teaches that the just are as 
unequal as the sinners. “ The saints are clad with j ustice 
(Job XXIX, 14), some more, some less; and no one on 
this earth lives without sin, some more, some less: but the 
best is he who has least.” ®2 But, we are told, life as 
such is not capable of being increased; how then can 
there be an increase of spiritual life? St. Thomas an- 
swers this objection as follows: ‘“‘ The natural life per- 
tains to the substance of man, and therefore can be neither 
augmented nor diminished; but in the life of grace man 
participates accidentaliter, and consequently he can pos- 
sess it in a larger or smaller degree.” °° 


30 Apoc. XXII, 11 sq.: “Qui non quod mensura Christi diversa 
justus est, iustificetur adhuc, et sit, sed tantum gratiae eius infundi- 
sanctus sanctificetur adhuc. Ecce tur, quantum valemus haurire.” 
venio cito et merces mea mecum 32 Ep., 167, n. 13: “ Induti sunt 
est. reddere wunicuique secundum sancti iustitia (Job 29, 14), alius 
opera sua.’ Cfr. Bellarmine, De magis, alius minus; et nemo hic vivit 
Iustific., III, 16. sine peccato et hoc alius magis, alius 

31 Contra Iovin., II, n. 23: minus: optimus autem est qui mini- 


“ Unicuique nostrum data est gratia 
iuxta mensunam gratiae (Eph. 4, 7)3 


mum.” 
33 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 112, 


388 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


c) From what we have said it is easy to under- 
stand the distinction which theologians make be- 
tween justification as gratia prima and justifica- 
tion as gratia secunda. The latter is merely an- 
other term for an increase of grace after justifica- 
tion, 


a) Such an increase may be effected either ex 
opere operantts, that is, by good works, or ex opere 
operato, through the sacraments, and is called jus- 
tification (iustificatio, SKaiwos) partly because 
Sacred Scripture refers to it by that name ** and 
partly because “to become just” (iustum fieri) and 
“to become more just” (iustiorem fieri) both 
imply true sanctification. 


In this connection the question may be raised whether 
sanctifying grace is diminished by venial sin. Venial sin 
does not destroy the state of grace and consequently 
cannot augment or diminish grace. To assume that it 
could, would lead to the absurd conclusion that a definite 
number of venial sins might eventually grow into a mortal 
sin, or that repeated venial sins gradually diminish grace 
until finally it disappears. The first-mentioned assump- 
tion is impossible because venial differs generically from 
mortal sin, and a transition from the one to the other 
would be a perdBaois eis dXXo yévos. The second assump- 
tion would entail the heretical inference that the state of 
art. 4, ad 3: “Vita naturalis per- the teaching of Tradition cfr. Alb. 
tinet ad substantiam hominis, et a Bulsano, Instit. Theol. Dogmat., 
ideo non recipit magis et minus; ed. G, a Graun, O. Cap., Vol. II, 
sed vitam gratiae participat homo p. 254, Innsbruck 1894. 


accidentaliter, et ideo eam potest 34 Ecclus. XVIII, 22; ° Apoc. 
homo magis vel minus habere.’ On XXII, 11. 


Se bo nae ne a 


ITS PROPERTIES 389 


grace can be lost without mortal sin.** No doubt venial 
sin influences the state of grace unfavorably ; but this evil 
influence must be conceived as indirect — by committing 
venial sins man weakens his will-power, and temptation 
eventually grows so strong as to make mortal sin inevi- 
table. ‘He that contemneth small things, shall fall little 
by little4°* | 


B) If we inquire how sanctifying grace in- 
creases in the soul, we find that the process must 
be conceived as a growing intensity analogous to 
that of light and heat in the physical order. 


Gratia prima, as we have seen in a previous chapter, is 
a supernatural physical quality.87. Hence its increase, 4. e. 
gratia secunda, must be an increase of physical quality. 
Such an increase is called in Scholastic parlance intensio.** 
In what does this process consist? Certain Thom- 
ists ° describe it as a maior radicatio in subiecto, while 
the majority of theologians hold that it is simply an 
additio gradus ad gradum. This latter explanation is 
probably the correct one. Sanctifying grace is either 
capable of gradual increase, or it is not. If it is, there is 
no reason why God should deny such an increase under 
certain conditions. If it is not, Luther would have been 
right in contending that a newly baptized infant enjoys 
the same measure of holiness as the Blessed Virgin Mary 


35 Cfr. Vasquez, Comment. im 37 V. supra, pp. 328 sqq. 
Summam Theol., 1a 2ae, disp. 221, 38 Cfr. Suarez, Disp. Metaph., 1. 
Caps Owais 7,7.6 II, disp. 16. 

86 Ecclus. XIX, 1: “ Quit sper- 39 The authority of St. Thomas 


nit modica, paulatim decidet.” For himself can be invoked by neither 
a fuller treatment of this subject we party to this controversy. Cfr. 
refer the student to St. Thomas, Sylvius, Comment. in S. Theol., 2a 
Summa Theol., 2a 2a€, qu. 24, art. 2ae, dui 2qjvart.) 3) 

Io, 


390 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


or the human soul of our Divine Lord. It is impossi- 
ble to imagine how grace could produce a quantitatively 
higher holiness by simply striking its roots deeper into 
the soul.*? 


y) A question of greater practical importance 
is this: Is the increase of sanctifying grace ac- 
companied by a corresponding increase of the in- 
fused virtues, and vice versa? 


Every increase or decrease of sanctifying grace must 
eo ipso entail a corresponding increase or decrease, re- 
spectively, of theological charity. Charity is either 
identical with grace or it is not.*! If it is, an increase of 
the one implies an increase of the other; if it is not, the 
one cannot increase without an increase of the other, be- 
cause they are inseparable and related to each other as 
nature to faculty, or root to blossom. Moreover, the 
degree of heavenly glory enjoyed by a soul will be com- 
mensurate with the measure of charity which it possessed 
at death. Now grace and glory bear a proportional 
relation to each other. Consequently, grace is aug- 
mented as charity increases, and vice versa. The same 
argument applies to the infused moral virtues. 

The case is different, however, with the theological 
virtues of faith and hope. These may continue to exist 
in the soul after charity has departed, and hence are not 
inseparable from sanctifying grace and charity, nor from 
the moral virtues. This consideration led Suarez to infer 
that, as the theological virtues of faith and hope may be 
infused into the soul independently of charity and before 

40 For a fuller treatment of this topic see Tepe, Instit, Theol., Vol. 


III, pp. 217 sqq. 
41 V. supra, pp. 336 sqaq. 


a 

; 

a 
4 
f 


LES ‘PROPERTIES 391 


justification, they must be susceptible of increase in the 
course of justification without regard to the existing state 
of grace and charity.t2 This is true of the sinner. In 
the justified, as Suarez himself admits, an increase of 
grace (or charity) probably always entails an increase of 
faith and hope,**— a proposition which finds strong sup- 
port in the decree of Trent which says: “ This increase 
of justification Holy Church begs, when she prays: 
‘ Give unto us, O Lord, increase of faith, hope, and char- 
yee hee 

8) A final question forces itself upon the en- 
quiring mind, viz.: Is sanctifying grace capable 
of an indefinite increase, or is there a limit beyond 
which it cannot grow? In trying to find an 
answer to this question we must draw a careful 
distinction between the absolute and the ordinary 
power of God. 

There is no intrinsic contradiction in the assumption 
that grace can be indefinitely augmented. True, it can 
never become actually infinite, as this would involve an 
absurdity.*° But if we regard the power of God as He 
sees fit to exercise it in the present economy (potentia 
Dei ordinaia), we find that it is limited by two sublime 
ideals of holiness to which neither man nor angel can 
attain, viz.: the overflowing measure of sanctifying grace 
in the human. soul of our Lord Jesus Christ *® and the 
“fulness of grace” granted to His Mother.*7 Though 


42 Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 2, 13. 

43 Suarez, op. cit., IX, 4, 15. 

44 Sess. VI, cap. 10: “ Hoc vero 
iustitiae incrementum petit sancta 
Ecclesia, quum orat: Da nobis, Do- 
mine, fidei, spei et caritatis augmen- 


tum.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 803), 


Cfr. De Lugo, De Fide, disp. 16, 
sect. 2. 

45 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa 
Theol. a2as2ne dusjyecaw artes. 

46 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, Christology, 
Pp. 231 sqq. 

47 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
Pp. 24 sqq. 


Mariology, 


392 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


these ideals are beyond our reach, we must not be dis- 


couraged, but try to approach them as nearly as possi- 
ble. | 


Thesis III: Sanctifying grace is lost by mortal sin. 


This thesis also embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. Calvin asserted that neither justifica- 
tion nor faith can be lost by those who are pre- 
destined to salvation, and that the unpredestined 
are never truly justified. Luther held that jus- 
tifying grace is lost solely through the sin of infi- 
delity. Against the former the Council of Trent 
declared: “If anyone saith that a man once jus- 
tied can sin no more, nor lose grace, and that 
therefore he that falls and sins was never truly 
justified; ... lethim be anathema.” * Against 
the latter the same council defined: “If anyone 
saith that there is no mortal sin but that of infidel- 
ity, or that grace once received is not lost by any 
other sin, however grievous and enormous, save 
by that of infidelity, let him be anathema.” °° At 
the same time, however, the Holy Synod expressly 
declared that venial sin does not destroy the state 


48 For a more elaborate treatment isse iustificatum; ... anathema sit.” 


the reader is referred to Suarez, 
De Gratia, IX, 6, 11, and Schiffini, 
De Gratia Divina, pp. 570 sq., Frei- 
burg 1901. 

49 Sess. VI,. can. 23: “Si quis 
hominem semel iustificatum dixerit 
amplius peccare non posse neque 
gratiam amittere atque ideo eum, qui 
labitur et peccat, numquam vere fu- 


(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 833.) 
50'Sess. VI, can. 27:3) “Si quis 
dixerit, nullum esse mortale pecca- 
tum nisi infidelitatis, aut nullo alio 
quantumvis gravi et enormi praeter- 
quam infidelitatis peccato semel ac- 
ceptam gratiam amitti, anathema 
sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 837). 


ITS PROPERTIES 393 


of grace: “For although during this mortal life, 
men, how holy and just soever, at times fall into at 
least light and daily sins, which are also called 
venial, they do not therefore cease to be just.” °* 

a) This teaching is so obviously in accord with 
Sacred Scripture that we confine ourselves to 
quoting three or four passages. Ezechiel says 
that sanctifying grace may be irretrievably lost: 
“Tf the just man turn himself away from his jus- 
tice, and do iniquity according to all the abomina- 
tions which the wicked man useth to work, shall 
- helive? All his justices which he hath done shall 
not be remembered; in the prevarication, by which 
he hath prevaricated, and in his sin, which he 
hath committed, in them he shall die.” °? Our 
Lord Himself admonishes His Apostles: “Watch 
ye and pray, that ye enter not into temptation.” °° 
St. Paul not only warns the faithful in general 
terms: “He that thinketh himself to stand, let 
him take heed lest he fall; °* but expressly des- 
ignates certain mortal sins as a bar to Heaven: 
“Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulter- 


51 Sess. VI, cap. 11: ‘“‘Licet in  pius, numquid vivet? Omnes iusti- 


hac mortali vita quantumvis sancti 
et iustt in levia saltem et quotidiana, 
quae etiam venialia dicuntur, peccata 
quandoque cadant, non propterea 
desinunt esse iusti.” 

D2 EZ NOUV TD ie sabe oS, 
averterit se iustus a iustitia sua, et 
fecerit iniquitatem secundum omnes 
abominationes, quas operart solet im- 


autem 


tiae eius, quas fecerat, non recorda- 
buntur; im’ praevaricatione, qua 
praevaricatus-est, et in peccato suo, 
quod peccavit, in ipsis morietur.” 

53 Matth, XXVI, 41: “ Vigilate 
et orate, ut non intretis in tenta- 
tionem.” f 

541 Cor, X, 12: ..° Qut se. exi- 
stimat stare, videat ne cadat.” 


304 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


ers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind, 
nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor 
railers, nor extortioners, shall possess the king- 
dom of God.” *° 

b) The teaching of Tradition was brought out 
clearly in the fight against Jovinian. 


That wily heretic claimed the authority of St. John for 
the assertion that the grace of Baptism can never be lost. 
The Johannean passage in question reads: ‘‘ Whosoever 
is born of God, committeth no sin: for His seed abideth 
in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.’ 54 
St. Jerome in his reply paraphrases the passage as follows: 
“ Therefore I tell you, my little children, whosoever is 
born of God, committeth no sin, in order that you may 
not sin and that you may know that you will remain 
sons of God so long as you refrain from sin.” 5” St. 
Augustine teaches: “If a man, being regenerate and 
justified, relapses of his own will into an evil life, as- 
suredly he cannot say: ‘I have not received,’ because of 
his own free choice of evil he has lost the grace of God 
that he has received.” °*. And St. Gregory the Great: 


551 Cor. VI, 9 sq.: “ Nolite  terea scribo vobis, filioli mei, omnis 


errare, neque fornicari neque idolis 


servientes neque adulteri neque 
molles neque masculorum concu- 
bitores neque fures neque avari 


neque ebriosi neque maledici neque 
rapaces regnum Dei possidebunt.” 
Cir. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 
15 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 808). 

561 John III, 9: “ Omnis, qut 
natus est ex Deo, peccatum non fa- 
cit: quoniam semen ipsius in eo 
manet, et non potest peccare, quo- 
niam ex Deo natus est.’ 


57 Contra Iovin., 1. II: “ Prop- 


qui natus est ex Deo, non peccat, 
ut non peccetis et tamdiu sciatis vos 
in generatione Domini permanere, 
quamdiu non peccaveritis.” On the 
different interpretations of 1 John 


III, 9, an admittedly difficult text, 


see Bellarmine, De Iustific., III, 15. 

58 De Corrept. et Gratia, c. VI, 
n, 9: “Si iam regeneratus et iustt- 
ficatus in malam vitam sua voluntate 
relabitur, certe iste mon potest 
dicere: Non accepi, quia acceptam 
gratiam Det suo in malum libero 
amisit arbitrio.’ 


ITS PROPERTIES 395 


*“ As he who falls away from the faith is an apostate, so 
he who returns to an evil deed is regarded by Almighty 
God as an apostate, even though he may seem to retain 
the faith; for the one without the other can be of no use, 
because faith availeth nought without [good] works, 
nor [good] works without faith.” °® The penitential dis- 
cipline of the primitive Church furnishes additional 
proofs for the doctrine under consideration. If grace 
could be lost in no other way than by unbelief, the Sacra- 
ment of Penance would be useless.*° 


c) In connection with this subject theologians 
are wont to discuss the question whether or not 
the forfeiture of sanctifying grace involves the 
loss of its supernatural concomitants. 


Theological love or charity is substantially identical 
with sanctifying grace, or at least inseparable from it, 
and hence both are gained and lost together. This is 
an article of faith. To lose sanctifying grace, therefore, 
is to lose theological love. On the other hand, it is 
equally de fide that theological faith (habitus fider) is not 
destroyed by mortal sin; *? it can be lost only by the sin of 
unbelief.*2 The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of theo- 


59 Hom. in Ez., 9, 1: “ Sicutt Penance in the First Six Centuries, 


qui a fide recedit, apostata est, ita 
qui ad perversum opus, quod dese- 
ruerit, redit, ab omnipotente Deo 
apostata deputatur, etiamsi fidem 
tenere videatur; unum enim sine 
altero nil prodesse valet, quia nec 
fides sine operibus nec opera adiu- 
vant sine fide.”’ 

60 For the solution of certain diffi- 
culties see Schiffini, De Gratia Di- 
vind, pp. 591 sqq. On the peniten- 
tial discipline of the early Church 
efr, G, Rauschen, Eucharist and 


pp. 152 sqq., St. Louis 1913. 

61 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
can, 28: “ Si quis dixerit, amissé 
per peccatum gratia simul et fidem 
semper amitti, aut fidem quae re- 
manet non esse veram fidem, licet non 
sit viva, aut eum qui fidem sine 
caritate habet, non esse Christianum, 
anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 838.) 8 

62 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
cap. 15: “Non modo infideltate, 
per quam et ipsa fides amittitur, sed 


306 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


logical hope. True, the Church has not definitely de- 
clared her mind with regard to hope, but it may be set 
down as her teaching that hope is not lost with grace and 
charity but.survives like faith.°* The two contrary op- 
posites of hope are desperation and presumption, con- 
cerning which theologians commonly hold that the 
former destroys hope, while the latter probably does not. 
But even if hope and charity are lost, faith may remain 
in the soul like a solitary root, from which, under more 
favorable conditions, new life is apt to spring. As re- 
gards the infused moral virtues and the seven gifts of 
the Holy Ghost (and, a fortiori, His personal indwelling 
in the soul),®* it is the unanimous teaching that these 
disappear with sanctifying grace and charity, even 
though faith and hope survive. The reason is that 
these virtues and gifts are merely supernatural adjuncts 
of sanctifying grace and cannot persist without it. “ Ac- 
cessorium sequitur principale.” © 

etiam quocunque alio mortali pec- amor Dei.” 


cato, quamvis non amittatur fides, Nn. 1407.) 
acceptam tustificationis gratiam 64V. supra, Section 2, 


(Denzinger-Bannwart, 


amitti.”’ 

63 Cfr, Prop. Quesnelli damn. a 
Clemente XI, prop. 57: “ Totum 
deest peccatori, quando ei deest spes, 
et non est spes in Deo, ubi non est 


65 The questions discussed in this 
subdivision of our treatise are more 
fully treated by Ripalda, De Ente 
Supernaturali, disp. 128, sect. 4, and 
by Suarez, De Gratia, IX, 3 saq. 


CHART HR Ett 


THE FRUITS OF JUSTIFICATION, OR THE MERIT OF 
GOOD WORKS 


The principal fruit of justification, according 
to the Tridentine Council, is the meritoriousness 
of all good works performed in the state of sancti- 
fying grace. 

Merit (meritum), as we have explained in the 
first part of this treatise,” is that property of a 
good work which entitles the doer to a reward 
(praemium, merces). 

Ethics and theology distinguish two kinds of 
merit: (1) condign merit or merit in the strict 
sense of the term (meritum adaequatum sive de 
condigno), and (2) congruous merit or quasi- 
merit (meritum inadaequatum sive de congruo). 
Condign merit supposes an equality between ser- 
vice and return. It is measured by commutative 
justice and confers a strict claim to a reward. 
Congruous merit, owing to its inadequacy and the 
lack of strict proportion between service and 
recompense, confers no such claim except on 
grounds of equity.* . 


1Sess, VI, cap. 16. 2V. supra, p.°131. 3V. supra, pp. 132 sqq. 
397 


398 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


In this treatise we are concerned with merit 
only in the theological sense of the term, 7. e. 
supernatural merit. We shall consider (1) its 
Existence,* (2) its Requisites,? and (3) its 
Objects.° 


4 Realitas sive existentia meriti. 6 Obiecta meriti. 
5 Conditiones meriti. 


a yer 


SECTION 1 


THE EXISTENCE OF MERIT 


1. HERETICAL ERRORS AND THE TEACHING OF 
THE CHURCH.—a) The medieval Beguins and 
Beghards held that man is able to attain such 
a perfect state of holiness here below as no 
longer to require an increase of grace or good 
works.’ Luther, holding that justification con- 
sists in the covering up of sin and the external im- 
putation of the justice of Christ, consistently 
though falsely asserted that “the just man sins 
in every good work,” ® that “a good work, no 
matter how well performed, is a venial sin,” ° 
and that “every work of the just deserves 
damnation and is mortally sinful, if it be consid- 
ered as it really is in the judgment of God.” ” 
Calvin rejected good works as “impurities and de- 
filements,” *? which God covers with the cloak of 
the merits of Jesus Christ and which He some- 
times rewards with temporal blessings but never 


7Cfr. Conc. Viennense, A.D. 9“ Opus bonum optime factum 
1311 (Clementin,, 1. V, tit. 3: “De est veniale peccatum.” Prop. 32, J. 
Haereticis”) in  Denzinger-Bann- c., n. 772. 
wart, mn. 471 sqq. 10“ Omne opus iusti damnabile 


8“In omni opere bono iustus est et peccatum mortale, si iudicio 


peccat.” Prop. Luthert Damnatae 
A.D. 1520 a Leone X, prop. 31 
(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 771). 


Dei iudicetur.”’ 
11“ Inquinamenta et 
insite VT; 1234s 


sordes,”’ 


399 


400 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


with eternal life. Modern Protestantism has 
given up or at least attenuated these harsh doc- 
trines.”” | 

b) The Church had defined her teaching on 
this point centuries before the time of the ‘“‘Re- 
formers.” Thus the Second Council of Orange 
declared as early as 529: “Good works, when 
performed, deserve a reward; but grace, which is 
a free gift, precedes good works and is a neces- 
sary condition of them.” ** The Fourth Lateran 
Council reiterated this doctrine: ‘Not only vir- 
gins and those who practice continence, but the 
married also, who please God by having the right 
faith and performing good works, deserve to ob- 
tain eternal happiness.” ** The Tridentine Coun- 
cil goes into the matter at length in the sixteenth 
Chapter of its Sixth Session, where we read 
inter alia: ‘‘And for this reason life eternal is to 
be proposed to those working well unto the end 
and hoping in God, both as a grace mercifully 
promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, 
and as a reward which is according to the promise 
of God Himself to be faithfully rendered to their 
good works and merits.” *” 


12 Quietism (Michael de Molinos 
et al.) denied the meritoriousness 
of good works performed in the 
“state of passive repose” (quies). 

13 “ Debetur merces bonis operi- 
bus, si fiant; sed gratia, quae non 
debetur, praecedit ut fant.’ Can, 
18 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 191.) 


14 Cap. “ Firmiter”: “ Non solum 
autem virgines et  continentes, 
verum etiam coniugati per rectam 
fidem et operationem bonam placen- 
tes Deo ad aeternam merentur bea- — 


titudinem pervenire,’ (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 430.) 
15 Sess. VI, cap. 16: “ Atque 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 401 


The same Council formally condemned the Lutheran 
position as heretical: “If anyone saith that in every 
good work the just man sins at least venially, or, which is 
more intolerable still, mortally, and consequently deserves 
eternal punishments; and that for this cause only he is not 
damned that God does not impute those works unto 
salvation; let him be anathema.” *° The positive teach- 
ing of the Church may be gathered from the following 
condemnation: “If anyone saith that the just ought not, 
for their good works done in God, to expect and hope for 
eternal recompense from God through His mercy and the 
merit of Jesus Christ, if so be that they persevere to the 
end in well-doing and in keeping the commandments ; let 
him be anathema.” +” The existence of merit in the true 
and proper sense of the term is specially emphasized as 
follows: .“If anyone saith that . . . the justified, by the 
good works which he performs through the grace of God 
and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he ts, 
does not truly merit increase of grace .. .; let him be 
anathema.” ‘* The quietistic errors of Michael de Mo- 


ideo bene operantibus usque in finem 17 Sess. Vij). cani 126: 1) 4S7 quits 


et in Deo sperantibus proponenda 
est vita aeterna et tamquam gratia 
filiis Det per Christum Iesum miseri- 
corditer promissa et tamquam mer- 
ces ex ipsius Dei promissione bonis 
ipsorum operibus et meritis fideliter 
reddenda.”’ (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
n. 809.) 

TONS ESS VL CA 28 ah Ot QULS 
in quolibet bono opere iustum saltem 
venialiter peccare dixerit, aut quod 
intolerabilius est, mortaliter atque 
ideo poenas aeternas mereri, tantum- 
que ob id non damnari quia Deus ea 
opera non wmputat ad damnationem, 
anathema sit.’ (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 835.) 


dixerit, iustos non debere pro bonis 
operibus, quae in Deo fuerint facta, . 
exspectare et sperare aeternam retri- 
butionem a Deo per eius misericor- 
diam et Iesu Christi meritum, si 
bene agendo et divina mandata cu- 
stodiendo usque in finem persevera- 
verint, anathema sit.’ (Denzinger- 
Bannwart, n. 836.) 

18 Sess, VI, .cans 3225) “ Si guis 
dixerit, .... ipsum iustificatuin bonis 
operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam 
et [esu Christi meritum, cuius vivum 
membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri 
augmentum gratiae,... anathema 
sit.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 842.) 


402 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


linos were condemned by Pope Innocent XI, Nov. 20, 
T0077" 


2. THE MERITORIOUSNESS OF Goop Works 
DEMONSTRATED FROM SCRIPTURE AND TRADI- 
TION.—Both Holy Scripture and Tradition em- 
ploy opus bonum and meritum as reciprocal or 
correlative terms. | 

a) In the Old Testament the good deeds of 
the just are often declared to be meritorious in the 
sight of God. Cfr. Wisd. V, 16: “But the just 
shall live for evermore, and their reward is with 
the Lord.” Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Be not afraid 
to be justified even to death, for the reward of God 
continueth for ever.” 7+ The New Testament 
teaching culminates in the “eight beatitudes,” 
each of which is accompanied by a special reward. 
After enumerating them all, with the promises 
attached to each, our Divine Saviour significantly 
adds: “Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is 
very great in heaven.” 7? 


St. Paul, who so strongly insists on the absolute gratui- 
tousness of Christian grace, nevertheless acknowledges the 
existence of merits to which a reward is due from 
God. Cfr. Rom. IT, 6sq.: “ [God] will render to every 
man according to his works, to them indeed who accord- 


19 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, n. aris usque ad mortem iustificart, 


I22I sqq. quoniam merces Dei manet in aeter- 
20 Wisd. V, 16: “Iusti autem in num.” Cfr. Gen. XV, 1. 

perpetuum vivent et apud Dominum 22 Matth. V, 12: ‘“‘Gaudete et 

est merces eorum.’’ exultate, quoniam merces  vestra 


21 Ecclus. XVIII, 22: “Ne vere-  copiosa est in caelis.’ 


OO nn aS Cn ee 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 403 
ing to patience in good work, seek glory and honor and 
incorruption, eternal life.” 2° 2Tim.IV,7sq.: “Ihave 
fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept 
the faith. As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown 
of justice, which the Lord the just judge will render to 
me in that day, and not only to me, but to them also 
that love. his coming.” 74-1 ‘Cor; TIL8:% Every man 
shall receive his own reward, according to his own 
labore?) Col, LL) 23) sa-0 Whatsoever you) do) doit 
from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men, knowing 
that you shall receive of the Lord the reward of inheri- 
tance.” 2° The most eloquent exponent of the necessity 
of good works is St. James, who also insists on their meri- 
toriousness: ‘‘ Blessed is the man that endureth tempta- 
tion; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the 
crown of life, which God hath promised to them that 
love him.”27 In the Apocalypse Jesus says: “ Be thou 
faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of 
hie. ae. 


b) The teaching of the Fathers is an effective 


,commentary on the Scriptural doctrine just ex- 


BsuRomi leon O San \nney «ey Qe 
veddet wunicuique secundum opera 
eius, tis quidem, qui secundum pa- 
tientiam boni operis gloriam et hono- 
rem et incorruptionem quaerunt, 
vitam aeternam,” 

242 Tim. IV, 7 sq.: “ Bonum 
certamen certavi, cursum consum- 
mavi, fidem servavi. In reliquo re- 
posita est mihi corona iustitiae, quam 
reddet mihi Dominus in illa die w- 
stus itudex; non solum autem mihi, 
sed et ws qui diligunt adventum 
eins Clr a Cor. TX25) 

251 Cor. III, 8: “ Unusquisque 
autem propriam mercedem accipiet, 
secundum suum laborem.” 


26 Col. III, 23 sq.: “ Quodcunque 
facitis, ex animo operamini sicut 
Domino et non hominibus, scientes 
quod a Domino accipietis retributio- 
nem haereditatis.”’ 

27 Tac. I, 12: “ Beatus vir, qut 
suffert tentationem, quoniam, quum 
probatus fuerit, accipiet coronam 
vitae, quam repromisit Deus diligen- 
tibus se.” 

28 Apoc:' II, 10: “Esto fidelis 
usque ad mortem, et dabo tibi coro- 
nam vitae.’ For additional Scrip- 
ture texts see Bellarmine, De Iusti- 
ficatione, V, 3, 5» 


404 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


pounded, as may be seen from their homilies re- 
produced in the Roman Breviary. 


St. Ignatius of Antioch says: “ Surfer me to be eaten 
by the beasts, through whom I can attain to God.” 2 St. 
Irenzeus: “ Precious should be to us the crown which 
we gain in battle, ... and the more we obtain it by 
combat, the more precious it is.”®° St. Ambrose: “Ts 
it not evident that the reward and punishment of 
merits endure after death?” St. Augustine: “ Eter- 
nal life contains the whole reward in the promise of which 
we rejoice; nor can the reward precede desert, nor be 
given to a man before he is worthy of it. What can be 
more unjust than this, and what is more just than God? 
We should not then demand the réward before we de- 
serve to get it.” °° Andagain: “ As death is given, so to 
speak, to reward the merit of sin, so eternal life is given 
to reward the merit of justice, . . . and hence it is also 
called reward in many Scriptural passages.” 33 


c) Theologically the meritoriousness of good 
works is based on the providence of God. There 
must be some sort of sanction to enforce the divine 


laws,—not only the natural law (lex naturae), 


29 Ep. ad Rom., IV, 1. 
80 Adv, Haer., IV, 37. 


88. Bp. ad Sist.z> 194). ne v2 


31 De Offic., I, 15, 57: “* Nonne 
evidens est, meritorum aut praemia 
aut supplicia post mortem manere?” 

82 De Moribus Ecclesiae, I, 2:5: 
“Vita aeterna est totum praemium, 
culus promissione gaudemus, nec 
praemium potest praecedere merita 
priusque homini dari, quam dignus 
est. Quid enim hoc iniustius et 
quid iustins Deo? Non ergo debe- 
mus poscere praemia, antequam 
mereamur accipere,”’ 


“ Sicut merito peccati tamquam sti- 
pendium redditur mors, ita merito 
iustitiae tamquam stipendium vita 
aeterna ... Unde etiam et merces 
appellatur plurimis s. Scripturarum 
locis.”” Other Patristic texts incul- 
cating the meritoriousness of good 
works performed in the state of 
grace can be found in Bellarmine, 
De Iustif., V, 4, 6. For the solu 
tion of objections raised against the 
Patristic argument consult Schiffini, 
De Gratia Divina, pp. 609 sqq. 


DN cat 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 405 


but, a fortiori, the “law of grace” (lex gratiae), 
as the supernatural order is so much more impor- 
tant than the natural. 


a) By the good works which he performs in the state of 
sanctifying grace, and with the aid of actual graces (i 
gratia et ex gratia), man acquires a twofold merit,— he 
helps to execute the divine plan of governance in regard 
to his fellow-creatures and assists in furthering the ex- 
ternal glory of God, which is the ultimate purpose of crea- 
tion. For this he is entitled to a double reward, just as 
the sinner is deserving of a double punishment for the in- 
jury he does to his fellowmen and the dishonor he reflects 
upon his Creator.** 

It is objected against this argument that our supernatu- 
ral merits, being finite, are in no proportion to the pos- 
session and enjoyment of an Infinite Good. This objec- 
tion vanishes in the light of the following considerations: 
(1) Sanctifying grace is a kind of deificatio, which 
raises man above himself to a quasi-divine dignity that 
colors all his actions.2®> (2) The ability of the justified to 
perform supernaturally good works is based entirely upon 
the infinite merits of Jesus Christ.** (3) The Infinite 
Good is possessed by the creature, not in an infinite but 
in a merely finite manner. Hence there is a due pro- 
portion between good works and merit.*” 


34 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 
Tanzae, (Gus ets att.) 4. 

35 Cfr. Prop. Bait damn. a.Pio V, 
13 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1013): 
“ Opera bona a filits adoptionis facta 
non accipiunt rationem meriti ex 
eo, quod fiunt per Spiritum adop- 
tionis inhabitantem corda filiorum 
Dei, sed tantum ex eo, quod sunt 
conformia legi quodque per ea prae- 
statur obedientia legi.” 


36 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
cap. 16: “ Absit, ut Christianus 
homo in se ipso vel confidat vel 
glorietur, et non in Domino, cuius 
tanta est erga homines bomitas, 
ut eorum velit esse merita, quae 
sunt ipsius dona.’ 

87 Cfr. Conc.. Florent., A. D. 1439, 
(apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n, 693): 
“et intuert clare ipsum Deum 
trinum et unum, sicuti est, pro meri- 


400 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


One difficulty still remains, viz.: By what title do in- 
fants who die in the state of baptismal innocence attain to 
eternal beatitude, which they have been unable to merit? 
We answer: The just man has two distinct claims to 
Heaven, one as a child of God,?% and another as a 
laborer in His vineyard. Baptized infants who have 
not yet arrived at the use of reason, possess only the first 
claim, while adult Christians who lead a good life enjoy 
also the titulus mercedis and consequently are entitled to 
a richer reward. Both claims ultimately rest on the mer- 
its of Jesus Christ.3® 

B) What we have said is sufficient to disprove the 
groundless assertion that the Catholic doctrine concerning 
the meritoriousness of good’ works derogates from 
the merits of Christ and fosters “ self-righteousness.” 
Would it not be far more derogatory to the honor of our 
Saviour to assume that He failed to obtain for those for 
whom He suffered and died, a limited capacity for gain- 
ing merits? Does it in any way impair the dignity of God 
as the causa prima to assume that He communicates to 
His creatures a limited causality, by which they are en- 
abled to act as true causae secundae, instead of being 
mere causae occasionales, as the Occasionalists assert? 4° 
As regards the other charge, no true Catholic is guilty of 
“ self-righteousness ” because he regards his good works 


forum tamen diversitate alium alio a Patre.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 
perfectius.”’ 904.) 


88 V. supra, pp. 356 sqq. 

39 Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, cap. 
8: “Ita non habet homo, unde glo- 
rietur, sed omnis gloriatio nostra 
in Christo est, in quo vivimus, in 
quo movemur, in quo satisfacimus 
facientes fructus dignos poenitentiae, 
qui ex illo vim habent, ab illo offe- 
runtur Patri et per illum acceptantur 


40 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
can. 33: “ Si quis dixerit, per hanc 
doctrinam catholicam de iustifica- 
tione, a s. Synodo hoc praesenti de- 
creto expressam, aliqué ex parte 
gloriae Det vel meritis Iesu Christi 
D. N. derogari, et non potius verita- 
tem fidei nostrae, Dei denique ac 
Christi Iesu gloriam illustrari, ana- 
thema sit.” 


en aes 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 407 


as “ fruits of justification,” owing purely to grace. The 
“ self-righteousness”” of which Luther speaks is. incom- 
patible with the virtue of humility. The faithful Chris- 
tian, according to St. Paul, may safely rejoice over his 
merits, because the uncertainty of justification and the 
consciousness that his good works are but limited at best, 
are a sufficient protection against self-righteousness and 
presumption.** 


3. EXPLANATION OF THE CATHOLIC DOCTRINE. 
—Though the Tridentine Council merely defined 
in general terms that all good works performed in 
the state of sanctifying grace are meritorious,”* 
it is theologically certain that the merit due to 
good works is the merit of condignity. 


a) According to Pallavicini*? the Fathers of Trent 
without exception were convinced that the merit inherent 
in good works is a meritum de condigno, based upon di- 
vine justice, and they purposely employed the term 
vere to exclude that quasi-merit which in the technical 
terminology of the Schools is called meritum de con- 
gruo.## They refrained from expressly employing the 
term meritum de condigno, because meritum verum is a 
plain and adequate term, and for this additional reason 
that they wished to avoid certain theological controversies 

41 Cfr. Bellarmine, De LIustifica- ficationem peractis adeoque diving 


tione, V, 7. See also the article gratia informatis redditisque ob 
on “Merit” in the Catholic En- merita Christi potentioribus, cuius 


cyclopedia, Vol. X. vivum membrum est is qui ea per- 
42Sess. VI, cap. 16: “vere agit, omnes concedebant rationem 
promeruisse;” Sess, VI, can, 32: meriti condigni ad conservandam 
“vere mereri.” augendamque eandem gratiam aeter- 
43 Hist. Conc. Trident., VIII, 4. naeque felicitatis consequendam.” 


44“ Operibus post acceptam iusti- (Pallavicini, J. c.) 


408 SANCTIFYING GRACE 
regarding the nature of the meritum de condigno and its 
requisites.*° 

b) We need not enter into these controversies to 
understand that condign merit supposes an equality be- 
tween service and reward. The proposition can be proved 
from Sacred Scripture by an indirect argument. The 
meritum de condigno is based on a strict claim of justice, 
not on mere equity. Now the Bible leaves no doubt that 
God meant to make himself a debtor to man in strict jus- 
tice. Cfr. Heb. VI, 10: ‘ For God is not unjust, that he 
should forget your work.” #° 2 Tim. IV,8: “. .. there 
is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the 
just judge will render to me in that day: and not only to 
me, but to them also that love his coming.” #7 James I, 12: 
“ Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when 
he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, 
which God hath promised to them that love him.” 48 That 
there must be a condignitas between service and reward 
is clearly apparent from such texts as these: — Wis. III, 
5: “... God hath tried them and found them worthy 
onihimsel {74902 Ptiessi ny A-sqicee Sein) all your per- 
secutions and tribulations, which you endure, for an ex- 
ample [as a token] of the just judgment of God, that you 
may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God, for which 
also you suffer.” °° Apoc. III, 4: “. . . they shall walk 
with me in white, because they are worthy.” *! Not merely 
as their benefactor but as the just judge, Christ will say 
49 Wisd. III, 5: “ Deus tentavit 


eos et invenit illos dignos se.’ 
502 Thess. I, 4 sq.: “In omni- 


45 V. infra, Sect. 2. 
46 Heb. VI, 10: “Non enim in- 
iustus est Deus, ut obliviscatur operis 


vestri.” 

S72 TMs EVE Oth ele ve FEPOSIEG 
est mihi,” etc. See note 24, supra, 
Pp. 403. 

48 Tac. I, 12: 
suffert tentationem, 
note 27, p. 403. 


“ Beatus vir, qui 
’ etc. V. supra, 


bus persecutionibus vestris et tribu- 
lationibus, quas sustinetis in exem- 
plum iusti inudicti Dei, ut digni 
habeamini in regno Dei, pro quo et 
patimini.” 

51 Apoc, III, 4: “ Ambulabunt 
mecum in albis, quia digni sunt.’ 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 409 
to the elect on judgment day: “Come, ye blessed of my 
Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from 
the foundation of the world. For I was hungry, and you 
gave me to eat... .”°* Justly therefore is sanctifying 
grace, as the principium dignificativum operum, called the 
“seed of God,” ®* because it contains a celestial reward 
even as an acorn contains the oak. True, St. Thomas, to 
whom we are indebted for this simile,>* in another part of 
the Summa®> defends the theological axiom: “ Deus 
punt circa condignum et remunerat ultra condignum,”’ 
but he does not mean to deny the equality between service 
and reward, but merely to exalt the generosity that 
prompts God to bestow upon creatures what is due to 
them more bountifully than they deserve. Cfr. Luke VI, 
38: “Give, and it shall be given to you: good measure 
and pressed down and shaken together and running over 
shall they give into your bosom.” °° 


52 Matth. XXV, 34 sq.: Venite, 1014): “* Opera bona tustorum non 


benedicti Patris met, possidete para- 
tum vobis regnum a_ constitutione 
mundi; esurivi enim et dedistis mihi 
manducare ...” 

531 John III, 9. 

54 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, 
art. 3, ad 3: “ Gratia Spiritus S.., 
quam im praesentt habemus, etst 
non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est 
tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut se- 
men arboris, in quo est virtus ad 
totam arborem. Et  similiter per 
gratiam inhabitat hominem Spiritus 
S., qui est sufficiens causa vitae 
aeternae, unde et dicitur esse pignus 
hereditatis nostrae.” 

55 Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 21, art. 
Amica cnte 

be Luke WVil,.38: “Date, et das 
bitur vobis: mensuram bonam, et 
confectam, et coagitatam, et super- 
efiluentem dabunt in sinum vestrum.” 
Cir. Prop. Batti damn. A.D. 1567 a 
Pio V, 14 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 


accipient in die iudicit extremi mer- 
cedem ampliorem, quam iusto Det 
tudicio mereantur accipere.’ For 
further information on this topic 
consult Bellarmine, De _ Iustifica- 
tione, V, 19; De Lugo, De Poeni- 
tentia, disp. 24, nm. 10. The Tho- 
mistic axiom, “ Deus punit citra con- 
dignum et remunerat ultra  con- 
dignum’’ and Baius’ condemned 
proposition are interpreted some- 
what differently than we have ex- 
plained them by Suarez, De Gratia, 
XII, 31, 14. On the general argu- 
ment of this Section the student 
may profitably consult St. Bonaven- 
ture, Breviloquium, P. V, § 12; Bil- 
duant,, Der Gratia)~ disss.8;)varts13i 
Tepe, Instut. Theol” Vols Ill.) pp. 
226 sqq., Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, 
Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., 
Pp. |. 218) *"saqq., ‘Breiburg).. 1908's 
Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 614 
sqq., Freiburg t1gor. 


SELON 
THE REQUISITES OF MERIT 


As we are dealing with the “ fruits of justification,” it 
becomes necessary to ascertain the requisites or condi- 
tions of true merit. There are seven such; four have 
reference to the meritorious work itself, two to the agent 
who performs it, and one to God who gives the reward. 


I. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE 
Meritorious Work.—A work, to be meritorious, 
must be morally good, free, performed with the 
assistance of actual grace, and inspired by a 
supernatural motive. 

a) As every evil deed implies demerit and is 
deserving of punishment, so the notion of merit 
supposes a morally good work (opus honestum). 


Cir. Eph. VI, 8: “ Knowing that whatsoever good 
thing any man shall do, the same shall he receive from 
the Lord.” + 2 Cor. V, 10: “We must all be mani- 
fested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one 
may receive the proper things of the body, according as he 
hath done, whether it be good or evil.”? There are no 
morally indifferent works in individuo, 7. e. practically ; 
and if there were, they could be neither meritorious nor 

1 Eph. VI, 8: “ Scientes, quoniam nos manifestari oportet ante tribunal 
unusquisque, quodcunque  fecerit Christi, ut referat unusquisque pro- 


bonum, hoc recipiet a Domino,” pria corporis, prout gessit, sive bo- 
22 Cor. V, 10: “Omnes enim num sive malum.” 


410 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 411 


demeritorious, but would become meritorious in propor- 
tion as they are made morally good by means of a “ good 
intention.” It would be absolutely wrong to ascribe 
merit only to the more perfect works of supererogation 
(opera supererogatoria), such as the vow of perpetual 
chastity, excluding all works of mere obligation, such as 
the faithful observance of the commandments. Being 
morally good, the works of obligation are also meritori- 
ous, because goodness and meritoriousness are correla- 
tive terms. Whether the mere omission of an evil act is 
in itself meritorious, is doubtful. But most theologians 
are agreed in holding that the external work, as such, 
adds no merit to the internal act, except in so far as it 
reacts on the will and sustains and intensifies its opera- 
tion. This and similar questions properly belong to 
moral theology. 


b) The second requisite of merit is moral lib- 
erty (libertas indifferens ad actum), that is to say, 
freedom from both external and internal compul- 
sion. This has been dogmatically defined against 
Jansenius.° 

That there can be no merit without liberty is 
clearly inculcated by Sacred Scripture. Cir. 1 
Cor. IX, 17: “For if I do this willingly, I have 
reward,’ *® Matth. XIX,.17:) “Ui. thow wilt 
enter into life, keep the commandments.” * 


3 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 
Eareae. au vita, art... 1, adit; lHo- 
mo, in quantum propria voluntate 
facit illud quod debet, meretur; alio- 
quin actus iustitiae, quo quis reddit 
debitum, non esset meritorius.” 

4Cfr. Suarez, De. Gratia, », Gee 
5 Sdq- 


5 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God the Au- 
thor of Nature and the Supernatural, 
pp. 291 sqq. 

61 Cores EX ters Sh Sie emien 
volens hoc ago, mercedem habeo.” 

7 Matthy XIX, 17: “Sst! autem 
vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- 
data.”’ 


412 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


“Where there is compulsion,” says St. Jerome, 
“there is neither a crown nor damnation.” ®* The 
morality of an act depends entirely on its being an 
actus humanus. Now no act is truly “human” 
unless it be freely performed. Consequently, 
freedom of choice is an indispensable condition of 
moral goodness and therefore also of merit. 

What kind of liberty is necessary to enable the 
will to acquire merit? Theologians answer by 
saying that it is libertas contradictionis sive exer- 
citu. If I doa good deed which I am free to do or 
not to do, I perform a morally good and therefore 
meritorious work. As regards the libertas speci- 
fications, (that freedom by which a person may 
act thus or otherwise, e. g. give alms to one 
applicant in preference to another, or mortify 
himself in this or that particular manner), there 
can be no doubt that, whatever the choice made, 
the action is always good and meritorious. How- 
ever, theologians have excogitated a hypothetical 
case in which an action may be physically free 
without being meritorious. It is when one is 
compelled to do a certain thing and is free only 
in so far as he is able to choose between two ac- 
tions exactly equal in moral worth. This would 
be the case, for instance, if he had to pay a debt 
of ten dollars and were left free to pay it either in 


8 Contra Jovin., 1, Il, n. 3: “ Ubi necessitas est, nec corona nec damna- 
tio est.” 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT A413 


coin or in currency. The more common opinion 
is that in a case of this kind there would be a lack 
of that liberty which is necessary to render an act 
morally good and therefore meritorious? _ 

c) The third requisite of merit is actual grace. 
Its necessity is evident from the fact that, to be 
meritorious, an act must be supernatural and con- 
sequently cannot be performed without the aid of 
prevenient and codperating grace.” 

d) Merit further requires a supernatural mo- 
tive, for the reason that every good work must be 
supernatural, both as regards object and cir- 
cumstances (ex obiecto et circumstantiis), and 
the end for which it is performed (ex fine). In 
determining the necessary qualities of this motive, 
however, theologians differ widely. 


a) A considerable number, mostly of the Thomist per- 
suasion, demand the motive of theological charity, and 
consequently regard the state of charity (caritas habi- 
tualis ‘sive status caritatis et gratiae) as essential for the 
meritoriousness of all good works performed in the state 
of grace, even if they are performed from some other, 
truly supernatural though inferior motive, such as 
obedience, the fear of God, etc. This rigorous school 
is constrained to raise the question whether every sin- 
gle good work, to be supernaturally meritorious, must 
proceed from an act of divine charity (toties quoties), or 


9 For a more extensive treat- De Incarnatione, disp. 26, sect. 10, 
ment of this and allied questions ii.) 126) sde 
consult Ripalda, De Ente Superna- 10 V, supra, pp. 82 saq. 


turali, disp. 74, sect. 3; De Lugo, 


414 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


whether the virtual influence of one act is sufficient to en- 
dow a series of subsequent acts with meritoriousness. 
Only a few Thomist theologians t defend the first-men- 
tioned theory. The majority’? hold that the influxus 
virtualis caritatis,is sufficient. This view is vigorously 
defended by Cardinal Bellarmine, who says: “It is not 
enough to make a general good intention at the beginning 
of a year, or month, or day, by which all future actions 
are referred to God; but it is necessary to refer each 
particular act to God before it is performed.” ** The 
advocates of this theory base their opinion on cer- 
tain Scriptural and Patristic texts, and especially on St. 
Thomas, whose teaching they misunderstand. 

The dogmatic question whether good works can be 
meritorious without being inspired by supernatural char- 
ity, has nothing to do with the moral problem whether 
there is an obligation to make an act of charity from time 
to time, except in so far as habitual charity,—7. e. the 
state of charity, which is always required for merit, nay 
even for the preservation of sanctifying grace,— cannot 
be permanently sustained unless renewed from time to 
time and effectuated by a fresh act of that virtue.> St. 


11 Especially Bafiez (Comment. in vitae aeternae primo pertinet ad 


S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 24, art. 6, caritatem, ad alias autem virtutes 
dub. 6). This view is also taken by secundario, secundum quod earum 
the so-called Augustinians. actus a caritate imperantur.’’ And 
12 Notably Billuart; see his treat- again, 1. c., ad 3: ‘“‘ Similiter etiam 
ise De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 4. actus patientiae et fortitudinis non 
13 De  Tustificatione, V, 15: est meritorius, nisi aliquis ex cari- 
“Non sufficere, si quis ad initium ‘tate haec operetur.’’ On the true 
anni vel mensis vel etiam diet gene- sense of these passages cfr. Schiffini, 
rai quadam intentione’ referat De Gratia Divina, pp. 647 saqq. 
omnia sua futura opera in Deum, 15 Cfr. Prop. damn. ab Innocentio 


sed necesse esse ut illud ipsum opus XI, prop. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, 
particulare referatur in Deum, quod nn. 1156): ‘‘ Probabile est, ne sin- 
postea faciendum est,” gulis quidem rigorose quinquennus 

14 Summa Theologica, 1a 2ae, qu. per se obligare praeceptum caritatis © 
114, art. 4: “Et ideo meritum erga Deum,’ 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT A415 


Alphonsus teaches that every man is obliged to make an 
act of charity at least once a month, but he is contra- 
dicted by other eminent moralists. In practice it is well 
to insist on frequent acts of charity because such acts not 
only confirm and preserve the state of grace, but render 
our good works incomparably more meritorious in the 
sight of God. Hence, too, the importance of making a 
“good intention” every morning before beginning the 
day’s work.*® 

8B) There is a second group of very eminent theolo- 
gians, including Suarez,’7 Vasquez,1® De Lugo, and Bal- 
lerini, who hold that, to be meritorious, the good works of 
a just man, who has habitual charity, need only con- 
form to the divine law, no special motive being re- 
quired. These writers base their teaching on the Tri- 
dentine decree which says: “For this is that crown 
of justice which the Apostle declared was, after his 
fight and course, laid up for him, to be rendered to 
him by the Just Judge, and not only to him, but also to 
all that love His coming. For, whereas Jesus Christ 
Himself continually infuses His virtue into the said 
justified as the head into the members and the vine 
into the branches,— and this virtue always precedes, and 
accompanies, and follows their good works, which with- 
out it could not in any wise be pleasing and meritorious 
before God (can. 2), we must believe that nothing further 
is wanting to the justified to prevent their being accounted 
to have, by those very works which have been done in 
God, fully satisfied the divine law according to the 
state of this life, and to have truly merited eternal life, 
16 Cfr. J. Ernst, Die Notwendigkett 17 De Gratia, IX, 3. ’ 
der guten Meinung. Untersuchungen 18 Comment, in S, Theol., 1a 2ae, 
tiber die Gottesliebe als Prinzip der disp. 220. 


Sittlichkeit und Verdienstlichkeit, 
Freiburg 1905. 


416 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

to be obtained also in its [due] time, if so be, however, 
that they depart in grace.’’*® This teaching is in harmony 
with Scripture. The Bible nowhere requires an act of 
charity to make good works meritorious for Heaven. In 
the “eight beatitudes ”*° our Lord Himself promises 
eternal glory for works which are not all works of charity, 
nor even dictated by charity, either formal or virtual. 
When He was asked: ‘“ Master, what good shall I do 
that I may have life everlasting?” 24 he did not answer 
with Bellarmine: ‘“ Steep all thy works in the motive of 
charity,’ but declared: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep 
the commandments.” ?? And when requested to specify, 
He simply cited the ordinary precepts of the Deca- 
logue.** We also know that at the Last Judgment He 
will receive the elect into the “kingdom of His Father ” 
solely in consideration of the works of mercy they have 
Hone: 

Theological reasoning lends its support to this view. If 
good works performed without the motive of charity 
were not supernaturally meritorious, this would be at- 
tributable to one of three causes. Either the just would 


19 Concilium Trident., 
cap. 16: “ Haec _.est » enim illa 
corona tustitiae, quam post suum 
certamen et cursum repositam sibi 
esse atebat Apostolus a tusto indice 
sibi reddendam, non solum autem 


Sess. VI, Deo [= per Deum; v. Sess. VI, can. 
26, 32] sunt facta, divinae legi pro 
huius vitae statu satisfecisse et vitam 
aeternam suo etiam tempore, st 
tamen in gratia decesserint, conse- 


quendam vere promeruisse censean- 


sibi, sed, et omnibus qui diligunt tur.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 809.) 
adventum eius. Quum enim ille ipse 20 Cfr. Matth. V, 2 sqa. 
Christus Iesus tamquam caput in 21 Matth. XIX, 16: “ Quid boni 


membra et tamquam vitis in palmites 
in ipsos wstificatos iugiter virtu- 
tem influat, quae virtus bona eorum 
opera semper antecedit et comitatur 
et subsequitur et sine qua nullo 
pacto Deo grata et meritoria esse 
possent, nihil ipsis wstificatis amplius 
deesse credendum est, quominus 
plene illis quidem operibus, quae in 


faciam, ut habeam vitam aeternam? ” 

22 Matth. XIX, 17: “Si autem 
vis ad vitam ingredi, serva man- 
data.” 

23 Cir. Matth. XIX, 18 sqq. 

24 The Scriptural argument is 
more fully developed by Tepe, Jnsi. 
Theat. Vol, til sppy233o saa; 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 417 


sin by doing good; or good works performed without 
charity would not be deserving of eternal beatitude; or, 
finally, there would be no strict equality between service 
and reward. All three of these suppositions are un- 
tenable. The first would lead to Bajanism or Jansen- 
ism.2> The second and third overlook the fact that the 
requisite proportion (condignitas) between service and 
reward is furnished by sanctifying grace or habitual char- 
ity, which, as deificatio, adoptive sonship, and union with 
the Holy Ghost, actually supplies that for which the 
motwum caritatis is demanded. 

We might ask the advocates of the more rigorous opin- 
ion, whence the act of charity which they demand for 
every meritorious work, derives its peculiar proportion- 
ality or condignitas with the beatific vision. Surely not 
from itself, because as an act it is merely primus inter 
pares, without in any essential respect excelling other 
motives. There is no alternative but to attribute it to 
that quasi-divine dignity which is imparted to the just 
man and his works by sanctifying grace. 

For these reasons present-day theology regards the 
second theory as sufficiently well established and the faith- 
ful are largely guided by it in practice.” 


2. REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF THE 
AGENT wHo Merits.—The agent who merits 
must be a wayfarer and in the state of sanctifying 
grace. | 

a) The wayfaring state (status viae) is merely 
another name for life on earth. Death as the 


25 V. supra, pp. 73 sqq- mat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 225 sqq., 
26On a similar controversy re- and Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 
garding the necessity of the motive 649 sqq. 
of faith, see Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 


418 SANCTIFYING GRACE 

natural, though not essentially necessary limit 
of life, closes the time of meriting. Nothing is 
more clearly taught in Holy Scripture than that 
we must sow in this world if we desire to reap in 
the mext:s/ 

b) The second requisite is the state of sancti- 
fying grace. Only the just can be “‘sons of God” 
ancl eins Or heaven: (the) Ponti Wi) os 
“As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless 
it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you 
abidepin/mme. jc7) (Rom) Vallis. \Andituons. 
heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs 
with Christ.” %° 


Does the degree of sanctifying grace existing in the 
soul exert a decisive influence on the amount of merit 
due to the good works performed? This question can 
be easily solved on the theological principle that the super- 
natural dignity of the soul increases in proportion to its 
growth in sanctifying grace. Vasquez holds that, other 
things being equal, one who is holier gains no greater 
merit by performing a given work than one who is less 


27 The Scriptural proof for this 
proposition will be found in the 
dogmatic treatise on Eschatology. 
On the absurdity of the semi-Pela- 
gian hypothesis of merita sub condi- 
tione futura see Pohle-Preuss, God: 
His Knowability, Essence, and 
Attributes, pp. 375 sq. 

28 Cfr. Prop. Bait damn. 1567 a 
Pio V, prop. 17 (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 1017): “ Sentiunt cum 
Pelagio, qui dicunt esse necessarium 


ad rationem meriti, ut homo per 
gratiam adoptionis sublimetur ad 
statum deificum.’”’ 


29 John XV, 4: “ Sicut palmes 


‘non potest ferre fructum a semet- 


ipso, nisi manserit in vite, sic nec 
vos, nist in me manseritis.” 

30 Rom. VIII, 17: “Si autem 
filtt, et haeredes; haeredes quidem 
Dei, cohaeredes autem Christi.’ 
Additional Biblical texts in Bellar- 
mine, De Iustificatione, V, 12 sq. 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 419 


holy.** All other theologians *? hold with St. Thomas *° 
that the meritoriousness of a good deed is larger in pro- 
portion to the godlike dignity of the agent, which in turn 
is measured by the degree of sanctifying grace in the soul. 
This explains why God, in consideration of the greater 
holiness of some saints who are especially dear to Him, 
often deigns through their intercession to grant favors 
which He refuses to others.** 


3. THE REQUISITES OF MERIT ON THE PART OF 
Gop.—Merit requires but one thing on the part 
of God, vizg.: that He accept the good work 1 actu 
secundo as deserving of reward. Since, however, 
theologians are not agreed on this point, we are 
dealing merely with a more or less well-founded 
opinion. 


Though the good works of the just derive a special 
intrinsic value from the godlike dignity of adoptive son- 
ship, and, consequently, in actu primo, are truly meritor- 
ious prior to and apart from their acceptance by God, 
yet human service and divine remuneration are 
separated by such a wide gulf that, in order to make a 
good deed meritorious im actu secundo, the divine accept- 
ance and promise of reward must be expressly super- 
added. 

In regard to the relation between service and reward 
Catholic theologians are divided into three schools. 

The Scotists #° hold that the condignitas of a good work © 


81 Comment. in S. Theol., 3a, 38 Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 29, 
disp. 6, cap. 4. Cts) esr art.\-4) 

32 Suarez (De Gratia, XII, 22), 84 Citi Jobi XLIl) 8s) Dany 11D, 3'5. 
Ripalda (De Ente Supernatural, 35 Cfr. Scotus, Comment. in Sent., 


disp. 81), De Lugo (De Incarna- I, dist. 17, qu. 2. 
tione, disp. 6, sect. 2, n. 37)- 


420 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


rests entirely on God’s gratuitous promise and free ac- 
ceptance, without which even the most heroic act would 
be utterly devoid of merit, whereas with it even natu- 
rally good works may become meritorious. This rather 
shallow theory almost completely loses sight of the god- 
like dignity peculiar to the just in their capacity of 
“adopted children of God” and “temples of the Holy 
Ghost,” and is unable to account for such important Bib- 
lical terms as “crown of justice,’ “ prize of victory,” 
“just judge,” etc. 

Suarez and his school contend that there is such a 
perfectly balanced equality between merit and reward 
that God is obliged in strict justice (ex obligatione iusti- 
tiae), prior to and apart from any formal act of accept- 
ance or promise on His part, to reward good works by the 
beatific vision. This view is scarcely tenable because 
there is no common basis on which to construe a relation 
of strict justice between the Creator and His creatures,*® 
and moreover St. Paul expressly teaches that ‘“‘ The suf- 
ferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with 
the glory to come.” ®” 

Hence we prefer to hold with Lessius,* Vasquez,®® and 
De Lugo *° that the condignitas or equality existing be- 
tween merit and reward, owes its origin both to the in- 
trinsic value of the good work itself and to the free ac- 
ceptance and gratuitous promise of God. This solution 
duly respects the intrinsic value of merit im actu primo, 
without derogating from the sublime dignity of God, who 
rewards good works not because He is obliged to do so 


86 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 88 De Perfect. Divin., XIII, 2. 


Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, 39 Comment. in S. Theol., ta 2ae, 
Ppp. 456 sq. disp. 214, 223. 
87 Rom. VIII, 18: “‘ Non sunt 40 De Incarnatione, disp. 3, sect. 


condignae passiones huius temporis 1 sq. 
ad futuram gloriam.” 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT A421 


by the merits of a mere creature, but solely because He 
is bound by His own truthfulness and fidelity. Thus 
God’s justice towards His creatures is placed upon a free 
basis, and there is no violation of justice (imuria) on His 
part. ‘From the fact that our actions have no merit 
except on the supposition that God so ordained,” says 
St. Thomas, “ it does not follow that God is simply our 
debtor ; He is His own debtor, 7. e. He owes it to Him- 
self to see that His commands are obeyed.’ ** This 
teaching can be proved from Sacred Scripture. Cir. 
James I, 12: “ He shall receive the crown of life, which 
God hath promised to them that love him.” * It is re- 
echoed by St. Augustine: “God is made our debtor, not 
by receiving anything from us, but because it pleased Him 
to promise us something. For it is in a different sense 
that we say toa man: You are indebted to me because 
I have given you something, and: ‘You owe this to 
me because you have promised it. To God we never say: 
Give back to me because I have given to Thee. What 
have we given to God, since it is from Him that we have 
received whatever we are and whatever good we possess? 
We have therefore given Him nothing. . . . In this man- 
ner, therefore, may we demand of God, by saying: Give 
me what Thou hast promised, because we have done what 
Thou didst command, and it is Thyself that hast done it 
because Thou hast aided our labors.’ *® The Triden- 

41 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, vitae [St. Paul says: 6 rhs duKato- 


art. 1, ad 3: “Dicendum quod, otyns orépavosl, quam rvepromisit 
quia actio nostra non habet rationem (émnyyeldato) Deus  diligentibus 
+, 


meriti nisi ex praesuppositione di- sé, 

vinae ordinationis, non sequitur 43 Serm., 158, c 2, n. 2: “ Debi- 
quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debi- tor factus est Deus non aliquid c 
tor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquanium nobis accipiendo, sed quod et placuit 
debitum est, ut sua ordinatio implea- promittendo. Aliter enim dicimus 
tur.’ homini: Debes mihi, quia dedi tibt; 


42lac. I, 12: “Accipiet coronam et aliter dicimus: Debes mihi, quia 


422 


SANCTIFYING GRACE 


tine Council seems to endorse this view when it says: 
“Life eternal is to be proposed to those . . . hoping in 


God . 


. . as a reward which is, according to the promise 


of God Himself, to be faithfully rendered to their good 


works and merits.” * 


promisisti mihi. Deo autem nun- 
quam dicimus: Redde mihi, quia 
dedi tibi. Quid dedimus Deo, quan- 


do totum quod sumus et quod habe- 
mus boni, ab illo habemus? Nihil 
ergo ei dedimus. .. . Illo ergo modo 
possumus exigere Dominum nostrum 
ut dicamus: Redde, quod promisistt, 
quia fecimus quod iussisti, et hoc tu 
fecisti, quia laborantes iuvisti.” 


44 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 
16: “In Deo sperantibus propo- 
nenda est vita aeterna... tam- 
quam merces ex ipsius Dei promis- 
sione bonis ipsorum operibus et me- 
ritis fideliter [i. e. ex fidelitate] red- 
denda.” Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia 
Divina, pp. 416 sqq. 


SECTION: 2 


THE OBJECTS OF MERIT 


After defining the existence of merit the Tri- 
dentine Council enumerates its objects as fol- 
lows: “If anyone saith that the justified, by the 
good works which he performs, . . . does not 
truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the 
attainment of that eternal life,—if it be so, how- 
ever, that he depart in grace,—and also an in- 
crease of glory: let him be anathema.’’* Hence 
merit calls for a threefold reward: (1) an in- 
crease of sanctifying grace; (2) heavenly glory; 
and (3) an increase of that glory. The expres- 
sion “vere mereri”’ shows that all three of these 
objects can be merited in the true and strict sense 
of the term (de condigno). ‘This is, however, no 
more than a theologically certain conclusion. 

I. INCREASE OF SANCTIFYING GraAcE.—The 
first grace of justification (gratia prima) can 
never be merited;? hence the meaning of the 
above-quoted conciliar definition is that it can be 
increased by good works. ‘This increase is tech- 


1Sess. VI, can. 32: “Si quis serit, consecutionem atque etiam 
dixerit, iustificatum bonis operibus  gloriae augmentum, anathema sit.” 

. non vere mereri augmentum gra- 2See the article on “ Merit” in 
tiae, vitam aeternam et ipsius vitae the Catholic Encyclopedia. 
aeternae, st tamen in gratia deces- 


423 


424 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


nically called gratia secunda. All Scriptural 
texts which assert that sanctifying grace is un- 
equal in different individuals, also prove that it 
_ can be increased or augmented by the Der toni: 
ance of meritorious works.’ 


_a) No adult person can merit the first grace of assist- 
ance (gratia prima actualis), nor any one of the series 
of actual graces which follow it, and by which justification 
ultimately comes to pass. They are all purely gratuitous. 
Similarly, too, the first grace of justification (gratia 
prima habitualis) cannot be strictly merited by the sinner 
preparing for justification. This is the express teaching 
of Trent: “But we are therefore said to be justified 
freely, because that none of those things which precede 
justification — whether faith or works — merit the grace 
itself of justification; for, if it be a grace, it is not now 
by works; otherwise, as the same Apostle says, grace 
is no more grace.”* To deny this would not only 
imperil the dogma of the gratuity of grace (because if 
the first grace given before active justification could be 
strictly merited, this would necessarily involve the gratia 
prima actualis), but it would also start a vicious circle 
(because the gratia prima habitualis is an indispensable 
condition of merit). This explains why St. Paul and St. 
Augustine again and again insist on the gratuity both of 
the first grace of assistance and the grace of justifica- 
tion proper.’ “ This grace of Christ,” says St. Augustine, 
“without which neither infants nor adults can be saved, 


3 V. supra, Ch. II, Sect. 3, Thesis ipsam iustificationis gratiam pro- 


II. 

4Sess. VI, cap. 8:. “Gratis 
autem iustificari ideo dicimur, quia 
nihil eorum quae _ iustificationem 
praecedunt, sive fides, sive opera, 


meretur; st enim gratia est, iam non 
ex operibus, alioquin, ut idem Apo- 
Stolus inquit, gratia iam non est gra- 
tia.”’ 

5 V. supra, Sect. 2, No. 2, 


r 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 428 


if 
is not bestowed for any merits, but is given freely, on 


account of which it is also called grace. ‘ Being justi- 
fied,’ says the Apostle, ‘ freely through His blood.’ ” ® 

In the light of this teaching it is easy to decide the 
question, raised by Vasquez, whether perfect contrition 
justifies the sinner merely per modum dispositionis or per 
modum causae formalis. Both contrition and charity, be 
they perfect or imperfect, are essentially acts that dispose 
the soul for justification.” Hence, no matter how perfect, 
neither is capable of effecting justification itself by way of 
merit (merendo), nay, of entering even partially, as 
Vasquez would have it, into the formal cause of justifica- 
tion, because, according to the Tridentine Council, sanc- 
tifying grace and not perfect contrition is the unica causa 
formalis of justification.® 

b) In connection with the dogma just explained theolo- 
gians discuss the question whether a just man may 
strictly (de condigno) merit the actual graces which 
God bestows on him. We must carefully distinguish 
between merely sufficient and efficacious graces. Theo- 
logians commonly hold® that merely sufficient graces 
may be merited de condigno, not so efficacious graces, 
because the right to efficacious graces would necessarily 
include a strict right to final perseverance (donum perse- 


9 See, for example, Suarez, De 
Gratia, XII, 26: “De auxilis suf- 


6 De Natura et Gratia, c. 4, n. 
4: ‘“‘ Haec Christi gratia, sine qua 


nec infantes nec aetate grandes salvi 
fiert possunt, non meritis redditur, 
sed gratis datur, propter quod et 
gratia nominatur. LTustificati, inquit 
(Rom. IIT, 24; V, 4), gratis per 
sanguinem ipsius.” 

7 Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, 
cap. 6; Sess. VI, can. 3; Sess. XIV, 
cap. 4; supra, pp. 286 sqq. 

8 For a more exhaustive treatment 
of this topic consult Tepe, Instit. 
Theol., Vol, III, pp. 158 saq. 


ficientibus et necessariis, quae post 
aliquod meritum de condigno aug- 
menti gratiae dantur, vel offeruntur, 
probabile est. concomitanter cadere 
sub idem meritum de condigno aug- 
mentt gratiae; nam qui meretur de 
condigno aliquam formam, meretur 
quidquid connaturaliter sequitur ex 
tali forma vel et connaturaliter de- 
betur.” On the actual distribution 
of sufficient grace, v. supra, pp. 167 
sqq. 


426 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


verantiae), which lies outside the sphere of condign 
merit. Assuming that the justified could by good works 
strictly merit the prima gratia efficax (an impossible hy- 
pothesis, because merit presupposes efficacious grace), 
this would involve a similar claim to a second, third, 
fourth grace — and ultimately to the final grace of perse- 
verance, which, in matter of fact, no man can merit. Not 
even heroic acts of virtue give a strict right to infallibly 
efficacious graces, or to final perseverance. Even the 
greatest saint is obliged to watch, pray, and tremble, lest 
he lapse from righteousness.’ For this reason the Tri- 
dentine Council mentions neither final perseverance nor 
efficacious graces among the objects of merit." 


2. ETERNAL LIFE oR HEAVENLY GLORY.— 
The second object of merit is eternal life. The 
dogmatic proof for this assertion has been given 
above.’* Eternal life is described by the Triden- 
tine Council ** both as a grace and as a reward. 


a) In the canon quoted in the introduction of this Sec- 
tion the same Council * enumerates four apparently sep- 
arate and distinct objects of merit, wiz.: increase of 
grace, eternal life, the attainment of eternal life, and in- 
crease of glory. Why the distinction between “ eternal 
life” and the “attainment of eternal life”? Does this 
imply a twofold reward, and consequently a twofold 
object of merit? Theologians deny that such was the 
intention of the Council, because the right to a reward 
evidently coincides with the right to the payment of the 


10V. supra, pp. 392 sqq. 12V. supra, Sect. 1, 

11 For a fuller treatment cfr. 13 Sess. VI, cap. 16; v. supra, pp. 
Tepe, Inst. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 258 400 sq. 
sqq., and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 14 Sess. VI, can. 32. 


mat., Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 237 sqq. 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 427 
same. An unattainable eternal life would be a 
chimera.® Nevertheless, the distinction is not superflu- 
ous, since the attainment of eternal life does not co- 
incide with the gaining of merit but must be put off until 
death, and even then depends upon the condition of the 
soul: “ si tamen in gratia decesserit”’ (provided he depart 
in grace). With this last condition the holy Synod also 
wished to inculcate the salutary truth that the loss of 
sanctifying grace ipso facto entails the forfeiture of all 
previously acquired merits. Even the greatest saint, were 
he to die in the state of mortal sin, would enter eternity 
with empty hands and as an enemy of God. All his 
former merits would be cancelled. To revive them would 
require a new justification.*® 

b) A close analysis of the Tridentine canon under re- 
view gives rise to another difficulty. Can the gloria prima 
be merited? In defining the gratia secunda as an ob- 
ject of strict merit, the Council expressly excludes the 
gratia prima. It makes no such distinction in regard to 
glory, but names both “eternal life” (gloria prima) and 
“increase of glory” (gloria secunda) as objects of merit. 
This naturally suggests the query: Why and to what 
extent can the just man merit the gloria prima, seeing that 
he is unable to merit the gratia prima? Some theolo- 
gians ‘7 contend that the justified are entitled to the gloria 
prima only as a heritage (titulo haereditatis), never as 
a reward (titulo mercedis). Because of its intimate 
causal connection with the gratia prima, which is beyond 


see the treatise on the Sacrament 
of Penance, Vol. X of this series; 


15 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 
29: “Dicendum vitam aeternam et 


vitae aeternae consecutionem non 
esse duo praemia distincta, quia 
merert mercedem et solutionem mer- 
cedis non sunt duae mercedes.” 

16 On the reviviscentia meritorum 


cfr. also Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, 
pp. 661 sqq. 

i7E. g. Ripalda (De Ente Super- 
nat., disp. 89, sect. 1) and De Lugo 
(De Incarnatione, disp. 3, n. 59). 


428 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


the reach of merit, the gloria prima, they argue, cannot be 
regarded as an object of merit except on the assumption 
that the merits which precede justification confer a claim 
to the gloria prima. This assumption is false, because 
without sanctifying grace no condign merits can be 
acquired.*® In spite of this difficulty, however, most theo- 
logians * hold that, unlike the gratia prima, the gloria 
prima may under certain conditions be an object of strict 
merit. The main reason is that, as the state of glory is 
not a necessary requisite of the meritoriousness of good 
works, while the state of grace is, the former may positis 
ponendis be an effect of the meritum de congruo, though 
the latter may not. A mere statement of the problem 
shows that it cannot be satisfactorily solved unless we dis- 
tinguish between and enter into a detailed examination of 
two distinct hypotheses. It is generally agreed that in- 
fants dying in the state of baptismal grace owe that grace, 
and the state of glory which they enjoy in Heaven, 
solely to God’s mercy and have no claim to beatitude 
other than that of heredity (titulus hereditatis).. Adults 
who preserve their baptismal innocence until death, 
manifestly cannot merit the gloria prima by their good 
works, because they already possess a legal title to it 
through Baptism.?° It follows that their good works 
increase, but do not merit, the gloria prima, to which these 
souls are already entitled titulo haereditatis. The case is 
quite different with catechumens and Christians guilty of 
mortal sin, who are justified by an act of perfect contrition 
before the reception of Baptism or the Sacrament of Pen- 
ance. Of them it may be said, without fear of contra- 
diction, that they merit for themselves de condigno, not 
18 V. supra, Sect. 2, No. 2. Theol., ta. 2ae, disp. 219, c. 2. 


19 Cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII; 20 Despite Bellarmine’s contradic- 
28, and Vasquez, Comment. in S. tion (De LIustificatione, V, 20.) 


a ee 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 429 


indeed the first grace of justification, but the gloria 
prima, because perfect contrition, being an opus operans, 
at the very moment of its infusion becomes an opus 
meritorium entitled to eternal glory.21 As regards the 
great majority of adult Catholics who, because of de- 
fective preparation, never get beyond imperfect contrition 
(attritio), and therefore are not justified until they ac- 
tually receive the Sacrament, it is certain that they owe 
whatever grace they possess and whatever glory they have 
a claim to, entirely to the opus operatum of the Sacra- 
Tene. 


3. INCREASE OF HEAVENLY GLory.—The third 
object of merit, according to the Tridentine Coun- 
cil, is “increase of glory.” This must evidently 
correspond to an increase of grace, which in its 
turn is conditioned upon the performance of ad- 
ditional good works. That there is a causal con- 
nection between meritorious works performed 
on earth and the glory enjoyed in Heaven is 
clearly taught by Holy Scripture. Cfr. Matth. 
XVI, 27: “For the Son of man shall . . . render 
to every man according to his works.” *° 1 Cor. 
III, 8: “And every man shall receive his 
own reward, according to his own labor.” ** A 

21 Cfr, St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 23 Matth. XVI, 27: “Et tunc 


Ia 2ae, qu. 122, art. 2, ad 1: wreddet unicuique secundum opera 
“ Praeparatio hominis ad gratiam eius (xara Thy mpagiy avrov).” 
habendam quaedam est simul cum 241 Cor. III, 8: “ Unusquisque 
ipsa infusione gratiae; et talis ope- autem propriam mercedem (rop 


ratio est quidem meritoria, sed non idcov uroOdv) accipiet secundum 
gratiae quae iam habetur, sed gloriae suum laborem (kara Tov tdioy 
quae nondum habetur.”’ KOTrov).” 

22 Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. 
III, pp. 266 sqq. 


430 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


further argument may be derived from the un- 
equal apportionment of glory to the elect in 
Heaven.” This inequality is based on inequal- 
ity of grace, which in turn is owing to the fact 
that grace can be augmented by good works. 
Consequently, the inequality of glory depends ulti- 
mately on good works.” 

4. NoTtE oN THE MeERITUM DE CoNGRUO. 
—Congruous, as distinguished from condign 
merit, gives no real claim to a reward, but only a 
quasi- iain based on equity (ex quadam aequi- 
tate, congruentia, decentia). 


Hence congruous merit and condign merit are not 
species of the same genus, but merely analogous terms. 
Because of the ambiguity of the word “ equity ” Domini- 
cus Soto, Becanus, and a few other Scholastics rejected 
the use of the term meritum de congruo in theology. But 
this was a mistake. The Fathers engaged in the Semi- 
pelagian controversy, notably St. Augustine,?* did not 
assert that the justifying faith of the sinner is entirely 
without merit. The requisites of congruous merit are 
identical with those of condign merit 8 in all respects ex- 
cept one,— the meritum de congruo does not require the 
state of grace. 


a) According to the common opinion, from 
which but few theologians dissent,?® a Christian 
in the state of mortal sin can, from the moment he 


25 See Eschatology. 28V. supra, Sect. 2. 
26 Cir. St. Thomas Aquinas, Sum- 29 Prominent among the dissenters 
ma Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, art. 8. is Billuart (De Gratia, diss. 8, 


27 De Praed. Sanctorum, c. 2. ATt.5)). 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 430 


begins to cooperate with supernatural grace, 
merit de congruo by good works, and obtain by 
prayer the dispositions necessary for justification, 
and ultimately justification itself. 


“Prayer relies on mercy,” says St. Thomas, “ condign 
merit on justice. And therefore man obtains from the 
divine mercy many things by prayer which he does not 
merit in strict justice.” °° This teaching is based partly on 
Holy Scripture and partly on the writings of St. Augus- 
tine, and is confirmed by certain utterances of the 
Council of Trent. By conscientiously preparing himself 
with the aid of actual grace, the sinner probably merits 
an additional claim (in equity) to justification. Cfr. Ps. 
L, 19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit: a con- 
trite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise.” ** 
Dan. IV, 24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms, and 
thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor: perhaps 
he [God] will forgive thy offences.” °? St. Augustine 
says: “ The remission of sins itself is not without some 
merit, if faith asks for it. Nor is that faith entirely 
unmeritorious by which the publican was moved to say: 
‘God, be merciful to me, a sinner,’ and then went away 


justified through the merit 


80 Summa Theol., ta 2ae, qu. 114, 
art. 6,‘ad 2: ‘“ Impetratio orationis 
innititur misericordiae, meritum au- 
tem condignt innititur iustitiae. Et 
a1deo multa orando impetrat homo ex 
divina misericordia, quae tamen non 
meretur secundum itustitiam.” 

31 Ps. L, 19: “ Cor contritum et 
humiliatum Deus non despicies.” 

82 Dan. IV, 24: “Peccata tua 
eleemosynis redime et iniquitates 
tuas misericordiis pauperum; forsitan 


_. tgnoscet delictis tuts.’’ 


of faithful humility.” % 


SSE DF Gd Stitt LOAN Conan Ne Oe 
“Sed nec ipsa remissio peccatorum 
sine aliquo merito est, st fides hanc 
impetret. Neque enim nullum est 
meritum fidei, qua fide tlle dicebat: 
Deus propitius esto mihi peccatori, et 
descendit iustificatus merito fidelis 
humilitatis.’” Cfr. Conc. Trident., 
Sess. VI, cap. 7 (Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 799): “ Hanc dispositionem 
seu praeparationem iustificatio ipsa 
consequitur.” For a fuller treat- 
ment cfr. Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 37. 


432 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


b) By good works the just may merit for them- 
selves, not in strict justice (de condigno), but as 
a matter of equity (de congrua), final persever- 
ance, conversion from mortal sin, spiritual favors 
for others, and also such temporal blessings as 
may be conducive to eternal salvation. 


a) It is a theologically certain conclusion, accepted by 
all theologians without exception, that the grace of final 
perseverance (donum perseverantiae) cannot be merited 
in the strict sense (de condigno). Most authors hold, 
however, that it can be merited de congruo. This meritum 
is technically called meritum de congruo fallibili. Those 
who deny that it can be merited at all, admit that it can be 
infallibly obtained by fervent and unremitting prayer.* 

8) It is impossible to answer with anything like cer- 
tainty the question whether the just man is able to merit 
for himself in advance the grace of conversion against 
the eventuality of a future lapse into mortal sin. Follow- 
ing the lead of Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas takes a 
negative view,°° on the ground that mortal sin interrupts 
the state of grace and annihilates all former merits. In 
another passage of his writings, however, the Angelic 
Doctor says: “There are two kinds of merit, one based 
on justice, and this is called condign; and another based 
solely upon mercy, and this is called congruous. Of the 
latter St. Paul says that it is just, 7. e. congruous, that a 
man who has performed many good works should merit. 
. . . And in this wise God does not forget our work and 


84V. supra, pp. 123 sqq. The art. 7: “ Respondeo dicendum quod 


student may also consult Tepe, In- nullus potest sibi mereri repara- 
stit. Theol., Vol. III, pp. 258 sqq., tionem post lapsum futurum neque 
and Bellarmine, De Iustific., V, 22. merito condigni neque merito con- 


35 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, grui.” 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 433 


love.” °° Scotus,*” Bonaventure,*® and Suarez *® regard 
this as “a pious and probable opinion,” well supported 
by Holy Scripture. . The prophet Jehu said to Josaphat, 
King of Juda: “ Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art 
joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and 
therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the 
Lord; but good works are found in thee.’ *° To this 
argument add the following consideration: If previous 
mortal sin does not prevent those acts whereby man is 
disposed for justification from being at least to a limited 
extent meritorious, there is no reason to assume that 
merits cancelled by subsequent mortal sin will not be im- 
puted to the sinner, with due regard, of course, to a cer- 
tain proportion between past merits and future sins.* 
To pray for the grace of conversion against the eventu- 
ality of future mortal sin, is always good and useful,* 
because it cannot but please God to know that we sin- 
cerely desire to be restored to His friendship if we should 
ever have the misfortune of losing it.** 

y) The just man may congruously merit for others 


36 Lect. in Hebr., III, -6, 10: 
“ Duplex est meritum. Unum quod 


baris; sed bona opera inventa sunt 
in te.” 


innititur iustitiae et istud est meri- 
tum condigni; aliud quod soli miseri- 
cordiae innititur, quod dicitur meri- 
tum congrui. Et de isto dicit 
[Paulus], quod iustum est, i. e. con- 
gruum, quod homo, qui mulia bona 
fecit, mereatur. ... Et isto modo 
non obliviscitur Deus operis nostri et 
dilectionis.”” 

37 Comment, in Sent., IV, dist. 2, 
Quist ant. 2. 

38 Comment. in Sent., II, dist. 28, 
dub. 2. 

39 De Gratia, XII, 38, 6. 

402 Paral. XIX, 2 sq.: “Impio 
praebes auxilium et his, qui oderunt 
Dominum, amicitia iungeris et id- 
circo iram quidem Domini mere- 


41 Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 38, 7: 
“ Possunt enim praecedentia merita 
esse tam pauca et tot peccata postea 
multiplicata, ut omnino  obruant 
merita et efficiant, ut nullo modo 
Deum ad misericordiam provocent; 
secus vero erit, st e contrario merita 
magna fuerint et peccatum subse- 
quens et rarum sit et excusationem 
aliquam ex ignorantia vel infirmitate 
habeat.” 

42 Ps, LXX, 9: “ Quum defece- 
vit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me.’’ 

48 Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 
1a 2ae, qu. i114, art. 7, ad 1: 
“ Desiderium, quo quis desiderat 
reparationem post lapsum, iustum 
dicitur; et similiter oratio, qua petit 


434 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


whatever he is able to merit for himself, e. g. the grace 
of conversion, final perseverance, and also the first 
prevenient grace (gratia prima praeveniens), which no 
man in the state of original sin is able to merit for him- 
self.** The reason for this, according to St. Thomas, 
is the intimate relation of friendship which sanctifying 
grace establishes between the just man and God.*® How- 
ever, as Sylvius rightly observes, it is not in the power 
of the just to obtain by this friendship favors which would 
involve the abrogation of the divinely established order of 
salvation. Such a favor would be, for example, the jus- 
tification of a sinner without the medium of grace, or 
of a child without the agency of Baptism. An unreason- 
able petition deserves no consideration, even if made by a 
friend. What may be obtained by the merit of good 
works may be even more effectively obtained by prayer 
for others. The Apostle St. James teaches: ‘“ Pray for 
one another that you may be saved; for the continual 
prayer of a just man availeth much.” ** This consoling 
truth is confirmed by the dogma of the Communion of 
Saints, by many illustrious examples from the Bible * 
and ecclesiastical history,** and by the traditional practice 
of the Church in praying God to give strength and per- 
severance to the faithful and the grace of conversion to 
the heathen and the sinner.*® 


eiusmodi reparationem, dicitur iusta, 
quia tendit ad iustitiam; non tamen 
ita quod iustitiae innitatur per mo- 
dum meriti, sed solum misericordiae.” 
Cfr. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 
687 sq. 

44V, supra, pp. 136 sqa. 

45 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, 
art. 6: ‘‘ Quia enim homo in gratia 
constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, 
congruum est secundum amicitiae 
proportionem ut Deus impleat ho- 
minis voluntatem in salvatione alte- 


rius, licet quandoque possit habere 
impedimentum ex parte illius, cuius 
aliquis sanctus iustificationem desi- 
derat.”’ 

46 Tac. V, 16: “ Orate pro in- 
vicem, ut salvemini; mulitum enim 
valet deprecatio iusti assidua.” 

47 E. g. Abraham, Job, St. Ste- 
phen. 

48 EF. g. St. Augustine and his 
mother St. Monica. 

49 Cfr, Suarez, De Gratia, XII, 
SOs ST. 


SUPERNATURAL MERIT 435 


8) A final question remains to be answered: Can the 
just congruously merit such temporal blessings as good 
health, a comfortable living, and success in business? 
They can, but only in so far as these favors are conducive 
to eternal salvation; for otherwise they would not be 
graces. St. Thomas seems to go even further than this 
by describing temporal favors as objects of condign 
merit when they are conducive to salvation, and of con- 
gruous merit when they bear no relation to that end.°° 
We have no space left to enter into an argument on this 
point, but in conclusion wish to call attention to two im- 
portant facts: first, that prayer is more effective than good 
works in obtaining temporal as well as spiritual favors; 
and secondly, that we should not strive with too much 
anxiety for earthly goods, but direct our thoughts, de- 
sires, prayers, and actions to God, the Infinite Good, who 
has promised to be our “ exceeding great reward.” ** 


READINGS: — St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, ta 2ae, qu. 114, 
art. 1 sqq.— Billuart, De Gratia, diss. 8, art. 1-5.—* Bellarmine, De 
Iustificatione, V, 1-22—* Suarez, Opusc. de Divina Iustitia.— 
Ipem, De Gratia, 1. XII, cap. 1 sqq.— Oswald, Lehre von der Heili- 
gung, d. i. Gnade, Rechtfertigung, Gnadenwahl, §7, 3rd ‘ed, 
Paderborn 1885.— Tepe, Institutiones Theologicae, Vol. III, pp. 
223 sqq., Paris 1896.—* Heinrich-Gutberlet, Dogmatische Theolo- 
gie, Vol. VIII, § 473 sqq., Mainz 1897.— Chr. Pesch, Praelectiones 
Dogmaticae, Vol. V, 3rd ed., pp. 215 sqq., Freiburg 1908.— 


50 Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 114, 
art. 10: “‘ Dicendum est quod, st 
temporalia bona considerentur, prout 
sunt utilia ad opera virtutum, quibus 
perducimur in vitam aeternam, se- 
cundum hoc directe et simpliciter 
cadunt sub merito, sicut et augmen- 
tum grate et omnia illa, quibus 
homo adiuvatur ad perveniendum in 
beatitudinem post primam gratiam. 
+. Sti autem considerentur hwuius- 


modi temporalia bona secundum se, 
sic non sunt simpliciter bona homu- 
nis, sed secundum quid, et tta non 
simpliciter cadunt sub merito, sed 
secundum quid, inquantum scil. ho- 
mines moventur a Deo ad aliqua tem- 
poraliter agenda, quibus suum pro- 
positum consequuntur Deo favente.” 

BLiGensiNVy, brs) (TBO i. ste Mer- 
ces tua magna nimis,” 


436 SANCTIFYING GRACE 


S. Schiffini, De Gratia Divina, pp. 504 sqq., Freiburg 1901.— 
Kneib, Die Lohnsucht der christlichen Moral, Vienna 1904.—I. J. 
Remler, C. M., Supernatural Merit, St. Louis 1914.— A. Devine, 
C. P., The Sacraments Explained, 3rd ed., London 1905, pp. 74-80. 
—L. Labauche, S. S., God and Man, pp. 254-270, N. Y. 1016. 
(On merit in general see M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. 
I, Dublin 1909, pp. 544 sqq.) —B. J. Otten, S. J.. A Manual of 
the History of Dogmas, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 249 sqq. 

On the Protestant idea of the fruits of justification see 
Mohler, Symbolik, § 21 sqq. (English edition, pp. 157 sqq.). 


INDEX 


A 


ACCEPTANCE of good works by 
God, 419 sqq. 

Actual Grace, 3 sqq.; Its na- 
ture, 5 sqq.; Its relation to 
habitual»; Grace, 14, sqq-; 
Definition of, 15; Its two- 
fold causality, 15 sqq.; Di- 
vision of, 19 sqq.; Proper- 
ties of, 49 sqq.; Necessity 
of, 50 sqq.; Gratuity of, 131 
sqq.; Universality of, 152 
sqq.; Its relation to free- 
will, 222 sqq.; As a requisite 
of supernatural merit, 413 
sqqd. 

Actus humanus, 412. 

Adoption, 357. 

Adoptive sonship, 155, 356 
sqq. ; 

Adults, all receive sufficient 
grace, 167 sqq. 

Affectus credulitatis, 105. 

Albertus Magnus, 206, 432. 

Alexander VIII, 179 sq. 

Alexander of Hales, 206 

Aloysius, St., 211. 

Alphonsus, St., 415. 

Alvarez, 30, 216, 242, 243. 
Ambrose, St., 69, 102, 158, 209, 
319, 349, 404. 
Amor afrectivus et effectiwus, 


Amsdorf, 291. 
Anabaptists, 322. 
Aquaviva, 260, 262. 
Aristotle, 26, 31, 333, 353: 
Arnauld, 180. 


Athanasius, St) 441'- sq. 373, 


374- 

Attributes, Divine, 344 sq. 

“Auctorem Fidei,’ Bull, 74 sq. 

Augustine, St.°7;) 8, Qi 17 3020 
22, 23, 24 Sq., 27, 29, 31, 33, 
34, 30,’ 37.39, 42) 43, 47; 59; 
59 sqq., 66, 70, 77, 78, 79, 
80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 89, OI, 92, 
97,08, ° £00, 102,\ L034 .\iL05; 
107, 108 sq., 112, 118 sq., 126, 


127, 138, 140, 141, 144, 146, 
159 sqq., 171, 174, 177, 188, 
189 sq. I9I sq. 194, 197, 


203 Sq., 210, 215, 228 saq., 
249, 252, 253, 254, 259, 262, 
204, 289, 308, 319 sq., 337 Sq., 
342, 343, 350, 368, 373 
Sq., 375, 383, 387, 394, 404, 
A2I, 424 Sq., 430, 431. 
Augustinianism, 147, 200, 232 
sqq. 
B 


Barus AND BaAJANISM, 55, 56, 
60,. 61, 62,: 07, JO, 074 SAG. 
147, 417. 

Ballerini, 415. 

Bafiez, 232 sqq., 246, 255. 

Baptism, 163 sqq. 279, 306, 
308 sq., 314, 315, 318, 319, 
330 Sq., 394, 428, 434. 

Barnabas, Epistle of, 318. 

Basil, St., 346, 349, 373. 

Beatitudes, 402, 416. 

Beauty, Supernatural, an ef- 
fect of sanctifying grace, 


349 sdqq. 
Becanus, 200. 


437 


438 INDEX 


Beghards, 399. 

Beguins, 399. 

Bellarmine, 163, 203, 210, 260, 
203, 319, 330, 334, 337, 414. 

Benedict XIV, 240. 

meaty | Sty37,"/ 220. 

Berti, 249. 

Beza, 214. 

Biel, Gabriel, 63, 211. 

Billuart,!'31)) 2T1,\216,; 238, | 242: 

Bonaventure, St., 210, 365, 433. 

Boniface II, go. 

Book of Life, The, 192 sq. 

Book of Torgau, 292. 

Butzer, 292, 322. 


C 


C2SARIUS OF ARLES, ST., 99. 

Cajetan, 165. 

Calvin and Calvinism, 44, 153, 
1561200, 212/218, 214) 210; 
B24) 233 1s, 228) /285,.)302, 
310, 392, 300. 

Camerarius, 204. 

Cano, Melchior, 363. 

Capacity for grace, 133 sqq., 
145 sqq. 

Capacity of nature, 50 sqq. 

Carthage, Councils of, 25, 28, 
85, 116. 

Cassian, John, 97, 142. 

Castelein, 195. 

Catharinus, 204, 211, 382. 

Causality of Grace, I5 sqq. 

Celestine I, St. 89, 90, 99, 


104. 

Celestius, 83, 85, 86. 

Cercia, 203. 

Certainty regarding justifica- 
tion, 379 sad. 

Charismata, I3. 

Charity, 29, 56, 60, 67 sqq., 78, 
336 sqq., 352, 363 sqq., 390, 
305, 413 sdq., 417. 

Children, see Infants. 

Christ, The Grace of, 10, 70, 
226. 

Chrysostom, St., 9I, 102 sqq., 
TALOIZ Le (DIS) LOL) 200)- 8315, 
349, 380. 


‘Clement of Alexandria, 308. 


Clement of Rome, 181. 
Clement V, 331. 

Clement VIII, 255, 261.: 
Clement XI, 74, 180. 
Cogitatio congrua, 69 sqq., 94. 
Concupiscence, 64, 120. 


Condignitas (equality) be- 
tween merit and _ reward, 
417. 8Oq2 OK) 

Condign Merit, 132 sq., 307 


sq., 407 sqq. ih 
ree ie de Auxiliis, 255, 
201. 
Congruism, 261 sqq. 
Congruous Grace, 262 sqq. 
Congruous Merit, 132, 397, 
407 sqq., 430 sqq. 
Conversion, 174 sqq., 207, 432 
sq. 
Cooperating Grace, 32 sqq. 
Cyprian, . St., 102, :126. 
Cyr of y Alexandria) 'St.))3490; 
360, 373. 


D 


D’ARGENTRE, I098. 

Definition of Grace, 5 sqq. 

Deharbe, 328. 

Deification of man, 341 sq., 
405. ‘ 

Delectatio victrix, 27, 225, 249 
sqq. 


De Lemos, 216, 236 


De Lugo, 72, 363, 415, 420. 

Despair, 179. 

“De Vocatione Omnium Gen- 
tium,’ 170, 182. 

Diospolis, Council of, 8, 85, 
136, I4I. 

Dordrecht, Synod of, 213. 

Dorner, 2093. 

Durandus, 63. 


ie 


Eck,’ Johann,:.132. 

Efficacious Grace, 41 sqq. 
Efficacy, Threefold, 265 sq. 
Elect, Number of the, 194 sq. 


INDEX 


ee Ecumenical Council 
of, 86. 

Ephrem, St., 109 

Estius, 216. 

Eternal life, 426 sqq. 
Eucharist, The Holy, 360. 
External and Internal Grace, 


Bi, Sac: 
F 


FACIENTI quod est in se Deus 
non denegat gratiam, 147 
sqq. 

Path a62;)) 73.) 100) sqq., 272, 
274) sqq., 298 saqq., 363 sq., 
390 Sq-, 395- 

Fides explicita—implicita, 184 
ad.) 270.) 

Fiduciary faith, 274 sqq., 310 


sq. 

Filiatio adoptiva, tio. 

Final perseverance, see Per- 
severance. 

Flacius, 201. 

Florence, Council of, 164. 

Fonseca, 257. 

Francis de Sales, St., 207, 256. 

Franzelin, 203. 

Frassen, 200. 

Freedom a requisite of merit, 
A4II sqq. 

Free-will, 32 sqq.; How Grace 
codperates with, 4o sq.; Its 
relation to Grace, 222 sqq. 

Friendship, 353. 

Friendship of God, an effect 
of sanctifying grace, 351 
sqq. 

Pileentiis, St. 23,. 182, 215, 

278. 


G 


GAZZANIGA, 216, 2a) 
Gelasius, Pope, 17 
Gifts of the ay, ‘Ghost, 369 


Sq. 
Glory, 426 saq. 
Glossner, 149. - 
God, The Grace of, I0. 


439 
Godts, 195. 
Gomarus, 213. 
Gonet, 204 sq., 216, 218, 219 


$05) 3450 
Good intention, 411, 414. 
Good works, Merit of, 397 
sqq. 
Gotti, 30, 185, 216. 
Gottschalk, 212. 
Goudin, 2106. 
Grace of justification, 313. 
Granderath, 361. 


Gratia antecedens—concomi- 
tans, 35. 

Gratia congrua—incongrua, 
262 sqq. 


Gratia efficax ab extrinseco 
sive per accidens, 255 sqq., 
268. 

Gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive 
per se, 232 sqq., 267, 2 

Gratia est in nobis, sed sine 
nobis, 37. 

Gratia gratis data, 12 sqq. 

Gratia gratum faciens, 12 sqq. 

Gratia inspirations, 23. 

Gratia magna, 252 sq. 

Gratia orationis, 43. 

Gratia parva (of Jansenius) 
44, 252 sq. 
Gratia prima, 136 sqq., 388 

sqq., 424, 427 sqq. 

Gratia sanans s. medicinalts, 
16, OI, I14. 

Gratia secunda, 388 sqq. 

Gratia vocans, 32, 35, IIl. 

Gratuity of Grace, 131 sqq. 

Graveson, 216. 

Gregory of Nazianzus, 
159, 308. 

Gregory the Great, St., 38, 290, 
308, 368, 380, 304. 

Grotius, Hugo, 294. 

Gutberlet, 165, 205. 


H 


102, 


HapitTs, 333 sqq. 
“Falf-Melanchthonians,” 292. 
Harnack, 295, 296, 319, 381. 
Heathens, The, receive suffi- 


440 


cient grace for salvation, 179 
sqq. 

Henno, 324. 

Henry of Ghent, 2to. 

Hilary, St., 97, 99, 209. 

Holy Ghost, 331 sq., 335, 346, 
361 sq., 368, 369 sq. 

Hope, 363 sqq., 390, 396. 

Hurter, 375. 

FAsss;) 273) 

Hypostatic Union, 12, 150, 345. 


I 


IGNATIUS oF ANTIOCH, St: 
404. : 
Illuminating grace of the in- 

tellect, 19 sqq. 


Imputation, Lutheran theory 
of, 313 sqq. 

Incarnation, Dogma of. the, 
282 sqq. 


Incompatibility of Grace and 
sin, 323 sqq. 

Increase of glory, 429 sq. 

Increase of sanctifying grace, 
384 sdq., 423 sqq., 420. 

“Tndiculus,” go. 

Infants, Unbaptized, 163 sqq., 
Baptized, 406. 

Infralapsarians, 156, 213. 

Inhabitatio Spiritus Sancti, 
361 sq., 370 sqq. 

Innocent I, 8, 9, 85, 154. 

Innocent X, 168, 226. 

Innocent XI, 73, 183, 281, 402. 

Intensio gratiae, 380. 

Irenzus, St., 47, 90, 404. 

Isaias, 178. 


J 


JAcoB AND ESAU, 201 sq. 

James, St., 286, 287, 288, 280, 
204, 403, 434. 

Jansenius and Jansenism, 44, 
52, 55, 62, 74, 77, 79, 80, 153 
Sq) 168.) 170. 16.272) Mars) 
221, 222, 223, 224 sqq., 240, 
252, 281, 41I, 417. 


INDEX 


Jehu, 433. 
Jerome, St., 58, 109, 354, 380, 
387, 304, 412. 
Jews, 1375 055; 

6 


307. 

John a S. Thoma, 216. 

John the Baptist, St. 116. 

Joseph, St., 116, 211. 

Jovinian, 387, 304. 

Julian of Eclanum, 83, 8s. 

Justification, 36, 73, 97, 113 
sq., 136 sqq.; Process of, 272 
sqq.; Necessity of faith for, 
274 sqq.; Necessity of other 
preparatory acts, 285 sqq.; 
The state of, 300 sqq.; The 
nature of, 301 sqq.; Negative 
element, 302 sqq.; Positive 
element, 310 sqq.; Sanctify- 
ing Grace the sole formal 
cause of, 322 sqq.; Qualities 
of, 378 sqq.; Increase of 
Grace, 388; Fruits of, 3097 


195, 282, 


sqq. 
Justin Martyr, St., 102, 308. 
K 


KLEE, 164. 
Kowwvia, Jeias dicews, 345. 
Krogh-Tonning, 293. 


L 


LATERAN, FourtH CouNCIL OF 
THE, 179, 400. 

Law of grace, 405. 

Lessius, 150, 206, 211, 221, 262, 
337, 420. 

Liberty, see Freedom. 

Liebermann, 8o. 

Logos, The Divine, 358, 359 


sq. 

Log - stick - and-stone theory, 
207) 202) 

Lucidus, 212. 

Lumen gloriae, 345. 

Lather, 52774,\132) )223)3a8e. 
288, 291, 293, 205, 302, 310, 
322, 384, 380, 392, 399, 407. - 


INDEX 


M 


MALDONATUS, 203, 204. 

Mary, B. V., 64, 116, 211, 384, 
389, 391. 

Massillon, 194. 

Melanchthon, 292, 310. 

Mennonites, 322. 

Mercy, Works of, 416. 

Merely sufficient Grace, AI sqq. 

Merit, 128, 131 sqq., 307 saqq., 
430. 

Meritum de congruo, 430 sqq. 

Meritum naturae, 138. 

Mezzofanti, Cardinal, 54. 

Mileve, Council of, 85, 
116. 

Modernism, 54. 

Molina and Molinism, 65, 148, 

~_ 200, 217, 255 Sdq., 337. 
Molinos, M. de, 401. 

Moral virtues, Infused, 


114, 


366 


Sqqiy) 
Mortal sin, 97, 106 sqq., 392 
sqq. 


N 
NABUCHODONOSOR, 58. 
Natural and Supernatural 

Grace, 7 sqq. 


Nature, Capacity of, 50 sqq. 

Necessitas antecedens peccatt, 
120 sqq. 

Necessitas 
279 sqq. 


medii—praece ptt, 


O 


OBDURACY, 175 Sq. 

Objects of merit, 423 sqq. 
Obstinacy, 178 sq. 
Occasionalists, 406. 

Ockam, 211. 

Bo steriliter bona, 57, 81 


Bene Second Council of, 
20, 44, 86, 92, 99, 100, 106, 
110, 123, 136, 139, 143, 213, 
400. 

Origen, 77. 


441 


Original sin, 303, 434. 
Orosius, 182. 
Osiander, 2092. 
Osorius, 204. 

Oswald, 104, 203. 


P 


PALMIERI, 61, 72, 103, 116. 

Pantheism, 343. 

Passaglia, 158, 375. 

Passions, The, 28. 

Paul St.2'iai'1316) onoowen: 
57; 64, 65, 68, 88, 100''sq., 


105, 107, 125, 137, 146, 157 
$q-4'':$00; 9; 160i7 Sq.4/ VTSO;(h Foo) 
POEM ZO Sas), (207 hue2a 7 isa. 
250); -260,." 270,277,280) sd, 
283, 288 sq., 314, 316, 317, 
318, 319 sq., 351, 383, 393, 


402, 407, 420, 424. 

Pah Vio250)) 265, 

Pelagius and Pelagianism, 56, 
64, 66, 71, 79, 82 sqq., 89, 97, 
103, 114, I19, 136, 141, 170, 
190, 197, 228, 308 

Penance, Sacrament of, 395, 
428.5. 

Perrone, 18. 


Perseverance, Final, 123 sqq., 
425 sq., 432 sqq. 
Pesch, Chr., 68, 72, 248. 


Petavius, 203)\"'204," 361, 13754 
Peter Lombard, 331. 

Peter Sty 17h 104s 
Pfeffinger, 292. 

Piccolomini, 262. 

Pighius, 204. 

IIiotis, 277 Sq., 290. 

Pistoia, Council of, 71, 74. 
Pius V, 165. 

Pius Vie 7t.5 73. 

Platel). 72." 

Plato, 350. 
Pneumatomachians, 373. 
Polycarp, /Sts).200: 
Pomponazzi, 52. 
Postlapsarians, 213. 
Potentia obedientialis, 19, 30, 


40. 
Praeambula fidet, 52, 102, 105. 


442 INDEX 


Praemotio moralis, 249, 253. 

Praemotio physica, 233 sqq., 
248. 

Prayer,'\43, OI," 127 \-saq.,//133, 
142 sqq., 266 sqq., 431, 433, 
Bonn 

Predestinarianism, 
212: 

Predestination, 152, 187 sqq.; 
ante praevisa merita, 199 
sqq.; post praevisa merita, 
206 sqq. 

Predestinationism, Orthodox, 
199 sqq. 

Prevenient Grace, 32 sqq. 

Priesthood, 13. 

Properties of 
Grace, 378 saqq. 

Prosper; St. 725) (37,50, 773/97, 
99, 100, 159, 182, 192, 215. 

Protagoras, 350. 


Q 


QUALITATES FLUENTES, 29 sqq. 
Qualities, 333 sq. 

Quasi-Merit, 134. 

Quesnel, 53, 72, 74 sqq., 180. 
Quietists, 343, 4oI. 


Wie 


RE-CREATION, 315, 330. 

Regeneration, 314 sq., 320, 339, 
341, 346. 

Repentance, 176. 

Reprobation, 152, 178, 212 sqq. 

Requisites of supernatural 
merit, 410 sqq. 

Ripalda,. 65, 60,. 71 sqq., 128, 
145, 149, 330, 342, 345, 363. 

Roman Catechism, 333, 340, 
349, 363. 


Heretical, 


sanctifying 


5 


SAINTS ABSOLUTELY  PREDES- 
TINED, 211; Favored by God, 
419. 

Salmeron, 337. 

Salutary acts, 82 sqq. 

Sanctification, Internal, 323, 


347, 348. 


Sanctifying Grace, 271 sqq.; 
Genesis of, 272 sqq.; The 
sole formal cause of justi- 
fication, 322 sqq.; Nature of, 
328 sqq.; A permanent qual- 
ity of the soul, 328 sqq.; An 
infused habit, 333 sqq.; Not 
identical with charity, 336 


sqq.; A participation of the’ 


soul in the divine nature, 
340 sqq.; The effects of, 347 
sqq-;  Sanctity, 347 sqq; 
Supernatural beauty, 349 


sqq.; Divine friendship, 351 


sqq.; Adoptive sonship, 356 
sqq.; Supernatural concom- 
itants, 302 sqq.; Properties 
of, 378 sqq.; Admits of de- 
grees and therefore can be 
increased, 384 sqq.; Lost by 
mortal sin, 392 sqq.; Fruits 
of, 397 sqq.; As a requisite 
of merit, 418 sq.; Increased 
by merit, 424 sqq. 

Sanctity, an effect of sancti- 
fying Grace, 347 sqq. 

Sardagna, 337. 

Scheeben, 361, 375. 

Schrader, 375. 

Scientia media, 245, 253, 257 
sq., 266. 

Scotus and the Scotists, 10, 
63,)'07;; 04; "210," 325.) 332,) 337, 


419, 433. 

“Seed of God,” Why grace is 
called the, 409. 

Self-righteousness, 406 sq. 

Semipelagianism, 97 sqq., 139 
sqq., 146, 148, 170, 190, 197, 
220, 228, '230. 

Sensitive sphere, 

' the, 26 sqq. 

Sinners, Ordinary and obdu- 
rate, i172 .saq. 

Sin, Incompatible with Grace, 
323 +sqq.; Is _ sanctifying 
Grace diminished by venial 
sin? 388 sq. 

Sins of malice, 247. 

Society of Jesus, 260 sqq., 325. 

Socinianism, 292. 


Graces. of 


te ih a Ae 


INDEX 


Socrates, 25. 
Sola fides theory, 286 sqq. 
Soto, Dominicus, 211, 363, 430. 
Stapleton, 206. 
Stoics, 64, 387. 
Strengthening 
will, 23 sqq. 
Suarez, 603,00.» 116," 122)" 128, 
150;) 216, '210, 257, 202) ,.325, 
330, 334, 346, 359, 362, 363, 
365, 390 Sq., 415, 420, 433. 
Sufficient Grace, 4I sqq., 167 


Grace of the 


sqq. 
Supererogation, Works of, 
All. 

Supernatural character of 


merit, 413 sqq. 
Sylvius, 216, 434. 
Syncretism, 267 sqq. 
Synergist dispute, 292. 


7. 


TEMPORAL BLESSINGS, 435. 

Temptations, 65 sqq. 

Tepe, 68, 72, 81. 

Tertullian, 179. 

@ciwors, 341, 376. 

Theodoret, 209. 

Theological systems devised 
to harmonize the dogmas of 
grace and free-will, 231 
saqi;. Thomism, 232 sqq.; 
Augustinianism, 248  sqq.; 
Molinism, 255 sqq.; Con- 
gruism, 261 sqq.; Syncret- 
ism, 267 sqq. 

Thomas, St., 27, 32, 34, 52, 53, 
62, 70,03) 121, 140, 161, 165, 
178, 185, 194, 210, 232, 298, 

B31 332s 334) 338; 339,345, 

349, 357, 365, 368 sq., 387, 

409, 414, 419, 421, 431, 432, 


435. 

Thomism and the Thomists, 11, 
29,, 200, 203, 216, 219, 232 
sqq., 325, 332, 389, 413, 414. 

Toletus, 204, 2 

Tournely, 207, 337. 

Traditionalism, 52. 

Trent, Council Obs 134.) 350 430; 


443 


38, 45, 74, 86, 94, 106, 107, 
ELT, It5 SQ), ¢l22Z; oiZ23. has 
$25 i) F300" 153; FOG. LOG, boa, 
TOS) 2035) 2245 227, 2420 Sa, 
247, 205, 272, 275, 285, 205 
Sqq., 303, 307, 311 sqq., 319, 
322 Sq., 324, 325, 320 sq., 
331, 335, 338, 352, 361, 363, 
365, 383, 385, 391, 392, 400, 
AOI, 407 Sq., 415, 421 sq., 423, 
425, 426, sqq., 431. 

Trinity, Dogma of the, 282 
sqq. 


U 


ULtricur1A, NICHOLAS DE, 52. 
Unbelief, 97. 
“Unigenitus,” Constitution, 74. 
V 


VASQUEZ, 69 sqq., 72, 94, 133; 
149, 262, 337, 363, 415, 418, 
420, 425. 

Vatican Council, [sh Mineay ces Mave fe 
183, 244 sq., 26s. 

Vega, 122. 

Venial sin, Possibility of 
avoiding, 117 sqq.; Is sanc- 
tifying Grace diminished by? 
388 sq 

Neon “Council Of 33T 303 

Vital acts of the soul, 27 \Sach 

Vitelleschi, 262. 

Vocation, The grace of, 190, 
196. 

Voluntas salvifica Det, 152 sqq. 

W 


WICLIF, 212. 
Will to save, God’s, 152 sqq. 


yi 
YSAMBERT, 21I. 
Z 


ZOSIMUS, 85. 
Zwingli, 298. 


iit 
Apt 


Che 


Date Due 


I 


IN U. S.A. 


PRINTED 


ca% 


vee 


= 
» 
i) 


ll 


ll MI 


| 


